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Doeument 659 14~ February 1975 
AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
Bonn, 26th-29th May 1975 
I. Report of the Coaucil 
Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to 
the Assembly 
II. Political Questious 
1. Political activities of the Council - Reply 
to the Twentieth Annual Report of the 
Council 
2. European union and WEU 
3. East-West relations 
4. Co-operation with the United States 
III. Defeuce Qaestious 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply 
to the Twentieth Annual Report of the 
Council 
2. State of European security - General 
Report for the Twentieth Anniversary of 
the Assembly 
3. Proliferation of nuclear weapons 
IV. Tecbuical aud Scieutific Questious 
1. The European Space Agency - Reply to 
the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council 
2. The European aeronautical industry and 
civil aviation 
V. Budgetary aud Admiuistrative Qaestious 
Draft Opinion on the budget of the minis-
terial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial year 1975 
VI. Relatious with ParHameuts 
Twelfth half-yearly report 
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Report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. de N iet on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duvieusart, 
Wall and Lemmrich on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by MM. Warren and Valleix on 
behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Com· 
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Com-
mittee for Relnlions with Parliaments 
Document 660 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
Bonn, 26th-29th May 1975 
MONDAY, 26th MAY 
Morainr 9 a.m. 
Meetings of Politica.l Groups. 
10.30 a.m. 
I. Welcoming address by Mrs. Renger, President of the Bundestag. 
2. Opening of the Session by the Provisional President. 
3. Examination of credentials. 
4. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
21st May 1975 
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the First Part of the Twenty-]first Ordinary Session. 
10.45 a.m. 
Sitting commemorating the Twentieth Anniversary of the Assembly 
Address by Mr. Georg Leber, Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Address by Mr. Paul Vanden Boeynants, Minister of Defence and Brussels Affairs of the Kingdom 
of Belgium. 
Address by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
Address by Mr. Adolfo Battaglia, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic. 
Address by Mr. Emile Krieps, Minister of Public Health, the Environment, Civil Service and Armed 
Forces of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
Address by Mr. P.H. Kooijmans, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. 
Address by Mr. Frederick Mulley, Minister for Transport of the United Kingdom. 
Address by the President of the Assembly. 
12.30 p.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
Meeting of the General Affairs Committee. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Votes on the draft recommendations postponed from the last session : 
(a) The energy crisis and European security: 
Vote on tke draft recommendation contained in Document 656 presented by Sir John Rodgers on 
behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
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(b) Conditions of service in the armed forces : 
Vote on the draft reccnnmendation contained in Document 650 presented by Mr. Klepsch on behalf 
of the Committee on Defence Questions and .Armaments. 
(c) State of European nuclear energy programmes: 
Vote on the draft reccnnmendation contained in Document 655 presented by Mr. Small on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
2. East-West relations: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft reccnnmendation. 
3. State of European security - General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly : 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Critchley, Dankert, Duvieusart, Wall and Lemmrich on 
behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and .Armaments. 
Debate. 
At the dose of the aittia1 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
TUESDAY, 27th MAY 
Moraia1 9 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
9.30 a.m. 
Address by Mr. Gaston Geens, Secretary of State for Budget and Scientific Policy of Belgium. 
lo.tS a.m. 
Address by General Alexander Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
11 a.m. 
Address by Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
State of European security - General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly. 
Resumed Debate. 
Afteraooa 3 p.m. 
1. State of European security- General report for the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly. 
Resumed Debate. 
Vote on the draft reccnnmendation. 
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2. Proliferation of nuclear weapons : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
WEDNESDAY, 28th MAY 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
1. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial 
year 1975: 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Vote on the draft opinion. 
2. European union and WEU : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Twentieth annual report of the Council : 
presentation by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of 
Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
(a) Political activities of the Council - Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Bruyne on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
(b) Application of the Brussels Treaty - Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Niet on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
(c) The European Space Agency- Reply to the twentieth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate on the annual report of the Council and the replies of the Committees. 
VoteB on the draft recommendations. 
5.30 p.m. 
2. VoteB on the draft recommendations not already voted upon by the Assembly. 
3. Twelfth half-yearly report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments: 




Afternoon 3 p.m. 
THURSDAY, 29th MAY 
(No morning sitting) 
Address by Mr. Roy Hattersley, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the 
United Kingdom. 
1. Co-operation with the United States : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. The European aeronautical industry and civil aviation: 
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Warren and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION 
At the close of the sittinr 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
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Twentieth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1914 
INTRODUCTION 
l. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the .Assembly the Twentieth Annual 
Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1974. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters: 
I. Relations between the Council and the .Assembly.................................. 16 
II. Activities of the Council ........... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
III. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 




RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
A. Progress of relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
In 1974, as in previous years, the Council 
made every effort to develop close and con-
structive relations with the Assembly. In response 
to the frequently expressed wishes of the Assem-
bly, the Council succeeded in arranging for it 
to receive replies to its recommendations and 
written questions sooner than previously. 
The nineteenth annual report was sent to 
the Assembly at the earliest possible dates com-
patible with the Council's procedures. 
As to the substance of their replies to the 
Assembly, the Council are well aware that the 
Assembly's wishes and expectations are rot 
always fulfilled. The reasons for this were more 
clearly apparent in 1974 than in the past. 
When asked by the Assembly to provide 
information or state their attitude on current 
political questions, the Council had to refer, more 
often than in the past, to other agencies dealing 
with these matters, because their own activities 
in these fields have diminished as political co-
operation between the Nine has developed. In 
the case of defence policy which both the Assem-
bly and the Council look upon as WEU's essen-
tial concern, it was even more apparent that the 
Council could not reply to the Assembly in the 
desired manner because co-operation in Euro-
pean defence policy had not yet reached a stage 
at which governments could state a joint view to 
the Assembly. 
This explains why the Council were unable 
to comply with the request from the General 
Affairs Committee for a joint meeting to con-
sider a large number of questions on the whole 
of European policy, and particularly on defence. 
The Council did, however, state that they would 
be prepared to consider informal discussions with 
members o.f the Committee on the occasion of the 
next Ministerial Council meeting, provided the 
Committee would regard such an arrangement 
as useful. 
Despite these aspects of the situation, the 
Council continue to attach the greatest value 
to the recommendations initiated by the Assem-
bly. 
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Inevitably, the budget proposed by the 
Assembly for 1975 and submitted to the Council 
for opinion, has not escaped the consequences of 
the financial difficulties now facing all the mem-
ber governments and the often stringent eco-
nomies imposed as a result. Discussions between 
the Council and the Assembly on the amount and 
the methods of applying the reductions called for 
by the governments were not completed Ly the 
end of the year. 
As in previous years, the interest of member 
governments in the Assembly's work was demon-
strated in 1974 by the attendance of several 
Ministers at its debates. In their speeches and 
their replies to questions put by members of the 
Assembly, they stated the attitudes of their 
governments. The Council noted that this was 
appreciated by the Assembly, as is shown in 
particular by the report accompanying Recom-
mendation 246. Furthermore, as in the past, 
Assembly Committees had talks with :Ministers 
during visits to member countries. 
Finally, the Council were able to meet the 
Assembly's wishes on a number of specific points: 
- They accepted the request, in Recom-
mendation 247, that future annual reports should 
include the details given in reply to Written 
Question 130 on the implementation of the resolu-
tion of 15th September 1956. 
- Details regarding two passages in the 
nineteenth annual report were given in reply to 
Written Questions 139 and 142, put by members 
of the Assembly. 
- In accordance with the Assemblv's 
wishes, they referred, where appropriate, ·to 
consultations between Western European govern-
ments in other bodies. 
B. Summary of contacts between the Council 
and the Assembly 
1. Speeches by Miniaters of member governments 
made daring the Twentieth Ordinary Session of 
the Assembly 
First Part (18th-20th JuM 1974) : 
Mr. Roy Hattersley, United Kingdom 
Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council; 
Mr. Alex Eadie, United Kingdom Parlia-
mentary Under-Secretary of State, Department 
of Energy; 
Second Part (2nd-6th December 1974): 
Mr. Hans MatthOfer, Federal Minister for 
Research and Technology of the Federal Republic 
of Germany; 
Mr. Renaat Van Elslande, Belgian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-opera-
tion; 
Mr. H. Vredeiing, Netherlands Minister of 
Defence; 
Mr. Bernard Destremau, French Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs; 
Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. 
2. Assembly Recommendations to the Council 
The Council gave replies to fifteen recom-
mendations transmitted after the Second Part 
of the Nineteenth Ordinary Session and the First 
Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session. These 
recommendations were numbered 240 to 245 
(excluding Recommendation 242) and 246 to 255. 
The Council also began consideration of the 
four recommendations, numbered 256 to 259, 
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adopted by the Assembly at the Second Part of 
its Twentieth Ordinary Session in December 1974. 
3. Written questions put to the Council by members 
of the Assembly 
Replies were given to seventeen written 
questions, numbered 135 to 151. 
4. Meetings between the Council and Assembly 
bodies 
The Council of Ministers and the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly met after 
the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 11th 
March 1974. 
5. Personal contacts 
Meeting in London on 15th July between 
the Permanent United Kingdom Representative 
to the Council, Sir John Killick, in the name 
of the Chairman-in-Office and accompanied by 
the Secretary-General, and Mr. Dequae, Chair-
man of the Assembly Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Meeting in Paris on 3rd December between 
the Permanent United Kingdom Representative 
to the Council, Sir John Killick, in the name of 
the Chairman-in-Office an:d accompanied by the 
Acting Secretary-General, and Mr. Siegler-
schmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Com-
mittee of the Assembly. 
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CHAPTER II 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
A. Introduction 
In 1974, the Council met at ministerial level 
in The Hague on 11th March, under the chair-
manship of the Netherlands Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Max van der Stoel. 
In addition, the permanent representatives 
met seventeen times, and the working group held 
twenty-three meetings to prepare their discus-
sions. 
The Council's meeting of 23rd October 
coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the 
signing in Paris in 1954 of the Protocols modi-
fying and completing the Brussels Treaty ; on 
this occasion, the United Kingdom Permanent 
Representative, Sir John Killick, speaking for 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. 
James Callaghan, Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, read the following 
statement: 
"The last twenty years have seen vast 
changes in Europe and the world. There have 
also been changes in Western European 
Union, which has shown a remarkable 
capacity to adapt itself to new requirements 
and circumstances. Indeed, the organisation 
owes its existence in its present form to the 
challenge of such circumstances. The revised 
Brussels Treaty remains as valid today as 
when it was signed twenty years ago. It 
brings our seven countries together in a 
fifty-year alliance in which we accept the 
most binding obligation any country can 
assume with regard to another: the commit-
ment to mutual defence. Not least, it is the 
origin of the Assembly which has since made 
such an important contribution to our work. 
May WEU flourish in the future as it has 
in the past." 
The Permanent Representative of Italy, 
Ambassador Raimondo Manzini, made the fol-
lowing statement in his capacity as doyen of the 
Permanent Council : 
"In associating myself with Sir John Kil-
lick's remarks on the occasion of the twen-
tieth anniversary of Western European 
Union, I trust that I am also expressing the 
views of the other members of the Council. 
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The ideals which inspired the seven coun-
tries when they signed the Paris Protocols 
in 1954 undoubtedly still hold good today. 
Just as they did twenty years ago, our 
common culture and our countries' attach-
ment to the vital principles of freedom and 
democracy impose upon us tasks which can-
not be set aside. Some of these tasks have 
been fulfilled ; the fact that we have suc-
ceeded in defending our freedom and in 
strengthening our co-operation is in itself 
an achievement of the greatest importance. 
I should also like to recall the role played by 
WEU when the United Kingdom was still 
not in the Common Market ; for a number 
of years, our organisation provided the link 
between the Six and the United Kingdom 
until it became a full member of the Euro-
pean Economic Community. 
Much has happened in the meantime and the 
international situation has changed consi-
derably, but even in this new context, our 
old agreements are still genuine evidence of 
a unity of purpose. Our organisation embod-
ies the spirit of co-operation between the 
countries of Western Europe. This has been 
clearly proved by the many subjects and 
problems which the Council and the parlia-
mentary Assembly have studied and debated 
to advantage. 
In celebrating the twentieth anniversary of 
the union, we therefore express the hope 
that over the next thirty years, it will con-
tinue to provide an important forum for 
the member countries, not only for consul-
tation and political co-operation, but also 
for achievements of a practical nature. 
To achieve this purpose, the member coun-
tries will clearly have to use WEU and its 
agencies in the most effective manner pos-
sible and to co-ordinate their activities 
rationally with those of other joint institu-
tions. 
WEU will then, as we all sincerely hope, be 
able to retain its rightful place alongside 
the other leading western organisations, 




The Council accepted with regret the resig-
nation of the Secretary-General of the organ-
isation, Mr Georges Heisbourg, on taking up 
a new post under the Luxembourg Government. 
The Assembly was informed by a letter to its 




In the course of the year, the Secretary-
General and his senior colleagues attended, on 
invitation, meetings of other international organ-
isations and institutions when questions of con-
cern to WEU were under discussion. The most 
frequent of these contacts were made as in 
previous years with NATO and the Council of 
Europe. 
B. Political questions 
At their ministerial meeting in The Hague 
in March, the Council discussed aspects of East-
West relations, particularly relations between 
the member countries of WEU and the German 
Democratic Republic. 
Throughout the year, the members of WEU 
played an active part in political co-operation 
between the nine members of the European Com-
munity. The Council noted with satisfaction the 
progress made within the framework of this 
co-operation in important areas of foreign 
policy ; they mentioned this in their reply in 
November to Assembly Recommendation 255. 
The seven member governments were of the 
opinion that no useful purpose would be served 
by a study within WEU of questions which they 
were already discussing in what they considered 
to be a completely satisfactory manner ; the 
Council indicated this to the Assembly when 
answering Written Question 149. 
However, in view of their responsibility for 
political matters and their determination to 
maintain the closest possible dialogue with the 
Assembly on all questions concerning the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty - in 
accordance with the intention repeated several 
times since the inception of co-operation between 
the Nine - the Council have given careful 
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attention to the recommendations and written 
questions transmitted to them. In their replies, 
they have made every effort to state their views 
as fully as possible on the problems dealt with 
by the Assembly. Where appropriate, they have 
referred to consultations in other institutions or 
between the Nine. 
1. East· West relations 
At the ministerial meeting in The Hague, 
on 11th March 1974, the German delegation gave 
the Council an account of the state of relations 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the German Democratic Republic. All delega-
tions agreed it was desirable that Western 
European governments should consult as fre-
quently as possible and should co-ordinate their 
attitude, in order to ensure the satisfactory 
progress of relations with the German Demo-
cratic Republic. 
In the course of the year under consider-
ation, the main aspects of the course of East-
West relations were the subject of many detailed 
discussions between the Nine and in the North 
Atlantic Council. 
In reply to the points raised by the Assem-
bly in Recommendation 252 concerning three 
important sets of negotiations in progress with 
the East, the Council noted that there were 
close and regular consultations between the 
allies taking part in the Geneva conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe, and in the 
Vienna conference on mutual and balanced force 
reductions ; moreover, the United States author-
ities kept their European allies informed, in the 
North Atlantic Council, of the progress of the 
strategic arms limitation talks. The Council 
added that in all these negotiations, Europe's 
vital interests in the matter were constantly 
stressed by the European governments directly 
concerned. 
In the case of the CSCE, which has formed 
the subject of a number of Assembly recom-
mendations to the Council in recent years, it 
should be noted that the Nine continued to make 
a major contribution to Atlantic co-operation 
and to play an active and substantial part in 
the conference itself, which is now in its second 
stage. As regards the progress of negotiations in 
Geneva during 1974, it is recalled that the 
Ministers of the member governments of WEU 
and of their allies, meeting in Brussels for the 
North Atlantic Council session of 12th and 13th 
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December, noted that there had been enough 
progress to show that substantial results were 
possible; this statement appears in paragraph 4 
of the final communique of the meeting, which 
goes on to say that nonetheless, important ques-
tions remain to be resolved. Ministers expressed 
the undiminished determination of their govern-
ments to work patiently and constructively 
towards balanced and substantial results under 
all the agenda headings of the conference, so as 
to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the 
conference as a whole as soon as possible. 
2. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 
The Council followed with interest the 
Assembly's debate in December on the report 
produced by the Defence Committee as a result 
of events in Cyprus during the summer of 1974 
and the situation to which they gave rise. The 
Council are now studying Assembly Recommend-
ation 256 on this subject. 
It will be recalled that the United Kingdom, 
as part of its responsibility shared with Greece 
and Turkey, as co-guarantor of the Zurich and 
London agreements on Cyprus, made every 
effort to help in finding a negotiated settlement 
between the parties concerned. Moreover, all the 
member governments of WEU took part in dis-
cussions in the United Nations, in the North 
Atlantic Council and among the Nine on the 
Cyprus question, covering both its humanitarian 
and political aspects and its repercussions on 
the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Together with their partners in the Euro-
pean Community they expressed their concern, 
in particular through the declaration adopted by 
the Nine on 22nd July, and later in the appeal 
of 14th August to the Greek and Turkish 
Governments. 
In the United Nations, France and the 
United Kingdom took an active part in the 
debates of the Security Council, of which they 
were, at that time, the only WEU members. 
Following those referred to in the Committee's 
report, the resolution of 30th August was 
adopted by the Security Council on the basis of 
a draft submitted by France and the United 
Kingdom, together with Austria. In addition, the 
delegations of the seven member governments of 
WEU voted for the resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly on 1st November, which was 
also mentioned in the Committee's report. 
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In the course of many discussions in the 
North Atlantic Council, the desire of the repre-
sentatives of the member governments of WEU 
and of those of their allies, has all along been 
to maintain the coherence of the Alliance, to 
avoid conflict between two of its members, and 
to find an acceptable settlement to the humani-
tarian problems of Cyprus ; this was underlined 
by the Committee's Rapporteur in his speech to 
the Assembly. 
Finally, it is recalled that the Council, in 
their reply in October to Written Question 148, 
noted that substantial weaknesses had been 
shown to exist in the constitutional arrangements 
for Cyprus which, from 1960 onwards, have been 
based on the London and Zurich agreements. 
Any new settlement on the island would not, 
in their view, necessarily be based on these 
agreements. 
3. Relations between Europe and the United Statea 
Two developments which took place during 
197 4 were noted by the Council as having met 
points of common concern to member govern-
ments and the Assembly. They were mentioned 
in the replies to Recommendations 251 and 252 
and to Written Question 146. 
- In their reply to the first of these recom-
mendations, the Council stated that they shared 
the Assembly's view that close understanding 
between the members of the Atlantic Alliance, 
especially between the United States and its 
European partners, was essential for the security 
of Western Europe. They added that in their 
opinion, Europe's development towards political 
unity was by no means inconsistent with the 
maintenance of solidarity within the Alliance. 
In this context, they recalled the conclu-
sions of the review of Atlantic relations under-
taken by the allies in 1973. In the Ottawa 
declaration signed in Brussels on 26th June 
1974, the members of the Alliance affirmed their 
resolve to maintain close consultation and co-
operation. This declaration emphasised that the 
progress towards unity, which the member 
States of the European Community are deter-
mined to make, should in due course have a 
beneficial effect on the contribution to the com-
mon defence of the Alliance of those of them 
who belong to it. 
-As regards the separate question of rela-
tions between the Nine and the United States, 
the intentions of the member countries of the 
European Community were set out in the decla-
ration on the European identity adopted by the 
Heads of State or Government meeting in Copen-
hagen on 14th December 1973. This declaration 
stated that the close ties with the United States, 
which are mutually beneficial, must be preserved. 
They do not conflict with the determination of 
the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and 
original entity. The Nine intend to maintain 
their constructive dialogue and to develop their 
co-operation with the United States on the basis 
of equality and in a spirit of friendship. 
During 1974, informal practical arrange-
ments for consultation between the Nine and the 
United States were worked out and put into 
effect. The Assembly was informed of this in the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 252, which 
added that such consultation in no way dero-
gated from the importance of the bilateral chan-
nels of information and consultation between 
each of the European partners and the United 
States to which the Assembly had referred. 
C. Scientific, technical and space questions 
The Council followed with interest the work 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions, which was again 
directed to the progress of European co-
operation in the aeronautical and space fields 
and developments in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. 
They answered three recommendations (244 
on an aviation policy for Europe, 248 on the 
European Space Agency, and 253 on a Euro-
pean policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy), adopted by the Assembly in .Nove~ber 
1973 and June 1974, as well as six written 
questi<>ns (135 to 138, 150 and 151) put by 
members of the Assembly. 
1. Civil and military aviation 
Both the Council and the member govern-
ments, who gave their support to the colloquy 
organised by the Committee in September 1973, 
appreciated the quality of the Committee's sub-
sequent report. 
In the reply which they gave to Assembly 
Recommendation 244 in May 1974, the Council 
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explained how they saw the general problem of 
an aviation policy for Europe. 
- They recalled the discussions which had 
taken place in 1973 between the European coun-
tries, at both industry and government level. 
They observed that much of this action had 
taken place within the framework of the Euro-
pean Economic Community ; it had been con-
centrated on the civil side of the aeronautical 
industry, but the importance of the military 
sector had been recognised in the context of an 
overall industry policy. 
- The Council referred to the action taken 
on the communication from the Commission of 
the European Communities on the European 
airframe industry, which had been mentioned in 
the reply to Recommendation 231. The studies 
undertaken covered some of the points raised by 
the Assembly : the principle of a concerted 
approach in national policies was recognised in 
the first of the implementing texts for the Com-
munity policy recommended by the Commission 
for Industrial and Technological Development 
in the Aeronautical Sector ; the various aspects 
of government aid for civil projects had been 
studied by groups of experts with the aim of 
reaching agreement on the harmonisation of 
existing methods of support. On this point, the 
Council stated that, like the Assembly, they con-
sidered that government aid should be chan-
nelled towards projects which would strengthen 
the competitive position of the European indus-
try. 
The Council also gave their views on a 
number of questions raised by the Assembly 
concerning European co-operation in the field of 
civil air transport : the development of the 
European network, the balanced development 
of air and other forms of transport, the defini-
tion of equipment requirements, the harmoni-
sation of airworthiness standards, and the 
standardisation of equipment. On these points, 
they broadly shared the Assembly's preoccupa-
tion. The clear and detailed statement of views 
in their reply cannot easily be summarised in 
this report. It should be mentioned, however, 
that the Council stressed the importance of the 
contribution made by the European Civil A via-
tion Conference (ECAC) to co-operation on 
European air transport questions. They also 
remarked on the extent and value of current 
work on a number of the questions mentioned 
above : for example, the COST 33 project 
(Cooperation europeenne dans le domaine de la 
recherche scientifique et technique) on the 
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development of inter-city transport systems ; 
study of the requirements of airline companies 
by the Association of European Airlines (AEA); 
the current activities of EUROCAE (European 
Organisation for Civil Aviation Electronic 
Equipment) ; the programme of work under-
taken under the auspices of the Joint Air-
worthiness Requirements Committee of the 
manufacturing countries ; and the work of the 
Standardisation Committee of the Association 
europeenne des constructeurs de materiel aero-
nautique (AECMA). 
- Since the Council's reply to Recommen-
dation 244 was transmitted to the Assembly, one 
member country (the United Kingdom) has 
announced a policy to bring its aircraft industry 
into public ownership. In their reply to Written 
Question 151, which referred to a number of 
points in the recommendation, the Council 
remarked that until the United Kingdom Govern-
ment has given details of its plans, it will not 
be possible or profitable to take consideration of 
the general questions raised by the authors of 
the question. They added, however, that these 
problems had not escaped the full attention of 
the national authorities. 
- The Council noted the concern expressed 
by the Assembly in Recommendation 244 and 
repeated by the author of Written Question 137, 
that member governments "should endeavour to 
draw up a European policy for the procurement 
of military aircraft with a view to reducing 
costs and, to this end, to ask the Standing Arma-
ments Committee for assistance". In their replies, 
they accepted that it would be both desirable 
and necessary for there to be greater collabora-
tion in the military aircraft field than hitherto, 
and that the eventual formulation of a European 
military procurement policy was a desirable 
goal. They referred to the study initiated by 
Eurogroup on the procurement of defence equip-
ment, which includes military aircraft. They 
added that any approach to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee was related to the study of 
proposals for reactivating this body (cf. Chapter 
II. C). 
2. Space questions 
The Council noted the points raised by the 
Assembly in the preamble and enacting terms of 
Recommendation 248 on the European Space 
Agency. 
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- In their reply sent in September, they 
said they would welcome wider participation in 
the work of the Space Agency; the draft con-
vention setting up the Agency in fact allowed 
for this possibility. 
- They shared the Assembly's concern that 
it had not been possible to appoint the Director-
General and other senior officials of the Agency; 
in their reply to Written Question 150, sent in 
December, they expressed the hope that agree-
ment could soon be reached on this problem. 
Meanwhile, the programme agreed by the 
European Space Conference, on 31st July 1973, 
for creation of the European Space Agency, 
participation in the United States post-Apollo 
programme by the construction of the space 
laboratory Spacelab, design and construction of 
a European maritime orbital test satellite 
(MAROTS), and development of a European 
rocket launcher (Ariane) was already under way, 
as recalled by the Council in their reply to 
Recommendation 248. In their answer to Written 
Question 150, they stated that pending the 
establishment of the Space Agency, day-to-day 
work on implementing the whole of this pro-
gramme was being conducted by the European 
Space Research Organisation (ESRO). 
- As for co-operation between the Space 
Agency and European parliamentary bodies, the 
Council pointed out that draft Resolution No. 5 
appended to the Final Act of the Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries set up to establish the 
Agency, was designed to maintain the arrange-
ments which had applied hitherto to ELDO and 
ESRO. These two organisations sent their annual 
reports, for information, to the Council of 
Europe ; this facilitated the discussion of their 
work by the Consultative Assembly and, there-
fore, by the WED Assembly, whose members 
attend both bodies. 
3. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
In their reply to Recommendation 253, the 
Council set out their views, which are basically 
as follows: 
A solution for the energy problem is now 
of vital importance for the economic future of 
Europe. 
While co-operation between European coun-
tries is still to be established in the case of oil 
and gas, achievements in the nuclear field and, 
in particular, in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, are already substantial, even if imperfect 
and open to improvement. 
Over the last few years, many attempts have 
been made to promote, if not a common indus-
trial nuclear policy, at least some concertation 
of national policies. 
This concertation has already produced 
practical results in the shape of a number of 
joint actions which are limited in scope, no 
doubt, but are by no means unimportant and are 
encouraging for the future ; the Council quoted 
a number of examples. 
This line of action, which some may con-
sider to be too limited and over-cautious, repre-
sents a pragmatic, realistic approach to the 
situation, which has offered the only means of 
achieving any success. 
The Council added that it would appear 
that while the creation of political agreements 
is an essential condition, it is by no means suf-
ficient if industrialists are not already willing 
to act in concert. Their willingness to do so 
would, of course, be encouraged by such political 
agreements. 
Lastly, while the vital role of reactors in the 
nuclear energy process cannot be disputed, the 
main guarantee of a measure of European inde-
pendence in the nuclear field lies not in reactors, 
but in supplies of uranium and the means of 
enriching it. 
... 
The Council noted with interest the reports 
prepared by the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions, after its 
visits to Japan and Canada. 
In reply to Recommendation 245 on 
advanced technology in Japan - the conse-
quences for Europe, they recognised the impor-
tance of developing co-operation with that 
country. They noted, amongst other points, that 
the concertation urged by the Assembly already 
takes place in several fields of science and 
modern technology, mainly within the OECD. 
The Council have also begun to consider 
Recommendation 259 on advanced technology in 
Canada - the consequences for Europe, which 
was received in December 1974. 
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D. Defence questions 
On the occasion of the presentation of the 
nineteenth annual report to the Assembly in 
June, the representative of the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, recalling that the modified 
Brussels Treaty bound the member countries 
together in a fifty-year alliance, observed that 
the treaty, which retains its full validity, con-
tained, in Article V, one of the most binding 
defence commitments into which the partners 
had ever entered. 
1. Level of forces of member States 
In the course of the year under review, the 
Council have continued to fulfil their respons-
ibilities under the Protocols to the modified 
Brussels Treaty which relate to the levels of 
forces of member States, and the procedures 
worked out for this purpose have continued to 
operate normally. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member States of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brus-
sels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides 
for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable 
these levels to be increased above the limits 
specified in Articles I and II. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that the 
limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol 
No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive 
information every year concerning the levels in 
question, in accordance with Article IV of that 
Protocol. This information is obtained in the 
course of inspections carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted 
to the Council by a high-ranking officer 
designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 1973, 
which was conveyed by this officer at the 
appropriate time, was considered by the Council 
on 24th April. Information indicating the status 
as at the end of 1974 was requested in December. 
Furthermore, the Council have taken the 
necessary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their resolution of 15th September 
1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the annual 
review. 
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In this connection, and in view of Written 
Questions 130 and 141 as well as Recommenda-
tion 247, and the Council's replies thereto, it can 
be stated in addition that, for the year 1973, a 
meeting was held in Brussels on 17th December 
1973 of the permanent representatives (or their 
substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. The report from this meeting was 
examined by the Council on 16th January 1974, 
who noted that the level of forces of these mem-
ber States, as set out in the NATO force plan, 
fell within the limits fixed in Articles I and II 
of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The Council also took note at the same 
time of a declaration by the Permanent Repre-
sentative of France on the level of French forces 
for 1973. The same procedure has already been 
set in train, for 1974, by the end of the year 
under review. 
The Council were notified in June that 
Vice-Admiral Vittorio Savarese, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Logistics, Armaments and Administra-
tion at SHAPE, had succeeded the late Vice-
Admiral Giovanni Fiorini as SACEUR's repre-
sentative to the Council. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member States on the mainland of Europe 
remaining under national command are fixed 
in accordance with the procedure laid down in · 
the agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 
1957 implementing Article V of Protocol No. II 
to the modified Brussels Treaty. 
'* •• 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able to fulfil in 197 4 their obligations under 
Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty 
concerning levels of forces. 
z. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In accordance with the undertaking given in 
paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recom-
mendation 213, the United Kingdom Government 
declared that the total level of British forces on 
the continent of Europe at 30th November 1974 
amounted to 60,136 men plus the Second Tactical 
Air Force. 
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The continued need for the presence of 
troops in Northern Ireland and the situation in 
Cyprus in the second half of the year made it 
necessary for units of the British Army of the 
Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty 
in those places. At 30th November 1974, there 
were some 4,000 men from BAOR in Northern 
Ireland and 310 in Cyprus. In the event of an 
emergency affecting NATO, it is expected that 
these units could be quickly returned to their 
duty stations. 
3. Examination by the Council of the actiuities of 
the Standing Armaments Committee and of the 
problem of the standardisation of armaments in 
Europe 
Following the decision taken by the Council 
in December 1973 and referred to in the nine-
teenth annual report to the Assembly, the deputy 
national armaments directors of member coun-
tries met in Paris on 29th and 30th January 
1974, with the terms of reference quoted in the 
same report. 
In paragraph 9 of the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 244, the Assembly was infor-
med how this meeting had been followed up at 
permanent representative level and at the 
ministerial meeting held in The Hague on 11th 
March 197 4. In their reply to Recommendation 
247, in October, the Council stated that although 
they had devoted considerable time and effort 
to this complicated question and made a study 
of several possible solutions, they had not yet 
been able to reach definite conclusions. This 
situation has n:ot altered and the Council have 
not discussed this question in depth for several 
months. Nevertheless, it is still before the Coun-
cil who will bear in mind the possibility of 
reporting to the Assembly as soon as more 
substantive results have been obtained. 
4. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) During 1974, the Council have replied to 
the various recommendations drafted by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
and adopted by the Assembly in plenary session 
in November 1973 and June 1974. 
In their reply to No. 243 on the state of 
European security - relations with the United 
States, the Council referred, on the matter of the 
strength of United States forces in Europe, to 
the assurance given by the United States Govern-
ment that, given a similar approach by other 
countries of the Alliance, the United States will 
maintain and improve their forces in Europe and 
refrain from reductions except in the framework 
of mutual and balanced force reductions. The 
Council recognise that the maintenance of 
United States forces in Europe at their present 
level implies that each country should undertake, 
according to its place in the Alliance, its proper 
share of the burden of maintaining the security 
of all. 
And so, the Ottawa declaration emphasised 
that all members of the Alliance agree that the 
continued presence of Canadian and substantial 
United States forces in Europe plays an irre-
placeable role in the defence of North America 
as well as of Europe. Similarly, the substantial 
forces of the European allies serve to defend 
Europe and North America as well. 
In the context of the close links between 
security on the mainland of Europe and in the 
Mediterranean area, the Council, in their answer 
to Recommendation 254 on this subject, recalled 
the draft declaration on the Mediterranean, 
which had been prepared jointly by the Nine and 
approved by all member countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance, before being submitted to the CSCE. 
They agreed that full use should be made of the 
lessons learned from the latest conflict in the 
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Middle East, to complement the study of anti-
tank and anti-aircraft missiles and observation 
satellites. 
With regard to Recommendation 24 7 on the 
application of the Brussels Treaty, the Council 
replied that they provide the Assembly with as 
much information as they can in their annual 
reports. 
Finally, after the December part-session, the 
Council began their study of Recommendation 
256 on European security and the situation in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 
(b) Five written questions in all on defence 
subjects were dealt with by the Council during 
the year. These concerned : clarification of the 
text of the resolution of 26th September 1973, 
amending Annex III to Protocol No. III (No. 
139) ; notification by the Council of the reasons 
why a final reply could not yet be given to 
Written Question 133 regarding an interpreta-
tion of the Montreux Convention on the Turkish 
Straits by the two member governments signa-
tories of the Convention (No. 140) ; implementa-
tion of the resolution of 15th September 1956, 
on forces of member States (No. 141) - cf. 1 (a) 
above; controls of levels of armaments (No. 142); 
and maintenance of United States forces in 
Europe (No. 147). 
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CHAPTER III 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
The programme of activity drawn up by the 
Agency for 1974, the nineteenth year of control, 
was carried out satisfactorily. 
The Agency has a dual mission. Under the 
terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, it is 
required: 
- first, to control the level of stocks or 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective ; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic 
of Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
Within the terms of this general mission, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of field 
measures for the control of levels and and of the 
non-production of certain categories of arma-
ments. This aspect covers all activities concerned 
with processing, for the purposes defined above, 
any useful documentary material and the results 
of field control measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control carried 
out physically wherever there are activities and 
stocks subject to control and, more generally, 
wherever this is necessary to ensure that the 
information supplied is correct and that under-
takings not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are observed. 
Controls from documentary sources can be 
considered as the basis for the control ; the 
purpose of field control measures is to verify, 
physically, the accuracy of the information 
obtained from documentary controls - when 
such information exists - particularly as regards 
the control of levels. Field control measures may 
also have to take account of information from 
other sources (Article XX of Protocol No. IV), 
which it may have been considered necessary to 
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verify ; documentary and field control measures 
are thus complementary and equally essential for 
the accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always 
presented documentary and field control 
measures separately, in the interests of both 
convenience and clarity. However, it must not be 
forgotten that these measures together make up 
a single control function. 
During 197 4, no changes were made in the 
general methods of armaments control described 
above. Both documentary controls and field con-
trol measures were applied without difficulty. 
B. Controls from documentary sources 
1. Information proceaaed by the Agency 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies 
by member States 
The questionnaire sent to member States 
for 197 4 was substantially the same as in the 
previous year. 
As in all previous years, follow-up action on 
the replies was twofold. It is recalled that some 
of the facts reported are checked physically by 
means of field control measures. In addition, all 
the replies are studied by the Agency experts, 
and compared with the other sources of informa-
tion available, including member countries' 
earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires 
and budgetary documents. 
As last year, the Agency was able to send to 
the Council at the proper time, the basic docu-
ments which they must have each year before 
they can accept or approve, as appropriate, the 
maximum levels or armaments for forces main-
tained by member States under national com-
mand on the mainland of Europe. 
(b) Requests for annual information for 
facilitating the Agency's task of "non-production 
control of certain types of armaments" 
(long-range missiles and guided missiles, 
chemical weapons) 
This annual procedure was applied as usual 
in 1974. 
(c) Co-operation with NATO 
In the context of the Agency's relations with 
the appropriate NATO military authorities and 
in accordance with the provisions of Protocol 
No. IV to the treaty, a meeting for the exchange 
of information was held at the Agency, as in 
previous years (see point 2 (a) below). 
In addition, the NATO authorities arranged 
a technical information visit for the Agency to 
the Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre 
at La Spezia (see point E.2. (b) below). 
(d) Co-operation with the United States 
of America and Canada (Article XXIII 
of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of the 
United States and Canada concerning their pro-
grammes of external aid in military equipment 
to the forces of member States stationed on the 
mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries 
have provided no aid to the forces concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
In 197 4, the defence budgets published by 
member States and their replies to the Agency 
questionnaire on this subject were studied in the 
same way as in previous years. 
This scrutiny of budgets confirmed the find-
ings of other studies carried out by the experts to 
determine quantities of armaments. 
z. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the replies of 
the member States to the annual questionnaire 
and after studying the statistical reports 
furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (Article VII 2 (a) of 
Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the 
NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, 
as each year, for the annual consultations with 
the NATO military authorities called for by 
Article XIV of Protocol No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau on 
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19th November 1974, attended by Agency experts 
and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and 
concluded with a meeting in Paris on 13th Decem-
ber 1974, under the chairmanship of the Deputy 
Director of the Agency ; this meeting was 
attended by the representatives of the Director 
of the International Military Staff of the NATO 
Military Committee, and of the Deputy Chief of 
Staff Logistics, Armaments and Administration, 
SHAPE, as well as by the Agency experts. There 
were no comments on the total quantities of 
armaments declared as held by the member States 
(Article XIII of Protocol No. IV), and presented 
by the Agency for study by these authorities. 
In consequence, the total quantities of arma-
ments declared to the Agency by the member 
States for forces placed under NATO authority 
and stationed on the mainland of Europe can be 
considered as appropriate levels for the control 
year 1974, within the terms of Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command 
on the mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to the 
Agency by the member States as being required 
on 31st December 1974 for their forces main-
tained under national command on the mainland 
of Europe have been accepted or approved by 
the Council, who have taken note of these figures 
of maximum levels of armaments for these forces 
in 197 4. The quantities notified to the Agency 
can thus be considered as appropriate levels of 
armaments for the current control year, within 
the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV. 
(c) Comment 
The situation remained unchanged in 1974 
and, in consequence, the term "armaments", 
whenever used with reference to levels in this 
report, should be understood to mean : 
armaments declared by the member States 
as being held by their forces on the mainland 
of Europe, with the exception of armaments 
with nuclear capability and of the arma-
ments of what one member State calls 
"strategic forces", that is to say, the arma-
ments over which the Agency has so far been 
enabled to exercise its mandate of controlling 
levels. 
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C. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general methot& of execu!ion 
As recalled in the introduction to this 
Chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings 
not to manufacture certain types of 
armaments are being observed; 
- to control the level of stocks of certain 
armaments. 
In order to fulfil the first of these tasks, 
the Agency experts must be very well acquainted 
with the special installations and facilities 
required to produce the proscribed weapons. 
They also have to study in depth all published 
information on industrial plants with the 
capacity to produce such weapons. After compar-
ing their findings with the results of their 
analysis of the information supplied by member 
countries for the year in question, or obtained 
from the whole series of visits and inspections 
during previous years, the experts first exclude 
factories where the production of such weapons 
seems highly unlikely. They then review the 
remaining plants and select those which are suit-
able for control measures. Finally, after a further 
selection, a sampling programme is worked out 
for each year. Here, it may be noted that the 
Agency's studies in the fields open to control are 
greatly assisted by the replies received from the 
German authorities to the annual requests for 
information to facilitate the Agency's task of non-
production control. 
For the Agency's second task, the basic 
information is provided by the declarations made 
by member States in their replies to the annual 
questionnaire. These declarations are checked 
both against those made in previous years and 
against information from various other sources. 
A suitable number of sample checks are then 
included in the programme. Due weight is, of 
course, given to weapons of the greatest military 
importance. Care is also taken to inspect factories 
at what is considered to be the most appropriate 
stage of the production cycle. This strictly-
applied programme of sample field control 
measures, conducted by experts, provides an 
accurate check of the declarations concerned and, 
as a result, the declarations as a whole can be 
accepted with every confidence. 
The previous paragraphs clearly indicate 
the differences between the Agency's two tasks 
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in the application of field controla. However, in 
order to ensure the most effective control pos-
sible with the resources available, controls of 
levels of stocks and non-production controls are 
carefully co-ordinated so that the information 
obtained can be cross-checked and the services 
of the experts concerned are used to best 
advantage. Thus, a control of quantities of 
weapons produced and of the non-production of 
prohibited weapons may be carried out at the 
same time in the same factory. 
The general methods of execution have 
remained unchanged for some time, but the 
Agency is still trying to perfect and improve both 
its selection procedures and the conduct of its 
annual programme. 
Article VIII of Protocol No. IV states that 
control measures in respect of forces under 
NATO authority shall be undertaken by the 
appropriate NATO authorities. This being so, the 
percentage of forces to be inspected by the 
Agency varies between member countries. Special 
considerations apply to the depots also covered 
by the same article. In peacetime, each country 
is wholly responsible for the logistic support of 
forces placed under NATO authority. It is there-
fore difficult to determine accurately which 
depots are wholly under NATO authority and 
which are under national command. Nevertheless, 
the system of combined Agency /SHAPE inspec-
tions, introduced in 1957, worked well in 1974, 
as in previous years. 
As the Convention for due process of law 1 
has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns take the form of "agreed control 
measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms con-
cerned, the Agency must give some six weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been withheld. 
These restrictions complicate the Agency's 
task, but are not considered to have reduced the 
effectiveness of control measures in 1974. 
I. Convention concerning measures to be taken by 
member States of Western European Union in order to 
enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry 
out its control effectively and making provision for due 
process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of 
the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed 
in Paris on 23rd October 1954. (Signed in Paris on 14th 
December 1957). 
2. Type and extent of field control measures 
The programme drawn up early in the year 
was carried out in full, except for minor 
modifications for practical reasons. 
In 1974, the total number of seventy-one 
control measures was slightly higher than the 
average for the five previous years, because two 
control measures were carried out concurrently 
at several of the establishments visited. 
These measures fell broadly into the follow-
ing categories : 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots ; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command ; 
(c) control measures at production plants : 
(i) quantitative control measures: 
These control measures were carried 
out at aircraft and aircraft engine 
plants, at plants manufacturing 
armoured equipment, at plants 
manufacturing missiles and 
ammunition, and at shipyards ; 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures were carried 
out at plants producing aircraft 
and aircraft engines, chemicals and 
missiles and at a shipyard. 
On the basis of all the field control measures 
carried out in 1974, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council : 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
levels of stocks of armaments at depots, 
units under national command and pro-
duction plants confirmed the data 
obtained from documentary control 
measures; 
- the measures taken for the control of non-
production revealed no production con-
trary to undertakings. 
3. General remarks 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to 
exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effec-
tively to carry out its task of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose from the very 
complex nature of the inspections were dealt with 
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satisfactorily through good relations with the 
national authorities. 
(b) In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons or, in 
one member State, to what that State calls 
"strategic forces". Nor does the Agency apply 
any controls to biological weapons. 
(c) As the Convention for due process of law, 
signed on 14th December 1957, has not yet 
entered into force, control operations carried out 
by the Agency in private establishments had to 
be applied in accordance with the "agreed con-
trol'' procedure, as in previous years. 
D. State and problems of control in general -
Development of control methods 
The Agency made no changes in its control 
methods in 197 4. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles 
(a) Production and purchases 
New guided missiles now in production 
include the Manba anti-tank missile, the Sea 
Dart and Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles, and 
the Matra Magic 550 air-to-air missile. Several 
other guided missiles have reached an advanced 
stage of development or are now going into 
production ; they include the Hot anti-tank mis-
sile, the Sea Wolf and Indigo surface-to-air mis-
siles, the Kormoran air-to-surface missile and the 
Otomat surface-to-surface missile. 
Production of older guided missiles, such as 
the SS-11 and Cobra, is continuing. 
This also applies to the production of 
surface-to-surface self-propelled 110 mm. artil-
lery rockets and to the development of other 
rockets in France, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. 
Larger quantities of guided and unguided 
missiles were exported to countries outside WEU. 
Three European anti-aircraft guided missile 
systems (Roland, Rapier and Crotale) were tested 
by the United States army during 1974. 
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(b) Control of levels in 197 4 
Control measures were carried out at a num-
ber of depots containing guided or other self-
propelled missiles or launchers, at several units 
under national command equipped with these 
weapons and at plants manufacturing guided and 
other self-propelled missiles. 
(c) Verification of non-production undertakings 
As in previous years, the Agency sent a 
"request for annual information in order to 
facilitate the Agency's non-production control of 
guided missiles and long-range missiles" to the 
State concerned. No evidence of any production 
contrary to undertakings was found when the 
reply received was verified. 
(d.) Documentary studies and technical 
information visits 
The Agency assembled valuable information 
on missiles likely to be produced in Europe in 
the years ahead, in its efforts to keep abreast of 
the most recent techniques in this field. 
Its experts made technical information visits 
in France (SNIAS, at Issac, CAEPE and the 
Societe Nationale des Poudres et Explosifs at 
Saint-Medard-en-Jalles; the Societe Europeenne 
de Propulsion at Haillan), the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Hanover Air Show), the United 
Kingdom (Farnborough Air Show) and the 
Netherlands (25th International Astronautical 
Congress, Amsterdam). These visits helped 
greatly in keeping them up to date with the 
latest European developments and techniques in 
the missiles field. 
2. Warships 
(a) Current construction 
On the mainland of Europe, naval construc-
tion programmes are in hand in all member 
States which have navies. 
Belgium is building ASW escort vessels. In 
France, work is continuing on the submarine 
programme and the building of ASW frigates ; 
construction of ASW corvettes has been started. 
Conventional submarines are under construction 
in Italy, and missile frigates and a supply ship 
will soon be completed in the Netherlands. The 
Federal Republic of Germany has just completed 
a building programme of conventional sub-
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marines and has a programme for missile coastal 
craft, some of which have been ordered from 
France. 
(b) Control activity in 197 4 
Control measures were carried out in naval 
shipyards combined, in one case, with an agreed 
non-production control measure. 
These operations were highly satisfactory 
and gave rise to no comments. 
(c) Technical information visits 
The Director of the Agency, together with a 
number of experts, visited the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Research Centre at La Spezia (Italy) 
on the invitation of the NATO military 
authorities. 
3. Military aircraft 
(a) Production and purchases 
The German Federal air force began to take 
delivery of the Phantom F 4F aircraft purchased 
from the United States. 
The Belgian and Netherlands Governments, 
which completed the modernisation of their air 
forces two years ago by the purchase of Mirage 5 
and Northrop NF-5 aircraft respectively, have 
for some time been studying a replacement for 
their F-104G aircraft by 1980. Norway and Den-
mark have joined these two WEU countries in 
looking for an aircraft to replace their F-104Gs. 
The types of aircraft under consideration are : 
Mirage F-1 M-53 (France), Saab Viggen J-37 
(Sweden) and YF-16 and YF-17 (United States). 
In France, production of the Jaguar, in 
co-operation with the United Kingdom, and of 
the Mirage F-1 is continuing according to plan. 
Some units have already received these new 
aircraft. In the United Kingdom, the Jaguar air-
craft in the tactical support version, began to 
be delivered to units of the Royal Air Force 
early in 197 4. 
The Italian aircraft industry is continuing 
production of the F-104S and G-91Y aircraft. 
(b) Control activity 
Control measures were carried out at depots 
holding aircraft or jet engines, at air force units 
under national command and at plants producing 
air frames or jet engines. 
(c) Future prospects 
The first prototype of the MRCA 75-Panavia 
200, built in co-production by the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, 
made its first flight in August 1974. 
The production of prototypes is continuing 
according to plan by the three main firms 
associated with the MRCA 75 programme, 
namely, MBB (Federal Republic of Germany), 
Aeritalia (Italy) and BAC (United Kingdom). 
The first prototypes (training and tactical 
support version) of the Alpha-Jet, built in co-
production by France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, have already made several flights. 
The first prototype of the Hawk training 
aircraft, built by Hawker Siddeley (United King-
dom) made its first flight during August 1974. 
This aircraft will replace the Gnat advanced 
trainer in the Royal Air Force flying schools. 
(d) Technical information visits 
Agency experts visited the Hanover Air 
Show (Federal Republic of Germany) and the 
Farnborough Air Show (United Kingdom) ; they 
also participated in the 25th International 
Astronautical Congress at Amsterdam (Nether-
lands). 
4. Chemical weaponB 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
Since the procedure in force was completed 
before the end of 1973, the Council informed 
the Assembly, in their nineteenth annual report, 
that they had noted the renewal for 1974 of the 
list of weapons subject to control. 
(b) Control activities 
The replies given to the questions asked in 
implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III 
show that no effective production of chemical 
weapons has yet been undertaken on the main-
land of Europe by member countries which have 
not renounced the right to produce such weapons. 
As in previous years, the Agency also addres-
sed to the appropriate authorities of the State 
concerned, a "request for annual information to 
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facilitate the non-production control of chemical 
weapons". 
The detailed reply received to this request 
was of great assistance to the Agency in drawing 
up its programme of agreed control measures for 
1974: such control measures were carried out at 
major chemical plants in the country concerned. 
In each case, a delegation from the national 
authorities took part in the exercise. 
None of these measures revealed any indica-
tion of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex II of Protocol No. III. 
(c) Improvement of control methods 
The choice made by the Agency of establish-
ments to be visited is the basis of all field control 
activity. As mentioned above, the reply to the 
request for annual information is a major guide 
to the choice made. 
As previously stated in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth annual reports, a supplementary pro-
cedure, designed to increase the effectiveness of 
the Agency's action in this respect, was tried out 
in 1973. The encouraging results for that year 
were confirmed during its application in 1974. 
(d) Technical information visits 
On the invitation of the Italian authorities, 
the Agency experts visited two major chemical 
plants with very advanced technical facilities. 
An Agency expert also had two meetings 
with the Commandant of the NBC establishment 
at the Defence Research Centre at Vilvorde in 
Belgium. 
S. Biological weaponB 
(a) As mentioned under point C.3 (b) of this 
chapter, no controls are carried out by the Agency 
in this field. 
It may be noted, however, that, with a view 
to facilitating any future non-production control 
of biological weapons, the Agency received in 
1974, as in previous years, information supplied 
by the country concerned in response to the 
Agency's annual request. 
The Council also noted, in December 1973, 
that the list of biological weapons subject to con-
trol was to be renewed for 197 4 ; this was men-
tioned in the nineteenth annual report to the 
Assembly. 
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(b) Technical information visits 
During the year, the Agency experts made 
several technical information visits to establish-
ments equipped with very modern facilities in 
Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
France. They obtained valuable information on 
a number of microbiological problems and had 
very useful talks with leading scientists. 
6. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation regarding these weapons 
remained the same as in previous years, the 
Agency is not in a position to engage in any 
control activities, or even to carry out prepara-
tory studies with regard to atomic weapons. 
7. Electronic (radiation) weapons 
Study of the use of the laser in weapons 
continued in the majority of countries. With the 
means available to it, the Agency makes every 
effort to keep abreast of developments in this 
technique. 
E. Miscellaneous contacts 
1. Contacts with the national authorities 
The Agency again maintained its numerous 
ties with national authorities, through Agency 
officials sent on mission and through national 
representatives visiting Paris. 
As in previous years, the main object of 
these contacts was to arrange inspections and 
technical information visits, or to solve problems 
relating to control measures. As usual, these 
contacts were very helpful to the Agency in 
fulfilling its task. 
z. Contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation 
There were a number of personal contacts 
between Agency officials and officers of the 
International Military Secretariat and SHAPE. 
Also, at the meeting held on 13th December 
. at the Agency and attended by representatives 
of NATO, for the purpose of fixing levels of 
armaments for forces under NATO command, 
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there was an interesting exchange of views on 
questions of common interest. 
G. Improving the proficiency of the experts 
As in previous years, the experts' technical 
lmowledge was kept satisfactorily up to date and 
further improved by means of the documentation 
collected by the Agency and the technical 
information visits organised by member States to 
this end. 
To assist the experts, the documentation 
office draws on published material · (press, 
specialised periodicals and various technical 
publications), which constitute a very valuable 
source of information concerning armaments 
under study, being developed or in production. In 
addition to the data sheets and monthly biblio-
graphical bulletins which it provides for them 
at intervals, this office has produced summaries 
on such subjects as the laser, atomic propulsion 
and helicopters. It also obtains bibliographical 
bulletins for the experts from other documenta-
tion services specialising in armaments, with 
which it keeps in touch. 
Technical information visits, which form 
part of a programme now being drawn up for a 
number of years, were directed to various fields 
in 197 4. Their aim is twofold : to study all arma-
ments techniques within a given period, and to 
acquire a wide knowledge of current progress in 
these techniques in the different countries. 
The experts also improved their proficiency 
through meetings with engineers and other 
qualified staff during control measures at plants. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the 
Council that, as a result of the control exercised 
in 197 4, the figures obtained in accordance with 
Article XIII of Protocol No. IV: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article XIV 
of Protocol No. IV ; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the terms 
of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957 ooncluded in execu-
tion of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1974 and for 
each of the member States, the appropriate levels 
of armaments subject to control for those 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course 
of field control measures at production plants, 
it did not detect for the categories of armaments 
which it controls : 
2- I 
- either the manufacture in these establish-
ments on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany of a category of 
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armaments that the government of this 
member State has undertaken not to 
manufacture ; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX 
of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
In 1974, the Agency applied controls effec-
tively in those fields which are open to it. 
In this, relations between the Agency and 
the national authorities and services of the mem-
ber States, and also with those of NATO and 




STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
1. Relations with FINABEL 
In accordance with the conclusions of the 
joint meeting of 16th May 1973, the Standing 
Armaments Committee haB established close con-
tacts with FINABEL and, in. particular, has 
studied the most recent FINABEL agreements 
with a view to follow-up action in the field of 
armaments production. Prominence has also been 
given by the Standing Armaments Committee to 
the three-service aspect of the activities of its 
working groups. 
2. Co-operation on armaments 
The study of the economic and financial 
problems of armaments production in the member 
countries, referred to in the nineteenth annual 
report, has been held over pending further 
developments in the move to reactivate the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee. 
A study of further action which govern-
ments might take on the various FINABEL 
agreements and draft agreements led the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee to consider drawing 
up a complete list of target-drone requirements 
and classifying them so that the various types 
of target capable of meeting the needs of the 
three services can be identified. The possibility 
of defining and developing some of these targets 
jointly wou'ld be studied at a second stage. 
The exploratory group met twice to consider 
what action should be taken on the proposal 
mentioned in the nineteenth annual report for 
defining evaluation criteria for military equip-
ment. They suggested that a working group 
should be set up, composed of officers, engineers 
and operational resea:reh experts, who would be 
asked to study evaluation techniques and their 
inclusion in the development process, as well as 
evaLuation criteria. The Standing Armaments 
Committee is at present studying the whole 
question. 
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3. WEU agreement 4.FT.6. 
In accordance with the wish expressed by 
the former ad hoc sub-group No. 6 at its last 
meeting, the Standing Armaments Committee 
agreed that a small group of two national experts, 
assisted by the IDJternational Secretariat, should 
revise the final wording of WEU draft agree-
ment 4.FT.6. (technica1 testing programme for 
wheeled transport vehicles). This task, calling 
for the closest study, was completed by the 
middle of 197 4. The draft agreement was pre-
sented to the Standing Armaments Committee 
at its meeting on 18th September 197 4 and has 
been submitted to the appropriate national milit-
ary authorities for approval. 
As regards future work on vehicles, the 
Standing Armaments Conun.i.ttee studied the pro-
posals submitted by the former ad hoc sub-group 
No. 6 before it was disbanded. They decided that 
this was not an appropriate time to examine the 
proposal to draw up a similar test programme 
for tracked vehicles but discussed at some length 
the continuation of technical studies and of the 
test programme for wheeled vehicles. 
In this connection, the Committee decided 
not to set up a separate working group to bring 
WEU agreement 4.FT.6 up to date, but to entrust 
this task and the technical work involved to 
national experts appointed by member govern-
ments. It was agreed that the experts should deal 
with their problems chiefly by correspondence 
and that the work should be co-ordinated by the 
United Kingdom as pilot country. with the help 
of the International Secretariat. The Standing 
Armaments Committee will receive a progress 
report each year and may be asked to approve 
special meetings of the experts and visits to 
technical centres if those should prove necessary. 
It was understood that these activities would not 
duplicate those of FINABEL in the operational 
field. 
4. Visits 
Along with a large number of civilian and 
military experts from member countries, one 
delegate represented the Standing Armaments 
Committee in September at German and British 
demonstrations held at Lichtenau and Meppen in 
the Federal Republic of Germany to assess the 
usefulness and progress of the work of working 
group No.9. 
On the invitation of the French authorities, 
the delegates to the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee visited the Technical Trials Centre at 
Angers on 19th September to study the methods 
and facilities used by the French army for 
evaluating military equipment (wheeled vehicles, 
engineering equipment, river-crossing equipment, 
engines, generators, pumps, etc.). 
S. Liaison Sub· Committee on joint production of 
armaments 
A meeting of the Sub-Committee is planned 
for 18th February 1975. 
B. Activities of working groups 
1. Working group No. 8 on operational research 
\Vorking group No. 8 on operational research 
held two meetings, the second of which was com-
bined with a visit to Itwly. 
Exchanges of information took place as in 
the past, with the submission of data sheets and 
declarations of interest, and through bilateral 
exchanges of reports on operational research 
studies. 
Work is continuing on the compilation of 
a five-language WEU glossary of operational 
research terms. 
Rules for a library of operational research 
reports were approved by the Standring Arma-
ments Committee, and the International Secre-
tariat is now organising this collection of docu-
ments. 
In Italy, the group visited the air force's air 
defence technical training centre at Borgo Piave 
(Latina), where various tactical situations in 
air defence were simulated on computers. 
In the course of a visit to the operational 
research centre in Rome, Italian experts pre-
sented operational research studies from the three 
services and this was followed by discussion of 
the methods applied. 
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2. Working group No. 9 on hindrances 
Working group No. 9 which is engaged in 
the study, extended experimentally to all three 
services, of new means of hindering enemy action, 
held three meetings, the last of which was 
coupi1ed with demonstrations at the test centres 
at Lichtenau and Meppen in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. They included experiments 
carried out by German and British experts. 
C. International Secretariat 
1. Meeting of deputy armaments directors 
The International Secretariat provided the 
necessary support services for the meeting of 
deputy national armaments directors held in 
Paris on 29th and 30th January 1974. The report 
on the activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee, submitted at the end of 1973, formed 
the main working document for this meeting 1 • 
2. Relations with member countries and the Council 
In January 1974, the Assistant Secretary-
General visited Brussels where he had talks with 
the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Van Els1ande. 
In October, the Assistant Secretary-General 
met the Italian military authorities in Rome and 
had talks with the Secretary of State, Mr. Mario 
Pedini, and with the Secretary-General of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Gaja. 
Lastly, on 22nd May 1974, the Assistant 
Secretary-General made his usual annual report 
to the Council on the activities of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and its working groups. 
3. Parliamentary~ assembly 
The International Secretariat informed the 
Standing Armaments Committee of the concern 
expressed by the WEU Assembly at its sessions 
of June and December 1974, regarding the need 
to improve European co-operation on armaments, 
and gave details of the questions put to the Coun-
cil on the subject by a number of parliamen-
tarians. 
1. Reference is made to this meeting in Chapter II. D 
of this report. 
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4. Relatiorur with NATO 
As in the past, satisfactory relations were 
maintained with NATO through the regular 
attendance of NATO observers at meetings of the 
Standing Armaments Committee, and of a repre-
sentative of the International Secretariat of the 
Standing Armaments Committee at alii meetings 
of the NATO Naval Group and of the Con-
ference of National Armaments Directors. 
5. Relatiorur with FINABEL 
The contacts established between the Stand-
ing Armaments Committee and FINABEL secre-
tariats at the joint meeting in May 1973 were 
fully maintained during 197 4 in the best spirit 
of co-operation. 
The chief positive feature of these contacts 
is that the Standing Armaments Committee is 
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now better informed and is consequently in a 
position to exploit, as and when appropriate, 
those FINABEL agreements which seem most 
suitable for co-operation or exchanges of views 
between member countries on subjects of com-
mon interest concerning ground forces. Further-
more, the new orientation of FINABEL's work 
towards long-term projects will, in future, offer 
the Standing Armaments Committee greater 
scope for action by enabling it to intervene before 
countries start the individual study and develop-
ment of equipment. 
In November 1974, the International Secre-
tariat was represented at the annual meeting of 
the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee which 
reviews the work and future programmes of the 
working groups. In the same way, the head of 
the FINABEL secretariat attended the meeting 
at the end of the year, at which the Standing 
Armaments Committee reviewed the results 
achieved by its working groups. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
The Public Administration Committee held 
two meetings in 1974- at Brussels, from 24th to 
26th April and at The Hague from 25th to 
27th September. 
An important part of each meeting was 
devoted, as is customary, to exchanges of informa-
tion on new developments affecting public admin-
istration in the member countries during the 
six-month interval between meetings. A number 
of subjects which are raised regularly during 
these exchanges were mentioned, country by 
country, in the nineteenth annual report. 
Although the choice of subjects discussed is 
naturally governed by the current situation, it 
is significant that many of the problems arising 
in the various member countries are very similar 
and can be grouped under a few broad headings 
- national development plans, regionalisation, 
administrative deconcentration and dispersal of 
government services outside the capital, initial 
and further training courses for senior and 
middle grades, relations with the unions, the 
problems of strikes in the public services, etc. 
These discussions provide an opportunity for 
comparing notes on the solutions adopted in the 
various countries and on the obstacles 
encountered. 
During its meetings, the Committee also 
prepares the multilateral course for government 
officials and the study visits, which are dealt 
with later in this chapter. 
With regard to courses for government 
officials, the Committee decided, at the Septem-
ber meeting, to modify the formula used in 1974 
and the three previous years. The purpose of 
these courses, designed basically for young civil 
servants, was to present the main characteristic 
features of the administrations of member coun-
tries. Despite their undoubted success and with-
out wishing to abandon this formula for future 
courses, the Committee recognised the need to 
provide courses dealing with a specific subject 
for government officials who, as is the case in 
many sectors of the administration, have little or 
no opportunity to meet at international level. 
Bilateral study visits do not really meet their 
needs, since the comparisons they offer are always 
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too limited. Noting that the United Nations had 
decided to declare 1975 International Women's 
Year, the Committee agreed that the subject of 
the 1975 course for government officials, which 
will take place in Italy, should be "The position 
of women in the civil service". The Committee 
also hopes that with the more specialised courses 
now planned, it will be easier to select 
participants, which often proves difficult for a 
subject of a general nature. 
At the September meeting, the Public 
Administration Committee noted that the Council 
had decided to entrust it with the task of follow-
ing the implementation by member States of the 
principles defined by the special working group 
set up by the WEU Council in October 1971 to 
study the secondment of national officials to 
international organisations. These principles, 
which the Council have transmitted to member 
governments with a recommendation for their 
application, are reproduced in Chapter VI, point 
F.l of this report. 
The Public Administration Committee plans 
to report to the Council on this matter during 
the summer of 1975. 
B. Multilateral course for govemment 
officials 
The twenty-third course for government 
officials, organised by the Public Administration 
Committee, took place in the United Kingdom. 
It was held at the Civil Service College, in 
Edinburgh, from 4th to 15th November. It was 
designed for young senior civil servants from 
the national administrations and, like the three 
previous annual courses, was intended to give 
them a clearer insight into the principal 
characteristic features of the administrations of 
member countries. 
The first week was devoted to a series of 
talks given by each national delegation in turn 
explaining the structure of their national admin-
istration and how it functions. The five specific 
topics selected, within the general theme, were 
the following : 
1. The role of parliament and its relations 
with the executive. 
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2. Relations between Ministers and officials 
of the central administration, including 
the use of ministerial cabinets. 
3. Regional administration. 
4. Administrative discretion and the func-
tions of administrative law, with special 
reference to the redress of grievances. 
5. The functions of the Ministry of Finance. 
These talks, followed by discussions and 
complemented by four lectures, added to 
participants' knowledge of comparative admin-
istration, clarified points of detail and, in some 
measure, enabled them to form an overall picture 
of the subject under study. As noted last year, in 
references to the previous course in the 
nineteenth annual report, participants also profit 
greatly from the linguistic standpoint, from the 
opportunity which they are given to understand 
more clearly the meaning of the administrative 
terminology used in the languages of the other 
countries. 
During the second week, each delegation 
presented a case study or an important recent 
development in the administration of their coun-
try. These sessions were designed to illustrate the 
general features of the country's administration, 
which had already been described, by showing 
how the administrative process works in practice. 
Participants were, for example, invited to explain 
the procedure in their country for selecting a 
site for a major installation, such as an airport 
or a steel works, or to describe the procedure for 
the passing of legislation by parliament, emphasis 
being on the rOle of civil servants and Ministers. 
At the end of the course, there was a general 
discussion on the impact of international institu-
tions on national administrations and the hand-
ling of business arising from their membership. 
Participants were asked to comment on the 
arrangements and experiences in their own 
countries. 
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It would appear that the Edinburgh course 
was a complete success, as is shown by the com-
ments received from delegations. 
C. Study visits 
The study visits arranged under the auspices 
of the Public Administration Committee did not 
increase in number during the year for the 
reasons explained in the two previous annual 
reports. Visits of this kind are organised in all 
the member countries through a great many chan-
nels, and are sometimes found to be in competi-
tion with each other. In addition, the financial 
difficulties encountered everywhere during 1974 
and the desire of governments to economise in 
most sectors undoubtedly affected activities of 
this kind unfavourably, despite their value for 
the officials who participate in them. 
These were the main reasons underlying the 
Council's reply to Written Question 145, in which 
they were asked whether they considered it pos-
sible and desirable to invite the Public Admin-
istration Committee to take steps to promote 
exchanges of ideas and persons between 'V estern 
Europe and the United States. 
The Committee noted, however, that a num-
ber of delegations hoped to be able to give a 
new impetus to study visits sponsored by the 
Committee next year. Moreover, by deciding to 
modify the formula for courses for government 
officials, as stated under point A, the Committee 
aims to organise "multilateral study visits" which 
would enable some senior civil servants from the 
member countries to study a specific subject 
together, to their mutual benefit. 
* 
** 
As in previous years, the Public Administra-
tion Committee received full support from mem-· 
ber governments, which recognise and appreciate 




BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
Summaries of the main, supplementary and 
total budgets for 197 4 and the main budget 
estimates for 1975 are shown in the appendix to 
this report. 
The mpplementary budget for 197 4 was 
introduced primarily to take account of (a) 
standard-of-living increase awaroed to staff as 
an advance against the 1974 general review, (b) 
two exceptional reviews of the remuneration of 
staffs serving in both the United Kingdom and 
France, (c) the annual review of remunerations 
effective from 1st July 1974, and (d) a forecast 
estimate of the cost of the general review, also 
due to take effect from 1st JuJy 1974. No decision 
in regard to the generail. review, however, had 
been taken by the end of 1974. 
On the recommendation of the Budget and 
Organisation Committee, the scope and present-
ation of the WEU budget estimates for 1975 have 
been modified. Hitherto, the annual main budget 
was prepared on the basis of known costs to 
be met in the coming year, a procedure which 
invariably entailed the presentation of supp]e-
mentary bud.get:8 in the oourse of that year 
to take account of increased costs, resuLting 
essentially from cost-of-1dving awards to staff, 
approved by the Council. 
In order to circumvent, as far as possible, 
the necessity for supplementary budgets, it was 
decided to include in the main budget, increases 
forecast for the year 1975, to cover salaries, 
allowances, goods and services. The increases 
covering sallaries and allowances, however, would 
remain blocked until approved by the Council on 
the recommendation of the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Government Budget Experts. 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
The practice was continued of holding 
periodical meetings between the administrative 
officials of the Secretariat-General, the Arm~V 
ments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Offi~e of the Clerk to examine 
matters of common interest. 
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C. WEU provident fund 
The advisory panel, set up by the Secretary-
General in 1972 to work out practica:l arrange-
ments for the day-to-day administration of the 
provident fund, met on three occasions in 1974, 
in the presence of a representative of the Olerk 
of the Assembly. On the advice of the panel, 
the Secretary-Genera;1 maintained the policy 
adopted in July 1972 of investing the fund 
in several currencies. By arranging these invest-
ments on a short-term basis, staff were better 
protected than hitherto against losses incurred 
through monetary flluctuations, but it cannot be 
concealed that the Secretary-General, with his 
responsibility for the administration of the prov-
ident fund, is seriously preoccupied by the effects 
upon it of monetary erosion which progressively 
diminishes its capital value. 
D. Pension scheme 
Progress in introducing the pension scheme 
for the staff of the oo-ordinated organisations is 
reported in paragraph E. 3. below. 
Within the framework of WEU, however, 
a number of preparatory measures were taken 
with a view to facilitating, so far as possible, 
the transition from the provident food to the 
pension scheme, as laid down in the draft pension 
reguilations. 
Among these preparatory measures was the 
need to calculate the sums required from the 
provident food of staff in service before 1st July 
1974, to ena:ble them to join the pension scheme 
by validation of past service. Since this involved 
not only serving staff members but also former 
staff, the operation represented a considerable 
task. 
Until the relevant figures are available, and 
until a number of important issues affecting 
pensions have been resolved within the Co-ordin-
ating Committee (see paragraph E. 3. below), 
it will not be possible to estimate accurately the 
number of WEU staff likely to opt for the 
pension scheme in preference to maintaining the 
provident fund. Options may be exercised within 
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the year from the date on which the Council 
approves the text of the "Pension Regulations" 
currently being studied by the Co-ordinating 
Committee. No such options, however, are open 
to staff joining WEU from 1st July 1974, who 
are obliged to subscribe to the pension scheme. 
Nevertheless, until the pension scheme becomes 
operative, they contribute to the provident fund. 
E. Actiuities within the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
I. Committee of Beada of AdminiBtration 
As in the previous years, the Heads of 
Administration of the co-ordinated organisations 
met frequently in the course of 1974. Apart 
from exchanging views on common problems, 
they were entrusted by the Standing Com.m.ittee 
of Secretaries-General1 with the task of preparing 
numerous documents for submission to the Co-
ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts, notably the proposals of the Secretaries-
General for the 1974 general review of remun-
erations. 
The Heads of Administration also set up 
an administrative committee on pensions, which 
met on several occasions in the latter half of 
197 4 to advise on a wide and complex variety 
of problems concerning the application of the 
pension scheme for the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, especially in the transitional period. 
z. Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
The Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General held twelve meetings in the course of 
1974, in addition to three joint meetings with 
the Standing Committee of Staff Associations. 
As the Assembly will have noted from the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 240, the 
Secretary-General's proposal to introduce a sys-
tem of dual grading, which had been advocated 
by the Assembly, did not find favour with the 
other co-ordinated organisations, which are not 
faced to the same extent as WEU with problems 
of promotion. 
The Standing Committee of Secretaries-
General was primarily occupied in preparing 
for discussions with the Co-Qrdinating Committee 
of Government Budget Experts on the rules to 
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be applied to the pension scheme and on the ques-
tion of taxation of pensions. It aJ.so submitted to 
the Co-ordinating Committee proposals to estab-
lish machinery for a co-ordinated application of 
the pension rules. No decision on these has yet 
been taken. 
Apart from pensions, the Standing ·Com-
mittee of Secretaries-General considered and 
approved, for submission to the Co-ordinating 
Committee, a number of proposals concerning 
e.xceptiolUiil salary reviews of staff serving in 
member countries, in accordance with established 
procedures, and for the 1974 general review of 
salaries. In the latter case, the Secretaries-
General, recognising the economic difficulties 
encountered by several member countries withi.n 
the co-ordinated framework and the accelera-
tion of inflation, limited their proposals to a 
straightforward adjustment of remunerations to 
the sta.ndard~of-living trends during the refer-
ence period 1st October 1971 to 1st July 1974 
(on which an advance, averaging 2 %, was 
accorded from 1st January 1974). No major 
proposals affecting allowances were made. 
The Co-ordinating Committee had not com-
pleted their study of the general review propo-
sals for staffs serving in Belgium, France and 
Germany at the end of 1974. Proposals covering 
staff serving in the United Kingdom have not 
yet been submitted. 
3. Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experta 
In the coune of 197 4, the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Government Budget Experts 
issued seventeen reports, Nos. 93-109. Sixteen of 
these were subsequently adopted by the Councils. 
The WEU Council's nineteenth report to 
the Assembly outlined the substance of the recom-
mendations contained in the 93rd report of the 
Co-ordinating Committee, concerning equality of 
treatment for male and female staff, and the 
94th report on the estab1ishment of a pension 
scheme for the co-ordinated organisations. Both 
these reports were approved by the WEU Council 
early in 1974, and were reprodtreed as Appen-
dices VI and VII respectively in Assembly Docu-
ment 631. 
It will be noted that in Part IV of the 94th 
report on pensions, the Co-ordinating Committee 
sought the approval of Councils to pursue the 
study of certain problems, notably in preparing 
the rules to be applied, the arrangements to be 
made to guarantee the payment of pensions, no 
matter what might happen to an organisation, 
and in finding an appropriate solution to the 
tax arrangements to be applied to the pension 
scheme. 
The Councils having approved these propo-
sals, the Co-ordinating Committee devoted twelve 
meetings in the course of 1974 to discussions on 
the pension scheme, nine of them to the tax 
problem. By the end of the year, a large measure 
of agreement had been reached on most of the 
essential points covered by the pension rules, 
including both guarantees and the bonus to 
officials remaining in service after the normal 
age of entitlement, as recommended by the 
Assembly in Recommendation 250, paragraph I, 
1. However, a divergence of views remained 
between governments on the extent and method 
by which pensions should be taxed. Since the 
deadlock could not be resolved within the Com-
mittee, the Chairman issued a report (No. 109) 
to Councils outlining the conflicting viewpoints 
and seeking their guidance. To this report, the 
Secretaries-General have attached a memoran-
dum, in which they ask Counciils to adopt the 
proposal of the majority (subject to improved 
conditions), or to invite the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee to find an altemative solution. 
The Councils expect to discuss the 109th 
report and the memorandum of the Secretaries-
General early in 1975. 
Of the other reports issued by the Co-
ordinating Committee, and approved by Councils 
during 1974, the following affected WEU staff: 
95th report : Standard-of-living increase of 
2% awarded to staffs of the co-ordinated organ-
isations as an advance against the 1974 general 
review (effective from 1st January 1974). 
98th report : Exceptional review of salaries 
in various countries including United Kingdom 
(6.1 %) and France (6%) as from 1st January 
1974. 
99th report : Adjustment of subsistence 
allowance rates for staff travelling on mission, 
as from 1st May 1974. 
102nd report : Adjustment of kilometric 
allowance rates for staff using their own vehicles 
on official duty. 
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104th report : Exceptional review of salaries 
in various countries inelud,ing the United King-
dom (5.4% ), as from 1st April 1974. 
106th report : Exceptional review of salaries 
in various countries including France (5.4 %) , 
as from 1st May 1974. 
108th report : Annual review of salaries for 
staffs of the co-ordinated organisations, including 
the United Kingdom (5.8 %) and France (3.8 %) , 
as from 1st July 1974. 
F. Other administrative activities 
1. Secondment of national officials to international 
organisatioiiB 
The studies carried out on this subject by 
a special group of experts set up by the Council 
in October 1971 originated from Assembly Recom-
mendation 200 of 27th Nowmber 1970. 
The Assembly was kept continuously 
informed of the progress of these studies, which 
concluded with the approvrul by the Council 
in July 1974, of the principles worked out by 
the experts for application in fixing the condi-
tions for secondment. · 
These principles are as follows : 
1. In view of the particular importance attach-
ing to the seoondment of national officials to 
international organisations, the States should be 
guided by a minimum of common principles in 
fixing the conditions for the secondment of these 
officials. Officials subject to these rules would 
be on European seconded service. 
2. Each <>f the governments of the member 
countries of WEU shall determine the categories 
of officials who can be placed on European 
seconded service and shall decide in each indivi-
dual case whether this system shall apply. 
3. The proposed system envisages the second-
ment of national officials to international organ-
isations and, in particular, the co-ordinated 
organisations. 
4. Officials on European seconded service will 
not be regarded as having left their national 
civil service ; they will be placed in the appro-
priate administrative position under their terms 
of service as national officials. 
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5. Without prejudice to the principle that each 
member State is free to establish the duration 
of seoondment, the following points might be 
considered : 
(i) the normal period wou1d be from three 
to five years ; 
( ii) possibility of extension ; ten years 
appears to be the normal maximum, 
any exceptions would be left to the 
discretion of governments ; 
(iii) governments would still retain the 
option, in certain special cases, of 
applying either a formula other than 
secondment (e.g. "temporary release" 
for very short periods, particularly for 
technical work in international organ-
isations of a scientific or a techno-
logical nature) or the national second-
ment rules which can vary from one 
country to another. 
6. Any official or member of staff to whom 
the benefit of Eu.ropean seconded service had 
been granted would, at the end of his period of 
secondment, automatically be reintegrated into 
his national civil service. 
7. Officials on European seconded service 
should suffer no discrimination, at least on being 
reintegrated into the nationa:l civil service, as 
regards progression in that service and, for this 
purpose, a period served in an international 
organisation should be counted as service with 
the home civil service ; there shouid be no delay 
in progression based on senio:t•ity and seconded 
officials should be entitled, like other offiei&s in 
their civil service, to compete for promotion by 
selection based on merit. 
Such promotion by selection may be granted 
according to the ruJes of each State, either dur-
ing secondment or when officials return to their 
home civil service, with retroactive effect where 
applicable. 
8. Respect for the essential independence of 
an official on European seconded service implies 
that, subject to the principles set forth below 
regarding retirement pension, he cann<>t, in 
principle, during the time of his secondment, 
accept any kind of fee, gift, reward or emolument 
from any source other than the international 
organisation to which he has been seconded. 
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9. Although, because of the independence of 
officials on European seconded service, govern-
ments are not, in principle, informed of the 
reports on their seconded staff, an organisation 
can forward a report and the government can 
request one, if necessary, especiaMy at the end of 
the period of service, in order to consider its 
official's suitability for promotion. 
10. Years of service counting for a retirement 
pension or a capita.'l sum paid by an international 
organisation are not, in principle, also counted 
for the pension payable to the same official by 
his own State. 
However, there should be no disadvantage 
for an official on European seconded service in 
comparison with his national colleagues. 
The members of the Council transmitted the 
text of these ten principd.es to thei·r governments 
with a recommendation for their application. 
It was further agreed that the Public Admin-
istration Committee should fo1Low the implemen-
tation of these principles by member States. 
The Public Administration Committee1 there-
fol'e has to consider how this duty is to be car-
ried out and will have to report to the Council 
in due course. 
2. Special mecraara to o(faet promotion difflealtia 
for WEU staff 
As stated in paragraph E.2. above, and as the 
Assembly was informed in the Council's replies to 
Recommendations 240 and 250, the Assembly's 
proposal to introduce dual grading at every 
level of employment did not win the support of 
the other co-ordinated organisations, and con-
sequently could not be placed before the Co-
ordinating Committee. 
The Council, while recogmsmg that the 
position of WEU staff gave rise to special prob-
letns as regards promotion prospects, considered 
that individual special measures should be suf-
ficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this 
connection. 
1. On this point, see Chapter V. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of WEU main budget for 1914 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ...•........ 348,705 3,418,624 7,668,758 11,087,382 
Travel ........................... 11,325 68,000 194,000 262,000 
Other operating costs ............. 61,440 253,600 326,205 579,805 
Purchase of furniture, etc. • .......• 4,475 13,000 14,500 27,500 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
ToTAL ExPENDITURE .............. 425,945 3,753,224 8,203,463 11,956,687 
WEU tax ........................ 104,750 1,082,390 2,495,915 3,578,305 
Other receipts .................... 7,890 7,600 11,000 18,600 
TOTAL INcoME .................... 112,640 1,089,990 2,506,915 3,596,905 
NET TOTAL ..........•............ 313,305 2,663,234 5,696,548 8,359,782 
National contriflutiona called for under the WEU main budget for 1914 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL ............................ 600 
* A Secretariat.Qenera.l. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Annaments Control Agency. 
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Summary of WEU supplementary budget for 1914 
A* B* c• Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ......•..... + 62,529 + 589,088 + 1,228,958 + 1,818,046 
Travel ........................... + 3,690 - + 5,400 + 5,400 
Other operating costs ............. + 5,150 + 14,525 + 18,710 + 33,235 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ - + 500 + 1,160 + 1,660 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE •••••••••••••• + 71,369 + 604,113 + 1,254,228 + 1,858,341 
WEU tax ........................ + 23,909 + 242,159 + 374,378 + 616,537 
Other receipts .................... + 880 + 14,000 + 25,200 + 39,200 
TOTAL INCOME .................... + 24,789 + 256,159 + 399,578 + 655,737 
NET TOTAL ....................... + 46,580 + 347,954 + 854,650 + 1,202,604 
National eontrfflatlona called for ancler the WEV supplementary flaqet for 1914 
. . 
600ths 
Belgium ............ ' ................ 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Neth~rlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
ToTAL ............................ 600 
• A Secretariat.General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
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Summary of total WEU budget for 1974 
A* B* C* Total B + C 
£ Frs. Frs. Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 411,234 4,007,712 8,897,716 12,905,428 
Travel ........................... 15,015 68,000 199,400 267,400 
Other operating costs ............. 66,590 268,125 344,915 613,040 
Purchase of furniture, etc. . ........ 4,475 13,500 15,660 29,160 
Buildings ......................... - - - -
TOTAL ExPENDITURE .............. 497,314 4,357,337 9,457,691 13,815,028 
WEU tax ........................ 128,659 1,324,549 2,870,293 4,194,842 
Other receipts .................... 8,770 21,600 36,200 57,800 
TOTAL INCOME •••••••••••••••••••• 137,429 1,346,149 2,906,493 4,252,642 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••• 359;885 3,011,188 6,551,198 9,562,386 
National eontribulioftll called for under the total WEV budget for 1914 
600ths 
Belgium ............................. 59 
France .............................. 120 
Germany ............................ 120 
Italy ................................ 120 
Luxembourg ......................... 2 
Netherlands .......................... 59 
United Kingdom ..................... 120 
TOTAL •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 600 
* A Secretariat.Qeneral. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Armaments Control Agency. 
45 










Summary of WEU draft main budget for 1915 
A* B* 
£ Frs. 
Salaries and allowances ............ 481,305 4,850,790 
Travel ........................... 13,360 72,700 
Other operating OOBts ............. 61,605 270,925 
Purchase of furniture, etc. • ......•. 3,210 13,500 
Buildings ............•..• · .. · · · · · · - -
TOTAL ExPDDITUBE •...•......•.• 559,480 5,207,915 
WEU tax ........................ 154,355 1,645,020 
Other receipts .................... 7,315 12,000 
ToTAL INcoME .•......•...•..•..•• 161,670 1,657,020 
NET TOTAL ...•......•...•.••..•.. 397,810 3,550,895 
• A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
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on European union and WEU 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty is the basis of European political union in defence 
matters; 
Expressing the wish that the efforts of the Nine to achieve such a union will allow rapid progress 
to be made in this direction ; 
Noting the decision of the Heads of State or of Government to examine, in 1975, a report on 
European union ; 
Noting that the defence policies of member countries are insufficiently co-ordinated; 
Noting nevertheless that these policies pursue a common goal, that of ensuring Western European 
security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; 
Considering that there is broad agreement between the members of WEU to plan their defence policy 
in such a way as to make Europe a true partner of the United States in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance; 
Considering moreover that the most serious threats at present are to the northern and southern 
flanks of the western defence system ; 
Recalling Recommendation 145 adopted by the Assembly on 15th December 1966, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. Propose that a future meeting of the European Council study the requirements of a European 
defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
2. With this conference in view, ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies 
now; 
3. Examine in particular the consequences for European security of the emergence of new nuclear 
powers and the agreements concluded or to be concluded between the nuclear powers ; 
4. Ensure that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it takes effective action 
in a.ll matters of concern to it ; 
5. Remind the EEC countries which have not yet acceded to it, and a.ll the European countries with 
a. democratic regime which wish to be associated with a common defence policy, that they may a.ccede 
to the Brussels Treaty ; 
6. Consider regularly and in the context of a. European defence policy, foreign policy ma.tters affecting 
the defence of Western Europe and the defence policies of the member States with a. view to co-ordinating 
military efforts, developing industrial potential and limiting the cost of defence for these States ; 
7. Bear in mind, particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect regarding the 
reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee, the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial 




(submitted by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. This document is a sequel to a report on 
European union and WEU submitted by your 
Rapporteur to the Assembly at its last session 
and referred back to Committee for presentation 
at the session to be held in Bonn in May 1975. 
2. Although the previous report was agreed to 
by a very large majority in Committee, the 
Assembly's debates showed that there was deep-
rooted disagreement between members in two 
respects : first, some members of the Assembly 
made fundamental objections to the report 
because they considered it anti-American, which 
was not at all your Rapporteur's intention, nor 
probably that of the Committee ; others had 
strong objections to specific parts of the report 
but were not against the general direction taken. 
3. Your Rapporteur therefore gathered that 
he had mistaken the significance of the vote in 
the General Affairs Committee and under-
estimated the differences still existing between 
the members of WEU over the shape of the 
European union which a large majority is 
seeking to promote. 
4. The discussions in Committee showed that 
there were very clear divergencies between its 
members, essentially over the likelihood of a 
European defence policy, the possibility of which 
was challenged by some members. 
5. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the text 
he is submitting does not represent the Commit-
tee's unanimous opinion. He has taken full 
account of all the objections made in plenary 
sitting and in Committee either, where they 
do not affect the general trend of his work, by 
completely revising the terms of the report or, in 
the case of positions he could not endorse, by 
incorporating a summary of the objections in the 
body of the report, indicating that they are not 
his own views. 
6. The divergencies no doubt stem from the 
fundamental opinions of those concerned, but 
are also due to a degree of uncertainty about 
the future of WEU, of Europe and perhaps of 
the Atlantic Alliance too. It is therefore difficult 
to distinguish between what is due to present, 
temporary circumstances and what is paving the 
way for the future organisation of Europe. 
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7. Speaking in the Dutch Parliament, Mr. van 
der Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, recently defined the present posi-
tion of WEU as follows : 
"Ministerial consultation in the context of 
WEU takes place less frequently since the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC 
and since political co-operation has mainly 
been transferred to the European political 
co-operation (of the Nine). 
This does not, however, mean a weakeninll 
of WEU, as it is a direct result of the ever-
increasing political consultation of the mem-
bers of the European Communities, which 
group comprises besides Ireland and Den-
mark all seven member partners of WEU. 
It does, however, mean that within WEU, 
even more than before, the accent will come 
to lie on the work of the Assembly which 
in the opinion of the government makes an 
important contribution to opinion-forming 
and on the dialogue between the Assembly 
and the Council and individual Ministers." 
8. Your Rapporteur might fully agree with 
such a statement if the Minister had also given 
his government's position on the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty which, until further 
notice, is the only juridical basis for a truly 
European defence policy. Moreover, one Com-
mittee member felt that, in view of uncertainty 
about British intentions, the possibility of WEU 
resuming its importance should be left open and 
in the meantime its role should be confined to 
that of the Assembly, as Mr. van der Stoel had 
said. 
9. Your Rapporteur, for his part, has confidence 
in the British desire to remain in the European 
Community and has based his thinking on the 
prospect of a European union comprising in any 
event the nine present members of the EEC. It is 
evident that if circumstances were to modify 
the situation in Europe the present report would 
have to be reviewed. 
10. Another objection to the report was that it 
sought to justify "French policy, which was to 
have France play a leading role in the defence 
of Europe". 
11. This is a criticism your Rapporteur could 
not accept. He had in no way sought to justify 
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French policy or claim French supremacy in 
Europe, he had merely considered the prospects 
open to Europe taking account of the positions 
adopted by France in the last ten years. 
12. Finally, your Rapporteur has to take 
account of a number of events which occurred 
since he wrote his last report, i.e. essentially the 
decisions taken at the summit conference held 
in Paris on 9th and lOth December 1974 and 
the important views expressed at the WEU 
Assembly's session in December 1974 by Mr. Van 
Elslande and Mr. Vredeling, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Belgium and Minister of 
Defence of the Netherlands respectively, which 
very directly concern the role attributed by these 
two countries to WEU at the present juncture. 
13. For all these reasons, this document will not 
be the result of a vain attempt to correct, cut 
up and rearrange an old report, it will seek to 
give an entirely new shape to the presentation 
of ideas which have remained the same. 
D. European union 
14. On 9th and lOth December 1974, the Heads 
of State or of Government of the member coun-
tries of the European Economic Community held 
a summit meeting in Paris which they decided 
should be the last of its kind. At this meeting, 
they defined the way in which they intend in 
future to deal with matters concerning relations 
between Europe and the rest of the world as 
follows: 
" ... Recognising the need for an overall 
approach to the internal problems involved 
in achieving European unity and the 
external problems facing Europe, the Heads 
of Government consider it essential to ensure 
progress and overall consistency in the 
activities of the Communities and in the 
work on political co-operation. 
The Heads of Government have therefore 
decided to meet, accompanied by the Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs, three times a 
year and, whenever necessary, in the Coun-
cil of the Communities and in the context 
of political co-operation. The administrative 
secretariat will be provided for in an appro-
priate manner with due regard for existing 
practices and procedures. 
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Greater latitude will be given to the perma-
nent representatives so that only the most 
important political problems need be discus-
sed in the Council. To this end, each member 
State will take the measures it considers 
necessary to strengthen the role of the 
permanent representatives and involve them 
in preparing the national positions on Euro-
pean affairs." 
15. Thus, the Heads of State or of Government 
defined new procedure for dealing more effi-
ciently with questions which are essential for 
the European Community. It should however 
be noted that the British and Danish Delegations 
did not associate themselves with the other seven 
member countries of the EEC on the election of 
the parliamentary assembly by universal suf-
frage. Furthermore, matters concerning defence 
and the relationship between foreign policy and 
the security of Europe were probably not dis-
cussed at the summit meeting in Paris. In any 
event, they were not mentioned in the final 
communique. 
16. It may nevertheless be considered that the 
Paris summit meeting gave new impetus to Euro-
pean union in political matters. Consequently, 
the question of organising Europe in defence 
matters will become increasingly acute as and 
when progress is made with political Europe. 
17. Decisions taken at the Paris summit meeting 
and the establishment of the European Council 
in 1975 make it unlikely that a European union 
will be formed on federal lines. Within the EEC, 
the governments seem to wish to give the Council 
sway over the Commission. Opposition between 
the institutions of the Rome Treaty and WEU 
is therefore declining and there seems little justi-
fication for the idea that the treaties on which 
European co-operation is based might be con-
siderably modified. 
18. It therefore seems realistic to envisage 
Europe being organised in the next few years 
on the basis of existing treaties, among which 
the modified Brussels Treaty is the only one to 
cover security and defence questions. Since Ire-
land and Denmark, members of the European 
Community, have never acceded to the Brussels 
Treaty, it is rather unlikely that WEU will be 
able to form the defence branch of the European 
Community in the near future, however logical 
this may appear at first sight. Conversely, it is 
unlikely that if Denmark and Ireland were pre-
pared to be associated with a European defence 
policy they would still refuse to accede to the 
modified Brussels Treaty. 
19. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes 
to recall a remark made by Lord Gladwyn in a 
report submitted to the WEU Assembly in 
November 1971 : 
" ... It would be inacceptable, therefore, for 
any State to join the EEC on the implied 
assumption that it would not one day have 
to accept responsibility for European 
foreign policy and defence. For if it did join 
on such an assumption there might be real 
difficulty in organising the defence of 
Europe at some possibly very critical 
moment in the not too far distant future. If 
this thesis is not admitted then it is dif-
ficult to see how progress can be made 
otherwise than by building up WEU as it 
were in parallel with the EEC pending 
the day when the parliament of Europe can 
be brought into the field of defence and 
foreign policy. But if it is admitted, there 
is a strong case for now taking over the 
whole WEU machine as it is and to a 
certain extent merging it with the existing 
EEC apparatus." 
20. When conditions allow, it would therefore 
seem desirable for the Council to invite Den-
mark and Ireland officially to join the treaty 
and to do likewise in the case of all countries 
applying for membership of the EEC. Should 
such countries refuse to accede to the treaty, it 
would still be possible to envisage the formation 
of a lop-sided European union, wider in the 
economic field, narrower in the defence and 
external policy fields. Everything indicates that 
this is the course on which Europe has actually 
embarked. 
21. There is one more objection to the previous 
report of the General Affairs Committee 
advanced by several speakers at the December 
session. They stressed the discriminatory nature 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly 
towards the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
considered it undesirable that a treaty whose 
signatories are not on equal footing should serve 
as a basis for European union. 
22. Here your Rapporteur endorses the wish 
expressed by the European Progressive Democrat 
Group on 25th June 1974 calling on the Decem-
ber summit conference to take a decision on 




"a uniform statute for the member States 
of WEU, with an increased emphasis on 
the role of the Armaments Committee of 
this organisation." 
23. It should be noted that Irish parliamenta-
rians also endorsed this wish, which implies that 
Irish public opinion is perhaps less hostile to 
a European defence organisation than is some-
times claimed. Conversely, the Federal Republic 
has never officially asked that the modified Brus-
sels Treaty be re-negotiated in order to revise 
the discriminatory clauses. 
24. It is clear that the European union as it is 
now taking shape is in many ways reminiscent 
of the Fouchet plan submitted to the European 
Parliamentary Assembly on 20th December 1961. 
In a report dated 4th April 1962, Mr. Badini 
Confalonieri meticulously compared the bases of 
a European union in the then French proposals 
with what the seven member countries of WEU 
had subscribed to in the modified Brussels Treaty 
which, according to him : 
"goes just as far as the French proposals, 
notably in: 
- in principle, wider competence ; 
- two-thirds, and simple majority vote in 
certain cases ; 
- automatic assistance in the case of 
attack; 
- the whole defence provisions ... " 
He added: 
"If the French proposals can be amended 
in this sense, the European interest pres-
cribes that they should be accepted in order 
to give a new start. If this is not done, the 
whole organisation could fall back into inter-
governmental inertia. The adaptation of the 
now proven and tested community methods 
to the new political community constitutes 
the right method for the future." 
25. This now seems to have occurred and the 
problems facing Western Europe in 1962 are 
still there today in a not very different form 
and your Rapporteur feels that here he is up-
holding a cause and ideas which for a long time 
and on many occasions have been upheld by the 
General Affairs Committee and the Assembly. 
26. Summing up the discussion on this report, 
the Committee Chairman pointed out that he 
considered the question which seemed to be 
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dividing Committee members was mainly when 
could a discussion on defence be held in the 
framework of the Nine. Your Rapporteur feels 
this should be quite soon, otherwise, it it fails 
to assume responsibility for its own security, 
Europe might be taken unawares by new situa-
tions towards which its members might take 
individual action to ensure their own security. 
The result might be to bring down the European 
edifice and considerably increase the threat to 
the independence of our countries. 
m. European defence in the framework of 
the Atlantic Alliance 
27. Eight of the nine member countries of the 
European Community are members of the Atlan-
tic Alliance, as are also the seven member coun-
tries of WEU. For them, the North Atlantic 
Treaty has a number of implications in the 
political field on the one hand and the defence 
field on the other. Signed on 4th April 1949, 
the treaty dates back to a time when there was 
no real organisation of Europe. The States which 
signed it were totally independent of each other. 
The treaty implies a number of commitments, 
the principal of which are set out in Article 3, 
by which the parties undertake separately and 
jointly to resist armed attack ; Article 5, by 
which the parties agree that if one of them is 
attacked they will take "such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to 
restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area", and Article 9 establishing a 
Council to consider matters concerning the imple-
mentation of the treaty. It should be noted that 
the undertakings entered into by the signatories 
of the North Atlantic Treaty are rather vague 
and limited. Article 5 does not define the meas-
ures to be taken by each party in the event of 
one of them being attacked and Article 9 places 
no obligations on those taking part in the Council 
set up by the treaty. 
28. It therefore became necessary subsequently 
for the Atlantic Alliance to set up a number of 
bodies to compensate for the shortcomings of 
the treaty. Thus, through NATO and the mili-
tary integration of forces stationed in Europe 
under one command, also integrated, the Euro-
pean members of NATO entered into military 
commitments extending far beyond those embo-
died in the treaty. Where deterrence is concerned, 
it may be said that the effect of integrated forces 
is at least equal and probably superior to what 
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might be achieved through the undertaking set 
out in the treaty. It is especially valid in that 
for more than twenty-five years the United 
States has maintained large numbers of troops 
on the mainland of Europe and in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in particular. Their pre-
sence means that an attacker would have to come 
to grips with the United States, and the American 
nuclear weapon can thus play its full deterrent 
role. 
29. However, two European countries, France 
in 1966 and Greece in August 1974, decided to 
withdraw their forces from the NATO inte-
grated commands, although proclaiming their 
wish to remain members of the Atlantic Alliance. 
In February 1975, Turkey for its part announced 
that it was considering closing all or some of 
the American bases on its territory in response 
to a decision by the United States Congress to 
suspend American military assistance to Turkey 
because of the Cyprus conflict. 
30. France's withdrawal from NATO raised a 
number of military, technical and financial prob-
lems which now seem to have been almost entirely 
solved. When President Ford and President Gis-
card d'Estaing met in Martinique in December 
1974 they concluded an agreement on the last 
outstanding point at issue, that of reimbursing 
the United States for the cost of infrastructure 
set up in France by the Americans prior to 1966 
and taken over by the French Government in 
1967. Moreover, co-operation between French and 
NATO forces has continued and has been streng-
thened in recent years in a way that appears 
acceptable to both parties. 
31. This is not the case for Greece. No one yet 
knows the full extent of the decision taken by 
Greece in summer 1974 for reasons which seem 
to be due more to the then prevailing situation 
in the Eastern Mediterranean than to an overall 
view of the future of the Atlantic Alliance. 
Finally, in the case of Turkey, whose latest 
decisions are still not fully known, the United 
States Congress has gone against the advice of 
the United States Government and has taken 
steps which may have a considerable impact on 
European security. 
32. However, progress made by the European 
countries in economic integration since 1950 sug-
gested that a time might come when the forces 
of a united Europe would constitute a sufficiently 
strong element of the Alliance to counterbalance 
American power. By speaking of the two pillars 
of the Atlantic Alliance, President Kennedy 
raised the idea of a partnership in which Europe 
and the United States would, in principle, be 
placed on an equal footing. In reality, this equal 
footing has never been achieved, particularly 
because Europe has been unable to achieve 
political unity. 
33. In such circumstances, General de Gaulle 
decided to withdraw French forces from the 
NATO integrated military structure and to ask 
NATO forces to withdraw from French territory. 
At the same time, France accelerated the develop-
ment of its nuclear force. However, no other 
member of NATO has followed France's policy 
and it has consequently become isolated from 
its European partners. In a manner of speaking 
it constitutes a separate element of the Alliance 
since it intends to respect in full the under-
takings into which it entered on signing the 
Atlantic Pact but does not intend to find itself 
committed beyond that through a system of 
military integration. Even so, it is prepared to 
go a long way in military co-operation with the 
allied countries in order to be prepared to meet 
any contingencies and in the military field it 
co-operates closely with its NATO allies. 
34. France's withdrawal also compelled it to 
hold bilateral negotiations with the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the legal grounds for 
maintaining French forces in Germany, which 
the Federal Republic wished. 
35. The maintenance of French forces in Ger-
many is now raising two sets of problems, which 
should be reconsidered by the French and Ger-
man Governments, concerning the need for and 
conditions of stationing French forces on Federal 
German territory, as was very clearly shown 
recently in a series of articles by the military 
correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, Adelbert Weinstein. 
36. First, in 1974 the French forces were 
equipped with tactical nuclear weapons which 
are located not on the territory of the Federal 
Republic but in France's eastern provinces. It 
is evident that the use of such weapons concerns 
the Federal Republic not only because it is a 
matter of defending the whole of Western Europe 
but also because German territory would suffer 
considerable damage if these weapons were to 
be used. 
37. Second, the maintenance of French troops 
on Federal German territory is now raising a 
number of problems which call for clarification 
of the status of these forces, which was laid down 
53 
DOCUMENT 662 
in a bilateral Franco-German treaty. In this 
connection, Chancellor Schmidt said in an inter-
view in the Figaro of 3rd February 1975 : 
"French public opinion must realise that 
despite our differences of opinion about 
NATO we consider French participation in 
the defence of Europe to be essential, for 
one day it might well prove necessary. This 
is not the situation at present, but it cannot 
be entirely precluded. We therefore hope 
the French Government is not considering 
withdrawing French troops from Germany. 
This might give the impression that France 
has absolutely no interest in common 
defence." 
38. For some years, further difficulties have 
been emerging within NATO due to the fact 
that the members of the Atlantic Alliance are 
becoming increasingly reluctant to make the 
necessary effort to maintain adequate forces in 
Western Europe. 
39. In recent years, it has become clear that the 
Warsaw Pact armies have more troops and 
weapons than NATO in every sector of conven-
tional defence. Recourse to nuclear weapons in 
the event of war may therefore very quickly 
become necessary, whereas all members of NATO 
agree that it is essential to deploy sufficient 
conventional forces to be able to put up efficient 
resistance to any attack without resorting to the 
terrible destruction involved in the use of nuclear 
weapons. This shows a degree of weakness on 
the part of the European governments, and 
behind the governments the people, who are not 
prepared to accept the implications - particu-
larly financial - of an effective defence policy. 
The time taken to replace obsolete weapons is 
increasingly long, force levels are falling and 
there are many signs that the combat-readiness 
of these forces is on the decline. 
40. It is difficult to assess the relative impor-
tance of the various causes of this weakening 
of the Western European countries' will to 
defend themselves. Fighting in Europe certainly 
seems less likely than twenty years ago, it is 
more difficult to make the younger generations 
accept the constraints of military life and eco-
nomic recession is forcing States to make savings 
and savings in defence budgets are the least 
unpopular. But one may also wonder whether 
the fact of relying on American nuclear weapons 
for the main element of collective defence policy 
is not one of the reasons why European society 
appears increasingly to be losing interest in its 
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own security. European defence efforts often 
seem to be aimed more at convincing the United 
States that it must maintain its forces in Europe 
than at preparing an effective participation in 
the defence of Europe. 
41. Admittedly, the adoption of a declaration 
by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th 
June 1974, signed by the Heads of European 
Governments in Brussels on 26th June, sought 
to give new significance to western defence 
policy. But close study of this text shows that 
it has little effect on the present situation since 
the signatories recognise that the presence of 
American forces in Europe "remains indispen-
sable", without specifying for how long, however. 
The European countries, for their part, "under-
take" to contribute to maintaining the common 
defence "at a level capable of deterring and if 
necessary repelling all actions directed against 
the independence and territorial integrity of the 
members of the Alliance", while the Americans 
declare their "resolve" to do likewise. These had 
been everyone's officially proclaimed aims for a 
long time, but there is nothing to show that the 
Brussels declaration has profoundly changed the 
de facto attitude of its signatories. 
42. Your Rapporteur believes that Eurogroup 
was set up within NATO in order to meet the 
need felt by most of the European members of 
the Alliance to find a new balance within the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
43. He does not wish to enter into the debate 
between France and its European partners on 
the usefulness of Eurogroup. It is enough to 
note the French position as again defined by 
the French Minister of Defence on 14th Decem-
ber 1974: 
"Eurogroup is in fact a club with no formal 
structure which itself carries out no pro-
gramme of co-operation. Results achieved to 
date give no reason to think that it is the 
best tool for European co-operation in the 
armaments field. It is closely linked with 
the Defence Planning Committee of which 
France is not a member." 
44. It may therefore be assumed that France 
has no intention of joining Eurogroup at the 
present juncture. Some non-French Committee 
members wished the present report to record the 
fact that they deplored this situation. 
45. Consequently, the question is whether it is 
necessary or desirable for Europe to concern 
itself with matters affecting its defence and in 
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what institutional framework is it possible to do 
so. It is evident to your Rapporteur that Europe 
can in no event depend on others for shaping 
its defence policy. Even if it is essential for this 
to be carried out in close co-operation with the 
United States and for co-operation normally to 
take place in the framework of NATO, this does 
not mean that Europe must condemn itself to 
non-existence in the defence field. The real prob-
lem is what are the priorities. Should Europe be 
built first while ensuring its own defence -
which means that Europe must identify itself 
through its institutions and through its policy 
in external relations and defence matters 1 Or 
should an effective western defence policy have 
priority over building Europe ? 
46. Lord Gladwyn gave an excellent description 
of the institutional framework of the problem 
in a report which he submitted to the European 
Parliament at the end of 1974. He described 
three alternatives : organising European defence 
round the European Communities, round Euro-
group or round WEU. 
4 7. The fact that the European Heads of State 
or of Government have never given serious con-
sideration to defence matters at the summit 
meetings which have succeeded each other in 
recent years makes the first alternative highly 
unlikely in the foreseeable future, even though 
many may consider it the most desirable. 
48. The second alternative would in any event 
mean France giving up what has been one of the 
basic elements of its foreign policy since 1966. 
It hardly seems prepared to do so and your 
Rapporteur, for his part, does not want it to. 
49. In your Rapporteur's view, the third alter-
native has the considerable merit of being based 
on existing treaties and, as the WEU Assembly 
has often proposed, of allowing existing links 
between WEU and NATO or even between WEU 
and Eurogroup to be retained and strengthened. 
Finally, this solution has the advantage of plac-
ing defence matters in a European framework 
which could easily be integrated in a European 
union at a later date. Your Rapporteur advocates 
the third solution since Lord Gladwyn's first 
alternative seems fairly unlikely in the near 
future and the second hardly desirable. 
IV. WEU in the European union 
50. In a report submitted on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee in December 1966, 
Mr. Kirk described the implications for WEU 
of the withdrawal of French forces from NATO 
and concluded as follows : 
"The essential element in all that has been 
said here is the maintenance and strengthen-
ing of the Alliance as a whole, both through 
placing greater emphasis on the defence of 
Europe by Europeans, and by maintaining 
a contact with the French through WEU. 
Two things should be underlined, however. 
The first is that, though the immediate prob-
lem may appear to be temporary, the 
objective of placing greater stress on Euro-
pean activity, either through European con-
ventional and nuclear forces, or through 
some other means, should be regarded as 
permanent. It should, in fact, have been 
attempted long ago. The second is - and 
this is perhaps the most important thing of 
all - that there should be no suggestion of 
WEU acting apart from the United States, 
let alone in active hostility to it. The vast 
majority of the States and peoples of Wes-
tern European Union would wholly repu-
diate any such a suggestion. So, it goes 
without saying, does your Rapporteur." 
51. He thus stressed that he saw no contradic-
tion between the desire to build a European 
union with defence responsibilities and close co-
operation between Europe and the United States. 
This is a fundamental attitude which seems to 
have dominated the work of our Assembly, par-
ticularly when it adopted the abovementioned 
report by Lord Gladwyn in November 1971. 
Moreover, at the same time it adopted another 
report, submitted by Mr. Boyden, which affirmed 
the Rapporteur's concern to pursue political and 
military co-operation in the framework of NATO 
to the greatest possible degree and relegated the 
prospect of European union to second place. 
Finally, this has been the nucleus of the debate 
which has dominated the work of the Assembly 
since 1966. 
52. It is quite clear that no one envisages a 
European defence policy without a major Ame-
rican contribution. The question is whether the 
defence of Europe is an American affair to which 
the Europeans are merely required to make a 
contribution or whether it is first and foremost 
a European affair. In the latter case, Europe 
must define its intentions in the fields of arms 
production, strategy and foreign policy, even 
if it has to discuss them subsequently with the 
Amerieans. No institution can replace political 
55 
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determination which, of course, can be defined 
only in the framework of the nine countries which 
have affirmed their intention to form a Euro-
pean union. 
53. Two Ministers replied to this question at the 
Assembly's last session: Mr. Van Elslande, Min-
ister for Foreign Mfairs of Belgium, and Mr. 
Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Nether-
lands. The first stated that : 
"A common foreign policy necessarily 
implies a common defence policy. The fact 
that we are all members of the Atlantic 
Alliance cannot be used as an alibi to justify 
the lack of a European defence policy. 
Standardisation is made necessary by com-
pelling economic considerations. Thorough 
standardisation implies the unification of 
tactical and strategic concepts, together with 
increasing integration of production. But 
such integration is inconceivable in the 
absence of political decisions. 
It seems to me therefore that through this 
approach we have a pragmatic means of 
promoting military integration in Europe, 
thus progressively imparting an initial con-
tent to this notion. It is a limited and tech-
nical approach but, as I shall point out, it 
also has the merit of emerging, though in 
a more modest manner, on to the political 
field and thus preparing the ground for 
European defence." 
54. Mr. Vredeling said: 
" ... The Nine of the EEC likewise have 
decided to consider, at their periodic con-
sultations, that area in which it is evidently 
most difficult to arrive at a form of co-
operation- namely, foreign policy. 
They expressly demonstrated their desire to 
evolve a European policy, with its own 
distinctive personality vis-a-vis the outside 
world, by transforming the system that 
governs their relations into a European 
union by the year 1980 or thereabouts. 
It is against this background that I discern 
possibilities for intensifying European co-
operation in the field of defence, and ulti-
mately for working out a policy of col-
lective security designed to proceed hand 
in hand with political unification." 
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55. The French position was described by Mr. 
Soufflet, then Minister of Defence, on 14th 
December 1974: 
"The government attaches great importance 
to European co-operation in the field of 
armaments. Following on past and present 
achievements, carried out principally with 
Britain and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, it is endeavouring in the same spirit 
to find· other projects which could lead to 
co-operative programmes. It has also had 
WEU consider the conditions in which the 
Standing Armaments Committee might be 
reactivated to deal with the8e matters. Its 
action, with the support of some of its part-
ners, and Italy in particular, has come to 
no conclusion for the moment." 
56. It may be wondered whether real progress 
can be made towards political union, i.e. not the 
creation of any form of new organisation but 
the definition of a European foreign policy, if 
there is no fundamental agreement in the defence 
field. To an increasing extent, the idea is gaining 
ground in Europe and it is evident in the Euro-
pean press that such agreement cannot be 
confined to what is done in the NATO frame-
work but must cover : 
(a) A concept of defence policy and strat.egy 
so that relations between Europe and the Umted 
States in the defence field are not confined to 
national resistance - uneven and in any event 
ineffective - to successive United States con-
cepts which correspond solely to United States 
interests in this field. 
(b) Co-ordination of national nuclear policies. 
There is obviously no changing the fact that 
the United Kingdom and France have national 
nuclear forces and the only question that may 
arise is whether they must remain an instrument 
of national policies or whether co-ordination is 
possible in a European framework. 
(c) The use of various kinds of forces in the 
event of hostilities so that Europe's defence may 
be based on a common concept of military action. 
Naturally, NATO can but remain the preferred 
forum for concertation as long as American for-
ces occupy an essential place in the Western 
European defence system. 
(d) The maintenance of European forces at an 
adequate level in the Central Europe sector. In 
this connection, General Valentin, former Com-
mander of the French First Army, writing in 
Revue de Defense nationale, August-September 
1974, said: 
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"The first reaction to consideration of the 
balance of forces in the near future is con-
cern at the reduction of the effort being 
made by the Western European powers, 
whereas the East's arms are being increased 
in number and quality. We saw above that 
the present stability was possible without 
parity between the opposing forces because 
of the threat of recourse to nuclear 
weapons; nevertheless, this balance implies 
that the level of the West's forces must be 
above a certain threshold. In other words, 
the ratio of Warsaw Pact forces to those 
of the Atlantic Pact must not be such as 
to allow the former to advance like water 
through a sieve without any firm reaction 
or real fighting. Yet it may be considered 
that this threshold is not much lower than 
the point which Western European forces 
will soon have reached. 
The Germans, who are well equipped numeri-
cally, are going to reduce their peacetime 
level 1 : admittedly, the reduction of numbers 
in the smaller units will be offset by an 
increase in the number of brigades and 
improved organisation of the call-up of reser-
vists. However this may be, overall, it is to 
be feared that these reforms may not result 
in an improvement and there will unde-
niably be a reduction in the number of 
troops. The British BAOR divisions have 
two brigades, which does not permit manoeu-
vre. For several years the Dutch and the 
Belgians have been steadily reducing their 
troop levels in Germany, and the future 
measures envisaged by the latter are hardly 
likely to reverse this trend, quite the con-
trary. As for France, although its first army 
will soon be reinforced with tactical nuclear 
weapons, it needs more thirty-ton tanks and 
to speed up the modernisation of its equip-
ment, which is spread over too long a period. 
Moreover, it is no secret that the fighter 
aircraft of all these nations are below 
strength. In fact, the Western European 
countries should increase the percentage of 
military expenditure rather than reduce or 
stabilise it, otherwise, because of the pro-
gress of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, the 
ratio of one army to the other will soon fall 
below the critical threshold." 
1. A German member of the Committee specified that 
the Federal Republic would make such a. reduction only 
in the framework of mutual and balanced force reductions. 
(e) Armaments, their standardisation, produc-
tion and distribution to European forces. It 
seems increasingly essential to the survival of 
a European arms industry capable of ensuring 
some degree of independence for Europe in this 
field for Europeans to define their needs jointly 
and work out their production programmes in 
the light of joint requirements. 
57. Some Committee members underlined that 
they considered satisfactory results had already 
been achieved in this field. Your Rapporteur 
does not deny that prospects are promising but 
he feels that in most cases this is just a start, 
many of them being bilateral agreements which, 
although useful, contain but few commitments 
for the future and in no way constitute a mean-
ingful European policy for the joint production 
of armaments. 
58. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes 
to recall the reply given by General Beaufre to 
a question put by a member of this Assembly on 
15th December 1966 : 
" 
What I say is that if we do not set up a 
common market for armaments in Europe, 
that is, if we do not manufacture 2,000 tanks 
at a time instead of only 15, our whole arma-
ments production is wasteful. That is cer-
tain. 
In the second place, I think the same holds 
good for research. If we do not pool our 
research potential and provide research with 
powerful means - both financial and intel-
lectual - we lose ground and we shall end 
by buying only American or Russian mate-
riel, for in a decade or two the Americans 
and the Russians will be a long way ahead 
of us, and I do not think I am mistaken. 
You are asking if this is possible. I repeat 
what I said earlier : we must develop our 
ideas, and, after that, we shall see what 
happens. I think that since this idea is right 
it must work out. If our industrialists had 
it clearly before them, they might be inter-
ested ... " 
59. If such a programme is agreed to, the 
question arises as to the framework in which 
it should be implemented. In this connection your 
Rapporteur wishes to quote from an article by 
General von Kielmansegg, former NATO Com-
57' 
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mander-in-Chief Central Europe, published in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 29th 
August 197 4 : 
"Politicians might be advised to reread the 
EDC treaty. The treaty proper covers fifty-
five pages which means a good hour's 
reading. Even if many elements, particu-
larly in the military and economic fields, 
have now had their day or are obsolete, 
there are also many ideas or provisions in 
this text which were at the time the subject 
of very detailed work and which would be 
usable today. All that covers the finance 
commissariat, the budget and arms program-
mes is more or less ready for use and could 
be used for the continued building of 
Europe, with a few changes and adaptations, 
naturally. The question "where" - for 
instance in Eurogroup or in the framework 
of European political co-operation -
certainly raises problems. First, because it is 
unlikely that all the members of these bodies 
would accept the defence framework. But 
there too we could bear in mind the six-
power EDC and the close links it had with 
Britain through a special treaty. These seven 
countries are the nucleus of Western 
Europe. They are grouped in the EEC. They 
have common interests in the defence field 
and are the members of Western European 
Union, which was the only outcome of the 
EDC disaster in the field of European 
policy. This is where a sort of metempsy-
chosis might take place, if only we wanted 
it." 
60. Without sharing General von Kielmansegg's 
regrets about the EDC, of which the least can be 
said is that it was premature, your Rapporteur 
willingly concedes that some elements of the 
draft treaty to establish the EDC might now be 
suitable for a European defence organisation. 
Above all, he does not think it necessary to seek 
new institutions to carry out what can be done 
in existing institutions and he wonders what 
grounds there may be for wishing to hand over 
to vague institutions involving hardly any com-
mitments for those taking part in them activities 
which should be handled in sound institutions 
based on treaties involving firm commitments for 
their signatories, as is the case of the Brussels 
Treaty. There would be no point in calling for 
more European co-operation if the very basis of 
that co-operation - Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty - were allowed to fade away. 
DOCUMENT 662 
V. Conclusions 
61. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that the 
role of WEU can and must be viewed from two 
different angles, depending on whether one is 
considering the short or longer term. 
62. ( i) In the short term, the modified Brus-
sels Treaty exists and in its present form has a 
number of advantages which it would be most 
dangerous to scorn: 
(a) it ensures automatic military assistance 
in the event of an attack on one of its 
signatories and therefore places the 
British and French nuclear weapons at 
the service of Europe ; 
(b) it is the only treaty which commits the 
Western European countries to close 
concertation in foreign policy questions ; 
(c) it associates France with the NATO 
defence system ; 
(d) it provides for co-operation in arms 
production which can easily be geared 
with the NATO machinery; 
(e) it associates parliamentarians from all 
the member countries with continuing 
examination of defence matters. 
63. For all these reasons, there is ample justifi-
cat.ion ~or ~aintaining WEU while the European 
umon IS bemg worked out. The Council should 
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even be asked to keep a closer watch on the strict 
application of the treaty than it did in 1974. 
64. (ii) Looking towards a future European 
union, the Brussels Treaty may still have an 
important role to play: 
(a) because it exists and present differences 
between its signatories may make it 
most difficult to draw up a new treaty 
on the joint defence of Europe ; 
(b) because it is not far removed from the 
direction the Nine wish to follow in 
their union ; 
(c) because there is nothing to prevent 
WEU being integrated in this union 
once it has the same members as the 
EEC, a prospect which some Com-
mittee members admittedly considered 
remote and uncertain. 
65. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to under-
line that he considers these conclusions are 
fully in line with a number of recommendations 
adopted by the Assembly in recent years, parti-
cularly Recommendation 145 adopted on 15th 
December 1966 by 44 votes to 0 with 4 absten-
tions. This recommendation was submitted by 
Mr. Peter Kirk on behalf of the General Affairs 
Committee. With few exceptions, your Rap-
porteur feels it corresponds to the present situa-
tion and it has provided a useful basis for 
preparing the conclusions to the present report. 
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Amendment No. 1 
European union and WEV 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Richter and others 
28th May 1975 
1. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "regularly and". 
2. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft Recommendation proper and insert: 
"7. Particularly in the examination it has been instructed to effect, to bear in mind the tasks of 
the Standing Armaments Committee in respect of the need to preserve and develop Europe's 
industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology." 
Sig-ned: Richter, Ahrens, Mrs. von Botkmer, Abens, Adriaensens, Treu, Tanghe, Warren 
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(by Mr. Dankert, member of the Committee on Defence Q.,..tiona 
and Armamenta, appointed by the Committee to be aaociated with 
the expert enti'UIJted with tlae eaaential drafting of tlae study) 
1. In a report adopted by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments in 1970 1 , the 
Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel, was led to 
remark: 
"41. A detached observer of the European 
defence scene, his mind uncluttered with 
the preconceptions that have accumulated 
over the years, might well conclude that the 
present manner in which the not negligible 
contributions of the European countries in 
cash and manpower are translated into 
fighting units on the ground are about the 
least rational and least efficient that could 
be devised. After all, the whole of the 
defence effort of most European NATO 
countries is concerned solely with providing 
defence in the NATO framework. Of the 
total of the defence budgets of all European 
NATO countries, probably more than 90% 
is spent on NATO related defence. Yet 
twelve sovereign defence ministries are 
maintained, many with three often autonom-
ous armed services within them. The largest 
European defence budget is ten times that 
of the smallest 2• 
The position of the troops on the ground on 
the central front still reflects very largely 
the pattern of the allied landings on the 
Normandy beaches 26 years ago, and for 
this reason bears little relation to a desirable 
optimum deployment in the present cir-
cumstances." 
2. The Committee, in conclusion, called for a 
high-level review of the whole concept of national 
European defence efforts, and sought to be asso-
ciated with a preliminary study of the problems 
involved. On the Committee's report, the Assem-
bly adopted Order 36, instructing the Committee 
"to examine the possibility of organising a con-
ference on the rationalisation of the defence 
efforts of the European countries, members of 
the Alliance". In implementation of this order, 
the Committee, having first established a sub-
committee which held extensive hearings and 
discussions throughout 1971, finally recom-
1. Document 527, adopted on 3rd November 1970. 
2. Or 760 times that of Luxembourg. 
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mended 1 that five preliminary studies be under-
taken prior to any decision on the convening of 
a conference : 
(i) (a) a rational distribution of defence 
tasks between countries ; and 
(b) a rational deployment of forces on 
the central front ; 
(ii) (a) a concerted long-term programme 
for standardised armaments pro-
curement ; and 
(b) collective logistical support ; 
(iii) a comparative study of the structure 
of national defence organisations. 
3. The Assembly endorsed this proposal in 
Order 40 and Resolution 50 adopted on 1st 
December 1971, but the Council, in 1972, declined 
to make available the necessary finance for the 
five studies. 
4. The report adopted by the Committee in the 
spring of 1973 2 dealt in part with the then pro-
posed negotiations on mutual and balanced force 
reductions ; the report recommended "that if 
some American withdrawals are agreed, then 
Western Europe should urge upon the United 
States changes which would improve its rein-
forcement, supply and deployment capabilities" 
in Europe (paragraph 24). The MBFR negotia-
tions had not then begun, and the Committee 
proposed that the earlier proposed study on the 
rational deployment of forces on the central 
front, in abeyance through lack of funds, should 
be initiated urgently. On the report of the Com-
mittee, the Assembly, on 21st June 1973, adopted 
Order 43 8, instructing the Committee "to arrange 
for the study of the rational deployment of forces 
on the central front, proposed in Document 559, 
to be carried out forthwith... and to be printed 
1. Document 599 : "A conference on the rationalisation 
of the European defence efforts", Rapporteur Mr. Riviere, 
adopted by the Committee on 16th November 1971. 
2. "European security and relations with the countries 
of Eastern Europe", Document 604, Rapporteur Mr. 
Critchley, adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments on 3rd May 1973. 
3. Text at Appendix I to the Preface. 
and published on completion", and deciding that 
the cost of the single study should be met from 
the ordinary budget of the Assembly. The terms 
of reference of the study, as set out in Document 
559, are reproduced at Appendix 1 • 
5. On 7th December 1973, in implementation 
of Order 43, the Presidential Committee, on the 
recommendation of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, appointed General 
Ulrich de Maiziere, former General Inspekteur 
der Bundeswekr, as the expert to undertake the 
study on the rational deployment of forces on 
the central front. The Defence Committee 
appointed me to be associated with General de 
Maiziere in the study, in accordance with the 
procedure envisaged in Document 559. Accord-
ingly, General de Maiziere and I, in the course 
of 1974, visited the capitals of countries maintain-
ing forces on the central front, and the various 
NATO headquarters concerned, for discussions 
with Ministers, senior officials and officers con-
cerning the subject of the study 2• 
6. The first, classified, draft of General de 
Maiziere's study was completed by 31st October 
1974, and has been communicated to the Minis-
tries of Defence of the countries maintaining 
forces on the central front. The text has now been 
amplified in some particulars and prepared for 
publication as an unclassified document. 
7. The study now published is a comprehensive 
document. In accordance with the terms of refer-
ence, the study examines the present deployment 
of forces on the central front and the historical 
reasons which led to the pattern of deployment ; 
and then considers its suitability from the point 
of view of current NATO strategy of forward 
defence and flexible response. General de 
Maiziere concludes that the peacetime locations 
of NATO units are in many ways not ideally 
suited to the role the units would be required 
to play if called upon to implement NATO's 
defensive strategy. After considering certain 
alternative deployment possibilities, the study 
concludes that on the grounds of cost, and in 
view of the changing nature of any defence 
plans, there would be no overall advantage to 
the defence effort in undertaking major reloca-
tion of units in peacetime. Certain minor adjust-
ments are however advocated, and recommenda-
tions are made concerning improved reinforce-
1. Text at Appendix II to the Preface. 




ment capabilities and facilities for rece1vmg 
reinforcements. The need for binding agreements 
with France concerning the circumstances and 
time in which French forces would be available 
to NATO command is also mentioned. 
8. General de Maiziere goes on to consider other 
ways to make more economic use of the funds 
provided for defence, through rationalisation in 
three broads fields. He considers first an 
improvement of national defence structures, 
including unification of the three services, 
modernisation of service equipment, and the need 
to ensure a proper balance between the three 
services. The study then discusses rationalisation 
through specialisation on a multinational basis, 
and finally deals with rationalisation by stand-
ardisation, including logistics, the procurement 
of equipment, and standardisation of training 
and procedures. The study draws particular 
attention to the lack of interoperability and 
compatibility in equipment in service with the 
NATO forces, quoting General Goodpaster to the 
effect that NATO loses about 30 to 50% of its 
potential capability merely by lack of standardi-
S81tion. General de Maiziere coMludes that ration-
alBion by standardisation is the most promis-
ing and most convincing way to achieve greater 
effectiveness from the funds made available for 
defence. 
9. It is noteworthy that the other areas for 
rationalisation of the defence efforts to which 
General de Maiziere draws attention at the con-
clusion of his study of the deployment of forces 
on the central front are precisely the four 
remaining topics for study - enumerated in 
paragraph 2 above- which the Committee pro-
posed in its initial report on the rationalisation 
of European defence efforts. 
10. The following study is the responsibility of 
General de Maiziere, although in accordance with 
the procedure envisaged by the Assembly in 
adopting Order 43 I have been BSiiOciated with 
him chiefly in the fact-finding interviews which 
we undertook together. It was always the Com-
mittee's intention, however, in proposing the five 
studies in the first place, that the essential draft-
ing should be entrusted to an expert, who would 
be free to express his own views. This General de 
Maiziere has done, and the study has not been 
submitted to the Committee prior to publication. 
11. I myself do not entirely share all the views 
expressed in General de Maiziere's study. As 
Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments, I am responsible for a 
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chapter on the same subject in the Committee's 
forthcoming report on the state of European 
security to which reference should be made for 
a statement of the Committee's views. I do, how-
ever, commend the whole study by General de 
Maiziere as a most authoritative basis for discus-
sion of a subject of great urgency. 
12. The Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments considers itself fortunate in having 
secured the services of such a distinguished 
soldier as General Ulrich de Maiziere. Drawing 
on his own extensive experience and that of his 
many friends in the armed forces of the NATO 
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countries, General de Maiziere has been able to 
provide a wealth of information in the study 
which would not otherwise have been readily 
available. On behalf of the Committee and in my 
own name, I take this opportunity of expressing 
our thanks to him for all the hard work that has 
gone into this authoritative document, and for 
his kindness in co-operating with a layman like 
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APPENDIX I 
ORDER 43 1 
on the rational deployment of forea on the eentral front 
The Assembly, 
Recalling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ; 
Recalling that the letter from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of 30th March 1972 asserted 
that the Council shared the Assembly's aims in this connection; 
Considering the results of certain meetings that governments, in implementation of the foregoing 
letter, have arranged with their parliamentarians who are members of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments ; 
Aware of the need to study fully the particular problems and requirements of European defence 
with undiminished security at any lower force levels that may be agreed in the course of negotiations on 
mutual and balanced force reductions, 
1. Instructs its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on the 
rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith in 
accordance viith paragraphs 20 to 24 of the explanatory memorandum and Appendix III (i) (b) of that 
document and to be printed and published on completion ; 
2. Decides that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly. 
l. Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 21st June 1973. 
3- I 
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APPENDIX II 
Terms of reference 
(from Appendix III to Document 559) 
Rational deployment of (oren on the central front 
The study should first describe the present 
relationship between the permanent locations of 
forces ·assigned to Allied Forces Central Europe 
and their war locations called for by the policy 
of forward defence. The contribution of recent 
history, such as the second world war and earlier 
patterns of NATO deployment, should be 
mentioned. 
The study should then consider whether the 
order in which the broad areas of the war loca-
tions are allocated to assigned national units, both 
from right to left of the central front and from 
front to rear, corresponds to the optimum when 
account is taken of : 
- military effectiveness for a strategy of 
flexible response and forward defence, 
and the relative military capabilities of 
different national units and their 
weapons systems ; 
- political effectiveness and the need to 
demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance 
in all situations ; 
- possible future levels of the different 
national units ; the possible impact of 
any negotiations on mutual and balooced 
force reductions. 
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The study should suggest possible models 
for optimum deployment, not eschewing innova-
tions such as the creation of highly-mobile multi-
national units in reserve positions, or the 
possibility of a pattern of deployment designed 
to facilitate agreement on MBFRs without pre-
judicing military effectiveness at any stage. 
The study should examine any changes in 
the permanent location of assigned units which 
present or possible optimum war locations make 
desirable, taking account of : 
- the need f«>r a high standard of accom-
modation and amenities for allied forces 
and their dependents; 
- the need for access to local training 
areas; 
- the provision of logistic support, and 
lines of communication in reinforcement 
and supply; 
- the cost of any changes. 
The study should finally review any 
proposaJs advanced for optimum deployment in 
war locations, in the light of the feasibility of 
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Study 
(by General Ulrich de Maiziere) 
A. 1. Introduction 
1. In accordance with the terms of reference 
laid down by the Assembly of Western Euro-
pean Union this study deals with the rational 
deployment of forces on the central front. The 
author assumes that the term "central front" is 
to be interpreted as covering the area of the 
NATO central region under the command of 
CINCENT whose headqu~B.rters are located at 
Brunssum in the southern part of the Nether-
lands. 
2. Therefore, the study will be concerned pri-
marily with the allied forces deployed in the 
central region which are at the disposal of 
SACEUR, or CINCENT respectively, for opera-
tional planning and control. However, it will not 
disregard the forces still under national control 
which are deployed in the central region and 
adjacent areas to the extent that they are im-
portant for the combined defence of the central 
region. 
3. So, considering his task in the light of the 
explanations given in the terms of reference, the 
author feels that the sponsor does not expect 
analysis and presentation of an alternative to the 
actual concept for defence in Central Europe 
which is based upon the North Atlantic Alliance. 
Besides, the author fails to see which alternative 
could offer Europe similar security, or even 
adequate security, as long as the USSR and the 
nations allied with her in the Warsaw Pact have 
at their disposal military capacities which by far 
exceed their actual defence requirements and 
thus obviously have an offensive character, and 
as long as the strong military confrontation in the 
heart of Europe continues to exist. 
4. Furthermore, in order to set the frame for 
the study and the proposals resulting from it, the 
author has based his considerations upon the fol-
lowing suppositions in regard to security and 
defence policy : 
- a dramatic change in the political con-
figuration between East and West is not 
to be expected ; 
- the Atlantic Alliance will retain its 
solidarity. All member nations will con-
tinue to base their policy on the agreed 
twin concept of detente and security. 
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This implies that a "relative" military 
balance can be maintained ; 
- the results of the negotiations on mutual 
balanced force reduction (MBFR) will 
not change the existing "relative" 
balance in Central Europe to the disad-
vantage of the West. Quick results are 
not to be expected from these negotia-
tions; 
- in the years to come the member nations 
will not reduce their financial contri-
butions to military defence but will 
provide for defence budgets which at 
least maintain the purchasing power ; 
- the United States will maintain a sub-
stantial conventional and tactical 
nuclear military presence in Europe ; 
- the member nations which take part in 
an integrated military defence organisa-
tion will continue to do so ; 
- the strategy of flexible response which 
includes forward defence will remain 
the basis of common defence planning ; 
- French forces will continue to be sta-
tioned in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The President of the French 
Republic will continue to reserve to 
himself the right to decide whether and 
at what time French forces shall parti-
cipate in the combined defence against 
a military aggression by the Warsaw 
Pact. 
5. Finally, the author presumes that a break-
through in technical development comparable 
in dimension to the first employment of nuclear 
weapons is not to be expected. On the other hand, 
the further development of conventional and 
nuclear weapon systems will bring forth remark-
able improvements in regard to range, accuracy 
and lethality. The importance of electronic means 
of command and control and combat will grow 
rapidly. 
6. The problems associated with nuclear 
weapons, especially the question as to what prin-
ciples should govern their use and how these 
would affect defence planning, have been con-
sidered only inasmuch as they have direct bearing 
on the subject discussed, i.e. the study of a ratio-
nal deployment in the central region. 
A. 2. Description of the area treated in this 
study 
7. The central region, in the area of responsi-
bility of CINCENT, covers the territories of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux 
countries (subject to limitations in regard to the 
latter) from the river Elbe in the north to the 
boundaries of Austria and Switzerland in the 
south. Federal German territory north of the 
River Elbe (Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg) 
falls within the .AFNORTH area. The boundaries 
with the two eastern neighbour countries, i.e. the 
German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslo-
vak Socialist Republic - both of them Warsaw 
Pact members - are approximately 800 km long. 
8. The neutral countries of .Austria and Swit-
zerland separate the areas of responsibility of 
CINCENT and CINCSOUTH from one another. 
If, in case of an aggression, the neutrality of 
Austria should not be respected by the Warsaw 
Pact forces, the boundaries would be extended 
by about 170 km. 
9. NATO's strategic concept and SACEUR's 
mission require CINCENT to defend as far for-
ward as possible against any type of aggression 
in a flexible response. 
10. For the accomplishment of this mission, 
forces from six nations are stationed in the 




Federal Republic of Germany (GE) 
Netherlands (NL) 
United Kingdom (UK) 
United States of America (US) 
11. In addition, and in accordance with a bila-
teral agreement, French troops are stationed in 
the south-west of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. They are not incorporated in the NATO 
integrated command structure. 
12. The presence of armed forces of seven allied 
nations on the territory of one country and their 
assignment in advance to multinational command 
authorities for operational planning and inspec-
tion (exclusive of the French units, of course) in 
peacetime has no precedent in history. It has far-
reaching political and military-technical conse-
quences. 
13. For command and control of operations, the 
central region is divided, into two sectors : 
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- theN orthern Army Group (NORTHAG) 
in the area between the Elbe river and 
the Harz mountains, with units from 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
It is associated with the 2nd Allied 
Tactical Air Force (TWO .ATAF) with 
assigned units from the same nations ; 
- south thereof the Central Army Group 
(CENT.AG) with units from Canada, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the United States. The associated 4th 
Allied Tactical .Air Force (FOUR 
ATAF) also has assigned units from 
the same nations. 
l 4. The boundaries between the army groups 
and ATAFs are identical. 
15. For regional responsibility from east to 
west the central region is divided in a different 
way. 
16. The whole territory of the Federal Republic 
of Germany is designated as combat zone (CZ) ; 
it is subdivided into the forward combat zone 
(FCZ), i.e. the zone in which- beginning at the 
frontier - one can expect to find the division 
area and, west thereof, the corps rear area. West 
of the FCZ is the rear combat zone (RCZ) with 
the majority of the supply installations of all 
nations - ending at the western frontier of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
17. The territory of the Benelux countries falls 
within the communication zone (ComZ). It also 
includes supply installations of all nations. 
B. Description of the present deployment 
B.I. Permanent locations of forces in the central 
region 
B.I.l. Present situation 
18. The M-day ground and air forces in the 
central region, which are earmarked for assign-
ment to CINCENT, are deployed as follows (see 
also the attached map, Enclosure 1), (status 1st 
April1974) : 
(a) Ground forces (from North to South) 
NORTHAG (HQ Monchen-Gladbach) 
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I (N L) Oorp8 (HQ Apeldom) with 2 M-day divisions comprising 6 brigades 
Division Brigade Peacetime deployment area 
4 Div 11 Mech Scharsbergen fNL 
(HQ Ha.rderwijk) 12 Mech Nunspeet fNL 
13 Mech Oirschot fNL 
1 Div 41 Armd Seedorf/GE 
(HQ Scharsbergen) 42 Mech AssenfNL 
43 Armd Ka.llenkote fNL 
I ( GE) Oorp8 (HQ Miinster) with 4 M-day divisions comprising 11 brigades 
1 a.bn bde 
1 tk regt 
Division Brigade Peacetime deployment area 
3 Div 7 Armd Ha.mburg-Neugra.ben 
(HQ Buxtehude) 8 Armd Liineburg 
9 Armd Miinster 
11 Div 31 Mech Oldenburg 
(HQ Oldenburg) 32 Mech Schwa.newede 
33 Armd Lingen 
1 (GE) Div 1 Mech Hildesheim 
(HQ Hannover) 2 Mech Brausnchweig 
3 Armd Langendamm 
7 Div 19 Mech Altahlen 
(HQ Unna) 21 Armd Augustdorf 
27 Abn Lippstadt 
100 Tk regt Remer 
I (UK) Gorp& (HQ Bielefeld) with 3 M-day divisions comprising 6 brigades with 
2 tk bn a.nd 
Division Brigade 
1 Div 7 
(HQ Verden) 11 
4 Div 6 
(HQ Herford) 20 
2 Div 4 
(HQ Liibbecke) 12 
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III ( GE) Oorpa (HQ Koblenz) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades 
1 abn bde 
Division Brigade Peacetime deployment area 
2 Div 4Inf GOttingen 
(HQ Kassel) 5 Mech Hom berg 
6 Armd Neustadt 
5 Div 13 Mech Wetzlar 
(HQ Diez) 14 Armd Koblenz 
15 Armd Koblenz 
26 Abn Saar louis 
V (US) Oorpa (HQ FrankfurtjM.) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades and 
Division 
3 Div (Armd) 
(HQ Frankfurt) 
8 Div 








2 Armd cav regt 
1 armd ca.v regt 






Sandhofen (north of Ma.nnheim) 
Fulda in covering force mission 
VII (US) Oorpa (HQ Mohringen) with 2 divisions comprising 6 brigades with 
1 cav regt 
Division 











2 Cav regt 
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Niirnberg in covering force mission 
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II (GE) Corps (HQ Ulm) with 4 divisions comprising 10 brigades and 
1 abn bde 
DiviBion Brigade 
12 Div 35 Mech 
(HQ VeitshOchheim) 36 Mech 
4 Div 10 Inf 
(HQ Regensburg) lllnf 
12 Armd 
1 Div (Mountain) 22 Mountain 
(HQ Garmisch) 23 Mountain 
24 Mech 
10 Div 29 Armd 
(HQ Sigmaringen) 30 Armd 
25 Abn 
200 Tk regt 
19. In addition CENTAG has at its disposal: 
- the 4 (CA) Bde Gp in Lahr ; 
- the 1 (US) Division (Mech) (dual-based), 
2 brigades of which are stationed in 
the United States (Fort Riley, Kansas) 
while the third brigade is permanently 
stationed in the Federal Republic of 
Germany with its home station at GOp-
pingen; 
- one armoured cavalry regiment (dual-
based) at Fort Bliss (United States). 
(b) Air forces 
20. The flying units (as opposed to the static, 
i.e. air defence and missile Pershing units of the 
air forces) for reconnaissance, air attack and air 
defence are stationed on airfields located within, 
and west of, the semi-circle described by the line 
Schleswig-Holstein- Oldenburg- Rheine- Koln-
K!aiserslautern - Baden-Baden -Augsburg. To the 
front of this line there are only a few perma-
nently occupied airfields. 
21. The number of combat aircraft stationed in 
the central region is approximately 1,350. 
Another 146 dual-based aircraft stationed in the 
United States will relocate to the central region 
in times of tension or upon the calling of appro-
priate alert measures. 
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22. The air defence surface-to-air missiles are 
deployed at prepared sites extending from north 
to south in the form of blocking positions, their 
effective radii overlapping so that the entire 
front of the central region is covered provided 
that the United States will leave their units in 
these belts. 
23. The Hawk belt against low-flying aircraft 
extends farther to the east following more or less 
the line Rendsburg - Cuxhaven - Bremen • 
Herford • Marburg - Frankfurt/Main - Wiirz-
burg - Ingolstadt - Miinchen - Rosenheim. 
24. That belt is backed by the Nike belt set up 
against aircraft flying at high altitudes. It runs 
along both sides of the line Wilhelmshaven -
Osnabriick - Dortmund - Wiesbaden - Mann-
heim - Stuttgart - Ravensburg. 
25. Deployed within the Hawk belt are units 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and the United States, and within 
the Nike belt units of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the 
United States. 
26. In peacetime all units employed in air 
defence, including their command and control 
organisations, are already under the operational 
command of SACEUR. 
27. The air forces are under the command 
of TWO ATAF (HQ Monchen-Gladbach) and 
FOUR ATAF (HQ Ramstein) respectively. 
28. The French ground forces stationed on the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany 
which are not included in the integrated NATO 
command structure are stationed as follows : 
II (FR) Corps (HQ in Baden-Oos) with 2 divi-
sions (comprising 6 brigades) 
1 Div in the area Landau-Trier - Wittlich 
(HQ for Trier) 
3 Div in the area Kon.stanz - Offenburg -
Tiibingen (HQ in Freiburg/Breisgau). 
29. In addition the French have the I (FR) 
Corps west of the German-French border with 
HQ in Nancy. 
30. Two of its divisions are stationed in the 
north-eastern part of France, in the area between 
its borders with Switzerland and Belgium : 
7 Div (comprising 3 brigades) with HQ in 
Mulhouse. 
4 Div (comprising 3 brigades) with HQ in 
Verdun. 
31. Another division, i.e. the 8 Div (comprising 
3 brigades), is deployed in the area north and 
east of Paris with HQ in Compiegne. Both 
French corps are under the operational command 
of the 1 (FR) Army in Strasbourg. 
32. All the tactical air forces of France which 
are to co-operate with the 1 (FR) Army are 
stationed on French territory. They are under 
the command of the 1 FATAC with HQ in Metz. 
33. Finally it should not be overlooked that the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France 
have a limited number of occupation forces per-
manently stationed in the western sectors of 
Berlin 1 • Their unimpeded ground ·and air lines 
of communication are ensured by agreement. 
'l'hese units are not part of the forces assigned to 
CINCENT. 
34. However, in accordance with Article 6 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty the Atlantic commit-
1. United States: 1 inf bde; 
United Kingdom : 1 inf bde ; 
France : 1 combat group. 
3° - I 
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ment for assistance expressed in Article 5 will 
take effect in case of an armed attack against 
these forces. 
35. Pursuant to United States publications, 
about 5,000 nuclear warheads of different yields 
for different weapon systems are stored on the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
i.e. within the central region. Due to the fact 
that all nations which have stationed forces in 
the combat zone of the central region and parti-
cipate in the military integrated organisation 
dispose of delivery means of their own, the 
warhead storage sites are deployed throughout 
the entire Federal Republic of Germany where 
they remain as United States property under 
strict United States control. 
B.I.2. Historical development of the peacetime 
deployment of allied forces in the central region 
36. Only to a small degree are the permanent 
locations of the ground and air forces in the 
central region as shown above the result of long-
range planning under operational aspects ; 
rather, their choice was considerably influenced 
by the political development in Central Europe 
after 1945 and by the state of the existing 
infrastructure. 
37. At the end of World War II the defeated 
German Reich was divided into four zones of 
occupation and occupied by the forces of the 
four occupation powers (the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France and the Soviet U,nion). 
The occupation forces were stationed primarily 
in accordance with the requirements for internal 
security and control of the occupied territory. 
The choice of locations was also determined bv 
the availability of barracks, airfields and training 
areas. Number and size of the troops had to be 
in keeping with their occupational tasks. The 
United States and the United Kingdom withdrew 
the forces which were no longer required for 
such tasks in Germany and sent them home, 
where a considerable number of units were demo-
bilised. The Soviet Union, however, did not fol-
low suit. 
38. The increasing tensions in the political 
situation, the expansion of the political and mili-
tary power of the Soviet Union, and eventually 
the Berlin crisis, led to the formation of the 
North Atlantic Alliance as a defence treaty in 
1949. In the same year the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) was constituted from the three 
occupation zones of the United States, the United 
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Kingdom and France, though the occupation 
status was retained for the time being. 
39. The communist invasion of South Korea 
caused the western governments to increase the 
strength of their occupation forces in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and accelerated the delibe-
rations which had already begun in regard to the 
inclusion of the German capabilities in the com-
mon defence efforts. However, the endeavours to 
establish a European Defence Community failed 
in August 1954. 
40. With the entry into force of the Paris 
Agreements and the accession of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to NATO and WEU- and 
the simultaneous termination of the occupation 
status in May 1955 - entirely new problems 
arose in regard to the stationing of forces. The 
build-up of German army, air force and navy 
units and their inclusion in the defence plans 
of NATO was to be accomplished within a short 
time. Even though operational aspects of their 
deployment were considered at the national level 
and within NATO, these considerations were not 
decisive in view of the necessity for a rapid build-
up of German forces. The locations were prima-
rily determined by the existence of facilities of 
the former W ehrmacht which could be made 
available for accommodating the units of the 
Federal armed forces. There were not nearly 
enough of these facilities. Many new facilities 
had to be constructed. As time was pressing most 
of them had to be erected either on real estate 
owned by the Federal Government or in com-
munities which were prepared to make available 
real estate for the construction of buildings and 
the establishment of training facilities without 
lengthy previous negotiations. 
41. At the same time, for reasons of internal 
politics and under economical and psychological 
considerations, it was in the interest of the 
Federal Republic of Germany that the garrisons 
of the Federal armed forces were distributed 
throughout the whole territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
B.II. Wartime positions 
B.II.l. Development since 1949 
42. If then it must be stated that the deploy-
ment of the allied forces in the Federal Republic 
of Germany was developed to a small degree 
only under operational considerations, it should 
be added that the plans for the defence of Central 
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Europe have undergone several changes since 
1949. After the establishment of NATO and the 
Allied Command Europe it became necessary to 
develop a defence structure and defence plans 
against a possible aggressor from the East on 
the basis of the actual deployment of forces which 
originally had been based on occupational con-
siderations. As the forces were then small they 
only permitted the planning of delaying actions 
east of the Rhine river ; the first lasting line of 
defence was envisaged on the Rhine. 
43. For the Federal Republic of Germany the 
participation in a common defence was only 
reasonable, and it could only accept the responsi-
bility for it, if, in doing so, a defence as far to 
the east as possible could be ensured. Such defence 
plans, which have generally become known under 
the term forward defence, were also in the inte-
rest of all partners in the Alliance, in particular 
of the member nations situated on the European 
continent. 
44. When the then occupation troops were no 
longer increased and German units were built 
up which, having reached operational readiness, 
were assigned to NATO for operational planning 
and control, the basic conditions for a gradual 
realisation of the forward defence concept in 
the central region were established. 
45. The first step was to advance the main line 
of defence to the rivers W eser, Fulda, Main and 
Lech. Finally, in the second half of 1963, a 
defence plan entered into force in the AFCENT 
area according to which territory in Central 
Europe should no longer be abandoned without 
combat, i.e. defensive combat should be taken up 
directly at the border of the German Democratic 
Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 
Thus, the requirement for defence as far to the 
east as possible was met for the central region 
as well. 
46. The strategy of flexible response, which was 
agreed upon by the NATO Council on 14th 
December 1967 and which includes the forward 
defence, is the basis for the presently valid 
defence plans from which the present war loca-
tions have been derived. 
B.II.2. The wartime positions in the general 
defence plan (GDP) 
47. The relationship between the permanent 
locations of forces earmarked for assignment to 
the central region and their wartime positions 
must be seen in two categories. 
(a) A.ir forces 
48. In case of war, the combat aircraft and the 
m.lSSile units employed in the air defence belts -
with the exception of the mobile Hawk batteries 
- will operate from permanent air bases or sites. 
49. All of these units can be brought to a high 
state of combat readiness in a few hours. The 
new HQ Allied Air Forces Central Europe 
(AAFCE), formed in summer 1974, will ensure 
that communications ·are improved and proce-
dures simplified so that a cross-tasking of all 
tactical aircraft across the entire region will be 
possible and flexible use can fully be made of 
speed and radius of action. 
(b) Land forces 
50. The relationship of the land forces between 
peace and war locations looks quite different and 
therefore requires a more detailed description. 
51. To begin with, only the M-day forces are 
considered. Each of 8 corps of 5 nations (Bel-
gium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) has to take responsibility for 
its own combat sector of different width along the 
border with the German Democratic Republic 
and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The two 
United States corps are committed side by side, 
whereas the three German corps are employed 
separately from each other in three different 
combat sectors. The diagram of the war locations 
- when looked at from north to south - resem-
bles the layers of a layer-cake, each corps repre-
senting one layer. 
52. A possible attack of the Warsaw Pact 
against Central Europe would therefore encoun-
ter from the beginning the forces of severai mem-
ber nations, including the United States and the 
United Kingdom; thus, the whole Alliance would 
be involved. 
53. The compara.tively 8Illall Canadian combat 
group will be kept available for CENT AG in 
the rear of the corps. 
54. The French forces can only be reckoned 
with when the President of the Republic of 
France has decided on the participation of 
France in the common defence. Therefore, no 
wartime positions have been preplanned for them 
by NATO. 
55. When the wrurtime positions are compared 
with the permanent locations, it becomes clear 
that all divisions and brigades have to negotiate 
a shorter or longer distance to reach their opera-
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tional areas. This deployment to wartime posi-
tions does not only take place from west to east, 
but partly also from north to south or from south 
to north. As a result, crossings and overlapping 
are inevitable. The deployment requires time as 
well. 
56. However, before analysing in detail both 
the deficiencies and strong points of the peace-
time and wartime deployment of the allied ·land 
and air forces assigned to CINCENT in the 
central region, the threat with which NATO has 
to reckon in Central Europe will be described. 
Without knowing the size and deployment of the 
Warsaw Pact forces and without considering the 
probable warning times for NATO and the main 
points of attack to be expected, an assessment of 
a rational deployment cannot be made. 
C. The threat 
C.l. General 
57. In the Atlantic Declaration of Ottawa, 
signed on 26th June 197 4 by the Heads of 
Government of the 15 NATO member nations, it 
was confirmed that "the circumstances affecting 
their common defence have profoundly changed 
in the last ten years: the strategic relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
has reached a point of near equilibrium... The 
Alliance's problems in the defence of Europe 
have thus assumed a different and more clistinct 
character". It was also stated in the declamtion 
that now as ever the ultimate purpose of any 
defence policy is to deny to a potential adversary 
the political objectives he seeks to attain through 
an armed conflict and to use all necessary forces 
for this purpose. 
58. To the Soviet Union military strength is 
indeed an important element of its world-wide 
strategy. Soviet military science teaches that the 
offensive is the sole decisive course of action in 
strategy, and the a,ttack in tactics. According to 
Soviet doctrine, thrust, fire and movement are 
the typical features of modern combat, a combat 
involving all services and service branches. Large 
a:rea.s of operation, the lack of firm front lines, 
rapid development, change of action and massive 
fire are the characteristics of combat operations. 
The will to win, initiative as well as iron com-
munist discipline are demanded of the Warsaw 
Pact forces as a prerequisite to victory. 
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59. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact 
allies have at their disposal a large military 
potential. Its deployment is clearly directed 
against the West. Facing the Allied Command 
Europe (ACE) in Eastern Europe (including 
the six directly adjacent military districts of 
Leningrad, the Baltic countries, White Russia, 
the Carpathians, Odessa and Transcaucasia) are 
roughly 90 Soviet divisions and about 60 divi-
sions of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) coun-
tries. In addition, approximately 20 divisions 
deployed within the interior military districts of 
the Soviet Union have to be counted as reserves, 
which include 6 airborne divisions. The numhm's 
of tanks, guns, anti-tank weapons and rocket 
launchers have been increased, and their e:f:fec-
tiveness was improved. 
60. On the other hand the Soviet build-up of 
forces at the Sino-Soviet border has slackened 
during the past 2-3 years ; but more than 40 
divisions of ground forces are deployed there. 
61. The tactical air forces of the Warsaw Pact 
have also been continuously reinforced. Older 
types of aircraft have been replaced by the latest 
models and the number of aircraft increased. In 
the ·area opposite ACE, the Soviet first-line 
:flying units, the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact air 
units and the long-range and naval air force 
units of the Warsaw Pact comprise roughly 6,000 
combat aircraft (fighters, fighter-bombers, recon-
naissance and bomber 'llircra:ft). The relatively 
high number of fighter aircraft of the Soviet 
home air defence forces will probably not have 
an immediate effect at the beginning of a war. 
62. The equipment of the Soviet naval forces 
with modern missile-carrying cruisers, destroyers, 
corvettes, landing ships and the necessary auxi-
liary vessels which started in the mid-sixties is 
being continued. Since 1968, the number of mis-
sile-cal1l'ying submarines, a considerable number 
of which are nuclear-powered, has more than 
doubled to approximately 110 at the present 
time, which is ·approximately one-third of the 
whole Soviet submarine fleet. A new type, the 
Delta class, is equipped with :nrlssiles having a 
range of 7,500 km. They are in a position to cover 
the entire NATO area. The construction of air-
craft crurriers has begun. 
63. With regard to ·the strategic armament, the 
Soviet Union has reached equality with the United 
States, its intercontinental missiles outnumbering 
those of the United States. Only in technology 
does the United States still have an advantage. 
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64. The NATO Ministers of Defence have 
repeatedly shown concern about the continued 
expansion and modernisation of the Warsaw 
Pact forces in a:ll fields. The communique of the 
ministerial session of the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Committee of 14th June 1974 includes the 
following statements : 
"These provide the Soviet Union and her 
allies with a military power far in excess 
of that required for self-defence... (The 
Ministers) pointed out that· such actions 
are difficult to reconcile with declared 
objectives of detente and disarmament..." 
C.2. Degrees of readiness 
65. In peacetime not all :forces of the Warsaw 
Pact are kept in an equal state of readiness. This 
is true in particular in regard to the Warsaw 
Pact land forces ; however, the strategic missile 
forces, the bulk of the air forces and large parts 
of the naval forces are in a high state of read-
iness. 
66. The units of the land forces are categorised 
in accordance with their peacetime strength in 
regard to both personnel and equipment. The 
Soviet forces in the western £orefield of the 
Soviet Union (the German Democratic Republic, 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and 
Hungary) are in a state of full operational read-
iness. The peacetime strength in regard to both 
personnel and equipment of the Soviet forces 
in the Soviet Union and of the non-Soviet War-
saw Pact land forces varies considerably. Their 
degree of readiness mainly depends on their 
deployment, the availability of mobilisation 
reserves and wartime missions. Especially in the 
Soviet Union, large reserves of personnel and 
materiel will be available upon mobilisation at 
short notice. 
67. The different degrees of readiness in peace-
time affect mainlv the combat effectiveness of 
the units, but not. so much their availability in 
case of mobilisation, since the mobilisation system 
permits bringing the division support troops 
and parts of the supply troops up to strength 
within a few days. After mobilisation, especially 
those divisions which have only cadre-strength 
in peacetime will need a longer time for attaining 
an adequate degree of combat effectiveness. On 
the other hand, the other divisions will be in a 
state of operational readiness immediately or 
upon completion of fill-up. 
C.3. Warsaw Pact forces confronting AFCENT 
68. In detail the deployment of Warsaw Pact 
forces confronting the central region shows the 
following picture : 
(a) Land forces 
Soviet Non-Soviet 
divisions divisions 
in the GDR 20 6 
in Czechoslovakia 5 101/3 
in Poland 2 15 
Total 27 311/3 
in Hungary 4 6 
in the 9 western mili-
tary districts of the 62 -
USSR 
Total 113 371/3 
69. All Soviet divisions in the western fore-
field of the Soviet Union and the majority of the 
indigenous divisions of the German Democratic 
Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 
Poland and Hungary will be available either 
immediately or upon very short notice. 
70. Generalily, the personnel strength of the 
Warsaw Pact divisions is smaller than the 
strength of the NATO divisions. Dissimilarities 
are mainly due to the different organisation of 
the supply troops which are smaller in the War-
saw Pact divisions. On the other hand the 
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Warsaw Pact divisions have a oompamtively 
larger contingent of combat troops. Not counting 
the existing reserves there are at least 15,500 
battle tanks to be reckoned with in the German 
Democrrutic Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic and in Poland; aJbout 7,000 in the 
German Democratic Republic alone. Equipment 
which waB replaced in the course of modernisa-
tion, including battle tanks, armoured personnel 
carriers, artillery and anti-air weapons, was 
partly used to activate new units and partly 
stx>red on site in depots in the £orefield of the 
Warsaw Pact countries. 
71. Strategic mobility WaJS enhanced consider-
ably by increasing the use of air transport moons 
since 1972. For instance, the exchange of per-
sonnel in spring of each year is now effected by 
air transport means. The special air transport 
capacities are adequate for transporting simul-
taneously the combat elements of two airborne 
divisions including their personnel, weapons and 
equipment. 
72. There are sufficient lar~ transit roads 
and through railroads hom east to west by 
which troops can be brought up expediently from 
the depth. 
(b) Air forces 
73. The Soviet first-line tactical air units, the 
tactiool air forces of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact 
countries, the Soviet long-range and naval air 
forces of the Baltic fleet must be considered as 
a threat to Central Europe 1 • Due to the flexibi-
lity of air forces the aforementioned forces can be 
reinforeed from or else be employed in other 
areas. 
7 4. There are roughly 4,000 combat aircraft 
confronting NATO in Central Europe, excluding 
the forces in Hungary and the Soviet home air 
defence forces : 
Northern and Central Europe Southern Europe 
Tactical aircraft in 
operational service 
NATO Warsaw (of which NATO Warsaw (of which Pact USSR) Pact USSR) 
Light bombers 165 250 200 8 30 30 
Elghter ground-attack 1,250 1,500 1,100 450 225 50 
Interceptors 350 2,100 1,100 225 600 200 
Reconnaissance 275 500 350 125 50 40 
Table reproduced from IISS "Military Balance 1974-75", page 100. 
1. AFCENT and BALTAP. 
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75. Since 1968 the number of combat aireraft 
confronting Central Europe has increased by 
approximately 10 %. The Fishbed and Flogger 
aircraft of the fighter units are also suited for 
the attack role ; they are a considerable rein-
forcement of the attack capabilities of the War-
saw Pact. Consequently, also the Warsaw Pact 
air forces outnumber the forces which are avail-
able in the AFCENT area. 
76. The air defence forces, in particular those 
of the land forces, have been equipped with 
mobile air defence missile systems and anti-
aircraft guns, weapons which have already stood 
the test during the Yom Kippur war in October 
1973. As a result, fighter units which are equip-
ped with aircraft equally suited for air attack 
and air defence can be employed increasingly 
for offensive tasks. 
77. The number of airfields available to the 
Warsaw Pact is large. A high number of airfields 
are permanently or temporarily used in the 
German Democratic Republic, the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic and Poland. On the per-
manently used airfields, numerous shelters have 
been constructed for the accommodation of air-
craft. Many airfields are protected by air defence 
systems. 
(c) Nuclear weapons 
78. There are nearly 600 ground-based medium-
range ballistic missiles in fixed sites in the north-
western part of the Soviet Union. They cover 
the entire AFCENT area including the com-
munication zone (Com.Z). Furthermore, the War-
saw Pact land and air forces possess numerous 
carriers for tootical nuclear woopons. So far, it 
has not been confirmed that nuclear warheads 
are stored in the £orefield. 
C.4. Warning times 
79. It may well ·be assumed that a conflict will 
be preceded by a period of tension which may 
last for a few days or even several months. How-
ever, abrupt changes cannot be ruled out entirely. 
In general, changes in the political climate alone 
will probably not be taken for symptoms of a 
possible conflict unless they are corroborated by 
corresponding indications from the military 
sphere. On the other hand, without the back-
ground of a deteriorating East-West climate, 
purely military incidents will also not be suffi-
cient warning in order to warrant the prepara-
tion of defence measures. It may be assumed 
78 
that even in a critical situation of strained East-
West relations it will be the military indications 
which will eventually lead to military measures 
being taken on our side. However, the detection 
of military indications will. to a great extent 
depend on the form of attack chosen by the 
Warsaw Pact as well as on the capabilities of the 
intelligence services of the NATO nations. 
80. The warning time question is one of the 
most important and also most complicated prob-
lems which is extremely hard to judge. 
81. It may be useful, for the considerations, 
to begin with two extreme situations. 
Situation A 
82. Strategic surprise ranks above strength. In 
this case the attack will be initiated only by the 
forces deployed near the area of attack. In order 
to ensure surprise, there will be no deployment 
to wartime positions or movement of identifiable 
reinforcements before the attack is launched. 
Movements of forces from garrisons situated near 
the front and assemblies in the attack areas couM 
be masked as "exercises" and it would be diffi-
cult to recognise them as genuine prepe.rations 
for an attack. Indications could at best be 
gathered from certain preparations of the forces 
deployed in the depth which could probably be 
alerted to be brought up as the second echelon. 
Situation B 
83. In this case the conditions are reversed. 
Strength ranks above strategic surprise. In this 
case the Warsaw Pact will mobilise and accom-
plish full deployment to wartime positions of 
all available forces before launching an attack. 
After these preparations the bulk of the Warsaw 
Pact forces will be deployed in their areas of 
attack along the frontier or in the assembly areas 
in West Poland and the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic respectively. The forces of the strategic 
reserve, including the airborne divisions, are 
available in the western part of the Soviet Union 
and in East Poland when the attack begins. 
84. There will. be more warning within a longer 
period of time available then. 
85. There are many other possibilities which 
lie between these two situations. 
86. At that it must be taken into consideration 
that the mobili<Jation and the deployment to war-
time positions o:! strong forces could be accom-
plished within a few days. The reinforcement 
would b~ considerai.,le as compared with Case A. 
87. The combat force strength will not be very 
different from Case B. Merely the logistic deploy-
ment will not have been comp[eted, the cadre 
divisions will not have had sufficient time for 
training and a number of general economic pre-
parations for war will not have been concluded. 
C.S. Modes and main directions of attack 
88. NATO is a defensive alliance. A military 
conflict can arise only if one or more NATO 
countries are attacked from the outside. NATO 
can merely react. The military initiative rests 
with the potential aggressor. He can determine 
the date, the area, the employment of forces and 
the political objective of an aggression. He has 
the advantage of the element of surprise. 
89. Therefore, the defender must be prepared 
to defend against an kinds of aggressions. On the 
other hand, it is wise, as well as justifiable, to 
examine which modes of attack are to be con-
sidered likely and which appear to be less prob-
able. The defender will base his operational plan-
ning on the modes of attack which he considers 
likely, but will not altogether lose sight of the 
other possibilities. 
90. To most experts it appears improbable that 
the Soviet Union and its allies will start a war 
with a great, world-wide nuclear strike or even 
a limited one against Europe, as long as the 
United States possesses an effective second strike 
capability. The risk of unimaginable ravages 
caused in their own country by the immediate 
nuclear retaliation of the United States would 
be too great. The aggressor himself would be 
exposed to annihilation. 
91. If, in spite of all endeavours for the main-
tenance of peace and for deterrence, a military 
attack should be launched in Central Europe, it 
is highly probable that, during the first phase, 
it will be limited to the employment of non-
nuclear weapons. 
92. I see two basically different possibilities 
and objectives for an aggression in Central 
Europe: 
- It will either be a limited aggression, 
politically as well as in the military 
sense, which will aim at the seizure of 
one or more objectives for use as a basis 
for negotiations. 
Such pawns might, for example, be : the 
North-East Canal or the cities of Ham-
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burg, Hannover, Kassel, Niirnberg, 
Miinchen. Within and east of the area 
along the line connecting these cities 
live roughly one-third of the population 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and <lie approximately 20 % of its 
industrial potential. 
- Another possibility would be an attack 
on the total frontage between the Baltic 
Sea and the Danube river, with the 
objective of seizing the whole territory 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
or even to break through to the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Such a war would hardly remain limited 
to Central Europe. This would be the 
most dangerous form of aggression 
against the centra;l region. Under the 
present conditions it must be assumed 
that the Warsaw Pact will launch a 
premeditated attack only if such an 
attack promises results of strategic 
significance. 
93. The main attack may be expected iu such 
a major aggression : 
( i) in the northern area an attack as a 
part of a tri-service operation could 
be aimed at opening the Baltic 
approaches and against Northern 
Germany; 
( ii) two directions could be expected in 
the central area : 
(a) the strongest thrust could be 
made from the area west of 
Berlin, leading westward through 
the North German plain with the 
objective of seizing the Ruhr area 
and the area north of it ; 
(b) another direction of main attack 
to be expected is from the Thur-
ingian bulge towards Frankfurt 
and the Palatinate ; 
(iii) other directions could be from Bohe-
mia via Niirnberg towards Stuttgart-
Strasbourg and via Regensburg 
towards Miinchen-Freiburg-Belfort. 
In violation of the Austrian neutrality 
it could be accompanied, and rein-
forced later on, ·by another force 
brought up from the Czechoslovak 
Socia;list Republic or Hungary via 
Vienna-Linz. 
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94. The point of main effort of operations in 
the central region could be expected in the cen-
tral sector formed almost exclusively by Soviet 
forces through the North German plain and from 
the Thuringian forest towards Frankfurt. It is 
in this area that the Warsaw Pact has assembled 
the strongest offensive force. 
D. Evaluation of the present deployment 
95. From the military and security policy point 
of view, the present deployment of allied forces 
in the central region reveals some remarkable 
assets, but also numerous considerable deficien-
cies. 
D.t. Assets 
96. The greatest asset of this deployment is 
that- a fact without parallel in military history 
-in Central Europe the land and air forces of 
7 nations (including France), which have joined 
in a defensive alliance, have been deployed in 
a relatively small area to fulfil a common mis-
sion ; 6 of these nations have delegated the res-
ponsibility for the operational planning and 
control to integrated NATO commands. As 
already mentioned above one coonbat sector 
extending up to the Warsaw Pact borders was 
assigned to each of the land forces of 5 nations 
(Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and 
the United States) in the general defence plan 
(GDP) (layer-cake). Thus, a military attack of 
the Warsaw Pact forces between the Baltic Sea 
and the Danube river would not be an attack 
against the forces of one country a:lone, but 
would encounter the forces of several allies, 
among them the United States and the United 
Kingdom, engaging them from the beginning. 
This defence planning consolidates the cohesion 
of common defence. It results from and at the 
same time guarantees the close solidarity within 
the Alliance. Its deterrent effect is one of the 
most important elements for the maintenance of 
peace in this part of the world. 
97. Although the French troops cannot be 
included in the common forward defence plan-
ning and therefore have not assumed direct res-
ponsibility at the border, the fact remains that 
the presence of a French corps with 2 divisions on 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and of another corps in North-Eastern 
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France clearly adds to the deterrence of the 
Alliance. In any case, when developing his ope-
rational plans, the potential aggressor has to 
reckon with the participation of the French 
forces in the common NATO defence efforts. 
98. Of similar importance for the deterrence 
is the fact that, already in peacetime, the whole 
air defence system has been placed under the 
operational command of SACEUR. This includes 
both the operational early warning system 
developed at great expense on the part of NATO 
and the interlacing links of the chain of Sam 
sites which, supported by NADGE (NATO air 
defence ground environment), guard against any 
surprise a,.ttack. 
99. Far too seldom mention is made of the 
deterrent effect which is produced by the pre-
sence of occup·ation forces of three member 
nations of the Alliance (the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France) in West Berlin. 
A major attack could not be directed against 
the central region of NATO without touching 
West Berlin in the rear of the offensive front. 
The mere encirclement or isolation of West 
Berlin would interrupt the agreed land and air 
lines of communication of the allies and would 
call for political reactions of the Berlin powers. A 
military occupation of Berlin, however - though 
presenting no difficulties from the military point 
of view - would put into effect the mutual 
assistance clause contained in Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and would thus have 
severe political consequences, although or just 
because the occupation troops of West Berlin 
are not assigned to CINCENT but are under the 
national command of the Berlin occupation 
powers. 
100. One of the positive aspects of the deploy-
ment in Central Europe is the dep'loyment of 
nuclear warheads on the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Their number is remark-
ably large. It is certainly larger and of greater 
variety than that of the Soviet nuclear warheads 
stored in the German Democratic Republic, the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Poland. 
101. Further advantages of the common NATO 
defence in the central region are : 
-the common NATO pipeline system ; 
- the NATO integrated communication 
system (NICS), which is being estaJb-
lished; and 
- the system of forward storage sites 
(FSS) which is also being established. 
102. They are among other the most essential 
elements of the common NATO infrastructure 
which will be discussed in detail in chapter 
G. 4. {1) (page 106). 
D.Z. Deficiencies 
103. Besides the advantages which are not to 
be underestimated, there are considerable defi-
ciencies. 
(a) "Relative" balance only 
104. It has already been pointed out that the 
conventional Warsaw Pact forces in Central 
Europe greatly outnumber the NATO forces and 
that they are still being increased. As to numbers, 
there is no balance between East and West, 
neither in respect of manpower nor in regard 
to the available weapon systems. The present 
balance of power between East and West can 
at best be called a "relative" balance taking into 
account the defensive concept of the Alliance ; it 
is just adequate to prevent an aggression by 
presenting an incalculable risk which the aggres-
sor would hesitate to take. With the available 
forces the deterrent effect demanded by the 
strategy of flexible response can only be produced 
if nuclear means are included. With purely con-
ventional means only an attack limited in regard 
to area and objective can be warded off with a 
chance of success. But, in conventional warfare, 
a major aggression can only be resisted for a 
limited period of time without reinforcement of 
the available land and air forces. Any unilateral 
reduction of the conventional defence forces 
decreases the chances of successful conventional 
defensive operations. Since it cannot be assumed 
that the nuclear threshold will be lowered, for 
that would considerably increase the risk for the 
United States, such a development would lead 
to a perforation of the complete deterrence 1 • 
(b) Operational problems regarding deploy-
ment 
Lack of balance between the command areas 
105. The area to be defended in the central 
region is divided into two unequal parts by the 
boundary between the command areas of 
NORTHAG/TWO ATAF and CENTAG/FOUR 
ATAF. While NORTHAG has to cover a front 
line of about 210 km, the front to be defended 
1. See also page 95. 
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by CENTAG is approximately 590 km long. If 
an aggressor should disregard the neutrality of 
Austria, another 170 km would be added to this 
front. 
106. NORTHAG must be prepared to face the 
greatest impact of attack on both sides of the 
Autobahn Helmstedt - Dortmund, since the 
Warsaw Pact has earmarked numerous armoured 
divisions for that purpose which in the lowlands 
of Northern Germany will find a terrain suited 
for tank operations. CENTAG, however, is 
responsible for the defence against the dangerous 
wedges of attack directed from the Thuringian 
bulge towards the Palatinate at the narrowest 
place of the Federal Republic of Germany 
("wasp-waist") as well as from Bohemia via 
Niirnberg towards Karlsruhe. In addition, 
CENTAG is faced with the problem of the un-
covered south-east flank of the central region. 
107. In terms of figures, the deployment of the 
1\I-day divisions and brigades in these two areas 
approximately corresponds to the importance of 
the mentioned defence tasks. 
108. The reinforcements of land forces 1 to be 
expected in a period of tension, upon mobilisation 
or after the beginning of an attack, will be more 
to the advantage of CENTAG. While NORTHAG 
can only expect some reserve brigades from the 
Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom, 
CENTAG can count on considerable reinforce-
ments from the United States. The French 1 
Army, too, will probably be employed mainly in 
the CENTAG area- after the President of the 
French Republic has decided on its employment. 
109. However, in this estimate the unsafe situa-
tion at the south-east flank of CENT AG must 
not be disregarded. Even now, the II (GE) Corps 
has to defend a sector the area of the Bayrische 
W ald which despite the favourable terrain is far 
too large. The border with Austria is virtually 
exposed. If the Warsaw Pact should disregard 
Austrian neutrality, part of the operational 
reserves available to CENTAG would probably 
be contained along this border. 
110. The deployment of the air force units, too 
shows some differences. The greater number of 
the available combat aircraft are placed under 
the command of FOUR ATAF. In case of war, 
substantial reinforcements with regard to combat 
aircraft can only be expected from the United 
1. See Chapter E.4., pages 91 et seq. 
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States 1• According to present plans, these will 
mainly be to the advantage of FOUR ATAF. 
In case the French tactical air forces (1 F ATAC) 
should be released, they will primarily be employ-
ed in support of the French land forces, that is 
also in the FOUR ATAF area. TWO ATAF, 
however, can only reckon with the support of the 
combat aircraft operating from the air bases of 
the United Kingdom, unless these are needed in 
other combat areas, e.g. AFNORTH. 
111. However, as soon as the new AAFCE air 
force command has been established and the 
procedures standardised this disproportion will 
be considerably corrected by centralised com-
mand and control of air operations and by the 
possibility of facilitated cross-tasking. 
112. But there is another disadvantage which, 
for the time being, even the establishment of the 
new command AAFCE will not remedy. All 
flying units assigned to AAFCE are deplyed to 
air bases in Germany and the Benelux countries, 
all of which are located west of the line Liibeck-
Hamburg-Bielefeld-Frankfurt-Miinchen within a 
belt of varying but insufficient width which 
extends from north to south. This deployment 
lacks depth. In addition, the air bases are limited 
in number. In many cases the occupancy sur-
passes their capacity. This applies to some of the 
air bases which are used by the United Kingdom 
but, above all, to those airfields occupied by 
United States squadrons. 
113. Up to 1966, the United States Air Force 
could still use air bases in France. But when the 
French Government withdrew their forces from 
the NATO integrated structure and all non-
French headquarters and units of the Alliance 
were made to leave France, the United States 
was compelled to redeploy its squadrons previ-
ously stationed in France ; some of them were 
transferred to the United Kingdom while the 
bulk was redeployed to the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The United States squadrons con-
cerned were under the command of FOUR ATAF 
and, at that time, only the FOUR ATAF area 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, i.e. the 
southern part of the country, was available for 
this purpose. Therefore, a great number of air 
bases used by the United States are more densely 
occupied than would be appropriate and desir-
able. Consequently, there is a risk that the air 
traffic control and radar facilities may be over-
loaded and the maintenance and supply facilities 
1. See also Chapter E.4., pages 94 et seq. 
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become inadequate. To ensure survivability more 
shelters must be built on the air bases. After all, 
if a home base is no longer available, the pos-
sibilities of using alternative bases are very 
limited. 
114. These difficulties will even increase con-
siderably when the prepared United States Air 
Force reinforcements are to be transferred to 
Central Europe in case of tension. This matter 
will have to be discussed later on 1 • 
115. In contrast, the unequal distribution of 
nuclear delivery means can hardly be changed. 
Only a small number of them are deployed in the 
NORTHAG area. 
Boundary between AF'OENT and AF'NORTH 
116. Mention must also be made of the problems 
regarding the boundary between AFNORTH and 
AFCENT. It runs along the river Elbe between 
Lauenburg and Cuxhaven. Thus, Hamburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein are part of the AFNORTH 
area (BALTAP). 
117. On the Warsaw Pact side command and 
control over the attacks against the Baltic appro-
aches including Schleswig-Holstein/Jutland and 
over the attack directed against the German and 
Netherlands North Sea coasts would be central-
ised in one hand. From the Soviet point of view 
this is quite logical. Both attacks must be 
regarded as an operational unity which aims at 
the opening of the Baltic approaches and the 
occupation of the North Sea coast, that is the 
conquest of the German and Danish coasts. The 
more difficult thrust into Schleswig-Holstein will 
be facilitated by an operation south of the Elbe 
river. Supply support of all operations at this 
front is accomplished from the same area 
(Mecklenburg). 
118. As regards the defence - i.e. on the part 
of NATO -the defence of the Baltic approaches, 
that of Denmark and that of Schleswig-Holstein 
are closely interrelated, but they are separated 
from NORTHAG by the wide lower part of the 
Elbe river. The defensive comblllt of the weak 
forces in Schleswig-Holstein can neither be sup-
ported by land forces nor be given logistic sup-
port from the area south of the Elbe river. The 
command and control and supply channels to the 
north of the Elbe river run from south to north, 
whereas south of the Elbe river they extend 
1. See also Chapter E.4., pages 91 et seq. 
from east to west. Thus, a change of the boundary 
between AFNORTH and AFCENT should not 
be considered even though disadvantages are 
connected with that boundary. Elements of the 
German Federal armed forces, in particular al-
most the entire navy, are placed under the com-
mand of remote headquarters which have dif-
ferent missions and interests. 
French forces 
119. Although the French forces on both sides 
of the Rhine river are an important factor of 
the common strategy of deterrence, it has to be 
regarded as a great disadvantage that NATO 
commanders responsible for operational planning 
and command and control do not know if and at 
what time the French forces will join the allies in 
their defensive combat in the central region, or 
what will be the mission of the French forces. 
It is true that, already in peacetime, French 
liaison staffs are attached to the higher NATO 
headquarters, and that there are regular staff 
conferences for a possible operational employ-
ment of French land and air forces in the 
CINCENT area of responsibility. The military 
staffs do their best in this respect. However, it 
cannot be foreseen whether in case of war the 
political conditions will actually exist and the 
developments in the military situation will 
actually take place upon which the considerations 
are based. In particular the time of a possible 
intervention of the French forces remains un-
certain. Therefore, their employment will always 
have to be improvised to a certain extent, a 
disadvantage to both the French forces and th~ 
common operational command. The remaining 
uncertainty is a handicap for the overall plan-
ning, in particular with regard to flexible 
decision-making on the employment of the opera-
tional reserves. 
120. Last but not least, there is the open question 
of a possible employment of French tactical 
nuclear weapons in the presumable combat area. 
Deployment to wartime positions 
121. The difficulties of the deployment to war-
time positions, the danger of crossing and over-
lapping movements and the required time have 
already been mentioned earlier 1 • 
122. When reviewing the details, the following 
picture is revealed. 
1. See page 75. 
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123. The longest distance has to be covered by 
the I (NL) Corps, the units of which - with the 
exception of the 41 Brigade in Seedorf - have 
to be brought up from the Netherlands far to 
the north-east. 
124. The greater parts of the I (GE) and I (BR) 
Corps require much less time for deployment to 
wartime positions. However, parts of their major 
formations have to perform disturbing move-
ments from north to south. 
125. The I (BE) Corps, too, has to cover a long 
distance for deployment to wartime positions. 
Most of its units must move from the area on 
both sides of the Rhine river and from the 
German-Belgian border area far eastward. Since 
the terrain through which the movements will 
have to be made is mountainous and rich in 
forests, the time required will very much depend 
on the prevailing weather conditions. The time 
required for bringing up units from Belgium is 
comparable to that needed for the Dutch units. 
126. The Ill (GE) Corps again requires less 
time. The armoured brigades of the 5 (GE) 
Division deployed at the Rhine river have to 
overcome similar difficulties with regard to ter-
rain and weather as their neighbour in the north, 
the I (BE) Corps. 
127. The V (US) Corps will reach its wartime 
positions within the same time as the III (GE) 
Corps. One (US) division, however, needs more 
time. With the exception of some smaller units, 
it must cross the Rhine river and is dependent 
on intact Rhine bridges. 
128. The VII (US) Corps meets with the most 
favourable conditions. 
129. The II (GE) Corps, however, has to over-
come greater difficulties. One division has to 
move from south to north, though the danger of 
crossing other movements is not as great as in 
the NORTHAG area. 
130. Thus, with regard to their wartime posi-
tions, the following forces are particularly un-
favourably deployed : 
- the greater part of the I (NL) Corps 
and large parts of the I (BE) Corps; 
- parts of the I (GE) Corps and of the 
I (BR) Corps ; 
- one (US) Division ; 
- one (GE) Division of II (GE) Corps. 
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131. The deployment to wartime positions has 
been prepared by the NATO commands with 
special care. All necessary movements are co-
ordinated, are laid down in detail and are 
updated continuously. However, it can only be 
carried out smoothly if all forces receive move-
ment orders at the same time, i.e. all nations 
agree to appropriate alert measures, and if the 
movements are not disturbed by enemy action. 
132. The most favourable solution would be, of 
course, if the deployment to wartime positions 
could already be accomplished and completed in 
a period of tension before an aggressim1 occurs. 
This, however, presupposes early political deci-
sions 1 • 
(c) Logistic supply routes 
133. Apart from the problems connected with 
moving ·the divisions into their respective war-
time positions the logistic supply routes must 
also be considered. 
134. For the Belgian, Netherlands, United King-
dom and German forces in the central region 
inconvenient crossings of logistic supply routes 
are to be expected in exceptional cases only. As 
a rule, their logistic supply routes run from west 
to east within their assigned sectors. The separa-
tion of military and civil roads is ensured in 
such a manner that the requirements of both the 
NATO armed forces and the civil defence forces 
are adequately met as long as spontaneous, un-
controlled movements can be prevented. 
135. The conditions are more critical where the 
United States forces are concerned. In wartime, 
Bremerhaven will hardly be available for use as 
a supply base for the United States forces. For 
then the supply routes would run from north to 
south within the FCZ. Shifting the supply base 
to ports in Belgium and the Netherlands will 
become necessary. However, this will result in 
very disturbing lateral movements, and crossings 
as well as an accumulation of supply movements 
within a comparatively small geographical area. 
This situation could be alleviated by means of 
bilateral agreements to be concluded between the 
United States and France which - similar to 
existing German-French agreements - make 
French territory available for the landing and 
storage of supplies. 
1. See also page 91. 
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136. There are other aggravating circumstances 
affecting the logistic supply routes in the central 
region which must be taken into consideration: 
- The main depots for the Belgian and 
the Netherlands forces stationed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany are loca-
ted in their respective home countries. 
The result is rather long supply routes. 
- The 7th United States Army has con-
centrated large quantities of supplies in 
the Palatinate area. 
- In both cases the barrier formed by the 
Rhine river and sometimes, in the 
northern area, also the river Meuse, 
must be negotiated on the way from 
west to east. Special attention is called 
to the necessity of providing adequate 
ferrying equipment. 
137. The fact that logistics is a national respons-
ibility does not make it easier to overcome the 
aforementioned difficulties. Logistic support for 
the land furces of different nations assigned to 
CINCENT could be improved considerably, 
especially during the initial phase of a military 
conflict, by increasing the stock levels of vital 
supplies in the depots located east of the Rhine 
river. This could also include, as a precautionary 
measure, the S:ock~e of materiel required by 
the land and a1r remforcements which are to be 
brought up in wartime. 
(d) Close anti-aircraft weapons and anti-
tank weapons 
138. The Yom-Kippur war in 1973 has drawn 
the world's attention to the importance of the 
close anti-aircraft weapons and anti-tank 
weapons. The considerable superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact forces in terms of tanks and tac-
tical air forces gives weight to the requirement 
for such weapon systems in the defence-oriented 
central region. Therefore, they are considered 
in detail. 
( aa) Close anti-aircraft weapons 
139. In exan1ining the means of anti-aircraft 
defence it must be admitted that the present 
systems integral to the corps are mostly obsolete. 
This is due to the relatively low priority accorded 
to this subject for a long time. However, this 
situation will improve during the next few years. 
140. The United States forces are well equipped 
with the Redeye missiles (one-man infra-red 
homing weapon) which are distributed to all of 
their armour and mech inf bns, including the 
div AA bns and the non-divisional commands. 
The divisional AA bns have the mixture of the 
20 mm Vulcan M-167 (6 barrels) and the infra-
red guided Chaparral missile MIM-73 A. 
141. The German forces deployed the Redeye 
to the divisional AA bns to supplement their 
40 mm gu,ns. The guns themseLves will be replaced 
from 1976 onwards by the self-propelled all-
weather capable Gepard system (35 mm L/90 
twin-barrel). 
142. The corps AAA bns are presently equipped 
with the 40 mm L/70 ; in about 1980, they will 
receive the GE/FR Roland system (with aU-
weather capability and radar control) which, 
incidentally, will also be introduced into the 
United States forces. 
143. The British forces also plan an increase 
in their air defence capability. The one Thun-
derbird medium-level bn will remain and the 
40 mm L/70 guns in the other two bns wHl be 
replaced this year by the mobile Rapier missile 
system (with optional blind-fire radar). 
144. In addition, three other reserve AAA bns, 
earmarked for I (UK) Corps, will be equipped 
with the Redeye-type weapon Blowpipe in 1977. 
145. 'l'he Netherlands forces have four battal-
ions of 40 mm guns and in addition will include 
one Gepard battery in each of their six mechan-
ised brigades. 
146. The Belgians will replace their two batta-
lions of 20 mm guns with four batteries of 
Gepard after procuring 55 systems. 
147. In addition to the foregoing, the forces of 
all nations possess varying numbers of heavy 
anti-aircraft machine guns of various calibres. 
(bb) Anti-tank weapons 
148. Due to the efforts made in the past the 
equipment of the central region with anti-tank 
weapons has somewhat improved. 
(1) Tanks 
149. The most important tank destroyer is the 
battle tank itself. With the exception of the M-48 
A2 Patton within the II (GE) Corps which will 
be replaced in 1978 all other tanks are being 
retrofitted with improved fire control systems. 
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150. In the NORTHAG area the British have the 
heavy Chieftain Mk. 2 with the 120 mm gun. 
There are over 2,000 Leopard 40 t tanks within 
the German, Belgian and NetherLands corps. 
CENTAG disposes of: 
- the modern M-60 48 t tank with the 
105 mm gun or the 152 mm Shillelagh 
missile, to which about 500 armoured 
reconnaissance/airborne assault tanks 
General Sheridan M-551 in the United 
States corps are to be added ; 
-the M-48 and the Leopard tanks in the 
II (GE) Corps ; 
- 32 Centurion tanks of the Canadian 4th. 
Mech Bde Group. 
(2) Tank destroyers 
151. Three of the NORTHAG corps have tank 
destroyers, the Netherlands the AMX-13/105 mm, 
the Germans and the Belgians Jagdpanzer-
Kanone 90 mm, whereas in the CENTAG area 
the United States forces provide a large number 
of rifles 90 mm (self-propelled and lightly-
armoured) and the II (GE) Corps for a great 
number of Jagdpanzer-Kanone. 
(3) Non-guided anti-tank systems 
152. There is a good variety of static, non-
guided, anti-tank weapon systems. At the lower 
end of the scale there are many thousands of 
anti-tank mines that the corps intend to lay if 
sufficient time is available. 
153. The infantry in all corps possesses largP 
numbers of short-range weapons : rifle grenades, 
M-72 and Leichte Panzerfaust 44 (which will be 
replaced by Lance). In NORTHAG the British, 
German and Netherlands units have over 3,500 
84 mm Carl Gustav between them. The Belgians 
use the 83 mm Blindicide to be replaced by Carl 
Gustav and Milan, which will also be introduced 
into the German motorised infantry (Jager) bns. 
The United States corps provide a considerable 
number of individually-fired light anti-tank 
weapons. 
154. FinaHy, in the non-guided weapon field, 
the Canadian, Netherlands and British units 
have recoilless rifles of 90 mm, 106 mm and 
120 mm L-6 Wombat respectively, which, how-
ever, can no longer be considered to be modern 
equipment. 
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(4) Guided anti-tank systems 
155. In this field the situation is continually 
changing and improving as second-generation 
systems are introduced. 
156. The United States corps are totally equip-
ped with the new Tow MGM-71 A missile. Their 
anti-tank helicopters wila. be equipped with the 
same Tow system beginning this year. 
157. The German corps still have a variety of 
systems. Some of the infantry bns have the 810 
Kobra. The anti-tank coy of the airborne bdes 
just received the United States Tow. The anti-
tank companies in brigades have Jagdpanzer-
Rakete with the SS-11/B1 (800-3,300 m). A new 
system Hot is being developed in co-operation 
with France. 
158. The British have at present Vigilant in the 
reconnaissance battalions and Swingfire in the 
armoured and infantry battalions. Vigilant will 
be replaced completely by Swingfire shortly. 
159. In the infantry the 120 mm recoilless rifle 
and some of the Carl Gustavs are to be replaced. 
Milan, amongst other systems, is being evaluated 
for this. Hot is being evaluated against the 
British Hawkswing as the succ£HWr to the SS-11 
on anti-tank helicopters. 
160. The Belgians use the Entac missile in 
their infantry and in the brigade anti-tank com-
panies. This will be replaced by Milan. 
161. The I (NL) Corps has introduced the Tow 
system for all brigade anti-tank companies. 
162. The Tow also will replace the 106 mm 
recoilless rifles in the infantry. 
163. Occasionally endeavours are made to 
calculate the average numbers of tanks and anti-
tank weapons per front kilometre and to draw 
conclusions regarding the defence capabilities in 
the different sectors. This procedure does not 
yield a reliable picture. An assessment of the 
overall effectiveness of the anti-tank defence must 
also take into consideration a number of other 
factors, above all the terrain, the organisation 
and the number of units operating on the front 
and kept in reserve, respectively. 
164. However, the following conclusions may be 
drawn from a general assessment of the present 
status of equipment : 
Tanks: 
165. Measured against the number of units 
NORTHAG is somewhat inferior to CENTAG 
in terms of equipment. 
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Anti-tank weapons : 
166. In spite of the efforts made during the 
past few years the . anti-tank weapons are still 
insufficient in number. In particular a back-
log exists in the Belgian and Netherlands forces. 
The multiplicity and the lack of uniformity of 
the present equipment are serious disadvantages. 
Therefore, priority should be given to the 
requirements for modernising, standardising and 
increasing the numbers of anti-tank weapons. 
(e) Personnel availability and materiel 
readiness 
167. The problem of the personnel actually 
available to the M-day units is closely connected 
with the time required for their deployment to 
wartime positions. On1y the United States units 
and the Canadian combat group are independent 
of mobilisation measures. In peacetime, the corps 
of the European member nations do not have 
their full wartime personnel strength. They are 
in a state of so-called graduated availability. 
As a rule, the combat forces, i.e. the brigades, 
are maintained at full personnel strength or 
require only minor augmentation in regard to 
personnel which harilly affects the attainment of 
immediate operational readiness. The combat 
support and supply troops of the divisions and 
corps, however, depend in most cases on smaller 
or larger contingents of personnel which must 
be brought up before or after deployment to 
wartime positions ; as a result, they will not 
reach full operational readiness in their areas 
of operation until hours or even days after the 
respective measures have been taken. 
168. The readiness to move is also dependent on 
the time required for loading the combat and 
supply vehicles with ammunition, fuels, subsist-
ence and other basic load supplies. If ammunition 
and fuels of the unit loads are not in the imme-
diate vicinity of the barracks - which some-
times is the case for security reasons - the 
transport of this materiel, its distribution and 
loading will take much time. 
169. Thus, a limited availability of personnel 
and unfavourable conditions in regard to the 
attainment of the materiel readiness to move 
affect the time of full operational readiness in 
a similar way as an unfavourable deployment ; 
often they will even increase the disadvantage 
of an unfavourable deployment. 
170. Matters are rendered even worse when 
entire battalions are employed in areas outside 
the central region for a longer period of time, 
even if it is only a temporary employment as, for 
instance, that of the battalions of the British 
Army of the Rhine (BAOR) in Northern Ire-
land. Even though the heavy equipment of these 
units remains in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and preparations are made for their prompt 
return in times of tension, their availability can 
hardly be considered to be greater than that of the 
dual-based forces to be brought up from the 
United States. 
(f) Lack of interoperability 
171. Last but not least, the flaws of the deploy-
ment are still aggravated by the fact that the 
interoperability of the units of different nwtions 
is very limited. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the logistics of the NATO-assigned forces 
is still a national responsibility. Thus, the allied· 
units in the central region are dependent upon 
their national logistic facilities and on their 
national logistic lines of communication. If 
peacetime and wartime locations are separated 
by a large area, the logistic support, too, i"' 
rendered very difficult, particularly during the 
initial phase of an armed conflict. Due to the 
lack of standardisation of weapons and equip-
ment a cross-servicing is possible only to a 
limited extent, or in many fields not possible 
at all. If one further considers the lack of 
uniformity with regard to the organisational 
structure of the major units, the procedures 
for operational control on the battlefield whicl1 
have not yet been fully co-ordinated, and the 
different tactical doctrines and training methods, 
the limits of interoperability become evident. 
They reduce flexibility in regard to the opera-
tional decisions of the NATO commanders. 
172. These problems will have to be discussed 
in a separate chapter 1• 
E. Studies on the improvement of the 
deployment 
E.l. Maintaining the culuantages of the present 
deployment 
173. An evaluation of the present deployment 
has revealed that certain flaws do indeed exist 
I. See Chapter G. 
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and that, above all, there is no optimum relation 
between the peacetime deployment in the cen-
tral region and the envisaged wartime positions, 
Therefore, one is justified in speaking of a 
"maldeployment" which delays the attainment 
of complete defence readiness. 
174. It must now be examined under what con-
ditions and by what measures the maldeploy-
ment couM be eliminated or at least reduced. 
175. However, before giving thought to this 
problem, it should be made clear that under 
no circumstances would it be reasonable to ini-
tiate or to permit any actions which would 
aggravate the existing maldeployment, including 
the readiness posture of the forces. Decisions 
which are apt to worsen the present situation 
and to have a negative effect on the reaction 
and defence capability include : 
- redeployment of forces from compara-
tively advantageous positions to gar-
risons located farther to the rear as, 
for instance, it is planned, and already 
initiated, for two Belgian brigades. 
Such redeployment will increase the 
time that will be required for the 
deployment to wartime positions ; 
- withdrawal of air defence missile units 
from the common :Mike and Hawk belts 
as announced by the Netherlands White 
Paper on Defence ; 
- a possible extension of the principle 
of dual-based forces for United States 
or United Kingdom forces; it would 
weaken deterrence, especialJy against 
surprise actions ; 
- any further weakening of the readiness 
posture in regard to personnel and 
materiel of the M-day forces stationed 
in the central region. This refers e.g. 
to the planned reorganisation of the 
Netherlands army units. The standby 
readiness as envisaged for the Federal 
armed forces would have a similar 
effect if it were to exceed a balanced 
scope. 
E.Z. Improuement of maldeployment through 
relocation of units 
176. Already in 1966, SHAPE commented on 
the question of maldeployment within the scope 
of the force planning studies for the seventies. 
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Later on SHAPE submitted a study which con-
tained a detailed analysis of the problems 
involved and offered possibilities for a solution. 
177. The Defence Planning Committee and the 
NATO Council had reservations regarding these 
recommendations. Though not underrating the 
disadvantages of the existing maldeployment, 
they realised the infrastructure problems asso-
ciated with redeployment and were reluctant 
because of the expenses involved. This must be 
explained in more detail. 
178. "Infrastructure" is "a term generally 
applicable for all fixed and permanent instal-
lations, fabrications or facilities for the support 
and control of military forces". 
179. Generally we distinguish between : 
- national infrastructure 
which is provided and financed by a 
NATO nation on its own territory for 
its own forces (including those forces 
assigned to or designated for NATO) ; 
- - common infrastructure 
this is the infrastructure essential to 
the training of NATO forces or to the 
implementation of NATO operational 
plans owing to its degree of common 
use or interest and its compliance with 
criteria laid down from time to time 
by the North Atlantic Council. It is 
commonly financed by NA'l'O mem-
bers 1 ; 
- bilateral infrastructure 
it concerns only two NATO members 
and is financed by mutual agreement 
between them (e.g. facilities required 
for the use of forces of one NATO 
member in the territory of another). 
180. Therefore, a redeployment of units of the 
land forces in the central region affects only 
the national or the bilateral infrastructure. 
181. On the other hallld, the governments con-
cerned are not free in their decisions regarding 
the stationing of their forces assigned to NATO. 
182. Among other things, the following prin-
ciples were laid down in the resolution of the 
North Atlantic Council on the implementation 
1. See also pages 107 et seq. 
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of the final act of the London conference dated 
24th October 1954 : 
- the forces assigned to SACEUR will be 
deployed in accordance with the NATO 
strategy; 
- the location of these forces will be 
determined by SACEUR in consulta-
tion and agreement with the national 
authorities concerned ; 
these forces shall neither be redeployed 
nor operationally used without the 
consent of SACEUR which must be 
based on political guidance furnished 
by the North Atlantic Council. 
183. The strong concentration of forces in the 
central region has resulted in large requirements 
for military infrastructure facilities which had 
to be financed nationally or on a bilateral basis. 
This gave rise to a number of problems. Not only 
were the existing infrastructure facilities occu-
pied to capacity as a result of the augmentation 
of the former occupation forces, the build-up 
of the Federal armed forces and the accommod-
ation of allied forces which had not been part 
of the former occupation forces, but considerable 
new constructions had also become necessary. 
Garrisons for at least one battalion each had to 
be established in approximately 350 towns and 
communities for the FederaJ. armed forces alone. 
Only some of these could make use of existing 
facilities. Most of the new garrisons of the Fed-
eral armed forces are situated in the eastern 
part of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
184. From the beginning the provision of train-
ing areas presented particular difficulties. In 
regard to layout and size many of the existing 
garrison training areas no longer met the require-
ments of technically saturated armies. But in 
a highly industrialised and densely populated 
country their expansion presents almost unsur-
mountable difficulties. Still less adequate are 
the large training areas which do not permit 
large-scale exercises of major units or tank, 
artillery or air-to-ground firing. For location 
and size of the training areas in the Federal 
Republic of Germany see attached map (Enclos-
ure 3). In the Benelux countries the situation 
is even worse. The forces must use foreign 
training areas - even in the United States and 
Canada. Special air bases on Sardinia and the 
NATO missiJJ.e range for all three services on 
Crete are used for firing practices with live 
ammunition. 
185. The accommodation and the training activ-
ities of forces cause inconvenience to the popul-
ation which must also not be neglected. I am 
referring in particular to disturbances by air-
craft noise and firing practice as well as 
obstructions to traffic as a result of military 
road movements. 
186. No NATO standards have been developed 
for the construction of barracks. Therefore -
and this appears to be legitimate - barracks 
are laid out and constructed in accordance with 
the requirements of the service, the service 
branch and the nation concerned. The non-
German forces need speciaJ facilities such as 
schools, shops, clubs, sports facilities, libraries. 
Their wishes in regard to accommodation for the 
dependents of the servicemen, preferably in 
separate housing complexes, must be met as far 
as possible. 
187. Thus, as a rule, military installations are 
laid out for specific units and for certain nations. 
Therefore the garrisons cannot be exchanged at 
will. In almost every case an exchange of gar-
risons would involve reconstruction measures or 
the construction of supplementary buildings. 
They cost money and time and do not always 
increase the value of the existing facilities. 
188. The following figures may illustrate the 
costs involved in the relocation of forces to 
garrisons with an existing infrastructure, or in 
the construction of new garrisons. They only 
apply to army forces, since a redeployment of 
any other forces in connection with the existin~ 
maldeployment is not being considered. The 
figures are based on the experiences of the 
German Federal armed forces. 
(a) The foLlowing costs are anticipated for the 
relocation to another garrison with similar 
infrastructure facilities : 
Relocation of one armoured 
battalion over a distance 
of 300 km 1.4 million DM 
Relocation of one armoured 
infantry battalion over a 
distance of 300 km 1.7 million DM 
189. These sums include the costs for the rail 
transport of tracked vehicles and the road trans-
port of wheeled vehicles as well as an average 




190. The figures do not include any expend-
itures on infrastl'UJCture. 
(b) At the present time, the capital investments 
on infrastructure for a new garrison amount to : 
- about 50 million DM for one armoured 
battalion; 
- about 53 million DM for one armoured 
infantry battalion ; 
- about 50 million DM for one armoured 
artillery battalion. 
191. The expenditures for the purchase of real 
estate, if government-owned real estate is not 
available, are IWt included. 
192. The costs involved in the purchase of 300 
hectares (740 acres) of land for a garrison train-
ing area are 30 million D M. 
193. The construction of a garrison firing range 
costs approximately 5 million DM. 
(c) The fo1lowing examples show the financial 
order of magnitude of the construction of new 
welfare and recreation facilities : Enlisted per-
sonnel clubs, non-commissioned officers' clubs 
and officers' clubs cost about 1 mil1ion DM each. 
194. Under the housing programme for married 
military personnel, roughly 80,000 DM are 
required for each housing unit. If one brigade, 
complete with headquarters, 4 battalions and 
a few self-supporting brigade units, is to be 
relocated into two garrisons to be newly con-
structed, the expenditures on infrastructure 
adone would amount to approximately 350 to 
450 million DM, provided that the necessary 
ground can be provided at all and must not be 
purchased at an excessive price. However, expe-
rience has shown that, in the area of the central 
region, this is highly improbable. 
195. The above examples are sufficient to make 
it clear that considerable costs would be involved 
in eliminating the maldeployment by redeploy-
ing the forces to garrisons to be newly con-
. structed or to existing garrisons which would 
require major alterations and supplementary 
constructions. It is true that such measures 
would reduce the time required for deployment 
to wartime positions but they would not produce 
new combat power. 
196. In addition, they would also reduce the 
capita:! investment portion of the defence bud-
gets, considerably diminishing the already 
limited possibilities for the procurement of 
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weapons and equipment. Therefore they cannot 
be recommended. The resulting improvements 
in the deployment are out of all proportion as 
compared with the disadvantages in regard to 
the continuous modernisation of the armed 
forces. 
197. Relocation expenditures could only be jus-
tified under special circumstances as, for 
instance, in the case of the covering forces or 
of certain forces, such as reconnaissance units, 
which wm be quick1y needed at the frontier in 
wartime but are at present in particularly un-
favourable locations - i.e. in locations far to the 
west. The same applies to such logistic installa-
tions which would considerably facilitate oper-
ations and enhance flexibility especially during 
the initial phase of defensive combat. 
198. Redeployment may also be justifiable under 
financial aspects if they involve merely an 
exchange of garrisons between locations where 
the necessary infrastructure exists and no major 
alterations or supplementary constructions are 
required. However, the excepted advantages will 
only materialise if more combat troops in a state 
of immediate operational readiness can be rede-
ployed to locations closer to the frontier and 
within their assigned zones of action. Primarily, 
this might be considered for parts of the I (NI.J) 
Corps and parts of the I (BE) Corps. A solution 
might be found in a kind of "ring barter" where-
by Netherlands and Belgian brigades would be 
relocated to the eastern part of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and training units or 
service support and supply units of the Federal 
armed forces which would be needed later would 
be moved to the vacated infrastructure facilities 
in the Netherlands and Belgium. However, there 
are not only political obstacles that would have 
to be overcome - current Belgian policy actually 
shows a different tendency - but also serious 
human problems would have to be solved in 
regard to long-term personnel and their families 
as, for instance, their separation from familiar 
environment, occupational opportunities for the 
wives, schools for the children, etc. If these prob-
lems are neglected, the servicemen's willingness 
to re-enlist will soon be affected. 
199. Finally, I propose to discuss part of a 
problem the solution of which appears possible. 
The Netherlands army and air defence forces 
stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany are 
deployed in such a manner that some of them 
require separate supply and welfare facilities as 
·well as logistic supply channels. If the Nether-
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lands Nike and Hawk batteries could be e.."t-
changed with the German batteries stationed 
farther north in the belt - the infrastructure 
facilities are more or less similar - it would be 
possible to save funds by simplifying the upkeep 
of the Netherlands army and air defence units. 
Similar considerations have already played a 
part, a few years ago, in connection with the 
concentration of the Canadian contingent in 
southern Germany. 
200. Even though the previous arguments con-
centrated on the financial consequences, there 
are still other considerations which make the 
author hesitate to recommend a relocation as a 
remedy for the maldeployment - apart from 
some exceptions. 
201. There is a natural and recurring tension 
between the permanent locations and the war-
time positions. Operational plans and thus the 
areas of operation of the units at the outbreak 
of combat actions are apt to vary, that is to say 
they are of a dynamic nature. The change of 
strategic doctrines and the development of the 
defence plans in the central region from a main 
line of defence on the Rhine river to the prin-
ciple of forward defence have already been men-
tioned on page 7 4. Even though it appears 
improbable that the present strategic concept 
including the principle of forward defence is 
going to be revised in the near future, a change 
in the number and the composition of the avail-
able forces could make new planning inevitable. 
There have been examples m the recent past such 
as: 
- the reorganisation of the Canadian con-
tingent and its concentration in the 
CENTAG area ; 
- the withdrawal of the French divisions 
from integrated planning; 
- the introduction of the principle of 
dual-based forces by the United States. 
202. In the future, defence planning can be 
influenced by, for instance: 
- agreements reached in the MBFR nego-
tiations ; 
- political decisions taken by individual 
member nations with regard to the 
number of forces to be stationed outside 
their national borders ; 
- or merely by drastic changes in the 
force structure of the individual nations. 
203. Infrastructure facilities, however, are per-
manent, that is static ; once they are established 
at great expense, they can only be altered at 
renewed high costs, and only to a limited extent. 
204. If, by taking appropriate measures, an 
optimum relation between peacetime locations 
and operational areas were established - which 
would take years - one could still not be sure 
that, despite all efforts, new defence plans or 
other unforeseeable changes which had become 
necessary in the meantime, would not cause a 
new maldeployment. Although a complete con-
formity of peacetime garrisons with the respect-
ive areas of operation would be an ideal solution, 
its realisation remains more or less an illusion. 
E.3. Relation between deployment and political 
decisions in a period of tension 
205. If one accepts an unavoidable degree of 
maldeployment and thus recognises that the units 
of the land forces always need a certain period 
of time to reach their areas of operation, it is 
all the more imperative to use the warning time 1 
most probably preceding an aggression to 
improve the operational readiness in regard to 
personnel and materiel by taking political deci-
sions in time and by granting the armed forces 
the time required for deployment to wartime 
positions. 
206. Therefore, already in peacetime, the politi-
cal leaders will have to decide for one of the two 
alternatives : 
- either to increase the funds for the 
infrastructure in order to achieve an 
optimum deployment and to provide for 
the possibility of taking political deci-
sions at a later date, which means, how-
ever, that there will be less capital 
investment for modern materiel ; 
- or to provide financial means primarily 
for weapons and equipment, putting up 
with deficiencies in deployment and the 
necessity of taking early political deci-
sions. 
207. Thus, in the last analysis, the problem of 
deployment becomes a matter of taking timely 
political decisions in times of increasing tension. 
1. See page 78. 
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208. However, it would be wrong to assume that 
early measures for the improvement of the 
defence readiness would automatically aggravate 
a crisis and thus jeopardise peace. On the con-
trary, if it is recognised that the enemy plans 
an aggression and his intent is confirmed by 
indications, it will have a deterrent effect and 
thus subdue the crisis and preserve the peace, 
when at an early date NATO shows its deter-
mination not to be intimidated and, if necessary, 
to offer resistance to pressure or aggression even 
by military means. 
209. There are, however, limits to the choice the 
political leaders have between both alternatives. 
If the presence of forces is reduced to such an 
extent and their deployment becomes so un-
favourable that the time required for the deploy-
ment to wartime positions is no longer reason-
able, a quick military response - at least with 
regard to surprise attacks - is no longer ensured. 
Such a situation would be nothing short of invit-
ing the potential aggressor to take possession of 
a pawn by surprise - i.e. without a warning 
time and any early indications - and to establish 
a fait accompli. Things must not get that far. 
210. Therefore, it must be repeated that, in view 
of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact to the central region and the present 
"relative" balance of power in the conventional 
field which is just sufficient to achieve deter-
rence, a one-sided reduction of the available 
forces and a further degradation of the present 
deployment by relocating units to the west cannot 
be tolerated. For this would mean deliberately 
putting up with a considerable reduction of the 
deterrent effect, a disproportionately long time 
required for attaining the movement readiness 
and for the deployment to wartime positions, and 
thus with an obviously greater risk. The military 
expert cannot but warn against such a develop-
ment. 
E.4. Reinforcements in periodB of tension and in 
case of mobilisation 
211. The time factor also plays an important 
part in assembling and moving up those forces 
which bring the M-day forces up to full wartime 
strength, are newly activated in case of mobilisa-
tion or are redeployed into the central region 
from outside. Their timely arrival also depends 
upon an early declaration of alert and mobilisa-
tion measures. Decisions regarding these measures 
must be taken on a national basis and by the 
Alliance as a whole and therefore require a 
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functioning consultation and decision-making 
capability of the political machinery of the 
Alliance. 
212. The reinforcements of forces which can be 
expected in periods of tension and in case of 
mobilisation differ widely in regard to type, 
combat effectiveness and time of availability. 
213. Details are given in the description below: 
(a) Augmenting the M-day forces 
214. The United States and Canadian forces in 
the central region need not be augmented. As 
expeditionary forces, they normally have their 
full strength so far as personnel and materiel 
are concerned. 
215. The British forces, however, have to move 
a remarkable amount of personnel from Great 
Britain to bring their service support units to 
full wartime strength and to redeploy their rein-
forcement reserves into the zone of action of the 
I (BR) Corps. This will take up to two weeks. 
However, the combat effectiveness of the British 
divisions is not jeopardised at that time. 
216. The M-day forces of the continental Euro-
pean allies - which in most cases are organised 
according to the principle of graduated avail-
ability 1 - must also be augmented to a certain 
extent to reach their wartime strength. The 
number of reservists and vehicles required for 
that purpose is in keeping with the criteria deter-
mined by SHAPE for M-day forces. It is limited 
and the distances to be covered are comparatively 
short. 
(b) Reserve units 
217. TheM-day forces of the central region will 
be reinforced by reserve forces to be newly activ-
ated as late as during mobilisation using reserv-
ists and available materiel or materiel to be 
requisitioned from civil stocks. They include : 
- from the Netherlands : One div with 3 
bdes and, in addition, one inf bde, that 
is a total of 4 bdes. They will be ready 
for call in their deployment areas 
within a few days. 
- from Belgium : One mech bde, one light 
inf bde, ready for call later. 
218. Furthermore, in all nations on the Euro-
pean continent, the territorial defence forces 
1. See page 84. 
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which are under national military command will 
be brought up to wartime strength or will be 
newly activated during mobilisation. 
219. The territorial defence organisation and 
forces of the Federal Republic of Germany play 
a special role in the central region. Their wartime 
strength amounts to about 330,000 men. Accord-
ing to NATO plans they will accomplish impor-
tant support tasks for all NATO forces stationed 
in the Federal Republic of Germany irrespective 
of their nationality. These include above all the 
maintenance of the freedom of operations, i.e. 
taking over of tasks, usually local, which facilitate 
and support the operations such as target 
defence, movement control, construction of bar-
riers, engineer tasks at the Rhine river, provision 
of fixed communications links. 
220. The territorial defence organisation fur-
nishes support to the NATO forces by making 
use of available local and other German resources. 
An essential element of this support is the provi-
sion of the civil manpower required to organise 
and initiate logistic support. This applies to all 
NATO units stationed in the Federal Republic 
which have submitted their requirements for 
German manpower to the territorial defence 
organisation. It will take several days until sup-
ply support can get started. A delayed call-up of 
civil manpower in a period of tension can 
seriously jeopardise follow-on supply support if 
the combat operations begin at short notice. 
221. Some elements of the territorial defence 
forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, as 
for instance the 6 home defence groups, each of 
which has approximately the strength of a bri-
gade, could be temporarily assigned to the NATO 
commands in a crisis situation to accomplish 
limited tasks which are in keeping with their 
equipment and training. But this should be an 
exception. 
222. Although the Federal Republic of Germany 
makes an important additional contribution to 
the common defence in the combat zone in the 
form of its non-assigned territorial defence organ-
isation and forces, it still has a large number of 
well-trained reservists at its disposal, who are 
not earmarked for mobilisation. Therefore, the 
Federal Republic of Germany should seriously 
consider to what extent it is possible to activate 
additional reserve units by making use of these 
reservists and the materiel which has become 
available in the course of modernisation. This 
can also be realised step by step ; one can begin 
with the activation of a few reserve battalions, 
in particular armoured battalions to be used as 
reinforcements for the home defence groups, or 
reserve regiments equipped with ~elatively light 
weapons; at a later date, these could be 
developed into brigades or even divisions. 
223. By analogy the proposal to expand the 
activation of reserve units in case of mobilisation 
- of course without reducing the number and 
presence of the M-day forces - applies to the 
Netherlands and Belgium as well, although they 
have already made allowance for this idea by 
organising some reserve brigades. Every rein-
forcement, no matter how small it may be, is a 
contribution to improved deterrence and more 
effective defence. The respective preparations 
can be made at comparatively small cost, but 
require a careful planning of the organisation 
and, above all, political determination. 
(c) Dttal-based forces 
224. A few years ago, the United States devel-
oped the system of the dual-based forces aiming 
at a reduction of their foreign exchange losses 
and supported by their increasing airlift capabil-
ities. 
225. The greater part of the division head-
quarters and two brigades of the 1 (US) Mech 
Div - the third brigade of this division is still 
stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Goppingen) - as well as 146 combat aircraft 
(7 squadrons) were withdrawn from the central 
region and relocated to the United States ; but 
they continue to be assigned to SACEUR. The 
heavy materiel of the army units has been stored 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, and suitable 
air bases have been prepared for short-term 
reception of these aircraft. The redeployment of 
the dual-based forces is not dependent upon 
certain political prerequisites ; it is exercised 
once a year. 
226. Of course, the dual-based forces do not 
have the same deterrent effect as the units per-
manently stationed in the central region. How-
ever, since they can be quickly brought up, are 
clearly assigned to SACEUR and are constantly 
kept up to date by exercises in their presumed 
zone of action, they are valuable reinforcements 
which are rapidly available and can be employed 
immediately, they can be firmly included in the 
defence plans. 
227. Due to the exceptional situation in 
Northern Ireland, the British Government felt 
bound to withdraw temporarily by way of rota-
tion some battalions from the British forces 
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assigned to NORTHAG for employment in 
Northern Ireland, without officially labelling 
them as dual-based forces. These units, too, have 
left their heavy materiel and even their families 
in the Federal Republic of Germany ; they con-
tinue to be assigned forces. Preparations for their 
return have been made. However, it will be dif-
ficult to disengage them from their employment 
in Northern Ireland as quickly as the dual-based 
forces in the United States which are not com-
mitted for other tasks as long as the tense poli-
tical situation in Northern Ireland continues and 
the British Government does not find other solu-
tions to master it. 
(d) Strategic reserves from overseas 
228. The Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Benelux countries are not in a position to make 
available, in addition to the units mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) and (b), forces as strategic 
reserves. In all probability, reinforcements for 
the central region cannot be expected from 
Canada either. 
229. The United Kingdom, however, disposes of 
the following strategic reserves which are sta-
tioned in Great Britain and which are available 
at short notice : 
- United Kingdom Mobile Force, compris-
ing some brigades and transport and 
combat aircraft. The United Kingdom 
Mobile Force is earmarked for SACEUR. 
- United Kingdom Joint Airborne Task 
Force and United Kingdom Amphibious 
Force. These are national units ; their 
assignment to SACEUR is dependent 
on an explicit political decision to be 
taken by the British Government. 
230. In any event, all these forces are ready 
for employment within the entire ACE area. 
Their employment at the flanks of the Alliance 
(Norway or Mediterranean) seems to be more 
probable than their employment in the central 
region. 
231. Major strategic reserves are available in 
the United States. 
Land forces 
232. For two divisions the heavy materiel has 
already been stored in Europe. One can definitely 
reckon with their availability. 
233. In addition, the United States is in a posi-
tion to make available some more divisions. Their 
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airlift and sealift capabilities permit the rede-
ployment of these divisions to Europe within 
some months, parts of them within 30 days. 
234. From the European point of view the forces 
that can be expected to arrive within a short 
period of time are of primary importance. In a 
longer period of time, the situation in Europe 
can undergo decisive changes in view of the con-
ventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact, before 
the United States divisions which are not avail-
able until a later point in time will arrive ; this 
the more as the Warsaw Pact is capable of 
activating and deploying considerable strategic 
reserves in a much shorter time. It is therefore 
understandable that the Europeans place less 
importance on reinforcements which will arrive 
in Europe after several months. They are prac-
tically without value for the principle of forward 
defence. 
Air forces 
235. Thus, the air force reinforcements intim-
ated by the United States are of particular 
importance to Europe, since they can be rede-
ployed to Europe in a much shorter time and 
thus result more rapidly in a substantial increase 
of the combat strength. Irrespective of the dual-
based squadrons, several hundred combat air-
craft can be taken into account within one month. 
236. The redeployment of these units is made 
dependent by the United States on the condition 
that these units can be received, i.e. that air bases 
are aVIailable, supply and maintenance are 
ensured and minimum requirements for surviva-
bility are met - a condition which is under-
standable. 
237. This still requires great efforts. 
238. Although it is possible to a certain extent 
to make additional use of the air bases which are 
already used and operated by the United States 
Air Force, the problem of reception is only 
partly solved. Therefore, the United States has 
proposed the "collocated operating bases" pro-
gramme. This proposal provides that some air 
bases in the Federal Republic of Germany, in 
the Benelux countries and in the United King-
dom which are used by the allies should be occu-
pied by an additional United States squadron 
each. 
239. The prerequisites for this would be special 
stocks for the respective type of aircraft, the 
provision of maintenance and repair capabilities, 
command and control facilities and last but not 
least the construction of additional shelters. 
94 
240. In the opinion of the United States, 100 % 
shelter protection for combat aircraft is indis-
pensable. However, this requirement seems to be 
slightly excessive. Not all aircraft are always in 
a state of operational readiness; even in the first 
days of combat one must reckon with failures. 
In all probability, shelter protection of 70-75% 
will be acceptable. At the time being, about 
1,800 shelters are already available ; France will 
construct 40 of these installations each year. 
241. Apart from making additional use of air 
bases, it should also be examined if the bases 
which were completely or partly inactivated in 
the past could not be reactivated for the reception 
of modern combat aircraft or what the prerequi-
sites and conditions are for making them quickly 
operational in a period of tension. A good 
example for this is the air base Geilenkirchen 
situated in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(north-west of Cologne). The necessary repair of 
the runway could be initiated at reasonable cost 
in advance in peacetime. Since the air base is 
continuously used by military units, it could be 
made operational in a period of tension within 
a relatively short time. 
242. Such favourable conditions cannot be found 
at all inactivated airfields. It is therefore recom-
mended that this compromise be thoroughly 
examined. 
243. The preparations for a reception that 
ensures the rapid employment of the announced 
reinforcement by the United States Air Force 
cannot be accomplished without financial means. 
At the time being, bilateral negotiations are con-
ducted with the host nations concerned on the 
programme of collocated operating bases. Results 
have been achieved only in part. 
244. However, this programme is of great 
importance to the entire Alliance, if one considers 
the fact that the conventional forces in the central 
region can be reinforced by several hundred 
combat aircraft within a rather short time. 
245. The financial means that must be provided 
for the reception of the United States aircraft 
are far less than the costs that would be involved 
if the European partners were to provide only 
part of this additional combat power by them-
selves. 
246. Considering the cost effectiveness aspect, 
great additional combat power could be achieved 
at comparatively low cost. 
24 7. Thus, a one-time effort of the Alliance 
seems to be justified. For this purpose a special 
NATO infrastructure programme comparable to 
the NICS programme is proposed to ensure the 
reception of United States Air Force reinforce-
ments including an extension of the shelter con-
struction programme. Such a programme would 
have to be provided in addition to the current 
agreed infrastructure measures. It could be 
partly financed by savings from the national air 
force procurement programmes. However, such 
an effort can only be expected from the European 
partners within the scope of binding commit-
ments on the part of the United States Govern-
ment with regard to the number of aircraft and 
the time of their redeployment to Europe. Apart 
from its purely military importance, the part 
that such a programme would play in maintain-
ing concord between the United States and 
Europe and in strengthening the solidarity 
within the Alliance cannot be overemphasised. 
(e) French forces 
248. The French forces, too, may be regarded 
as being part of the strategic reserves. The 
French Government has hardly left any doubt 
that in case of a major aggression directed 
against the central region, which would also be 
a threat to the security and integrity of France, 
its troops would participate in the common 
defence. 
249. For this purpose the following forces are 
available under the command of the 1 Frerwk 
Army 1 : 
- the II (FR) Corps with 2 divisions 
which are already stationed on the ter-
ritory of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many ; they are immediately available ; 
- the I (FR) Corps with 2-3 divisions 
which are largely ready units but have 
to be brought up from North-Eastern 
France or from the area north and east 
of Paris, respectively; they will be 
available at a later date ; 
- the tactical air forces under the com-
mand of the 1 F ATAC ; they are im-
mediately available. 
250. For the defence of the French mother 
country large additional reserve units will be 
activated in case of mobilisation. 




251. For deterrence and defence both types of 
forces are required in the central region. 
252. Those which are already available in peace-
time and can be brought into a state of operational 
readiness at very short notice and those which 
have to be activated on the spot by mobilisation 
or have to be redeployed to the central region 
from the outside. 
253. The combat-ready forces in the central 
region are the most obvious manifestation of 
military defence capability and also convincingly 
warn the potential aggressor in peacetime against 
seeking military adventures. Only the readily 
available forces are capable of effectively resist-
ing s.urprise actions of the enemy. In most cases, 
a high degree of availability and modern weapons 
will have to be given priority over an ideal 
deployment. The forces available at the present 
time are the minimum forces required for imple-
menting the strategy of flexible response and 
forward defence in view of the present threat. 
The potential aggressor is well-informed about 
these available forces and will take into account 
their strength and type in his estimates when 
preparing his own possible military actions. He 
will also register exactly any unilateral reduction 
of the military presence and will draw his con-
clusions. 
254. Reinforcements which are brought up from 
the outside or which have to be activated by 
mobilisation have a smaller warning or deterrent 
effect. As far as land forces are concerned, it 
takes rather a long time before these forces are 
combat-ready or can be brought up. 
255. Proceeding on the assumption that in all 
probability an attack will be preceded by a pro-
longed period of political tension, during which 
the potential aggressor could first of all try to 
use his military strength to exert political pres-
sure, military reinforcements of all kinds are 
among the most effective means of crisis manage-
ment. However, a possible warning time must 
also be used with determination from both the 
political and military point of view. A redeploy-
ment of several hundred combat aircraft from 
the Unit-ed States, the airlift of the dual-based 
personnel of the 1 (US) Div or even merely 
of parts of the divisions, the weapons of which 
are already stored in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the mobilisation of reserve units in the 
nations on the European continent or comparable 
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measures taken in the United Kingdom would be 
such a forcible political warning that, considering 
the present balance of forces, any potential 
aggressor would probably be deterred from tak-
ing the risk of a conventional >armed conflict. 
When, at the same time, the French forces are 
making visible preparations to participate in the 
common defence, the warning would be even more 
impressive. For the enemy's intelligence service 
it is more difficult to determine exactly in advance 
the number and types of the various reinforce-
ments than determining that of the available 
forces, and in particular to determine the time 
of their availability. Thus, it is also more difficult 
for the aggressor to calculate the risk. 
256. By appropriate exercises in peacetime (such 
as the Reforger and Crested Cap exercises of the 
United States) the possibilities which the Alliance 
has and its preparedness to make use of them 
can be made clear already in peacetime ; thus, 
they increase the deterrent effect without reveal-
ing the total strength of the possible or planned 
reinforcements. For this very reason it is strongly 
recommended to intensify such redeployment and 
mobilisation exercises. 
257. Should, however, peace be broken by an 
attack in spite of that, our conventional defence 
capability would be considerably increased by 
the improvements proposed in this chapter. These 
proposals can be realised at no or only little cost 
as compared with their effect of an increased 
deterrence and defence capability. A successful 
defence would then be possible for a certain 
period of time even without the use of nuclear 
means. It would take very much longer before 
one would inevitably be forced to employ nuclear 
means. However, the Central European nations 
could gain nothing but profit by every further 
day on which they can defend themselves with 
merely conventional means without abandoning 
areas of a size worth mentioning. This leaves a 
greater margin for political and even military 
measures in other parts of the world which, as a 
whole, could result in the suspension of the hostil-
ities before nuclear weapons would have to be 
used. 
:!58. In conclusion, however, it must again be 
emphasised that the possibilities of reinforcing 
the conventional combat power have to be care-
fully prepared, must be regularly exercised in 
peacetime and must be actually used in a period 
of tension by taking appropriate and timely 
political decisions. 
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F. Possible other patterns of deployment 
F.l. Establillhment of a barrier zone between the 
Baltic Sea and Danube river 
259. 'l'he previous investigations dealt with the 
possibilities of improving the deployment in the 
central region on the basis of the present deploy-
ment situation and the military-political condi-
tions ; in the following chapter it is to be 
examined whether there are still other patterns 
of deployment, and thus of defence planning, 
which conform better to the threat and to the 
requirements for deterrence and defence which 
can be deduced from that threat - without 
exceeding the scope determined by the strategy 
of flexible response and forward defence. In this 
context, the possibility of realising such models 
will for the present be neglected. 
260. For this purpose, a proposal will first be 
taken up which again and again has been sub-
mitted for discussion by different sides during 
the last twenty years. The advocates of that 
proposal believe that it has gained renewed 
actuality due to the experiences gained during 
the Yom-Kippur war of October 1973. 
261. The proposal in question is a defence plan 
which aims at attaining success in defence by 
establishing a continuous barrier between Liibeck 
and Passau, parallel to the border of the 
Warsaw Pact countries. This barrier is to be 
reinforced by obstacles, mines and field fortifi-
eations taking advantage of terrain suitable for 
that purpose. The troops permanently employed 
within the barrier are to be equipped with a 
great number of anti-tank weapons and low-
level air defence weapons. Thereby the barrier is 
to be provided with a high defensive capability, 
particularly against armoured and mechanised 
units supported by tactical air forces. 
262. The advantages of this solution are seen 
as follows: 
263. A barrier mainly armed with defensive 
weapons would make evident, also to the outside, 
the deliberate limitation of NATO to defence. 
At the same time it would give evidence -
which can be overlooked by neither friend nor 
foe - of the implementation of the requirement 
for a forward defence. 
264. The barrier would force the aggressor to 
employ stronger forces and to prepare his attacks 
more carefully. It would thus prevent a broad 
surprise attack and give the defender the time 
required for achieving the full operational readi-
ness of his own mechanised and tank divisions 
at the rear of the barrier, which, from an opera-
tional point of view, can be employed in a 
manifold way, for the mobilisation of reserve 
units and for bringing up further reinforcements 
from outside. The time gained as a result of the 
existence of the barrier could therefore also 
compensate for existing deficiencies in the peace-
time deployment. 
265. The proposal seems fascinating but it can-
not stand a critical analysis. 
266. If it should be based on the assumption 
that the barrier zone were to be occupied by 
German troops only, it would forego the funda-
mental advantage of a deterrent effect which is 
based on the fact that nearly all allies have taken 
over a combat sector in the central region, exten-
ding up to the border, and that consequently an 
aggressor would encounter from the very begin-
ning not only German troops but forces from the 
whole Alliance. If, however, all nations are to 
participate in the barrier in the sense of the 
"layer-cake", their corps would have to be re-
organised into a static and a mobile part. This 
limits interoperability. 
267. There are other serious reasons which speak 
against the proposal. 
268. In recent military history, static defence 
barriers - and even consolidated lines of for-
tresses - were not able to protect the area to be 
defended from occupation by an aggressor. A 
barrier in the described form - however great 
its fire-power- can always be broken up locally, 
in a confined area, by a concentration of 
fire of the aggressor. This does not even require 
the employment of nuclear weapons. Airborne 
troops - nowadays in the size of major units -
are in a position to leap over the barrier in the 
air and to break it open from the rear. But once 
the barrier is pierced at individual points, the 
aggressor will advance his armoured units 
through the gaps into the depth. It is true that 
the friendly mobile forces placed in readiness 
in the rear can oppose him there, but they would 
be weaker than is the case under the present 
deployment, for large parts of the available 
friendly forces must be employed within the 
barrier if it is to have an effective fire-power. 
They are therefore contained there and it will 
not be possible to withdraw them in time, not 
even from those parts of the barrier which are 
not attacked. Moreover they are neither equipped 
nor trained for mobile combat in another area. 
4 - I 
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269. Still, the old experience has always proved 
true that, the lower one's number of forces, the 
greater mobility with which one must operate. 
Thus defence is not limited to rigid holding of 
specific areas, nor does it mean rapid evacuating 
or even abandonment of terrain without fighting. 
Defence as properly understood signifies flexible 
reaction to the enemy's plan of attack whilst 
holding specific areas and concentrating in time 
one's own forces for counter-attack at operational 
or tactical points of main effort one has chosen 
oneself. 
270. A defence plan placing its hopes upon 
static defence in rigid barriers cannot be recom-
mended, in view of the modern technical equip-
ment and the manifold possibilities of flexible 
interaction of fire and movement. 
F.2. Redeployment of United States units into the 
North German lowlands 
271. The discussion of the question as to if and 
in what way a reinforcement of NORTHAG is 
necessary and practicable is not new, for it is 
NORTHAG that has to expect the strongest 
thrust on both sides of the Autobahn Helmstedt-
Dortmund. Under classical aspects, the open 
terrain well suited for tanks offers precisely the 
conditions required for rapid surprise tank 
operations. For that purpose, a great number of 
tank units have been deployed in the northern 
part of the German Democratic Republic by the 
Warsaw Pact countries 1 • There are only a few 
reserves available to NORTHAG ; in case of 
mobilisation, essentially only the augmentation 
of the M-day forces with personnel and materiel 
is to be expected. The earmarked reserve units 
- 4 Dutch and 2 Belgian brigades - do not 
decisively alter the force ratio. Besides, they wi11 
not be 'available for several days after the initia-
tion of mobilisation 2 • 
272. In recent time, the discussion on the rein-
forcement of NORTHAG has gained renewed 
momentum due to a study prepared by the Ame-
ricans Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record 
(The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.) 
dealing with the United States force structure 
within NATO. The authors base their considera-
tion on the fact that "the presumption of a short, 
intensive war as the most likely threat in Europe 
has recently received official recognition in 
1. See page 80. 
2. See page 92. 
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Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger's 
Annual Defence Department Report, Fiscal Year 
1975". They raise the question as to what extent 
the concentration of the United States forces in 
southern Germany which dates back to the end 
of World War II in 1945 can still be valid at 
the present time. The combat effective mecha-
nised and armoured United States divisions are, 
in their opinon, not optimally employed in the 
terrain of the woody hills between Kassel and 
Hof - especially in view of the conversion of 
their tanks to the new 152 mm tank gun (guided 
missile Shillelagh/high-explosive shell). There-
fore the redeployment in peacetime of parts of 
the United States land forces stationed in the 
central region - up to two divisions - to the 
North German lowlands is proposed. The advan-
tages are obvious. 
273. Such a redeployment would mean an impor-
tant reinforcement of NORTHAG which would 
essentially increase the deterrence and defensive 
strength in the North German area. Another 
element of great operational importance would 
be added to the British-German bloc employed 
concertedly on both sides of the presumable axis 
of main attack of the enemy. The lack of reserves 
in the NORTHAG area would thus be remedied. 
274. Last but not least, in case of a conflict 
limited solely to North Germany, United States 
troops would also be immediately affected by an 
enemy attack. 
275. In contrast to these advantages there are 
also serious objections. 
276. The considerable costs which would be 
incurred by such large-scale regrouping have 
already been reported on in chapter E. 2. They 
would be increased even more by the necessary 
build-up of a new logistic system. In the study 
prepared by R. D. Lawrence an attempt is made 
to balance these costs by an extension of the 
principle of dual-based forces and rotation. A 
reduction of the American presence to 60 % and 
the permanent stationing in the United States 
(CONUS) of the other 40% after withdrawal is 
proposed. "The rotation of units in CONUS to 
their parent divisions in Europe every four 
months would approximate a Reforger airlift 
three times a year." 
277. Such a weakening of the presence of the 
United States M-day forces at a time when the 
Warsaw Pact forces are continuously reinforced 
is, however, not acceptable to NATO. It would 
shift the relative military balance in Central 
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Europe one-sidedly to the disadvantage of the 
West. An essentially worsened initial situation 
for the MBFR negotiations would result. 
278. Finally, the reinforcement of NORTHAG 
in such a way would create a weakening of 
deterrence and defence in the CENT AG area. 
It would lead to a further over-extension of the 
combat sectors of those corps left to CENTAG 
and would increase the danger at the open south-
east flank of AFCENT. 
279. But if one thinks of the redeployment of 
United States troops to North Germany on con-
dition of exchange for other forces within this 
area, the British, the Dutch and the Belgians 
would not come into question for that purpose. 
The distances from their bases would become too 
great. Besides it cannot be expected of those 
nations that they let their corps be employed in 
an area not situated immediately forward of their 
homelands. But an exchange of American for 
German units would largely deprive the North 
German area of German garrisons. The ensuing 
effects on internal policy and in a psychological 
respect would be most undesirable. They might 
even provoke a reciprocal effect. 
280. The disadvantages caused by a redeploy-
ment of United States troops in peacetime to the 
NORTHAG area outweigh the possible advan-
tages. 
281. Such a solution cannot be recommended. 
282. A more favourable picture results as to 
the possibilities of employing units of the United 
States land forces in the NORTHAG area only 
in times of tension and in case of war, respec-
tively. 
283. Certainly, then it will not be possible to 
weaken CENTAG by withdrawing United States 
units from the combat sectors envisioned in the 
general defence .plan. The smooth progress of 
the build-up of the forward defence just in the 
critical initial phase of a conflict must not be 
disturbed or even endangered. But an allocation 
to North Germany of the divisions to be brought 
up from the United States may be taken into 
consideration. They would enable a substantial 
reinforcement of NORTHAG. 
284. The reception of such forces in that area 
must be carefully planned and prepared. For 
example, depot space would have to be made 
available in peacetime for the equipment to be 
stored ; likewise, airfields for the landing of 
large transport units would have to be prepared 
- unless one accepts a landing in hitherto 
prepared areas and a longer road march into 
the operational areas situated farther to the 
north. 
285. The possibilities of logistic support of 
American troops, and thus of the fifth nation in 
the North German area, are, however, limited. 
American logistic lines of communication in an 
east-west direction do not exist there. The United 
States base in the Bremerhaven area- situated 
east of the W eser river - is not prepared to 
effect direct issues of supplies to field units. 
286. These complications show once more the 
serious disadvantages of national responsibility 
in regard to logistics and of the lack of standard-
isation. 
287. For the time being the allocation of United 
States forces - remote from the mass of the 7th 
United States Army - promises success only if 
the most logistic problems are at first solved, but it 
will then offer political as well as, in particular, 
military advantages. Therefore such a solution 
should definitely be prepared right now. For if, 
for example, in case of a conflict, an unfavour-
able development of the situation should render 
a reinforcement of NORTHAG indispensable, 
CINCENT will have to think of such dispositions 
in any event. 
288. But until the abovementioned conditions 
are met, another solution must be looked for. An 
immediate solution can be seen in withdrawing 
German forces from the CENT AG area for 
employment within NORTHAG. German forces 
can be employed anywhere within the combat 
zone of the central region. For them, the logistic 
prerequisites can be fulfilled more easily. 
289. To the extent they are allocated as opera-
tional reserves in the CENTAG area, they will 
be available comparatively quickly. Their tasks 
can be assumed by the arriving United States 
reinforcements. If, however, German units must 
first be withdrawn from the front line, the time 
required is considerably longer, if the situation 
still permits a relief by new United States units 
at all. 
290. In summary, the following can be stated: 
291. Should a reinforcement of NORTHAG 
become necessary in case of defence, the safest 
and quickest way of achieving this would be the 
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employment of German units from the opera-
tional reserve of CENT AG and the assumption 
of their tasks by newly brought up United States 
units. In a later phase, other United States 
reinforcements which are brought up could set 
free additional German forces, or these reinforce-
ments could be employed themselves in North 
Germany - after the most urgent logistic prere-
quisites have been ensured. 
F.3. Consequences ensuing from possible MBFR 
(Mutual balanced force reduction) agreements 
292. Finally, brief mention should be made of 
the effects which might occur if the MBFR 
negotiations that are being conducted should lead 
to positive results and bring about a reduction 
of the allied forces stationed in the central region. 
For the time being, the deliberations are of a 
hypothetical nature. The opinons of the nego-
tiating partners from East and West still differ 
considerably. Practical results are not to be 
expected in the near future. The extent of pos-
sible reductions cannot be predicted. For this 
reason it is also not possible to submit concrete 
proposals. The brief statements are limited to 
general considerations. They presuppose that the 
central region as a whole will be part of the area 
of reduction which is under negotiation. 
293. Balanced force reductions on both sides in 
the area of reductions are to lead to a more stable 
situation from both a military and military-
political point of view with a lower level of forces. 
This presupposes force reductions on both sides 
which must be accomplished in East and West 
and balanced in such a way that they lead to 
an approximate equilibrium between both sides 
on the basis of a common ceiling to be negotiated 
anew. 
294. NATO has proposed that a first phase is 
to be limited to American and Soviet land forces. 
A second phase could also include the land 
forces of other nations directly participating in 
the negotiations. For the time being, the air 
forces and tactical weapons are not to be the 
subject of negotiations. 
295. As to the determination of the scope of a 
new common ceiling the military side must point 
out that there are limitations also to balanced 
force reductions on both sides. The military com-
manders responsible for operational control must 
remain in a position to maintain in case of war 
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the cohesion between the operations, i.e. a 
coherent defence. The figures proposed at Vienna 
by NATO for a common ceiling can be considered 
to be the lowest possible limit which would 
ensure a coherent defence against the adversary 
still to be expected after a force reduction. If 
one accepts a lower limit, there would be a danger 
of defence being split up into individual engage-
ments and, as a result, the Alliance having to 
do without centrally exercised operational con-
trol. Moreover, the asymmetry which already 
exists anyhow between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
will be so much more to the disadvantage of the 
West the lower the common ceiling will be. Rein-
forcements can be brought up from the Soviet 
Union by surface transportation more quickly 
than from the United States by sea and air. Due 
to their favourable geographical situation and 
due to the fact that the initiative is in their 
hands, the Warsaw Pact countries are able to 
establish a new unilateral military preponderance 
more quickly than the West would be able to 
react. 
296. If one starts from the assumption that the 
common ceiling hitherto proposed would become 
the basis of an agreement, this means practically 
that the reductions of all land forces stationed in 
the central region will scarcely exceed 10 %. At 
first this does not call for a fundamental change 
of the present concept of deployment. Barracks 
becoming unoccupied due to the reduction might, 
however, be used for offsetting minor deficiencies 
in the present peacetime deployment. 
297. But the picture might change if, within 
the total number of the reductions to be effected 
in the central region, that of the United States 
forces were greater than that of the British 
and the continental European - the so-called 
indigenous - forces. Finally, also other political 
reasons - independent from MBFR - for exam-
ple developments in the domestic policy of the 
United States, might lead to a drastic reduction 
of the United States forces in the central region. 
Should then the remaining United States forces 
be attributed a new role fundamentally differing 
from their present one ? 
298. Two possibilities will be submitted for dis-
cussion in this context : 
(a) Relief of the American forces stationed 
in the central region from their task as "front-
line troops", and their provision as operational 
reserves. Instead, employment at the front of the 
previous tactical and operational reserves, as far 
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as they are made available by continental Euro-
pean countries or by Great Britain, while broad-
ening the combat sector of these nations. 
299. The limitations of this solution are again 
governed by the necessity of maintaining a cohe-
rent defence. But the solution would have the 
advantage of free use of the combat effective 
United States units which are stationed in the 
central region or are to be transported there, 
at the developing points of main efforts of 
defence - however under the condition that the 
logistic problems can be solved. The decisive 
disadvantage would, however, be due to the 
fact that the confrontation between Soviet and 
United States land forces would only occur in 
a later phase of a military aggression, namely 
when the front line was not able to hold out. 
In the initial phase an attack would only encoun-
ter European troops, primarily those of the 
F'ederal Republic of Germany. 
300. Once more it must be made clear - even 
at the risk of repetition - that the deterrent 
effect originating from a commitment of United 
States forces immediately at the border of the 
Warsaw Pact countries is more important than 
the possible advantage which might accrue to the 
operational control by a free operational avail-
ability of American units. The prerequisites and 
conditions of a promising planning of operations 
and operational control must, of course, not be 
excessively limited or even neglected. But on 
principle those deliberations should be given 
priority which result in an increase of the deter-
rent effect - at least as long as it remains the 
primary common strategic goal to preserve peace 
by deterrence. 
(b) The idea of deterrence would be better 
made allowance for if a proposal were made 
providing for the formation of several multi-
national mobile forces which in case of a local 
conflict - wherever it might occur within the 
central region- could be employed quickly, thus 
making evident the presence of the Alliance as 
a whole. 
301. As such that idea is not new. SACEUR 
already disposes of a multinational force (ACE 
Mobile Force - AMF). This is a brigade-size 
unit composed of combat battalions, supply ele-
ments and air transport units of the armed 
forces of several nations in the central region. 
This force can be organised rapidly in times of 
tension and be redeployed to trouble areas of 
NATO, above all at the flanks in the south and 
north, thus showing the possible intruder that 
a military adventure in these areas, too, would 
encounter the forces of several partners of the 
Alliance. For such a purpose, the multinational 
composition even of a relatively small force is 
justified from a political and a military point of 
view. But the limitation to brigade strength 
makes it quite clear that the importance to be 
attributed to AMF is mainly of a political nature 
in the sense of deterrence. Its military value is 
comparatively small as it is too insignificant from 
a military point of view to generate an effective 
increase of combat power in the operational areas. 
302. As long as the principle of the "layer-cake" 
is maintained in the central region, additional 
multinational units cannot contribute a new poli-
tical element to deterrence. But for defensive 
combat in the strict sense of the word, a combina-
tion of units from contingents of several nations 
at a very low level - i.e. below division or even 
brigade level - is less effective than the employ-
ment of nationally homogeneous divisions or even 
corps. 
303. The formation of multinational units -
for example one each in North and South 
Germany - can only present a feasible auxiliary 
solution if for compelling political reasons, 
neglecting the advantages of a presence at the 
border and contrary to expert advice, individual 
nations, above all the United States, should in 
fact no longer be committed at the border. It 
must, however, be ensured that such multina-
tional units will really be available for operation 
in the central region in case of a crisis or in 
wartime and will not be employed outside Central 
Europe, for example at the flanks, such as AMF. 
For then the deterrent effect and the defence 
capability in the central region would not be 
increased but decreased. 
304. In summary, it must be realised that 
eventual MBFR agreements will only exercise 
a lasting influence on the concept of deployment 
if the reductions are of a greater extent - much 
more than 10% - or if an individual nation 
were affected to an essentially higher degree than 
others in the same area of reductions. 
F .4. Reduction of the number of tactical nuclear 
weapons in the central region 
305. From time to time doubts are expressed, 
not only in the United States but also in some 
European circles, as to whether it is necessary 
and justified that in Europe about 7,000 Ameri-
can nuclear warheads are stored to be used for 
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tactical purposes, several thousands of them on 
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany 
- these include weapons of all types and yields, 
among them atomic demolition munitions (ADM) 
and warheads for air defence missiles. 
306. In fact, nobody would wish that such a 
large quantity of nuclear weapons be actually 
employed, turning Central Europe into a desert. 
Therefore the question suggests itself whether 
the tasks assigned to the tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe could not be accomplished with a 
smaller number of them, and whether their total 
number could not be drastically reduced by 
returning them to the United States. 
307. And yet warning must be given of such 
a conclusion. 
308. The strategy of flexible response is based 
on gapless and uncalculable deterrence. It pre-
supposes a broad spectrum of all defence forces 
- of the conventional, tactical nuclear and stra-
tegic nuclear means. Isolated, without the other 
two, one of these three large fields can accom-
plish the tasks of deterrence, defence and 
threatening with escalation. 
309. Thus the existence of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe is an important and indis-
pensable element of deterrence. But this element 
is only effective if the number of warheads and 
their decentralised storage make credible to the 
potential aggressor that they are sufficient for the 
accomplishment of any tasks which might become 
necessary within the scope of strategy, and that 
at the same time they can be quickly employed. 
In this context a long-lasting tactical nuclear war 
limited to Europe only is not envisaged. Such a 
war cannot be in the interests of Europe. Nuclear 
weapons in Europe serve other tasks. 
310. First of all, the warheads required for the 
European share in the great retaliation must be 
kept available. Certain flying units and the 
Pershing missile units will be equipped with 
such warheads. The awareness of a well-planned 
and effective nuclear second strike will prevent 
the Soviet Union from launching a nuclear sur-
prise attack - first strike - and thus render 
improbable this most terrible form of armed 
conflict, the consequences of which can hardly 
be imagined. 
311. The employment of tactical nuclear weapons 
may, however, also become necessary if, as a 
result of an attack with superior conventional 
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means, there is a danger that vital parts of the 
NATO territory might be lost. Then the time 
for an employment of nuclear weapons - limited 
in the beginning - as a means of threatening 
with escalation would have come. That employ-
ment is intended to show the aggressor that the 
whole Alliance is determined to defend them-
selves with all means and thus to induce him to 
decide to cease the aggression in order to avoid 
a further escalation. It cannot be planned before-
hand when, where, with what delivery means and 
with what strength a limited employment must 
be accomplished. For such a serious step funda-
mentally changing the character of a war, the 
political and military leaders must rather insist 
on maintaining a high degree of freedom in 
decision-making, of flexibility and of quick reac-
tion. But this presupposes a decentralisation of 
SAS (special ammunition sites) as well as the 
storage of different types of nuclear warheads 
for various weapon systems and of different 
yields in these sites. It is only by a broadly 
dispersed nuclear presence in the entire combat 
zone that a form of nuclear weapon employment 
for tactical defensive purposes can be ensured 
which corresponds to the respective political and 
military situation - a selective and well-
graduated form which, however, will become 
quickly effective at the same time. Only then will 
the nuclear deterrence remain credible on all 
levels. 
312. Thus, it will not be feasible to make a 
considerable change to the number of nuclear 
weapons stored in Europe. But it will be possible 
- and even necessary - to adapt their composi-
tion in regard to type and effects to the technical 
developments, to the new organisations of the 
weapon systems and to the refinement of the 
nuclear strategy. 
313. But apart from the military objections, the 
negative political-psychological effect of a pos-
sible reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe 
must also not be ignored. The Warsaw Pact coun-
tries as well as great portions of the European 
population would consider such a reduction -
whether justly or unjustly - as the beginning 
of a denuclearisation of Europe and thus of a 
decreasing readiness of the United States to 
commit itself for Europe. This would encourage 
the Warsaw Pact, but weaken the will of the 
European peoples to defend themselves. French 
or British nuclear weapons cannot replace those 
of the United States - neither in number nor 
in variety. 
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G. More effective employment of funds 
(rationalisation) 
G.l. Introduction 
314. The studies conducted so far have shown 
that a basically new concept for the deployment 
within the central region would either not result 
in a considerable increase of deterrence and 
defence capability or else would require such 
large funds that the possible advantages would 
not be in proportion to the disadvantages 
involved. This does not preclude partial improve-
ments of the present deployment. Several pro-
posals have been submitted in this respect. 
315. However, one should not resign oneself to 
this state of things. Strictly speaking, it may 
widen the scope of this study, but this last 
chapter shall deal with the question of how to 
make more economic use of the funds provided 
for defence purposes. On a national level as well 
as by co-operation between the allies it will be 
possible not only to improve combat effectiveness, 
but also to eliminate one of the serious weaknesses 
of the defence structure, namely the lack of inter-
operability and compatibility. 
316. In all countries the defence budgets have 
undergone a similar development. The operating 
expenditures, especially those on personnel and 
materiel maintenance, are rising rnpidly. Their 
proportionate share in the total defence budget 
has increased steadily and will continue to do 
so. This will unavoidably lead to a reduction of 
the capital expenditures so that their share will 
decline in proportion. But it is precisely the 
capital expenditures which, among other things, 
serve to support progress to ensure the moderni-
sation of weapon systems and other equipment of 
the armed forces : 
- research, development and testing ; 
- military procurements ; 
- national and NATO common infra-
structure. 
317. An extension of the programmes for 
development and procurement projects over lon-
ger periods of time can only bring temporary 
relief. In the long run, this is no suitable method 
to overcome the dilemma of the operating costs 
and the capital expenditures. 
318. All NATO partners are aware of this fact. 
319. The search for newer and better methods 
may be characterised by the following terms 
interrelated as indicated below : 
RATIONALISATION 
/(general term)""-
// ""'""' SPECIALISATION STANDARDISATION 
(directed specification) (doctrine, research 
and development, 
materiel) 
320. There have been attempts to tackle these 
difficult problems. But only partial results have 
been achieved so far. On the national level, the 
adherence to obsolete traditional ideas and the 
inertia of existing organisational structures stand 
in the way of rationalisation. In the international 
sphere it is necessary to overcome the dissimilar-
ities of existing defence concepts and military 
doctrine. Further handicaps are national econo-
mical egotism and international industrial com-
petition. 
321. Recently, in view of the continuously 
increasing pressure of rising costs, the Ministers 
of Defence have made it clear that they are 
determined to support with energy a policy of 
rationalisation. NATO and Eurogroup have taken 
important steps in this direction. 
322. The co-operation between the United States 
and Europe has also received new impulses. Long-
term objectives, including as an ultimate goal the 
complete standardisation of all materiel, have 
also been defined. But it is very doubtful, indeed, 
if such an ideal standard can be achieved within 
the foreseeable future. 
323. It is more reasonable to consider concrete, 
separate steps which can be realised on a short-
term or medium-term basis and at the same time 
mark the right course to be followed. The idea 
of rationalisation can be served best in a prag-
matic manner if such steps are taken energeti-
cally, supported by the political determination 
of the Ministers and the parliaments. The fol-
lowing comments shall not, and cannot, cover the 
entire complex field of rationalisation. They 
merely endeavour to contribute towards a solu-
tion by offering a few constructive ideas and 
concrete proposals. 
G.2. Rationalisation by improvement of national 
defence 8tructurea 
324. Not all possibilities for a rational organisa-
tion and functional equipment of the armed 
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forces have as yet been exploited by all coun-
tries, i.e. on a national level. In this respect the 
following suggestions are made : 
(1) Development towards a unification of forces 
325. In this regard Canada has ventured farthest 
into new territory. Against strong opposition it 
has taken the plunge and realised complete uni-
fication - its outward mark being like uniforms 
for all services - and has reorganised its forces 
under purely functional aspects. In other coun-
tries the organisational changes are less conspi-
cuous or noticeable but one can observe a conti-
nuous, although slow, development towards solu-
tions on a unified armed forces basis. These 
developments should be accelerated. The smaller 
the size of the armed forces, the easier the conso-
lidation of its different services and the more 
cogent is the requirement for unification. On the 
other hand, the services of numerically large 
armed forces will probably retain more indepen-
dence for some time to come. 
326. However, the following principle should 
apply to all : 
"The tasks which can be carried out jointly 
should be centralised." 
327. This implies centralisation on a joint ser-
vices basis of all those tasks which can be accom-
plished this way more economically and more 
effectively. In many cases it will be possible for 
one service to assume a kind of "pilot function" 
for the others. A higher military joint services 
command and control organisation with a clearly 
defined authority of direction should ensure that 
the pilot function is exercised so as to serve the 
interests of all concerned. 
328. Some examples should be mentioned: 
- a military territorial joint services orga-
nisation down to garrison level ; 
- a military joint services administration 
down to garrison level ; 
- a "pilot service" of the air force for all 
types of pilot training, air security and 
materiel maintenance, no matter in 
which service the individual aircraft 
are flown; 
- a pilot service of the army for small 
arms and motor vehicles - including 
their maintenance - no matter by 
which service they are employed ; 
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- a joint services medical service organi-
sation, especially with regard to the 
fixed medical treatment facilities ; 
- centralised joint services training in 
disciplines common to all services at 
joint schools, one for each discipline. 
329. In the top structure (Ministries of Defence 
and General Staffs) the tasks which are common 
to all services could be concentrated and centrally 
performed. 
330. This would include, for instance : 
- preparation, implementation and control 
of budgets; 
-armament; 
- administration for the armed forces ; 
- force planning and operational plan-
ning; 
- personnel matters ; 
- questions of discipline and order of the 
armed forces ; 
- intelligence ; 
- common problems of logistics. 
331. Without neglecting the specific demands 
made by the elements of earth, air and water on 
command and control, organisation and techno-
logy, many possibilities offer themselves for 
economising on personnel, funds and time by 
joint efforts. 
(2) Main efforts of modernisation 
332. The modernisation of materiel depends on 
the tasks which are assigned to the forces of the 
various countries within the scope of common 
defence. Therefore, it must be considered and 
decided jointly within the Alliance. However, it 
must also be in keeping with the possibilities and 
the interests of the member nations. Once they 
are made, decisions on force structures and 
equipment of forces have long-lasting effects. 
They determine the capabilities of the forces for 
a period of 10-15 years. Therefore, it would be 
a mistake to organise the forces merely in view 
of the current political situation or under the 
impression of some recent - possibly one-sided 
-experiences from a regional theatre of war. 
333. It would also be risky to rely too much 
on certain weapon systems which are expected to 
work miracles if put to use. One single weapon 
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system will neither decide the battle, nor a war. 
Only a well-balanced system of mixed weapons 
is in a position to cope with any situation. At the 
latest, overemphasis on one single weapon will 
become a definite disadvantage as soon as the 
adversary has developed a new anti-weapon. 
334. However, the emphasis placed on certain 
arms could vary within the system of mixed 
weapons. In view of the superiority of the 
Warsaw Pact forces in numbers of battle tanks 
and combat aircraft the following priorities are 
recognised for the modernisation of the forces 
in the central region : 
- anti-tank weapons for fighting battle 
tanks at different ranges and in any 
weather; 
- air defence weapons for low and medium 
altitudes with all-weather capability and 
radar control, if possible ; 
- provisions for aircraft survival by 
construction of shelters and airfield 
defence; 
- improvement of command and control 
systems; 
- electronic warfare means, including 
electronic reconnaissance and remotely-
piloted vehicles (RPV) ; 
- improvement of the floating and fording 
capabilities of army combat vehicles. 
335. It must be understood that the priorities 
for the modernisation of materiel in the central 
region as set forth above do not imply that the 
classical combat means such as tanks, artillery, 
fighter and reconnaissance aircraft have lost in 
importance. 
(3) The balancing of the services 
336. One of the most difficult and far-reaching 
decisions in regard to the structure of the armed 
forces is the allocation of funds, personnel and 
materiel to the services. 
337. A review of the costs per serviceman shows 
that the army soldier is the least expensive in 
terms of capital expenditures and operating 
expenditures. An airman costs at least one and 
a half times as much and a sailor more than 
twice as much as the army soldier. 
338. Therefore, it is reasonable to ask whether 
the combat effectiveness of the air force and the 
navy which is achieved at these higher costs is 
proportionate to the tasks of defence which they 
are expected to perform on a national level and 
in the common interest of the Alliance. However, 
in posing this question we already exceed the 
scope of national responsibility and arrive at the 
problem of specialisation among the members of 
the Alliance. 
G.3. Rationalisation by specialisation on a multi-
national basis 
339. Specialisation as an element of rationalisa-
tion is still rather new. In a certain sense it has 
been practised within NATO from the beginning. 
Not every nation was, or is, in a position to 
contribute all types of weapon systems to the 
common defence. There are countries which 
possess their own nuclear weapons and other 
countries which have none. Only a few member 
nations are in possession of strategic bombers and 
aircraft carriers. Some countries have always 
attached more importance to their navies and air 
forces while others are putting more weight in 
their armies. Most of these differences in 
emphasis have their origin in national histories 
and national and geographical interests and are 
in very few cases the result of deliberate com-
bined planning. 
340. More specialisation among the European 
partners will contribute to a more effective use 
of the defence budgets for the benefit of common 
defence. 
341. Various models could be developed for this 
purpose. 
342. The most comprehensive form of specifica-
tion would be the so-called service solution, which 
means that individual partner nations would give 
up one of their services in order to place more 
emphasis on the remaining services. This solution 
would indeed open vast possibilities for rationali-
sation. Logistics and training could be consider-
ably reduced and become less expensive. On the 
other hand, for some partners the system would 
result in a high degree of dependence on the 
solidarity of the Alliance, a circumstance which 
they could not change at short notice. Consider-
ing the fact that an established commdn foreign 
security policy does not exist this would hardly 
be justifiable. Meeting this requirement should 
be considered as an important political goal. But 
to ask for specification to such an extent at the 
present time would be unrealistic. 
343. However, a gradual realisation of the ser-
vice solution, e.g. with regard to mobilisation and 
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reinforcements in wartime, is also conceivable. 
For instance, the continental European partners 
could concentrate their efforts on the activation 
of reserve army units while the United States 
could take care of the air force reinforcements. 
A similar line of thought was already developed 
in Chapter E.I.4. 
344. The less ambitious proposals, which could 
be called intra-service-solution, are to be con-
sidered as being more realistic. It is not nece.'l-
sary for all services of every nation to be in 
possession of all weapon systems. For instance, 
it is conceivable that one nation might altogether 
renounce establishing and arming units with the 
new Lance rocket launcher system while a neigh-
bouring nation organises additional Lance units 
in support of the former. Similar methods could 
be applied to certain types of heavy artillery, air 
reconnaissance and electronic reconnaissance, to 
mention just a few examples. Such solutions are 
less likely to affect sovereignty, will involve 
less political dependence and will consequently 
be easier to realise. Of course, the renouncing 
nation must not divert to other departments the 
funds thus released. On the contrary mutual 
solidarity requires that such funds will be used 
in addition to the amounts spent on those defence 
tasks on which the nation concerned places parti-
cular importance. 
345. The functioning of such specialisation could 
be facilitated - and this is probably a basic 
requirement - by clear mutual commitments laid 
down in bilateral or multilateral agreements con-
cluded for a duration of several years and on a 
clear monetary basis. Perhaps the proved NATO 
annual review procedure could be further devel-
oped so that it can serve as a general umbrella 
for such agreements. 
346. Support by host nations for allied troops 
stationed outside their home countries must 
also be considered as a partial aspect of speciali-
sation. In the central region this task is per-
formed to a considerable extent by the national 
territorial defence organisations. But this applies 
mainly to wartime. As far as the peacetime 
deployment is concerned this principle could be 
further developed. 
347. Finally, the use of a leasing system should 
be discussed in this context, a concept which is 
not new in recent military history. 
348. Especially the smaller nations, for which 
the procurement of even a limited number of 
indispensable new weapon systems would mean 
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non-recurring costs that are too high and must 
be paid within a short period, might find it 
easier to use a modern type of leasing system for 
obtaining the equipment required by their forces. 
349. There are, for instance, the following pos-
sibilities : 
350. Weapon leasing : The weapon systems to be 
procured are leased by one nation to the other 
against payment of an annual lease. The duration 
of the lease payments must not exceed the fore-
seeable lifetime and modernness of the respective 
weapon system. The lessee must get full control 
over the weapons let to him. The lessor will, 
however, retain a reservation of property - in 
particular with regard to a possible transfer of 
the weapons to other users by the lessee- until 
the total rent paid is equivalent to the purchase 
price. 
351. Finance leasing :A modern business method 
of which many flexible and customer-oriented 
variants are nowadays used commercially. For 
instance, in our case, the manufacturing indus-
tries could take a share in the financing of a 
weapon leasing which, however, would probably 
have to be guaranteed by government indemnity 
bonds. 
352. As unusual as this proposal may seem, it 
might - upon closer examination - open a new 
way for mutual support. It would enable the 
financially strong countries to contribute to 
increasing the defensive power of smaller coun-
tries without having to make additional demands 
on their own defence budgets. 
353. In summary, it can be stated that progress 
in specialisation can also be achieved by indivi-
dual measures if there is appropriate political 
determination and if clear financing arrange-
ments are worked out in conformity with the 
possibilities of both parties concerned. A political 
union would facilitate specialisation. But we need 
not wait for it in every case. On the other hand, 
each step towards a political union should be 
accompanied by another step towards more mili-
tary specialisation. 
G.4. Rationalisation by standardisation 
354. Rationalisation by standardisation is the 
most promising and most convincing way to 
achieve greater effectiveness of the funds made 
available for defence. Standardisation should be 
the aim particularly in two major fields, that is 




355. By logistics, NATO understands the pro-
vision and use of all means required for support 
in regard to personnel and materiel and for the 
maintenance of the combat effectiveness of the 
forces as well as all measures taken in relief of 
the forces to avoid any impairment of their 
operational readiness. To use understandable 
working terms, which however are not to be 
regarded as official terms, logistics can be seen 
as consumer logistics - referring to the consumer 
- which is a task of military command and 
control, and as producer and procurement logis-
tics (production), which is a government task. 
356. Consumer logistics includes : 
- provision of weapons and ammunition, 
all types of equipment, vehicles and 
individual clothing ; 
- storage, transportation, distribution and 
supply of ammunition, fuels, spare parts 
and subsistence ; 
- maintenance of materiel \ including 
vehicles; 
- evacuation of personnel, supplies, 
defective equipment and empties ; 
- infrastructure ; 
- medical service. 
357. Whereas producer and procurement logis-
tics in the broadest sense means armament which 
is closely interrelated with the civil economy. 
(b) National responsibility for logistics and 
its dependence on geographical con-
ditions 
358. As stated before 2 the allied commanders 
are responsible for the operational planning and 
operational command and control for all military 
units assigned to them in case of an armed 
conflict, in order to accomplish their defence 
mission according to the general defence plan 
(GDP). Within the scope of the rauthorities 
delegated to them, they issue orders which are 
obligatory down to the smallest unit within the 
military hierarchy. 
1. Materiel is the collective term used for weapons and 
equipment. 
2. See page 87. 
359. However, each nation itself is responsible 
for the logistic support of its assigned units. The 
allied commanders confine themselves to place 
requirements, to make recommendations or to 
co-ordinate, if necessary. They have neither allied 
stocks nor logistic troops and thus no logistic 
command elements at their disposal. This restricts 
the flexibility of the operational command. It 
may even result in the deferment or even aban-
donment of a military operation that appears 
necessary, since the required logistic support for 
one or several participating allied units cannot 
be ensured by the responsible nation. This arrange-
ment is inconsistent with the proved principle 
of the indivisibility of military command and 
control. 
360. However, in the Warsaw Pact forces which 
are almost exclusively equipped with materiel of 
Soviet origin the logistic command and control 
rests with the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Warsaw Pact forces ; it can be planned, ordered, 
prepared and carried out in accordance with his 
operational plans. 
361. Compared with the dimensions of modern 
armed conflicts the Central European territory 
including France and Great Britain is rather 
narrow. From the logistic point of view it lacks 
in depth. 
362. The supplies and supply facilities required 
by the forces for the direct support of their 
combat actions are stored or situated in the 
combat zone 1 • The supplies flow from the com-
munication zone 1 depots and from the depots in 
France and Great Britain to the depots in the 
combat zone. Depending on the national supply 
system, this is accomplished either by the delivery 
or pick-up method, respectively. 
363. As a rule, the war reserves - except those 
of the United States forces - are adequate only 
to satisfy the requirements of a limited time. As 
they are located in the combat zone, the produc-
tion plants for military materiel in the central 
region are endangered to such an extent that an 
undisturbed continued production cannot be 
expected in case of run armed confliot. Therefore, 
Central Europe is dependent upon supplies of all 
kinds from outside. These have to be brought 
up by sea. The United States virtually is the only 
country that comes into question as a supplying 
country. Thus, nobody will fail to realise the 
dependence of Central Europe on the United 
1. Definition see page 69. 
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States, if a conflict should last longer than a 
few weeks. 
(c) Areas already integrated and standard-
ised 
364. The national responsibility for logistics 
requires national logistic command and control 
organisations and encourages national decisions 
on the procurement of materiel without prior co-
ordination. 
365. However, one would not do justice to the 
complex of questions under consideration if one 
were to omit those functional areas of logistics 
in which extensive co-operation and even full 
integration have been realised. 
366. They include : 
(aa) NATO common infrastructure 1 
367. According to their gross national product 
the member nations pay proportionate shares 
into an infrastructure fund for the construction 
of military installations serving the employment 
of the forces in case of a conflict or the training 
of the forces in peacetime. The installations to 
be constructed are proposed by the allied com-
manders and approved by the NATO Council 
after discussion by the Infrastructure Committee. 
Upon completion of an installation the user is 
responsible for its maintenance. 
368. Among the most important installatiOns of 
NATO common infrastructure are: 
- airfields on which all NATO aircraft 
can land; 
- an early warning system against enemy 
aircraft and missiles extending in a 
semi-circle from the North Cape to 
Anatolia. It is augmented by the more 
modern NATO air defence environment 
system (NADGE), by which recognition 
and reporting are improved and at the 
same time defence is released semi-
automatically within a very short time ; 
- Nike and Hawk anti-aircraft missile 
sites for defence against high- and low-
flying aircraft, including the respective 
depots; 
- a pipeline system which - as far as 
Central Europe is concerned - extends 
as an integrated network from the 
1. Definition see page 88. 
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Atlantic and Channel coasts to the line 
by the river W eser-Schwiibische Alb. It 
still requires augmentation ; 
- a long-line communications system that 
interconnects all peacetime and war head-
quarters independent of the national 
PTT networks. It is expanded by 
the NATO integrated communications 
system (NICS) which is being organised 
and, in addition to the headquarters, 
includes all corps command posts ·and 
corresponding air force command posts, 
as well as all political NATO authorities 
and the national governments. It has 
been provided with automatic computer-
ised data links ; 
- a system of forward storage sites (FSS) 
is planned and in some cases already 
under construction. These sites are to 
provide storage space for different types 
of essential supplies such as ammuni-
tion, various types of fuels, active items 
of supply and spare parts ; 10 FSS have 
already been completed in Central 
Europe. They will be filled in such a 
way that a brigade can be supplied with 
all types of supplies required at short 
notice. They operate on the principle of 
common use and common interest. 
(bb) The infrastructure installations are aug-
mented by multinational logistic organisations 
and headquarters. These include : 
- The Central European Pipeline Organ-
isation which is responsible for the 
operation and financing and is under 
the command of CINCENT in organ-
isational respects, in wartime also in 
tactical respects. An Agency composed 
of allied and national officers is respon-
sible for control. This agency allocates 
to the national forces the POL quantities 
to which they are entitled according to 
the quantities they have filled into the 
system. In wartime and if required by 
the operational situation, CINCENT 
may intervene and assume control. Since 
almost all NATO airfields in Central 
Europe are connected to the pipeline 
system, the aircraft can be supplied 
with jet or aviation fuel on the spot. 
The land forces draw their gasoline or 
diesel from the filling stations estab-
lished at all intermediate depots or ter-
minals for railroad tank cars, tank 
trucks and jerry cans. 
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- In wartime, a Joint Logistics Organisa-
tion and Information Centre (JLOIC) 
is planned rut AFCENT while it is 
already established jointly with NOR-
TRAG/TWO ATAF. These centres are 
tested regularly during the major 
NATO exercises Wintex (former Fallex) 
which are conducted every two years. 
They are composed of allied personnel 
of the logistics divisions of the head-
quarters concerned and of officers from 
the participating nations. It is the 
logistic means of command and control 
of the commanders. The centres prepare 
the logistic situation report on the units 
assigned and develop the requirements 
and recommendations with regard to 
logistic command and control, taking 
into consideration the planned opera-
tional measures. National logistic repre-
sentatives act as liaison staffs between 
AFCENT and the national Ministries 
of Defence or general staffs, respect-
ively. They receive the logistic require-
ments of CINCENT and forward them 
to their national agencies. They inform 
the Commander-in-Chief about the 
logistic situation of their own assigned 
units and advise him on specific national 
logistic matters. 
- The NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Organisation (NAMSO) (including the 
Hawk Supply Section), and the Hawk 
Management Office (HMO) - two 
NATO agencies in Luxembourg and 
Paris, provide the national forces with 
spare parts from a NATO depot for 
various types of aircraft and guided 
weapons systems (e.g. Nike, Hawk and 
the Lance system which is about to be 
introduced). They are responsible for 
the procurement, storage, delivery and 
administration of funds. 
( cc) Cross-servicing 
369. In practice, even today every aircraft can 
be refuelled at any NATO airfield, even if it is 
occupied by units of one nation only ; it can 
also be serviced, if the necessary technical faci-
lities and appropriately-trained personnel are 
available. Reimbursement is effected at a later 
date. Similar procedures apply to the land forces 
and the navy. In a critical situation the allied 
commander in the combat zone may order a re-
adjustment of supplies of the same type between 
units of different nations. 
(dd) A storage of supplies in neighbouring 
European countries is provided for by numerous 
bilateral logistic agreements. Thus, the Federal 
Republic of Germany has concluded one agree-
ment each with France, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Norway and Denmark and there are agree-
ments between Great Britain and both Belgium 
and the Netherlands as well as agreements 
between the allied stationed forces and the 
Federal Republic of Germany on the basis of 
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 
(ee) For about 20 years the Military Agency for 
Standardisation (MAS) founded by NATO, for-
merly located in London and moved to Brussels 
in early 1970, has exercised its functions which 
exceed the scope of logistics. The results are 
modest. The NATO 7.62 mm cartridges, which 
can be fired with all rifles and machine-guns 
of the NATO forces, have been standardised 1 • In 
addition, all fuels and lubricants (gasolines, avia-
tion fuels, diesel oils, lubricants), the 155 mm 
artillery ammunition and some electronic spare 
parts have been standardised. Certain signs and 
markings and procedures were standardised as 
well, including, for instance, among other things 
the road signs indicating the carrying capacities 
of bridges, the signs posted in depots, the issuing 
of operational orders and the NATO command 
and reporting system. The results were laid down 
in several hundred agreements (STANAGs). 
With regard to logistics, however, they are 
hardly of any importance. 
(ff) Finally, there are co-productions of weapon 
systems on a bilateral and multilateral basis 
between two or more European nations or 
between individual European nations and the 
United States of America. There are for exam-
ple: the aircraft Starfighter, Phantom, Jaguar, 
the Transall transport aircraft, the light training 
airCI"~aft Alpha-Jet and the multi-role combat 
aircraft (MRCA) which is under development. 
As regards the land forces, there are : the battle 
tank Leopard, certain types of artillery, anti-
tank missiles, engineer equipment, etc. In recent 
years, however, there has apparently been a 
retrograde movement. 
370. The interim results of the past integration 
and standardisation efforts in the field of logis-
tics within NATO or just within Europe defini-
tely reveal some valuable first achievements. The 
1. Unfortunately, there is information that some nations 




greatest efforts are made in the field of infra-
structure. Even though the procedures from the 
planning to the completion of the infrastructure 
projects are complicated and time-consuming, 
they have been remarkably successful in streng-
thening the defence capability of the West by 
the establishment of joint military installations. 
However, in other fields within the large scope 
of logistics, the results achieved so far are rather 
poor. 
(d) Gaps in standardisation 
371. Especially in the field of materiel the lack 
of standardisation is a serious factor. It is the 
primary source of many an avoidable deficiency 
of NATO defence. A few examples will illustrate 
that: 
372. To begin with, there is not even an agreed 
common measuring system. In addition to the 
metric system used in most of the European 
countries, other measuring units such as foot, 
inch, miles, gallons and pounds are still used. 
The armed forces of the four most important 
NATO nations (United States, United Kingdom, 
France and Federal Republic of Germany) use 
cross-country vehicles of their own construction. 
Within NATO there are several types and a 
great variety of makes in the different load 
classes for trucks of 3 to 15 tons. Medium and 
heavy battle tanks of a great variety of models 
are used by the land forces of the central region 
alone ; they include the German Leopard, the 
British Chieftain Mk. 2, the French AMX-30 
and the American M-48 A2 and M-60 A1 and 
A2. The air forces fly different types of aircraft 
of United States, British, French or Italian con-
struction for comparable tasks. Further examples 
were stated by the former Chairman of the 
Military Committee, General Johannes Steinhoff, 
in his presentations and publications. According 
to his statements there are a hundred different 
types of ships in the classes above the destroyer 
class, 36 different fire-control radars, 40 dif-
ferent ship's guns of bigger calibre. There is a 
parallel development of 13 anti-tank rockets in 
12 member nations of the Alliance. However, only 
2 or 3 are required within the Alliance. In the 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance the enormous 
sum of '$20 billion is spent every year for 
research and development projects. Up to 50 % 
of them are duplicating efforts or parallel devel-
opments made three or four times. 
373. General Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe until December 1974, 
is of the well-founded opinion that NATO loses 
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about 30-50 % of its potential capability merely 
by lack of standardisation. 
374. The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Luns, 
was quite right when he recently called the 
improvement of standardisation and specialisa-
tion within the Alliance "the need of the hour". 
(e) Difficulties encountered with standard-
isation 
375. The realisation of standardisation meets 
with a great variety of obstacles and difficulties 
which are partly due to practical reasons which 
must be taken into account, but partly are merely 
due to pertinacity, prestige-thinking and national 
egotism. 
Economic/industrial problems 
376. In the tconomic system of the free world 
there is no strict separation between the arma-
ments industry and the civil economy. Apart 
from a few exceptions, their boundaries are not 
fixed. Thus, cross-country vehicles are used in 
agriculture, forestry and by the construction 
industry. The heavy trucks of the armed forces 
largely correspond to the commercial types. The 
firms of the textile industry produce uniforms 
in addition to normal men's clothing. The inter-
locking is particularly evident in the industries 
producing electronic, communications and electric 
equipment. 
377. Therefore, industrial reorganisations in the 
armament sector in most cases affect the civil 
production as well. The problem of employment 
which is of great importance to employment 
policy must be taken into account by ensuring 
the greatest possible continuity of production. 
Finally, the principle of free competition, a pre-
requisite for a free market, must not be aban-
doned. 
Time of procurement of materiel 
378. Particular difficulties in regard to the 
introduction of standardised materiel are caused 
by the time factor. As a rule the obsolete materiel 
to be phased out by the forces of the various 
"''ations has so far been replaced at different 
times, since it had been procured at different 
times. As regards expensive weapon systems, 
which must be newly procured, the nations have 
to ensure that the requirements of the three 
services (e.g. tanks, aircraft, boats) do not coin-
cide ; otherwise excessive demands for investment 
would be made on the national budget. Thus, the 
standardisation of materiel requires careful co-
llO 
ordination in regard to timing and mutual con-
sideration. 
Doctrines and technical requirements 
379. The individual nations still have different 
ideas regarding tactical command and control 
doctrines and the resulting technical require-
ments. As long as these result from the special 
missions of the forces, they may be justified. 
However, comparable missions in a comparable 
terrain should result in common tactical and 
technical concepts. This particularly applies to 
the central region. 
Prestige of the experts 
380. Last but not least it is often necessary to 
subdue the national or professional craving for 
prestige of military and technical experts. It is 
understandable that an expert who believes to 
have found a convincing solution from the pro-
fessional point of view wishes to carry his point 
in the interest of the matter. In this connection, 
he often meets with contradictory opinions of 
experts from other nations. Often an under-
standing can only be reached by the intervention 
of higher military or political leaders. A second-
best technical solution which is accepted by all 
concerned can be more effective for the common 
defence than several so-called best solutions, in 
particular, if the latter are incompatible. 
(f) Full standardisation as a long-term goal 
381. Thus experience shows that complete 
standardisation of materiel cannot be achieved 
within a short time. But it has to remain the 
long-term goal to be striven for which must not 
be lost sight of. All measures to be taken now 
and in the future in the field of logistics must 
continuously be directed towards that goal. 
382. In this context, all bodies dealing with 
standardisation, no matter whether on an inter-
national or on a national level, should adhere to 
the following principles, partly already taken 
up by Eurogroup: 
- common elaboration of analyses of 
trends in military technology and com-
mon development of strategic-opera-
tional goals and of tactical-technical 
requirements ; 
- unlimited open exchange of information 
under consideration and guaranteeing 
the national patent applications ; 
- for any development to be newly initi-
wted an attempt is to be made to find 
partners for a standardised solution ; 
- as far as a NATO-wide standardisation 
cannot be achieved, at least bilateral or 
multilateral solutions must be searched 
for. They must remain open to other 
nations that wish to join them later; 
- step-by-step adaptation of target dates 
for the phase-out of obsolete materiel 
and the introduction of new materiel ; 
- combined research and development 
efforts with proportionate sharing of 
costs from the very beginning ; 
- participation of the industries of an 
user nations by co-production, taking 
into account the respective industrial 
situation and the conditions of employ-
ment. Co-production includes participa-
tion in technical know-how, in the tests 
and test facilities ; 
- European and United States interests 
are to be balanced against each other 
and harmonised. Due consideration must 
be given to the offset problem. In this 
respect, the United States should not 
expect a unidirectional stream of 
materiel flowing from the United States 
to Europe or a stream of money flowing 
from Europe to the United States ; nor 
must Europe concentrate on purely 
European solutions in the armament 
sector. In regard to armament, too, the 
solidarity of NATO between the United 
States and Europe must hold true. 
(g) Proposals for further steps towards 
standardisation 
383. From a political point of view, there is 
agreement as to the goal of maximum standard-
isation. But the abovementioned difficulties of 
realisation result far too often in limiting onese]f 
too easily to political declarations as regards the 
desirability of standardisation - postponing, 
however, to a more distant future measures for 
pratical implementation. 
384. And yet, also under the present conditions, 
there are sufficient concrete possibilities of con-
tinuing the development of standardisation in 
the logistic field in small steps and phases, if the 
political determination to do so is distinctly 
accentuated. Very often the highest military 
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representatives have made clear that they want 
to support energetically any approaches in that 
direction. 
385. The following proposals which are intended 
to serve as examples in this regard are submit-
ted ; it is not claimed that this listing of proposals 
is complete. These proposals are based on the 
measures which have already been taken since the 
mid-fifties for the standardisation of logistics. 
They may only be considered as suggestions 
which in any case need pertinent examination. 
They refer to the logistic command and control 
organisation of the high allied commands as 
well as to the materiel sector in the strict sense 
of the word. They were sub-divided into measures 
which can be implemented within a short time 
(immediate measures), and in medium-term and 
long-term phases - without establishing a time 
schedule. 
Short-term measures (immediate measures) 
(1) Extension to CENTAG of the combined 
logistic command and control organisation, as it 
is already being tested in the NORTHAG area 
by direction of Eurogroup. 
(2) Authority to dispose of all logistic supplies 
already stored or still to be stored in the forward 
storage sites, for NORTHAG and CENTAG 
respectively. Development of a simplified pro-
cedure for supplementary financial compensation 
(reimbursement). 
(3) Activation of an allied motor vehicle trans-
port command with assigned, multinationally 
composed units disposing of large means of 
transportation 1 for increasing the logistic flexi-
bility. These means would also enable CINCENT 
to rapidly transport to the users concerned the 
logistic stocks made available to CINCENT. 
(4) The concentration of part of the national 
means of air transport for logistic purposes in 
a multinational unit under allied command 
should also be carefully studied. 
(5) Establishment of stocks of already standard-
ised supplies, especially bulk consumables (certain 
types of ammunition, fuels, active spare parts, 
medical supplies '2 ) amounting to 3-4 days of sup-
ply (supply rates) for exclusive disposal by 
CINCENT as an operational logistic reserve. 
This stock is to be stored in one or two NATO 
1. Including civilian transportation capacities to be 
mobilised. 
2. Regulated items. 
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depots already in existence or to be constructed 
with NATO infrastructure funds. By means of 
these stocks, CINCENT will be able to establish 
logistic focal points and bridge critical situations. 
(6) Delivery, storage, testing and follow-on sup-
port for the rockets of the new artillery rocket 
launcher Lance by NAMSA (as already existing 
for Nike, Hawk and other missile weapon 
systems). 
(7) Development and introduction of uniform 
exterior auxiliary fuel drop tanks for the various 
types of aircraft in service with the air forces 
of the individual nations, at least for the Star-
fighter and Phantom aircraft flown by several 
nations, in order to facilite cross-servicing. 
(8) Differing installation units in major weapons 
and equipment should, starting right now, be 
replaced without delay by standardised parts 
(e.g. mountings for batteries of the same voltage, 
couplings for trailers of all kinds, track pads for 
tracked vehicles, aircraft mountings for bombs 
and rockets, etc.). The mi1itary technical experts 
will find numerous other possibilities in this 
respect. 
Mediurn-terrn phases 
(1) Establishment of a common system of elec-
tronic identification (FFS) for unequivocal dis-
tinction between friend and foe in the air. 
(2) Standardisation of the medical service for 
all services, including the fixed medical treat-
ment facilities - with the exception of special 
installations peculiar to one service. ThaJt 
includes the procurement and stol'lage of com-
mon interchangeable medical supplies. (For 
instance, any stretcher should fit into the rails 
of any ambulance truck.) 
(3) Establishment of common blood banks which 
may be disposed of by allied senior medical 
officers as required. 
(4) Relocation of the Agency of the Central 
European Pipeline Organisation (CEPO), which 
in case of war will be subordinated to CINCENT, 
from the Paris area to the Brunssum area and 
conversion of its telecommunications to NATO-
owned carrier means. 
(5) Grant to CINCENT of the right to draw bulk 
expendables (regulated items) from national 
depots in cases of crisis. 
(6) Parallel to the step-by-step transfer of logistic 
authorities to CINCENT and the subordinate 
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higher NATO authorities, their logistic staff 
divisions must be activated with appropriate 
personnel and communications. 
(7) Binding renunciation of purely national 
solutions in regard to development, production 
and introduction of new weapon systems and 
major equipment. 
386. The measures to be proposed for the long-
terrn phases follow from the principles outlined 
on pages 110-111. They are to be supplemented by 
the requirement for an adaptation of the logistic 
supply systems and the logistic command and 
control systems in all fields within the individual 
nations, with the ultimate goal of transferring 
the entire logistic responsibility for the assigned 
units to the NATO commanders, and thus of 
establishing the uniformity of operational com-
mand. An important prerequisite for achieving 
this is, however, the development of an uncom-
plicated financial accounting procedure (reim-
bursement) or- what would be still better- the 
setting up of an allied logistic fund to be main-
tained by the nations concerned. In any case I 
have the impression that in the long run inte-
grated logistic command and control as well as 
full standardisation can hardlv be achieved 
without cornrnon funding. But this necessitates a 
far-reaching renunciation of rights of sovereignty 
hitherto carefully guarded. It can only be realised 
with the consent and assistance of the national 
parliaments. That renunciation can hardly be 
imagined without progress on the way to a 
political and monetary union of Europe, a goal 




387. A greater interoperability and thus a more 
flexible operational control do not only depend 
on standardised materiel and on consequently 
standardised logistics. They also require a high 
degree of agreement in military doctrines and 
thus in training. There is altogether a close rela-
tion between command and control doctrines, 
logistics and training. The more the principles 
and the procedures of command and control are 
in agreement with one another, the more quickly 
will the nations be able to come to terms about 
common tactical-technical requirements in regard 
to materiel, and the easier will it be to find 
technical solutions acceptable to all partners. 
Standardised materiel in turn enables a rational-
isation of training beyond the frontiers. 
388. In order to begin with a closer co-operation 
in specific fields of training, one need, however, 
not wait until full standardisation in the materiel 
sector is reached. The advantages which can 
thereby be attained justify any effort in this 
direction. They consist in : 
- exchange of experiences ; 
- increase of operational flexibility by 
agreement on tactical principles and 
procedures of command and control ; 
- monetary savings by rational common 
use of training facilities ; 
- closer solidarity between the military 
personnel of the various nations. 
(b) Common training already practised in 
a mttltinational scope 
389. Although the training of the assigned and 
earmarked units is a responsibility of the indivi-
dual nations as well, as is the case with logistics, 
there are already a number of common training 
projects within the scope of NATO and of Euro-
group. 
390. Each year, numerous multinational NATO 
exercises are conducted, be they field manoeuvres 
of the land and air forces or command post 
exercises at the various command levels. The 
Wintex exercises (formerly called Fallex) play 
a special part in this context. Not only allied 
commands participate in these exercises, but also 
the national general staffs, representatives of 
the governments and parliaments as well as dele-
gates of the civil administrative authorities. 
391. At the NATO Defence College in Rome 
(formerly Paris), about 2,500 senior officers and 
civil servants have hitherto undergone an instruc-
tion in matters of security policy and policy of 
the Alliance, qualifying them for employment 
in responsible positions within the organisation 
of the Alliance. 
392. Besides, there are training centres used 
likewise by several NATO members, e.g. the 
NATO range at Bergen/Hohne in the Federal 
Republic of Germany for tank firing, Decimo-
mannu on Sardinia for the training of flying 
units of the air force in live firing, and a centre 
in the Suda Bay on Crete where missile units 
of the army and the air force can conduct their 
firing practice. 
393. As to individual training and unit training 
down from brigade level the common elements 
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are, however, still few. Although regular EURO/ 
NATO training conferences have taken place, 
there have not been any tangible results. Some 
projects were raised and discussed, and the 
execution of further studies was promised. But 
no positive decisions were made to start one or 
other common training project. 
394. Since about 1970 Eurogroup has developed 
some promising initiatives. As to the results so 
far achieved in this respect, in most cases only 
a few nations join in common solutions in indivi-
dual fields. 
395. Two of these projects under way shall be 
mentioned here : 
"Leopard" training 
396. This is a combined effort for training tank 
crews and technical personnel on the Leopard 
battle tank at the Combat Troops School II of 
the Federal armed forces at Munsterlager and 
at the Ordnance School in Aachen. Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Nether-
lands and Norway participate in that training. 
Eurospeak 
397. Combined classroom instruction in the 
Polish, Russian, Czech and German Languages 
at the German Federal Languages Office located 
in Hiirth near Cologne. Participating nations : 
Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy, United Kingdom. 
(c) Further development of combined 
training 
398. On the whole, the results achieved are still 
insignificant. In many fields, there is nothing 
but declarations of intention. 
399. But also in regard to standardisation of 
training better results are attainable if - as in 
the case of logistics - one proceeds in steps and 
phases and overcomes too narrow objections of 
those who are "mere experts". 
400. As to individual training, the following 
proposals are submitted for discussion in this 
context: 
- initially, extension of the currently-
practised form of participation of guests 
in certain courses and of the joint use 
of specific national training facilities 
by units of other nations ; 
- in a second phase, certain model courses 
might be conducted by one nation each 
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on behalf of the European partners. 
They serve the testing of clearly-
outlined training in partial fields, make 
it possible to gain experience and furn-
ish indications for possible cost savings ; 
- in a third phase one could pass on to 
combined training for entire specialities. 
In this respect, especially suited are 
those fields which as to their nature play 
an important part for co-operation 
within the scope of the Alliance - such 
as command and control services con-
cerned with gathering, transmitting and 
evaluating information ; 
- in a fourth phase, common schools for 
selected training fields could be estab-
lished. Here, too, one should begin with 
specialities. As a rule, the training of 
troopers, infantrymen and gunners must 
remain the competency of the troops on 
account of the great number of these 
soldiers. 
Some examples of training fields which might 
be organised on a multinational level (in the 
sequence of the assessed possibilities of imple-
mentation) : 
( 1) helicopter pilots ; 
(2) surviVlal tmining of pilots at sea ; 
(3) training of air controllers ; 
( 4) training of flight controllers ; 
( 5) programmers and technicians for elec-
tronic data processing ; 
(6) training technology, such as combined 
development and utilisation of pro-
grammed training aids, trainers, etc. ; 
(7) training for the artillery rocket laun-
cher Lance (as already initiated at the 
missile school at Geilenkirchen in the 
Federal Republic of Germany) ; 
(8) training for the NADGE air defence 
system and the NATO integrated com-
munications system NICS which is 
being developed ; 
(9) NBC defence training of all troops; 
(10) combined training of pilots for aircraft 
of the same type (e.g. MRCA), perhaps 
including the possibilities of training 
in the United States ; 
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(11) qualified radio training, radio intel-
ligence and intercept service ; 
( 12) extension of exchange for training in 
general staff service by sending a 
larger number of officers to the 
national academies of the various 
countries; 
(13) finally, European special schools could 
be established - e.g. signal, anti-
aircraft missile, engineer and technical 
schools of the land and air forces as 
well as naval ordnance schools. 
401. The rationalisation of unit training is more 
difficult. Besides, it is more complicated to divide 
it into specific phases. 
402. The conduct of large-scale operational and 
strategic exercises with the aim to practise the 
interaction of the units of various nations and 
the training of the integrated staffs remains a 
task of the allied commands. Such exercises are 
expensive ; therefore they can only be conducted 
at greater intervals of time. 
403. The European efforts should be concen-
trated on making available to NATO units which 
are well-trained from a tactical point of view 
and act according to uniform doctrines. One of 
the main difficulties in this respect is the lack 
of training areas. In the densely populated, 
highly industrialised central region it will not be 
possible to envisage an increase in the number 
of training areas or an enlargement of existing 
training areas. Even the maintenance of the 
training operations in the existing areas is more 
and more criticised by the population of the 
adjacent regions or by city inhabitants seeking 
recreation in the open country. 
404. Therefore, only a few possibilities are left : 
- full utilisation of the training areas 
existing in the central region, i.e. 
training in daytime and at night, in-
cluding weekends ; 
- joint use of training facilities in those 
countries of the Alliance where com-
paratively large training areas can be 
made available more easily, e.g. Canada, 
Turkey, perhaps also France. The 
associated higher costs, above all for 
transportation, are compensated by the 
advantages in training and by the 
strengthening of solidarity in the 
Alliance; 
- establishment of model facilities for 
joint use. An example is the Flag Offi-
cer Sea Training Centre for destroyers 
and frigates at Portland (United King-
dom). An extension to other training 
facilities in various countries should be 
studied ; a start was already made with 
the training centre for mountain troops 
in the High Alps in France (Mont Gali-
bier). 
405. A concentration of all European training 
areas and training facilities- possibly including 
the United States facilities located in Europe-
might be strived for as an ultimate goal. But 
this necessitates a small, technically well-equip-
ped central agency which would have to accom-
plish the allocation to all users according to the 
principle of optimum joint utilisation. 
406. If a standardisation of training really is 
to lead to a more rational utilisation of the 
financial means and is to improve at the same 
time the interoperability, certain prerequisites 
must, however, be fulfilled. 
407. They include: 
- the development of common principles 
of command and control for operations ; 
- the overcoming of language difficulties ; 
- the production of modern training aids 
for programmed training ; 
- fully or partly standardised materiel, at 
least materiel which is compatible ; 
- common funding for which all partici-
pants have to make a contribution cor-
responding to their share, the host 
nation concerned being granted an 
appropriate compensation for the faci-
lities it has made available. 
408. Last but not least it must be ensured that 
national training facilities which have lost their 
tasks due to the creation of common institutions 
or whose activities have been diminished con-
siderably will then be dissolved or at least dras-
tically reduced in size. Otherwise this would only 
result in a duplication of training establishments, 
and thus an increase of the overhead structure. 





409. The examinations conducted in the course 
of this study have shown that - as long as the 
present threat by the Warsaw Pact forces exists 
- the allied land and air forces, including the 
nuclear means, which are now stationed in the 
central region are just adequate to confront a 
possible aggressor with an incalculable risk and 
thus to ensure the deterrence required by the 
strategy of flexible response. But any unilateral 
reduction in strength and availability levels of 
the combat-ready forces will jeopardise the ful-
filment of that mission. In determining their 
defence budgets and deciding on the modernisa-
tion of the materiel of their forces, the NATO 
nations must take into account the continuous 
reinforcement of the Warsaw Pact forces if the 
relative balance of power between East and West 
is to be maintained. 
410. If, as a result of an erroneous assessment of 
the power of deterrence and the defence determi-
nation of NATO, there should be a military con-
flict, a defence promising success is possible 
against a conventional attack limited in regard 
to area and objective. However, in conventional 
warfare, a major aggression can only be resisted 
for a limited period of time, unless the currently 
available land and air forces are reinforced. 
411. Therefore, it is indispensable to make pre-
parations for a conventional reinforcement of the 
combat-ready forces in times of tension or in 
wartime. This end is served by the following 
measures: 
- establishment of army reserve units by 
the continental European partners of 
the Alliance. The study suggests greater 
efforts in this respect ; 
- moving in air force and army reinforce-
ments from overseas. Besides the limited 
strategic reserves from the United King-
dom these include in particular those 
forces which can be made available and 
moved across the Atlantic by the United 
States. Special attention must be given 
to their reception in the central region 
so as to ensure that they can be 
employed expediently and will receive 
full logistic support. 
412. In this respect the study suggests a special 
NATO infrastructure programme mainly for the 
purpose of preparing the reception of air force 
reinforcements to the extent that the United 
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States is willing to commit itself in regard to 
numbers of aircraft and their time of arrival in 
Europe. 
413. The relation of the peacetime deployment of 
the allied land forces in the central region and 
their wartime positions according to the GDP 
is not altogether advantageous. A maldeployment 
of certain forces is undeniable. In order to reach 
their wartime positions the land forces will have 
to perform movements varying in duration 
during which crossings and overlappings will be 
unavoidable. It may well be possible to improve 
the peacetime deployment by redeploying certain 
units to more favourable locations. But the 
necessary expenditures on infrastructure alone 
would reduce the time needed for deployment to 
wartime positions, they would not increase the 
combat power. Therefore - except for certain 
individual adjustments - the advantages gained 
by a relocation of garrisons would not be in 
proportion to the disadvantages caused by the 
reduction of capital expenditures on the conti-
nuous modernisation of the materiel. Further-
more, considering the fact that the GDP, on 
which the wartime positions depend, is subject 
to continuous changes, it must be said that a 
complete coincidence of peacetime locations and 
wartime positions cannot be achieved. 
414. All the more important is the factor of time. 
415. It is justified to assume that any conflict 
will be preceded by a period of tension. There-
fore, the political and the military leaders may 
count on a certain warning time which, however, 
at worst, may only consist of a few days. This 
warning time must be used with determination 
for taking those measures which are necessary 
to overcome the deficiencies of the deployment 
and to initiate the reinforcement of the actually 
available conventional forces. Early decisions 
that increase deterrence and defence readiness 
will demonstrate the determination of the 
Alliance to resist all political pressure or military 
interference. Therefore, they will not have an 
aggravating effect on the crisis but on the con-
trary will help to abate the crisis and to pre-
serve the peace. 
416. Although the French forces stationed on 
both sides of the French-German border play 
an important role as a part of the common deter-
rence, the uncertainty as to when, in what num-
ber and with what mission the French units 
will join in the common defence is a serious 
handicap for the NATO commanders in their 
operational planning. Therefore, the military 
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expert must emphasise over and over again the 
necessity of binding commitments and agreements 
in the operational sphere. Not only will they have 
a favourable effect on common defence, but on 
the French forces as well. The problems caused 
by the absence of arrangements for the possible 
employment and the control of French tactical 
nuclear weapons in the central region are unde-
niable, the more so since any attack against the 
central region will activate the extensive assis-
tance commitments of the WEU agreement. 
417. The deterring effect of the present deploy-
ment is mainly due to the fact that in the GDP 
combat sectors are assigned to the forces of five 
NATO nations, charging each of them with direct 
responsibility at the frontier to the Warsaw Pact 
countries. This system - often called the "layer-
cake" principle - must not be changed under 
any circumstances. 
418. The political and military significance of 
the "layer-cake" has priority over all other ope-
rational considerations as long as it remains the 
main strategic objective to preserve peace by 
deterrence. 
419. This also detracts from the significance of 
those deliberations which are concerned with 
basically different patterns of a peacetime 
deployment in the central region. In spite of its 
undeniable shortcomings the present deployment 
and the current GDP are still the most favour-
able solution under the aspect of deterrence. To 
say it again : this does not preclude individual 
adjustments. 
420. Any changes in the disposition of forces 
in the central region which may be considered 
necessary under operational aspects - e.g. a 
reinforcement of NORTHAG - could be made 
more effective if the operational reserves or the 
reinforcements to be brought up were employed 
for such purposes, subject, however, to the condi-
tion that the respective logistic prerequisites can 
be established in practice. 
421. This condition makes clear the decisive 
deficiency of the defence structure of the cen-
tral regions, i.e. the lack of compatibility and 
interoperability of the forces. The point is that 
since the forces of various nations depend on 
national lines of communication and !Iince their 
materiel - and often their doctrine too - are 
not standardised they cannot be operationally 
employed at a chosen place. The integration of 
operational planning and command and control 
has no equivalent in the field of logistics. This 
puts a narrow limit on the flexibility of opera-
tional command and control. 
422. Only in September of this year SACEUR 
stated in Ottawa: 
"We must have the flexibility to employ our 
forces wherever they might be needed. This 
flexibility requires a greater degree of 
interoperability of the various national 
forces than we presently enjoy." 
423. The way to reach this goal within the forces 
of NATO is by rationalisation through specialisa-
tion and standardisation. More effective rational-
isation would not only result in greater inter-
operability but also in better employment of the 
funds provided for defence purposes and in a 
considerable improvement of combat strength 
on a "no cost or low-level cost" basis. 
424. The study comes to the conclusion that the 
ideal aims to be pursued are the complete stan-
dardisation of materiel, an extensive specialisa-
tion within the Alliance and the integration of 
logistic responsibility with the NATO comman-
ders. However, it will take a long time before 
these goals are reached, if they are reached 
at all. Therefore, ways and means of taking 
concrete individual steps must now be found 
which lead in the right direction and can be 
realised in the near future. The following sugges-
tions contained in the study are submitted for 
discussion. 
425. They concern in particular : 
- an improvement of the national defence 
structures. This includes among other 
things a greater effort regarding the 
concentration of functions common to 
all three services and the clear orienta-
tion of the modernisation of materiel 
towards the weapon and command and 
control systems required for the com-
mon defence mission; 
- specialisation to be realised step by step 
on a multinational level beginning with 
an intra-service solution 1 • The possibil-
ityof applying a leasing system adapted 
to the present conditions should be 
examined 1 ; 
- standardisation to be realised step by 
step in the field of logistics, i.e. 
standardisation of materiel and integra-
tion of the logistic command and control 
organisation ; 
l. See page 105. 
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- standardisation of military doctrine and 
training to be realised step by step. 
426. However, progress will only be possible if 
the Ministers of Defence, supported by their 
governments and parliaments, express their firm 
intention to pursue a policy of co-operation and 
rationalisation. It must be stated in plain terms 
- especially for the benefit of sceptics and the 
hesitating experts - and must then be put into 
practice. Clear funding arrangements are just 
as important. As long as there are no multi-
lateral defence budgets every single measure of 
rationalisation will be endangered unless it is 
backed up by binding agreements that include 
the financial commitments. As far as possible 
such arrangements should also include the French 
partner. 
427. With the invasion of the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic in mind the members of the 
Alliance have worked out the impressive study 
on Alliance defence problems in the seventies 
(AD 70). In this document they decided to elimi-
nate by combined effort identified deficiencies 
of their common defence system. The result was 
a work programme for the future with clear 
priorities. Not all of the objectives have been 
reached, but there has been a marked progress. 
428. In view of the pressure exerted by the 
financial burden and the continuously increasing 
operating costs at the expense of capital expendi-
tures, the development of an AD 75 should now 
be initiated with the objective of giving a decisive 
impulse for promoting the idea of rationalisation. 
I. Prospects 
429. It may be considered to be a weakness that 
in Europe several institutions of different com-
positions deal with problems of foreign, economic, 
security and defence policy. They include : 
Western European Union, the European Com-
munity and Eurogroup within the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
430. None of these institutions is concerned with 
all political fields and in every one of them only 
part of the European countries are represented. 
This diversity, and in most cases also the lack 
of competence in questions of defence policy and 
in military matters, have rendered it more diffi-
cult to find solutions that are promising for the 
future. 
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431. It is not within the terms of reference of 
this study to develop solutions for a political 
unification of Europe. But it cannot be denied 
that a political union of all Western European 
nations with a supranationally controlled and 
common foreign, security and defence policy 
would create the decisive prerequisites for com-
bining the military efforts of all European part-
ners. In such a way an effective rationalisation 
by specialisation and standardisation will lead 
to an optimum utilisation of the means expended 
for defence purposes, thus enhancing the defence 
effectiveness on the continent. 
432. The fact that this long-term objective will 
probably not be attained in the near future must 
not prevent us from making a concrete start, 
utilising the appropriate political and military 
organisational structures suited for the purpose. 
433. Any possible approach should be taken. 
There is no time to be lost. The study has shown 
that there are plenty of possibilities to take steps 
which can be put into practice if they are 
governed by political determination. Each one of 
these individual steps should include as many 
European partners as possible. But each indivi-
dual step should also be examined so as to ensure 
that it will not diminish but strengthen the 
European-American solidarity. For the foresee-
able future, security for Europe is not imaginable 
without strategic nuclear coverage. Western 
Europe itself is not in a position to make avail-
able the means required for that purpose. There-
ll8 
fore Western Europe will remain dependent for 
security on firm ties with the United States. 
Thus it goes without saying that no isolated 
action on the part of Europe must be t.aken. 
434. But Europe may only expect a credible 
protection from the United States as long as it 
is also indispensable as a partner to the interests 
of the United States and as long as it remains a 
trustworthy ally. In this connection, the 
Americans expect Europe firmly to commit 
itself in the defence sector and to make a contri-
bution in concert with the military efforts of 
the United States. 
435. Therefore, Europe must play a more active 
part than before, both from a political and a 
military point of view. And, of course, this can 
only be a Europe which fully and equally inclu-
des France and Great Britain. 
436. The more firmly such a Europe speaks the 
same language the more effectively will it be 
able to represent its interests, and the more 
willingly will the United States wish to maintain 
its ties. 
437. But the political determination of the 
governments must also be directed towards 
keeping alive in the peoples themselves the con-
sciousness of the increasing threat to our freedom, 
and towards strengthening the readiness to 
defend this freedom. Otherwise, all military 
defence efforts might be undermined a·.11d might 
consequently be useless. 
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ENCLOSURE2 
Deployment of Warsaw Pact 
land forces facing the 
centml region 
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Replies of the Council to Recommendations 256 to 259 
RECOMMENDATION 256 1 
on European security and the situation 
in the Eastern Mediterranean 2 
Deploring the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus ; 
8th April 1975 
Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island depends on improved relations between Greece 
and Turkey and between the communities in Cyprus involving mutual concessions on several issues ; 
Recalling the continued increase in Soviet military power, especially at sea; 
Aware that European security is endangered by any weakening of the links between NATO and its 
member countries and by any deterioration in relations between NATO countries; 
Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with 
international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to 
the defence of Europe as a whole ; 
Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Com-
munity have contributed, is playing an essential r6le in the return to normal conditions in the island; 
Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations ; 
Reiterating its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to 
prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the refugees 
on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks 
the survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured ; furthermore to appeal to the responsible 
States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters ; 
2. Endeavour to ensure that the good offices of their partners and allies and in particular of the members 
of the European Community continue to be available to all parties in order to secure a general settlement 
of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the two communities ; 
3. Impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO 
bestows on each and every member ; 
4. Recognise the importance of the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus ; 
5. Develop the association agreements of Greece and Turkey towards the objective of their full mem-
bership of the European Community. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session (9th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mt". Critchley on behalf of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 651). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 256 
1. The Council share the deep concern expressed by the Assembly about the loss of life and human 
suffering in Cyprus. They agree that a lasting solution to the present crisis depends on an improvement 
in the relations between Greece and Turkey and between the two communities in Cyprus. The Council 
are also aware of the implications for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean of the present unstable 
situation in Cyprus. 
2. The Council would like to point out that several member governments of WEU have already 
contributed substantially to the humanitarian aid being provided for refugees in Cyprus, particularly in 
response to two appeals issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees in autumn 1974. The UNHCR issued a further appeal for funds in 
January 1975 and certain member governments of WEU have already responded to this latest request. 
It is the hope of the Council that negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus will eventually 
result in an agreement which will permit a long-term solution to the refugee problem and the rehabilita-
tion of the refugees themselves. 
3. The Council affirm their continuing concern for the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. They wish to draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that, at 
their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 1975, in the framework of political co-operation, the Foreign 
Ministers of the nine countries of the European Communities considered recent events in Cyprus. 
Recalling their previous statements on the subject and particularly the importance they attach to the 
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, as well as the relevant United Nations resolutions, 
they decided to approach the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, through the Chairman, to 
inform them : 
- that they continue to regard as highly desirable the search for a just and lasting negotiated 
settlement through consultation between the two communities in Cyprus ; 
- that, in order to facilitate the achievement of this aim, the Nine are ready to hold talks with 
the representatives of all the interested parties. 
4. The Council have no doubt that all members of the North Atlantic Alliance are fully aware of 
the importance of the Alliance to European security. The Republic of Cyprus is not, of course, a member 
of the Alliance. 
5. British forces have been in the sovereign base areas in Cyprus since 1960. But as a result of the 
recent defence review, these forces will be reduced; there will be cuts both in the number of British 
soldiers and in the number of strike aircraft stationed there in support of CENTO. In deciding these 
cuts, due account has however been taken of common security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
The bases themselves will of course remain. 
6. The proposal that the association agreement of Greece and Turkey with the Community should 
be developed towards full membership of the EEC is a matter for the Council of the European Com-
munities. Nonetheless the member countries of WEU by their signature of the Treaty of Athens and the 
Treaty of Ankara are committed to the objective of increasing development of relations between the 
EEC on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other, which should lead to full membership of 
the Communities for these two countries. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 257 1 
on the state of European aviation actiuitieB 2 
The Assembly, 
Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and 
hence for the aviation industry ; 
Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced 
technology ; 
Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Invite the member countries to : 
1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement; 
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equip-
ment capability of European aviation companies; 
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ; 
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories 
so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be 
retained in Europe ; 
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import 
of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such 
agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to 
protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the baJance of payments of member countries ; 
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations 
and aircraft sales ; 
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, 
financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session (lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 6118). 
122 
DOCUMENT 664 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 257 
The Council refer to their earlier replies to Recommendation 244 on an aviation policy for Europe, 
and to Written Question 151. 
The views expressed in Recommendation 257 have been brought to the notice of member govern-
ments. The Council can assure the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it 
is concerned continue to receive their fullest attention. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975. 
123 
DOCUMENT 664 
RECOMMENDATION 258 1 
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly 2 
The Assembly, 
Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countriea ; 
Anxious to develop a sense of Europe~ solidarity in the parliaments of member countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the governments of member countries to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, 
on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend 
to take on Assembly recommendations. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session {11th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments {Document 653). 
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to Recommendation 258 
The Council attach great importance to the Assembly's relations with national parliaments. These 
relations contribute indeed to strengthening the spirit of European solidarity. 
Member governments will as in the past and in accordance with their established practice inform 
their parliaments on international developments considered by the Council or the Assembly of WEU 
and on the progress of co-operation in WEU. Furthermore WEU parliamentarians are at liberty to 
question their governments whenever they want a more detailed consideration of foreign policy matters 
which are of particular concern to WEU. 
Finally, members of the Assembly may make statements in their national parliaments and may 
refer, as necessary, to their own or their colleagues' statements at the WEU Assembly. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975. 
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RECOMMENDATION 259 1 
on advanced technology in Canada 
the consequences for Europe 2 
The Assembly, 
Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in 
its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ; 
Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for 
scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions 
on this proposal; 
Considering a]so Canada's wish to develop its foreign policy and overseas trade in new direc-
tions; 
Aware of the need to collaborate with Canada on: 
(a) the development of V-STOL aircraft; 
(b) nuclear research and development ; 
(e) other energy resources within the framework of the overall energy policy; 
(d) computer communications, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Invite member governments: 
1. To afford the interparliamentary association - as proposed by the Canadian Senate - their 
assistance in the study of the abovementioned subjects; 
2. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Canada on : 
(a) remote sensing systems in satellites to further environmental monitoring, oceanography, 
new reforestation methods and worldwide crop assessment ; 
(b) domestic satellite communications systems. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session (12th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 649). 
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to Recommendation 259 
1. Immediately after the second world war, attention was directed to the research and development 
of nuclear energy as a possible auxiliary solution for the energy problems which seemed to be threatening 
the international community; but the subsequent progress of events and the present energy crisis have 
transformed solutions for these problems into a pressing need on which the economic future of our 
continent largely depends. 
2. Consequently, the progress achieved in the field of nuclear research and development over the 
last twenty years, in both Canada and Europe, represents a major contribution to solving these problems. 
Co-operation along the lines urged in Recommendation 259 is therefore even more to be desired. 
3. This is not, however, a new issue; the Canadian agencies concerned ahd national commissions in 
a number of European countries are already co-operating bilaterally for the development of joint research 
programmes on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The whole energy problem is the subject of close 
collaboration in various international bodies. 
4. Co-operation is already taking place with Canada on space matters. The Canadian Government 
joined in the programme, adopted by the European Space Research Organisation in 1971 for the testing 
and development of a satellite air-navigation control system (Aerosat programme). 
Canada also has observer status with the European Space Conference and its subordinate agencies. 
She is therefore in a position to make her views known within the ESC working group which keeps in 
touch with the work of the United Nations. This group is the forum in which the member States concert 
their space policies for their relations with other organisations. Consequently, Canada can co-ordinate 
and harmonise her own space policy with that of the European States, whenever she considers this 
desirable. 
This applies particularly to the activities of the committee on the peaceful use of outer space 
and its two sub-committees, which are at present considering the problems of direct radio transmission 
by satellite and prospecting the earth's resources by satellite, not only from the political and legal 
points of view, but also on the economic and technical level. 
The transatlantic links so established should facilitate the conclusion of any new agreements 
between the future European Space Agency, successor to ELDO fCECLES and ESRO fCERS, and its 
Canadian partners for the development of space monitoring and communications systems. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th March 1975. 
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INFORMATION REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 1 
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
1. This report, in two parts, covers the period 
November 1974 to May 1975. Part one reviews 
the reports on the activities of Western Euro-
pean Union submitted to the parliaments of 
member countries by their respective govern-
ments. Part two analyses parliamentary action 
on Assembly recommendations with a view to 
drawing the attention of governments to the 
work of the Assembly. 
2. It is recalled in this respect that relevant 
te."<ts communicated to the Office of the Clerk 
are given in Collected Texts 21. 
I. Reports on the activities of WEU submitted 
to the parliaments of member countries 
3. Recommendation 258, adopted by the WET; 
Assembly on 5th December 1974, urged the 
governments of member countries "to present 
a report, during debates on foreign policy, on 
their position on matters considered by the 
Council or Assembly of WEU and the action 
they intend to take on Assembly recommenda-
tions". Further to Order 44, which sought to 
promote this recommendation by means of par-
liamentary action, your Rapporteur wrote to 
the seven delegation Chairmen on 23rd January 
1975 enquiring what action the governments were 
taking on this recommendation. 
4. So far, only the Chairmen of the Belgian 
and French Delegations have replied, and in 
accordance with Order 41 only Mr. de Bruyne 
spoke in the debate in the Belgian Senate on the 
budget of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1 , 
5. However, it is noted that on 12th December 
197 4 the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany issued a report (Document 7/2966) 
on the activities of Western European Union 
for the period 1st April to 30th September 1974. 
This government considers WEU to be an impor-
tant element of western cohesion. 
6. The Netherlands Government devoted three 
paragraphs to WEU in the explanatory memo-
1. See end of part two. 
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randum to the draft budget of the :Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs published on 17th September 
1974 (Document 13100, Chapter IV, No. 2, page 
37). 
7. On 24th September 1974, the German Dele-
gation published a report by its Chairman, Mr. 
Amrehn, on the first part of the twentieth 
session of the Assembly (June 1974) (Document 
7 /2558) with the text of Recommendations 248 
and 255 at appendix. 
8. In application of Rule 29 of its Rules of 
Procedure, the French National Assembly issued 
an information report on the activities of the 
WEU Assembly during its nineteenth ordinary 
session, prepared by Mr. Radius, Chairman of 
the French Delegation (Document 1461, 19th 
December 1974). The Committee welcomes the 
publication of this report but trusts that the 
report on the twentieth session will include as 
an appendix the texts transmitted to the French 
parliament. 
D. Action taken on texts adopted 
9. Your Rapporteur is glad to be able to inform 
the Assembly that for the first time since 1972 
the number of interventions in the parliaments 
of the various WEU member countries1 rose 
thanks to eight members (out of a total of 178). 
He hopes that this progress heralds a return to 
a more normal situation : more than fifty inter-
ventions a year should be possible if members of 
national delegations continue, in their parlia-
ments, to show interest in the texts they have 
adopted. Similarly, Committee Chairmen, Rap-
porteurs and Chairmen of Political Groups might 
intervene in their parliaments in support of 
Assembly recommendations. 
10. The Committee urges members of the Assem-
bly to implement the suggestions set out in the 
first thirteen paragraphs of Document 653 on 
improving relations with the national parlia-
ments. It also reminds all delegates wishing to 
I. See Collected Texts 21. 
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take action on the work of the Assembly that 
the Committee can be of assistance and to this 
end they should contact the Committee secre-
tariat. 
Recommendation 247 
11. In reply to a letter from Senator Bonaldi 
dated 9th August 1974, Mr. Andreotti, Italian 
Minister of Defence, said that Italy was applyin~ 
the provisions of this recommendation and that 
Italy was still endeavouring to reactivate the 
WEU Standing Armaments Committee. 
Recommendation 248 
12. On 25th February, the Italian Minister 
responsible for co-ordinating scientific research 
and technology gave his opinion on this recom-
mendation, which deals with the European Space 
Agency. 
Recommendation 252 
13. In reply to a written question put on 9th 
August 1974 (see Collected Texts 20, page 14), 
Mr. Moro, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
replied that the Italian representatives to the 
appropriate international bodies, and particu-
larly WEU, have been instructed "to promote 
or activate procedure for consultation whenever 
appropriate or necessary". 
Recommendation 253 
14. On 20th February 1975, Mr. Cattanei, 
Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, replied in great detail to the question 
put by Mr. Bonaldi and with regard to the peace-
ful use of nuclear energy gave a full list of 
Italian programmes or international program-
mes in which Italy is participating. 
Recommendation 254 
15. In reply to a letter from Senator Bonaldi, 
the Italian Minister of Defence sent a note on 
the creation of a United Nations observation 
satellite, the usefulness of lessons learned from 
the Israeli-Arab conflict, the balance of forces 
in the Indian Ocean, respect for the Montreux 
Convention and improving defence arrangement:,; 
in the Mediterranean. 
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16. On 22nd November 1974, Mr. Hengel, a 
LU-xembourg member of parliament, put a writ-
ten question to his government. Mr. Thorn, 
Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
replied on 7th January 1975 that he very largely 
agreed with the trend and general concept of 
this recommendation. Luxembourg was stiLl in 
favour of creating the European union decided 
on at the Paris summit conference in 1972. With 
regard to the participation of the Secretary-
General of WEU in consultations in the frame-
work of the EEC or NATO, such a practice 
w~mld be incompatible with the basic principles 
of these organisations. 
Recommendation 257 
17. The Committee having selected this recom-
mendation for transmission to the parliaments of 
the WEU member countries, your Rapporteur 
put a written question on 22nd February 1975. 
He is surprised to be the only person so far to 
draw attention to the only text selected by the 
Committee for transmission to parliaments. 
Document 655 (Report by Mr. Small on the state 
of European nuclear energy programmes) 
18. Although the Assembly did not vote on the 
relevant reoommandation, this report has led to 
several written questions being put on the rati-
fication of the conventions it mentions. 
19. On 18th December 1974, Mr. van Ooijen and 
Mr. W altmans put a question to the Netherlands 
Minister. On 28th January 1975, Senator Min-
nocci put a question to the Italian Minister and, 
finally, on 8th February 1975, Mr. de Montes-
quiou put a written question to the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
20. The first reply was from Mr. den Uyl, 
Netherlands Prime Minister, explaining the situa-
tion with regard to the ratification of two con-
ventions by the Netherlands and promising that 
bills providing for their ratification and imple-
mentation would be tabled shortly. So far, the 
Committee has seen no relevant biJJ.s. 
Other action 
21. In France, Mr. de Montesquiou spoke in the 
debate on the civil aviation budget· on 18th 
November 1974. He called for the creation of a 
WEU aeronautical group for liaison between all 
competent bodies and with foreign countries. Mr. 
CavaiU6, Secretary of State, said that he was 
bearing in mind the suggestion for co-operation 
in the framework of WEU. 
22. In BeLgium, on 15th January 1975, Mr. de 
Bruyne asked for the Belgian Government's opin-
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ion on the role of WEU. Mr. Van E:lslande, 
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressed 
his interest in the work of WEU. He referred to 
his attempts to revive the Council's ministerial 
meetings and added that he wou1d attend the 
Assembly's sessions with pleasure if the occasion 
arose. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
(Totals by• country for each session) 
Member countries 
0 8 
Recommendations ~r i ~ i adopted in I ! l 3 a ~ ,&J 1i Total 1~ ~ 1-1 ~ .z ~ 
-go ~ z 
:5 1'<4 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 
1957 4 0 1 0 0 5 2 12 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4 3 12 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 9 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 1 29 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 0 11 
1962 2 4 4 6 2 3 10 31 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 3 41 
1964 4 14 9 11 1 5 2 46 
1965 0 11 12 24 0 5 28 80 
1966 2 12 12 49 1 4 18 98 
1967 14 9 22 29 2 6 16 98 
1968 6 14 20 22 1 16 47 126 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4 36 91 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 10 55 
1971 0 4 19 9 0 6 10 48 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 0 10 
1973 0 4 2 6 1 0 0 13 
1974 0 1 0 13 2 0 0 16 
1975 2 4 1 1 0 2 0 10 
Total 53 127 166 219 13 75 186 839 
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APPENDIX II 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1973 
~ 
.s.:s ~ t .Sl 1s ~ 11 ~ ~ 6 'tl ]~ j I ~ C).~ ~ » ~ ] ... !IJ ·~ ~ r ~~ ! 1 ] ~ .Sal C) 'tl rll l j:Q r;.. ] ~ ~ !l 0 C) ... ~ 1$0 ~ ~ r;.. 
233 -
234 -
235 1 1 
June 236 1 1 4 
1973 237 1 1 
238 X 1 ] 
Res. 52 X -
239 2 2 
240 -
241 X 2 2 
Nov. 242 -
1973 243 - 9 
244 -
245 X 2 2 
Other action 2 1 3 
246 1 1 
247 2 2 
248 X 2 2 
249 
-
June 250 - 15 
1974 251 1 1 
252 2 2 
253 2 2 
254 2 2 
255 X 1 2 3 
256 
-
Dec. 257 X 1 1 





Other action 2 4 1 1 2 10 10 
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OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS 
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975 1 
submitted on behalf of 
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 1 
by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT OPINION 
on the budget of Western European Union for the financial year 1975 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on improving the status of WEU staff 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. WEU budget estimates for 1975 
Proposed expenditure and income 
National contributions 
II. Details regarding the duties of the members of the staff of the ministerial 
organs of Western European Union 
III. Details regarding the duties of the staff of the Office of the Clerk of Western 
European Union 
IV. Table of establishment of Western European Union 
V. Recommendation 250 on improving the status of WEU staff and the 
reply of the Council 
VI. The pension scheme 
Draft Opinion 
on the budget of the mfngterial orgtUtll of WEU 
for the financial year 191/S 
The Assembly, 
Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council 
has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
Having taken note of the contents, 
Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chairman); 
Mr. Legaret (Substitute: Pignion.), Lord Selsdon (Vice· 
Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, AlbM', de Bruyne, Castellucci, 
Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : Spautz), Kauffman, de Koster 
(Substitute : Peifnenburg), Lewis, Page, Lord Peddie 
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Schleiter, Talamona, Vohrer, Waltmans, Mrs. Wolf 
(Substitute : Kempfler). 
Also present: Mr. Adriaensens. 
N. B. The names of Representatives who took part in 
the vote are printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on improoing the status of WEU staff 
The Assembly, 
Aware of the effort made by the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations to establish a pension 
scheme for the staff of these organisations ; 
Deploring nevertheless the fact that the governments have not yet been able to set up a joint man-
agement body for all the organisations, a single appeals board or guarantee the payment of pensions should 
one of them withdraw or an organisation be wound up; 
Deeply regretting that the Co-ordinating Committee has been unable to agree to a reversionary 
pension being granted to widowers of female staff in the same way as to widows of male staff; 
Welcoming the action taken on Recommendation 200 and the definition of principles to be implemented 
with regard to the secondment of national officials to the co-ordinated organisations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. Establish a joint management body for the pension scheme; 
2. Set up a single appeals board ; 
3. Guarantee the full and uninterrupted payment of pensions even in the event of a government with-
drawing or an organisation being wound up and to this end apply the provisions set out in Recommendation 
250 of the Assembly; 
4. Grant widowers of female staff a reversionary pension in the same conditions as for widows of male 
staff; 
5. Afford officials who have obtained home loans from the provident fund a means of continuing those 
loans should they opt for the pension scheme ; 
6. Ensure that serving officials who do not opt for the pension scheme continue to benefit from the 
social advantages linked with the present provident fund system; 
7. Grant officials of equal grade and length of service, regardless of the date of their retirement, a 
pension calculated on the basis of salaries payable to serving staff ; 
8. Take note of the problems arising from the introduction of the United Kingdom Social Security 
Act in April 1975 ; 
9. Establish a system for readjusting emoluments whereby the co-ordinated organisations may: 
- hold general reviews every four years or more frequently if circumstances warrant it ; 
- assess trends in the standard of living in the middle of the period between general reviews ; 
- examine cost-of-living trends every six months ; 
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- take the necessary steps to adjust salaries in accordance with the trend of the cost of living as 
quickly as possible by abolishing the two-month observation period. 
II. Invite the Public Administration Committee to submit to it as soon as possible a. first report on the 
way member States have implemented the principles defined by the special group of experts set up in 
October 1971 to study conditions for seconding national officials to international organisations, on the diffi-




(•ullmitted fly Lord Selsdon, Rapporteur) 
I. Budget of the mini.terial organs of WEU 
1. Approval 
I have studied the budget of the ministerial 
organs of WEU for the financial year 1975 and 
have, for the time being, no comment to make 
Secretariat-General .............. 
Standing Armaments Committee .. 
Agency for the Control 
of Armaments ................ 
Office of the Clerk .............. 
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU .......... 
3. WEU establishment 
The total establishment of WEU for 1975 
is as follows : 
Secretariat-General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . 28 
Agency for the Control of Armaments 52 
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Office ofthe Clerk .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . 28 
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1975 157 
In order to avoid submitting supplementary 
budgets during the year, the Council had decided 
that the draft budgets of each branch of WEU 
should take account of the foreseeable effects of 
inflation during the budgetary year. 
The increased estimates in the budgets of the 
ministerial organs and of the Assembly for this 
year as compared with 1974 are thus due not 
only, as is customary, to the rise in prices and 
salaries during the previous financial year, which 
was higher in 1974 than during previous years, 
but also, for the first time, to an estimate of the 
probable effects of inflation during the current 
financial year. 
s• - 1 
thereon. I therefore submit the attached draft 
opinion and draft recommendation to the Com-
mittee for its approval. 
2. The budget 
The total budget of WEU for 1975 as com-
pared to 197 4 is as follows : 
1974 Budget 1975 Budget 





359,800 14,592,386 397,810 17,250,205 
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D. Pensions 
1. Government guarantee - Joint fund 
1.1 The pension scheme having reached its 
final stage, one important point is still out-
standing, i.e. a government guarantee. As with 
the proposed pension scheme as a whole, this 
problem has not yet been submitted to the Coun-
cils for decision. However, it has been dealt 
with in what may be considered a final form at 
the level of the Co-ordinating Committee and 
the text approved by that Committee will be 
incorporated in the pension scheme rules now 
being drawn up. This text lays down that: 
"Article 40 - Charge on budgets 
1. Benefits paid under this pension 
scheme shall be charged to the budgets of 
the organisation responsible for the assess-
ment of these benefits pursuant to Article 
31. 
2. The member States of the organisation 
jointly guarantee the payment of these 
benefits. 
3. In the event of merger, reconstitution 
or other transformation or in the event of 
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dissolution of the organisation, the Coun-
cil or any ad hoc body set up, where 
required in one of the aforementioned 
cases, shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure uninterrupted payment of the pen-
sion scheme benefits until the cessation of 
entitlement of the last beneficiary." 
1.2 These proVISions are certainly well-
intended, but they fail to offer the guarantees 
which may be rightfully expected in such an 
essential field, particularly as regards the 
regular payment of the sums due, whatever the 
circumstances and without prior discussion and 
decision. 
1.3 Moreover, several members of the Co-
ordinating Committee were aware of this short-
coming since, when the above article was being 
finalised, it was pointed out by several dele-
gations that, in the two cases envisaged of the 
withdrawal of a member State or the dissolution 
of an organisation, a delicate financial problem 
might arise if the measures to be taken in such 
an event were not determined now . .Although, in 
fact, Article 40 provides that member States 
jointly guarantee the payment of pensions, yet 
were a number of them to withdraw from an 
organisation it would obviously be inconceivable 
that the countries still remaining should alone 
bear the total cost of the scheme. 
1.4 The Co-ordinating Committee, while recog-
nising the importance of this problem and the 
need for countries joining or withdrawing from 
an organisation to honour their commitments, 
considered that the mea.Sures to be taken should 
be included in the general financial arrange-
ments concomitant with adhesion or withdrawal 
but should not appear in the pension scheme 
rules. 
1.5 These comments are significant : they bring 
out the ambiguity in the minds of certain dele-
gations which may be dangerous in such matters 
and may deter a number of officials who might 
otherwise wish to join the scheme. 
1.6 It is evident that the only solution to this 
problem lies in the proposals made in the recom-
mendation adopted by the Assembly during its 
Twentieth Session (Document 631) for creating 
a joint management body with its own legal 
status in respect of which each government 
would enter into financial commitments which 
would remain unaffected in the event of a coun-
try withdrawing from one of the co-ordinated 
organisations or an organisation being wound up. 
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1.7 Such a solution could probably not be 
applied immediately since time would be required 
for it to be worked out, formed and agreed to by 
governments. 
1.8 It has been objected that the creation of 
such a body would involve further expenditure. 
In this connection, reference has been made to 
the creation of another co-ordinated organisa-
tion ; such an argument cannot stand close 
scrutiny, since in the long run it would cost far 
more if management of the scheme were dis-
persed than if it were centralised. 
1.9 The Councils should therefore adopt a 
formal declaration of intent coupling joint man-
agement with adoption of the scheme itself. 
Moreover, several governments are in favour of 
this. It would be necessary to convince those who 
are reluctant and also, it must be admitted, 
certain organisations which are over-jealous of 
their prerogatives at the expense of the true 
interests of their staff. However this may be, 
and in view of the time required to establish 
joint management, the pension scheme might at 
the outset be managed by each organisation con-
cerned. 
2. Revaluation of pensions 
2.1 According to the rules now being drawn 
up, the pension payable is calculated on the basic 
salary for the last grade held by the official for 
not less than one year before retirement and 
the appropriate step in that grade. 
2.2 It is also stipulated that should the Council 
of the organisation responsible for the payment 
of benefits decide on an adjustment of salaries 
in relation to the cost of living, it shall decide 
at the same time on an identical adjustment of 
pensions. Should salary adjustments be made in 
relation to the standard of living, the Council 
shall consider whether an appropriate adjust-
ment of pensions should be made. 
2.3 However unreservedly welcome may be the 
automatic adjustment of pensions in accordance 
with the trend of the cost of living, it is regret-
table that there should be such clear reservations 
where adjustments in the light of improvements 
in the standard of living are concerned. 
2.4 Is it fair to deprive, or envisage depriving, 
a retired person of the improved standard of 
living from which all serving officials would 
benefit 1 Any such solution would be quite unfair 
and most difficult to apply. 
2.5 Nor would it be very fair since the pension 
of an official retiring at a given time would be 
calculated inclusive of an increase in salary 
which may have been granted to meet an increase 
in the standard of living granted say a month 
before, whereas a colleague who had retired two 
months earlier might not qualify for such an 
increase. 
2.6 It would be difficult to apply since it might 
entail the use of a number of pension scales for 
a specific grade and step, reflecting arbitrarily 
the various decisions taken in this field over the 
years. 
2.7 To sum up, retired officials, regardless of 
the date of their retirement, should be granted 
a pension which, for equal grade and length of 
service, is calculated on the basis of salaries 
actually paid to serving officials. 
3. Reconsideration of the option for married 
women 
3.1 The rules now being drawn up state that 
in the event of the death of a male official his 
widow may claim a reversionary pension. This 
right does not apply to the widowers of women 
officials of the co-ordinated organisations. 
3.2 Such discrimination is surprising in organi-
sations which have recently adopted a series of 
often generous measures concerning equal treat-
ment for men and women and may well deter a 
number of women from joining the scheme now 
being prepared. 
3.3 Should the course be one of no return, 
female officials ought to be allowed an oppor-
tunity of changing their decision in the event of 
the rules being modified. 
3.4 It has been argued that to insert such a 
provision in the rules would be difficult insofar 
as it might presuppose a subsequent modifi-
cation. When adopting the pension scheme, the 
Council should at least discuss the matter and 
reassure those concerned. 
4. Loans for purchasing accommodation 
4.1 The disappearance or at least considerable 
reduction of the credits available to officials 
opting for the pension scheme will make impos-
sible or considerably reduce the granting of loans 




4.2 Nevertheless, such loans are a particularly 
useful social measure since international officials 
often do not have access to national facilities in 
this respect. 
4.3 Member States might consider earmarking 
a small part of the large sums they will recover 
for the validation of past service to finance such 
operations in the future at a reasonable interest 
rate and provided satisfactory guarantees are 
given. In any event, this situation calls for an 
early and fair solution. 
4.4 In the same context, serving officials who 
have been granted a loan to purchase or improve 
accommodation in the framework of the existing 
rules and who do not have available the entire 
sum necessary to validate their past service must 
be allowed reasonable time in which to reimburse 
their debt. Arrangements must also be made to 
allow them to continue their home loans at an 
acceptable rate of interest. 
5. Position of serving officials who wish to 
continue with the provident fund 
5.1 The rules now being prepared provide that 
officials in service when the pension scheme is 
introduced will be able to continue with the 
provident fund for up to one year as from the 
date on which the Council approves the new 
scheme before opting for one or the other. 
5.2 This provision is satisfactory since it 
respects the principle of acquired rights. 
5.3 But it must be ensured that this principle 
is applied not only to the main aspect, i.e. the 
maintenance of the provident fund in its present 
form but also to subsidiary problems such as 
the granting of loans from this fund and the full 
maintenance of the guarantees offered by com-
plementary insurance schemes, some aspects of 
which may be modified to avoid overlapping with 
benefits under the pension scheme. 
5.4 It must also be underlined that the condi-
tions for reimbursement of medical, surgical, 
hospital and pharmaceutical expenses after 
retirement which must be maintained for retired 
officials should also cover officials now in service 
who do not opt for the pension scheme, provided 
they fulfil the necessary conditions which, for 
instance, might be to leave the organisation at 
retiring age after not less than ten years' service. 
This provision is already applied in two co-
ordinated organisations : NATO and OECD. 
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III. Appeals Board 
6. Appeals 
6.1 Two recent conflicting judgments by two 
appeals boards- in OECD and NATO- on 
an identical text (rules on equal treatment for 
men and women employed in the co-ordinated 
organisations) clearly show, if proof were needed, 
the dangers foreseen by the Assembly 1 which led 
it to recommend having an appeals board capable 
of harmonising juridical decisions and of 
guaranteeing the parties every desirable legal 
guarantee. 
6.2 It is regrettable that no action was taken 
on this recommendation and that it was not even 
submitted to the Councils of the co-ordinated 
organisations for consideration. The forthcoming . 
introduction of the pension scheme, which will 
no doubt give rise to a number of disputed 
claims, makes such harmonisation even more 
necessary. 
IV. Salary adjustments 
7. Adjustment procedure 
7.1 There has been criticism of procedure for 
adjusting salaries. 
1. Document 561, Recommendation 214 adopted by 
the Assembly on 30th November 1971 during the Second 
Part of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session (Extract): 
"3. Instruct the Secretary-General to seek, together 
with his colleagues of the other co-ordinated organis-
ations, harmonisation in the rules governing the 
appeals board for staff in the organisations ; " 
Reply of the Council : 
"3. The Council recognise that, under the existing 
procedures, differing interpretations of texts could 
be given by any one of the appeals boards of the 
co-ordinated organisations, resulting in divergent 
decisions. They will therefore arrange that the other 
co-ordinated organisations be consulted with a view 
to harmonising the rules to the extent required to 
eliminate such divergences." 
Document 584, Recommendation 230 adopted by the 
Assembly on 7th December 1972 during the Second Part 
of the Eighteenth Ordinary Session (Extract): 
"3. (b) to consider, together with the Secretaries-
General of the other co-ordinated organisations, the 
possibility of instituting one appeals jurisdiction for 
all staff." 
Reply of the Council : 
"3. (b) As requested by the Assembly, the Secretary-
General has invited his colleagues from the other 
co-ordinated organisations to consider the possibility 
of instituting one appeals procedure for all staff." 
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7.2 The level of salaries of officials is decided 
by means of general reviews. Criteria taken into 
account for grades A and L consist essentially 
of comparisons with salaries payable in other 
international organisations, and more particu-
larly the EEC, and in national civil services, 
with due attention to the trend of the cost of 
living. 
7.3 For grades B and C, levels are fixed on 
the basis of enquiries into salaries paid in good 
private firms in the country of employment. The 
statistical experts who established procedure 
for these enquiries more than ten years ago set 
up a coherent system which has proved effective. 
It should however be brought up to date so as 
to avoid arguments about the choice of reference 
firms and the alignment of a specific grade in 
the organisations with a specific post in the 
private sector. 
7.4 The general reviews also provide an oppor-
tunity for dealing with all matters concerning 
the granting of allowances and the possible 
creation of new allowances. 
7.5 A general review is thus a very cumbersome 
exercise, involving careful preparation and much 
discussion. Representatives of the organisations 
and member States devote a considerable amount 
of time to it, and although the cost has never 
been assessed, there is no doubt that it is high. 
7.6 When the present co-ordination system was 
instituted in 1958, general reviews were held 
every four years. This interval was reduced to 
three and then two years. It may be considered 
that there is little reason for such frequent 
reviews and that general reviews should again 
be held every four years. 
7. 7 In the period between two general reviews 
(at present two years), provision is made for an 
annual review dealing solely with the trend of 
the cost of living. 
7.8 However, if the cost-of-living index rises 
by more than five points during the year under 
review, an exceptional review is made. 
7.9 The inflation which is rife in all the coun-
tries of employment has led to many reviews in 
the last two years which have sometimes over-
lapped and involve an excessive amount of 
administrative work. 
7.10 The present system might be replaced by 
two annual reviews on a fixed date to deal with 
the adjustment of salaries in the light of trends 
in the cost of living. 
7.11 Further, every two years - i.e. in the 
middle of the period between two four-yearly 
general reviews - consideration might be given 
to whether a standard-of-living adjustment 
should be made. 
7.12 The present system is cumbersome, costly 
and very slow. While it is normal for a general 
review to require three or four month's discus-
sions, adjustments due to the cost of living 
should be made without delay because they are 
intended to alleviate a drop in purchasing power 
which has been noted objectively. This is not the 
case ; when the cost-of-living index in a specific 
country rises by more than five points, thus 
justifying an exceptional adjustment, there is a 
pause of two months to ensure that the increase 
was neither seasonal nor fortuitous. The cost-of-
living index for the second month is available 
only a month or six weeks later. The Co-
ordinating Committee is thus able to approve 
salary increases only after a period of three to 
three and a half months. Approval is submitted 
to the Councils of the co-ordinated organisations 
which include the matter in their agendas. Only 
after four to four and a half months can the 
adjustment thus be made with retroactive effect. 
There is little justification for such slowness. 
7.13 There would be no serious drawback to 
abolishing the two-month observation period 
since experience has proved the deplorable fact 
that nowadays falling price indices are a text-
book theory. 
7.14 In short, it is proposed : 
(i) to lighten the present complex pro-
cedure by replacing it by : 
- four-yearly general reviews; 
- consideration of the trend of the 
standard of living in the middle of 
the period between general reviews; 
- half-yearly consideration of the 
trend of the cost of living ; 
(ii) to take the necessary steps to make 
adjustments corresponding to the 
trend of the cost of living as soon as 
possible and to abolish the two-month 
observation period. 
7.15 This reorganisation would considerably 
ease the strain of reviews by the co-ordinating 
bodies and administrative work. It would prob-
ably reduce the number of readjustments now 
enjoyed by staff but would at the same time 
ensure quicker application of measures adopted. 
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V. United Kingdom Social Security Act 
of 1973 
8.1 The introduction of the United Kingdom 
Social Security Act of 1973 in April of this year, 
entailing substantially increased contributions 
both from employers and employees, raises a 
number of problems concerning WEU staff, both 
those serving in the Secretariat-General in Lon-
don and those British nationals serving in Paris 
who have, up to now, contributed regularly to 
the Social Security services on a voluntary basis. 
A number of questions in this respect need to be 
settled: 
(a) the readiness of member governments 
in WEU to subscribe to both an inter-
national and a national pension 
scheme; 
(b) the amount and conditions of retire-
ment benefits to which WEU staff 
may be entitled under the United 
Kingdom Social Security Act. These 
need to be clarified ; 
(c) the possibility for non-British WEU 
staff employed in London to opt out 
of the United Kingdom Social Security 
scheme; having been obliged to con-
tribute up to now to the former 
scheme, would any benefit so far 
acquired be lost 1 
(d) a clarification of the position of non-
British WEU staff serving in London 
who contribute voluntarily to their 
national pension scheme ; a new reci-
procal agreement between WEU mem-
ber countries may be required ; 
(e) similarly, the position of British 
nationals serving in Paris who have up 
to now contributed to the United 
Kingdom Social Security scheme on a 
voluntary basis. 
8.2 The Assembly should be kept informed of 
the negotiations with the British Government 
in this respect. 
VI. Seconded national officials 
9. Conditions for secondment 
9.1 In Recommendation 200 adopted on 27th 
November 1970, the Assembly recommended that 
the Council : 
"Instruct its Public Administration Com-
mittee to study the harmonisation of con-
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ditions for seconding national officials to 
the co-ordinated organisations with a view 
to submitting recommendations to the 
member governments." 
9.2 In its twentieth annual report, the Council 
indicates: 
"The studies carried out on this subject by 
a special group of experts set up by the 
Council in October 1971 originated from 
Assembly Recommendation 200 of 27th 
November 1970. 
The Assembly was kept continuously infor-
med of the progress of these studies, which 
concluded with the approval by the Council 
in July 1974, of the principles worked out 
by the experts for application in fixing 
the conditions for secondrnent. 
These principles are as follows : 
1. In view of the particular importance 
attaching to the secondrnent of national 
officials to international organisations, the 
States should be guided by a minimum of 
common principles in fixing the conditions 
for the secondrnent of these officials. Offi-
cials subject to these rules would be on 
European seconded service. 
2. Each of the governments of the mem-
ber countries of WEU shall determine the 
categories of officials who can be placed 
on European seconded service and shall 
decide in each individual case whether this 
system shall apply. 
3. The proposed system envisages the 
secondrnent of national officials to inter-
national organisations and, in particular, 
the co-ordinated organisations. 
4. Officials on European seconded service 
will not be regarded as having left their 
national civil service ; they will be placed 
in the appropriate administrative position 
under their terms of service as national 
officials. 
5. Without prejudice to the principle 
that each member State is free to establish 
the duration of secondrnent, the following 
points might be considered : 
(i) the normal period would be from 
three to five years ; 
(ii) possibility of extension ; ten years 
appears to be the normal maximum, 
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any exceptions would be left to the 
discretion of governments ; 
(iii) governments would still retain the 
option, in certain special cases, of 
applying either a formula other than 
secondrnent (e.g. "temporary release" 
for very short periods, particularly 
for technical work in international 
organisations of a scientific or a 
technological nature) or the national 
secondrnent rules which can vary 
from one country to another. 
6. Any official or member of staff to 
whom the benefit of European seconded 
service had been granted would, at the end 
of his period of secondrnent, automatically 
be reintegrated into his national civil 
service. 
7. Officials on European seconded service 
should suffer no discrimination, at least on 
being reintegrated into the national civil 
service, as regards progression in that 
service and, for this purpose, a period 
served in an international organisation 
should be counted as service with the horne 
civil service ; there should be no delay in 
progression based on seniority and 
seconded officials should be entitled, like 
other officials in their civil service, to 
compete for promotion by selection based 
on merit. 
Such promotion by selection may be 
granted according to the rules of each 
State, either during secondrnent or when 
officials return to their horne civil service, 
with retroactive effect where applicable. 
8. Respect for the essential independence 
of an official on European seconded service 
implies that, subject to the principles set 
forth below regarding retirement pension, 
he cannot, in principle, during the time 
of his secondrnent, accept any kind of fee, 
gift, reward or emolument from any source 
other than the international organisation 
to which he has been seconded. 
9. Although, because of the independence 
of officials on European seconded service, 
governments are not, in principle, informed 
of the reports on their seconded staff, an 
organisation can forward a report and the 
government can request one, if necessary, 
especially at the end of the period of 
service, in order to consider its official's 
suitability for promotion. 
10. Years of service counting for a retire-
ment pension or a capital sum paid by an 
international organisation are not, in 
principle, also counted for the pension 
payable to the same official by his own 
State. 
However, there should be no disadvantage 
for an official on European seconded 
service in comparison with his national 
colleagues. 
The members of the Council transmitted 
the text of these ten principles to their 
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governments with a recommendation for 
their application. 
It was further agreed that the Public 
Administration Committee should follow 
the implementation of these principles by 
member States. 
The Public Administration Committee 1 
therefore ·has to consider how this duty is 
to be carried out and will have to report to 
the Council in due course." 
9.3 The Assembly wishes to be kept informed 
of the work of the Public Administration Com-
mittee. 
1. At the September meeting, the Public Administration 
Committee noted that the Council had decided to entrust 
it with the task of following the implementation by 
member States of the principles defined by the special 
working group set up by the WEU Council in October 1971 
to study the secondment of national officials to inter-
national organisations. These principles, which the Council 
have transmitted to member governments with a recom-
mendation for their application, are reproduced above. 
The Public Administration Committee plans to report 
to the Council on this matter during the sun1mer of 1975. 
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APPENDIX I 
WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOB 1975 
Proposed expenditure and tneome 
A* B* 
£ Francs 
Salaries and allowances ............. 481,305 4,850,790 
Travel ................••........... 13,360 72,700 
Other operating costs ............... 61,605 270,925 
Purchase of furniture ............... 3,210 13,500 
Buildings .......................... 
- -
Total expenditure ................... 559,480 5,207,915 
WEU tax .......................... 154,355 1,645,020 
Other receipts ...................... 7,315 12,000 
Total income ....................... 161,670 1,657,020 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••.••••••.•.• 397,810 3,550,895 
• A - Secretariat-General. 
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Annaments Committee. 
C • Agenoy for the Control of Annaments. 
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Belgium .................... 59 39,117.98 
France ..................... 120 79,562.00 
Federal Republic of Germany . 120 79,562.00 
Italy ...................... 120 79,562.00 
Luxembourg ................ 2 1,326.04 
N etherla.nds ................ 59 39,117.98 
United Kingdom ............ 120 79,562.00 
600 397,810.00 
Total WEU budget 
* A · Secretariat-General. 
B • International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C • Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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APPENDIX II 
In accordance with Opinion 9 adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1963, 
the Council has communicated details to the Assembly regarding the duties of the 
members of the staff of the ministerial organs of Western European Union. 
A. Secretariat-General 
Post No. Grade Function 
1 HG Secretary -General 
2 )) Deputy Secretary-General 
3 )) Assistant Secretary -General 
4 A6 Legal Adviser 
5 B4 Personal Assistant to Secretary-General 
6 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
7 B5 Personal Assistant to Deputy Secretary-General 
8 B4 Personal Assistant to Assistant Secretary-General 
9 B4 Personal Assistant to Legal Adviser 
General .Affairs Division 
10 A5 Head of Division 
11 A3 Deputy Head of Division 
12 A3 Committee Secretary 
13 B4 Assistant fVerbatim Writer 
14 B3 Secretary/ Assistant 
.Administration and Personnel Division 
15 A5 Head of Division 
16 A3 Deputy Head of Division 
17 A2 Administrative Officer 
18 B4 Assistant (Personnel) 
19 B4 Assistant (Administration) 
20 B3 Secretary 
Lin(fUist Division 
21 L5 Head of Division 
22 LT4 Reviser 
23 LT3 Translator F fE 
24 LT2 Tra.nsla.torEfF 
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Post No. Grade Function 
Regiatry and Production Service& 
25 A2 Head of Registry 
26 B4 Documentation Clerk 
27 B4 Head of Typing Pool 
28 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
29 B3 II 
30 B3 II 
31 B3 J 
32 B2 Shorthand-typist 
33 B2 ll 
34 B2 ll 
35 B2 Assistant (distribution) 
36 B2 Assistant (reproduction) 
General Service& 
37 B1 Telephonist 
38 B1 )) 
39 C3 Chauffeur Mechanic 
40 C3 • 
41 C3 Maintenance Supervisor 
42 C2 Messenger 
43 C2 II 
Security 
44 C4 Senior Security Guard 
45 C3 Security Guard 
46 C3 • 
47 C3 )) 
48 C3 • 
49 C3 • 
147 
DOCUMENT 666 




























































Assistant Secretary -General 
Private Secretariat, Mail, Documentation 
Assistant responsible for the private secretariat 
Secretary /Shorthand-typist 
Archivist, responsible for distributing documents 
Driver Mechanic 
Committee Secretariat 














» )) )) 
» ll » 
Telephonist 
Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
» )) )) 
Administrative and General Staff 
Administrative Assistant 
Deputy to Head of Finance a.nd Administration Section, 
Head of Finance and Account Office 
Roneo Operator 
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C. Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Post No. Grade Function 
I HG Director 
2 A2 Director's Assistant 
3 A7 Deputy Director 
4 B4 Assistant 
Director' 8 Office 
5 A4 Head of the Office and Assistant to the Director, 
Security Officer 
6 A3 Head of Central Documentation 
7 A2 Assistant to the Head of Central Documentation 
8 B4 Assistant Documentation Clerk 
9 LT3 Translator E fF 
lO LT3 )) F/E 
II B3 Secretary 
12 B2 Shorthand-typist 
13 B4 Assistant, Head of Central Registry, Assistant to the 
Security Officer 
14 B3 Secretary 
Information and Study Diviaion 
15 A6 Head of Division 
16 A5 Head of the Industrial Section 
17 A5 Expert on biological and chemical weapons 
18 A4 Logistics Expert on armaments for land forces 
19 A4 Logistics Expert on armaments for air forces 
20 A4 Logistics Expert on naval armaments 
21 A4 Assistant to the Head of Division for General Questions 
22 B4 Assistant 
23 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
24 B3 )) » 
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Post No. Grade Function 
lnapection and Control Diviaion 
25 A6 Head of Division 
26 A5 Expert on artillery and tanks 
27 A5 Expert on guided missiles 
28 A4 Expert on biological weapons 
29 A5 Expert on armaments for air forces 
30 A4 Expert on artillery 
31 B4 Assistant 
32 B3 Bilingual Shorthand-typist 
Administration and Legal Affairs Diviaion 
33 A6 Head of Division 
34 B4 Assistant 
35 A4 Legal Expert 
36 A5 Head of Finance and Administration Section 
37 B3 Chief Clerk 
38 B4 Assistant Accountant 
39 B2 Senior Clerk 
40 B4 Head of Group responsible for General Services 
41 B3 Chief Clerk, Assistant to Head of Group responsible 
for General Services 
Other services and Security Service 
42 C5 Head Designer and Duplicator Operator 
43 C3 Driver Mechanic 
44 C3 Security Guard 
45 C3 » ll 
46 C3 )) ll 
47 C3 ll » 
48 C3 » » 
49 C3 » » 
50 C3 ll II 
51 C3 » » 



































Counsellor in charge of defence questions and armaments 
Counsellor in charge of political questions 
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Counsellor in charge of scientific, teehnologica.l and aerospace 
questions 
Counsellor in charge of finance and administration 
Counsellor in charge of Press Department 
First Secretary /Head of the Publications and Translations 
Department 
First Secretary Reviser /Publications 
Secretary Head of Archives and Committee Secretary 
Secretary-Translator /Publications 
» 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant 
Secretary to the President and the Clerk 
Secretary to the Clerk Assistant f Assistant Sergeant-at-Arms 
Office 
Proof Reader and Assistant Translation Department 
Assistant to the Archives and Mail Department 
Assistants to Committees 
Assistap.t to the Administrative and Financial Department 
Assistant to the Translation Department 
Assistant to the Press Department 
Switchboard Operator 
Head of Roneo Section /Storekeeper 
Roneo Assistant /Messenger 
Messenger 




Secretary -General 1 
Deputy Secretary-General 1 
Director of the Agency -
























l. A . Secretariat-General. 
APPENDIX IV 
Table of estGblishment 
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
Bl Cl Total A,B,C 
- - 1 
- - 1 
. - 1 1 
1 - 2 
- 1 1 
- 3 4 
1 6 9 
4 8 12 
-
1 4 
- 2 4 
- -
1 
1 - 2 
3 2 6 




4 8 20 
7 8 22 













28 52 I29 
B . International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C . Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
2. Including four secretaries TranslationsJPublications. 
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RECOMMENDATION 250 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff 2 
DOCUMENT 666 
Congratulating the government budgetary experts for expressing the will, in the 94th report 
of the Co-ordinating Committee, to work out a pension scheme similar to that in force in the Com-
munities and for making proposals, in the 93rd report of that Committee, for ensuring equal treat-
ment for male and female staff in the co-ordinated organisations ; 
Aware of the problems raised by fluctuating exchange rates for non-resident officials with com-
mitments in their countries of origin ; 
Considering the discrimination between officials of nationalities other than that of the country 
in which they are employed according to whether they occupy grade C posts on the ome hand or 
grade A, L or B posts on the other ; 
Regretting finally the extreme difficulty or even impossibility of promotion for WEU officials 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
l. Ensure that a pension scheme which is truly similar to that in force in the European Com-
munities is introduced with provision, inter alia, for the establishment of a system of internal taxa-
tion of salaries and pensions, bonuses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of entitle-
ment to a pension and the creation of a joint management body with its own legal status separate 
from the organisations in respect of which each government would enter into financial commitments 
which would thus remain unaffected in the event of a country withdrawing from one of the co-ordi-
nated organisations or an organisation being wound up ; 
2. Provide further for : 
(i) introducing a system of separation allowances which would not be affected by currency depre-
ciations for officials not remaining in service long enough to qualify for a pension: 
(ii) maintaining the possibility for officials to obtain loans for building or renovating accommodation; 
(iii) establishing for retired officials - particularly those who do not have medical coverage in the 
country to which they retire - a system providing suitable coverage and which shall be partly 
financed by their contributions ; 
(iv) granting widowers of female officials the reversionary rights allowed in the case of widows of 
male officials ; 
3. Seek a means of allowing non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their coun-
tries of origin by authorising - subject to specific justification - the payment of a portion of their 
salaries in their national currencies on the basis of salary scales applicable in the countries concerned ; 
4. Grant grade C officials who are not nationals of the country in which they are employed the 
right to home leave and education allowance on the same basis as non-resident grade A, L and B 
officials; 
II. In the framework of WEU : 
5. Give urgent consideration to dual grades at every level in order to offset promotion difficulties. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : se~ the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 631). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 250 
I. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations 
1. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 240 on improving the status of WEU staff, 
the Council informed the Assembly of the progress of the initial work by the Co-ordinating Com-
mittee of Government Budget Experts on the establishment of a common pension scheme for the 
Rtaff of the co-ordinated organisations. 
This work has been continued at subsequent meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee on the 
basis of the report submitted to the Committee by the specialist working group on pensions. The 
taxation arrangements to be applied to pensions have yet to be agreed and there are a small num-
ber of other points of lesser importance still to be resolved. These problems will be the subject of 
further discussion in the Co-ordinating Committee at its meetings in the course of the next few 
months. The Council are not yet, therefore, in a position to reply in full to all the points raised 
in Recommendation 250. 
It can be stated, however, that agreement is near on the establishment of a system of bon-
uses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of pension entitlement, but that this 
may be applied only to staff serving in the co-ordinated organisations prior to 30th June 1974. 
The form which the joint management body suggested by the Assembly might take has still 
to be studied in detail. 
2. No decision has been taken by the Co-ordinating Committee on points (i), (ii) and (iii). 
The Co-ordinating Committee was unable to agree that, at the present time, widowers of 
female officials should be granted a reversionary pension on the same conditions as widows of male 
staff. 
3. Proposals to enable non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of 
origin through the payment of a portion of their salaries in their own national currencies, were 
submitted by the Secretary-General of WEU to the Co-ordinating Committee in 1973. The Com-
mittee decided, however, that such proposals could only be considered if submitted by the Standing 
Committee of Secretaries-General following normal procedure. Should the Secretaries-General of the 
other co-ordinated organisations agree on an appropriate formula, fresh proposals will be submitted 
after current work on the pension scheme has been completed. 
4. This point has not yet been considered by the Co-ordinating Committee, but the Standing 
Committee of Secretaries-General are at liberty to put forward appropriate proposals should they 
consider them justified. 
II. Meas·ures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of WEU 
5. While recognising that the position of WEU staff gives rise to certain special problems as 
regards promotion prospects, the Council feel unable to act upon the Assembly's recommendation 
for the introduction of a general system of dual grading at every level. They consider that individual 
special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connection. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974. 
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APPENDIX VI 
The pension scheme 
I. General features 
1. The scheme is similar to the one in force in 
the European Communities and is based on the 
same principles. 
2. It applies to the permanent staff of all the 
co-ordinated organisations. 
3. It is to be financed out of budgets, the cost 
of the pensions being borne entirely by the bud-
gets of the co-ordinated organisations, into which 
the contributions of serving staff will be paid. 
II. Benefits 
1. Entitlement to a retirement pension comes 
after ten years of effective service in one or more 
of the co-ordinated organisations. 
2. Pensionable age is 60. Those retiring earlier 
may however draw an early pension from the 
age of 50 onwards, the amount of the pension 
being reduced according to the age at which it 
starts to be paid. 
3. The amount of the retirement pension is 2 % 
of latest basic salary for each reckonable year of 
service, the maximum being 70% of such salary. 
4:. Anyone who has served for less than ten 
years will receive a severance grant comprising : 
- repayment of pension contributions 
deducted from salary, with compound 
interest at the rate of 4% per annum; 
and 
- a grant equal to one and a half months' 
final salary multiplied by the number of 
reckonable years of service. 
5. Those whom a Disablement Board recognises 
as su.ffering from permanent disablement pre-
venting them from performing their duties will 
receive a disablement pension equal to the retire-
ment pension which would have been paid at age 
65. If the disablement arises from work the 
disablement pension will be 70% of final salary. 
6. A survivor's pension is payable to widows 
(and former wives) on the death of a serving staff 
member, former staff member, and those entitled 
to a disablement pension. Survivors' pensions 
are in principle 60 % of the pension to which the 
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staff member would have been entitled at the 
time of death, but must be not less than 35 % 
of final salary. 
7. An exception to the principle of equality as 
between male and female staff : a survivor's 
pension cannot at present be paid to widowers 
except those with no possibility of obtaining 
gainful emplosment. 
8. Payment of pensions to orphans and depen-
dants. 
9. Retired staff and those receiving disablement 
pensions will also receive family and household 
allowances. 
10. Pensions are calculated according to the 
scale ruling in the country in which the staff 
member was last serving. If however he subse-
quently settles : 
- in the country of which he is a national ; 
- in the country of which his spouse is a 
national; 
- in a country in which he has served for 
at least five years in one of the organisa-
tions; 
he may opt for the scale applicable to that coun-
try. 
11. Pensions are indexed to the cost of living. 
The question of their adjustment to the standard 
of living is to be decided by Councils. 
12. The pension scheme will come into force on 
lst July 1974, with special arrangements for 
staff who have left the organisation since 1st 
January 1973. 
III. Transitional arrangements 
The purpose of the arrangements is to pro-
vide for the transition from the present provident 
fund scheme to the new pension scheme. 
A. Staff still serving or having left the organisation 
since 1st January 1913 
Staff in this group may opt for any one of 
the following three alternatives (and have one 
year in which to decide) : 
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1. To join the pension scheme with effect from 
lst July 1974 and to be credited irrevocably with 
periods served in one or more organisations. They 
must then forgo their provident fund holdings, 
but, 
(a) for the period prior to the setting up 
of the provident fund they may keep 
the difference between ( i) the amounts 
paid by the organisation plus their yield 
up to the day the service was credited, 
and (ii) those amounts plus compound 
interest at 4 % per annum up to 1st 
July 1974; 
(b) for the period subsequent to the setting 
up of the provident fund, they may 
keep that part of their holdings, if any, 
in excess of 21 % of salaries paid during 
that period plus compound interest at 
4% per annum up to 1st July 1974. 
2. To join the scheme only with effect from 1st 
July 1974 and not receive credit for service 
before that date. 
Those exercising this option will receive, in 
addition to a retirement pension calculated with 
effect from 1st July 1974 (or a severance allow-
ance if they have completed less than ten years' 
service starting from that date), their assets in 
the provident fund in respect of service prior to 
1st July 1974 plus compound interest at the rate 
earned by the fund from that date onwards. 
3. To remain in the provident fund scheme in 
respect of both past and future service. 
4. A staff member opting for a pension and 
continuing to serve beyond the age of 60 will 
receive an annual increase of 5 % of the rights 
accumulated at the age of 60, provided 
156 
APPENDIX VI 
(a) the pension does not exceed 70 % of 
final salary and 
(b) the increase does not exceed 2 % of 
salary per annum. 
B. Staff who retired before 1st January 1918 
1. Former staff who left the organisation after 
completing at least ten years' service, and their 
widows and orphans, the widows and orphans of 
staff who died while serving, and staff disabled 
before 1st January 1973 and their widows and 
orphans, may as a transitional measure be 
paid a pension on refunding by them of 
the amounts in the provident fund due to them 
at the time of their retirement, death or disable-
ment. The refund must also include any sums 
withdrawn from the fund but not repaid. It is 
limited to the amount of the contributions paid 
by the staff member concerned and by the organ-
isation plus compound interest at 4 % per 
annum. The repayment is reduced where appro-
priate to take account of the years already 
elapsed since ceasing employment. 
2. A relief allowance has been foreseen for 
those unable to make the refunds called for by 
the previous Article, if the organisation considers 
it justified in consideration of their total 
resources. 
3. The options available under the transitional 
arrangements must be exercised within one year. 
4. The increases mentioned in paragraph A.4 
above do not apply to staff in this category. 
* 
**' 
Arrangements still have to be worked out in 
detail, especially concerning the composition and 
responsibilities of a Pensions Advisory Commit-
tee which would see that the pension scheme was 
uniformly applied in all the co-ordinated organi-
sations. 
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Political activities of the Council 
Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the political activities of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
III. Political evolution of the Council 
IV. The Secretary-General 
V. Conclusions 
28th April 1975 
1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 4 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt 
(Chairman) ; Mr. Krieg (Substitute for Mr. Grangier), 
Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chahmen); MM. Abens, Amrehn, 
Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bettiol, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. 
Brugnon, Cermolacce, Fletcher (Substitute : Lewis), Mrs. 
Godinache-Lambert (Substitute: de Bruyne), MM. Leynen 
(Substitute: de Ste:che), Mende (Substitute: Vohrer), 
Minnocci, Nessler, de Niet, Peijnenburg, Peridier, Portheine, 
Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt, Steel (Substitute : Lord Beaumont 
of Whitley), Urwin, Van Hoeylandt, Reale. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Noting that the Council is holding far fewer meetings at ministerial level; 
Considering that the Permanent Council has therefore become the only body of WEU working at 
that level; 
Regretting that the member countries have not taken account of this new situation to delegate 
to the Permanent Council more of the duties which the Council of Ministers is not in a position to 
carry out; 
Noting that despite repeated promises the Council fails to keep the Assembly well informed of matters 
affecting the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, in particular by refusing to hold a joint meeting 
with the General Affairs Committee and also by replying evasively to recommendations and written questions 
from the Assembly ; 
Considering that in any event the Council is still responsible for supervising the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Thanking the Council for having set out frankly in its twentieth annual report the reasons for its 
inactivity ; 
Considering that the new situation gives added importance to the duties of the Secretary-General; 
Deploring, in these circumstances, that the governments have been unable to terminate the interim 
situation which has prevailed since September 1974, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Include regularly in its agenda consideration of the various problems raised by the application of 
the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
2. In the light of its deliberations, remind governments whenever necessary of the implications of this 
treaty; 
3. Draw up a list of problems connected with the application of the treaty over which the governments 
of the seven member countries are divided so that they may be considered at ministerial level or that atten-
tion be drawn to them in the North Atlantic Council or in the European Council; 
4. Provide the Assembly with meaningful information on all matters affecting the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, even if they are dealt with in the framework of other institutions ; 
5. Appoint to the Secretariat-General a personality carrying sufficient authority with the govern-
ments of the seven member countries and terminate the present interim situation without delay by 




(submitted by Mr. de Bruyne, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In considering the twentieth annual report 
of the Council, and hence the activities of WEU 
in 1974, greater care must be taken than in the 
past to determine what the Council has done in 
the framework provided by the governments of 
the seven member countries and the policy these 
same countries have pursued. When the Council 
was meeting four times a year at ministerial 
level, it played a political role on which it could 
report in its annual report, in replies to recom-
mendations and written questions and during 
joint meetings with the Committees of the 
Assembly. 
2. The Council no longer plays this role since 
in 1974, it met only once at ministerial level and 
. . ' It IS an open secret that this meeting in The 
Hague on 11th March 1974 was short and had 
little political content. This is due to the deli-
berate intent of the seven member governments 
and the blame cannot be laid at the door of the 
~ouncil in the form in which it actually meets, 
I.e. at the level of Ambassadors and under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary-General. 
3. First, therefore, consideration must be given 
to how far the Council is carrying out the role 
allotted to it by the governments and, secondly, 
to what extent this role meets the requirements 
of the modified Brussels Treaty. Finally, the 
Assembly will have to consider how far the 
Council allows it to carry out its role by inform-
ing it of all that affects the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories in 
the framework of bodies other than WEU and 
particularly, in nine-power political consulta~ 
tions. 
4. On several occasions since its reply to Recom-
mendation 221 on 6th November 1972, the Council 
has undertaken to provide the Assembly with 
detailed information in this respect. The twen-
tieth annual report of the Council implies that 
this has effectively been done in 1974. However 
its replies to the Assembly's recommendatio~ 
and written questions and its reluctance to agree 
to joint meetings would infer that it is taking 
a very restrictive view of its commitments, despite 
the absence of any new factor which might allow 
it to go back on its statement that WEU is "at 
159 
present the only European organisation with 
defence responsibilities" J.. 
5. It must therefore be ascertained whether the 
Committee considers that the Council can con-
tinue as a remnant of a political organisation 
rendered obsolescent by the evolution of political 
co-operation in Europe - condemned by the 
growing ~~actice of summit meetings, nine-
power political consultations and the statement 
repeated at the summit meeting in Paris in 
December 1974 of the Nine's intention to form 
~ .~~ropean u~ion with?ut delay with respons-
Ibilities extending to foreign policy. 
6. In previous discussions, some Committee 
me~bers stated that on the contrary they 
believed WEU was an appropriate nucleus for a 
defence organisation and that there should 
therefore be no question of the Council aban-
doning consideration of political questions which 
might affect the organisation of European 
defence. This seems to conform to statements 
made by the Council itself, inter alia in its reply 
to Recommendation 221. 
7. However this may be, the Council is still 
responsible for keeping watch over the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
Assembly for ensuring that the Council fulfils 
its role effectively. As long as the Brussels Treaty 
remains intact, it is the Assembly's duty to warn 
the Council against anything which might be a 
relinquishment of any of its prerogatives, unless 
they have been officially taken over by other 
bodies. 
8. But even so the Council must ensure that 
these bodies actually carry out the task assigned 
to the Council under the treaty. 
9. The Council sent the Assembly the report 
on its activities in 1974 in good time. One very 
valid point, at least, in Chapter I is that the 
reasons for its conduct are set out with unusual 
frankness and clarity. Any criticism from the 
Assembly will therefore bear on the Council's 
activities as portrayed in the report rather than 
on the report itself. 
1. Reply to Recommendation 221. 
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U. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
10. As in previous annual reports on the activ-
ities of the Council, the present report for 197 4 
accords great importance to maintaining good 
relations between the Council and the Assembly. 
11. However, one may wonder whether some of 
the Council's efforts in this direction really had 
the support of all seven governments or whether, 
on the contrary, some of them made it difficult 
to maintain a dialogue between the two sides of 
WEU. 
12. In order to determine the situation in this 
respect, your Rapporteur put the following writ-
ten question to the Council : 
"In view of paragraph 4 of the reply of the 
Council to Recommendation 255 and of the 
Council's present activities, what are the 
tasks of the Secretary-General of WEU? 
What role does he play in preparing replies 
to recommendations or questions of the 
Assembly 1 
How can he contribute to the preparation 
of these replies when they deal with subjects 
which, although within the purview of the 
modified Brussels Treaty, are dealt with by 
the seven member countries in the framework 
of organisations other than WEU?" 
13. The Council's reply was relatively detailed, 
since it indicated that : 
" ... The Secretary-General's contribution to 
the preparation of draft replies to recom-
mendations and written questions from the 
Assembly varies according to the nature of 
the problems dealt with. He is generally 
invited by the Council to study texts on 
administrative questions concerning the 
organisation and to submit draft replies. 
Replies on other subjects and, in particular, 
on those which are discussed by member 
governments in bodies other than WEU, are 
normally drafted by the delegations of 
member countries whose administrations 
have access to the necessary sources of 
material. 
Replies to recommendations or written ques-
tions are finally approved by the Council 
which, as already mentioned, meets under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary-General." 
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14. Since the Council considered very few poli-
tical matters in 1974, this is tantamount to saying 
that most of the replies to recommendations or 
written questions in this field must have been 
prepared by the delegations of member coun-
tries. This probably explains the considerable 
disparities between the various replies from the 
Council this year. It is evident that discussions 
in the working group or Council must result in 
anything which might not suit one or other 
government being deleted from the replies rather 
than an insufficient initial draft being completed. 
So if the draft is weak, there would appear to be 
little chance of the Council going into more 
details in order to reinforce and complete it. 
15. The situation described in the annual report 
no doubt makes such procedure inevitable, at 
any rate as long as the Secretary-General of 
WEU does not take part in intergovernmental 
discussions on important political matters, be 
they in the framework of the Nine or NATO. 
However, one may wonder how the Secretariat-
General views its role, particularly with regard 
to the chairmanship of the working party or the 
Permanent Council. Does it consider that it 
merely has to note the positions adopted by the 
governments, or, on the contrary, that it should 
spur on their discussions in order to reach the 
highest possible common denominator of agree-
ment? 
16. The Secretary-General shoU!ld not merely 
record draft replies prepared by national admin-
istrations. He should submit specific proposals to 
the Council in order to substantiate the replies 
to the Assembly. In short, he should defend the 
prerogatives of the Assembly in its relations with 
the governments. Your Rapporteur can but encou-
rage the Council to follow this course if it really 
wishes to maintain good relations with the 
Assembly, for it is quite evident that the 
Assembly sees its relations wirth the Council as 
something more than polite exchanges and is 
entitled to expect the Council to keep it properly 
informed. 
17. The action of each specific government, 
shown inter alia by the presence of a large 
number of Ministers or Secretaries of State at 
the Assembly's last two sessions and the often 
detailed, substantial and interesting statements 
they have made on those occasions, indicates that 
- apart from possible reservations some may 
make about a particular policy of one or the 
other - the attitude of most governments 
towards the treaty can still secure the approval 
of the General Affairs Committee. 
18. The twentieth anniversary of the signing of 
the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels 
Treaty afforded certain government representa-
tives an opportunity of giving their views on 
both the Brussels Treaty and the functioning of 
WEU. The very positive nature of the statement 
by Sir John Killick, representing the British 
Foreign Secretary, quoted in the annual report, 
is noteworthy, and particularly the following 
passage: 
" ... The revised Brussels Treaty remains as 
valid today as when it was signed twenty 
years ago. It brings our seven countries 
together in a fifty-year alliance in which we 
accept the most binding obligation any 
country can assume with regard to another : 
the commitment to mutual defence ... " 
19. Similarly, the Italian Permanent Represen-
tative, Ambassador Raimondo Manzini, adopted 
a very positive attitude towards the role of the 
Council: 
" ... In celebrating the twentieth anniversary 
of the union, we therefore express the hope 
that over the next thirty years it will con-
tinue to provide an important forum for the 
member countries, not only for consultations 
and political co-operation but also for 
achievements of a practical nature. 
To achieve this purpose, the member coun-
tries will clearly have to use WEU and its 
agencies in the most effective manner pos-
sible and to co-ordinate their activities 
rationally with those of other joint institu-
tions ... " 
20. However, compared with this action by 
specific governments, there is a total absence of 
collective action by the Council, even in relations 
with the Assembly to which the Council claims 
to attach great importance. In 1974, replies to 
Assembly recommendations, at least in questions 
concerning the General Affairs Committee, were 
more threadbare than ever. This has also often-
though admittedly not always-been the case for 
replies to written questions put by members of 
the Assembly. 
21. In this connection, the considerable differ-
ences in the standard of these replies should be 
noted. Thus, the reply to Written Question 148 
on the implications of the Cyprus affair for 
WEU (communicated to the Assembly on 28th 




factory. It analyses the problems! confronting the 
Seven as a whole as a result of a serious inter-
national crisis, and it is extremely positive that 
the seven governments should have managed to 
agree on a common position. But such a reply 
is exceptional and replies to Written Questions 
144, 145, 146, 147 and 149 can in no way be 
considered acceptable nor can they satisfy the 
members of the General Affairs Committee who 
put serious and specific questions to the Council. 
22. Finally, the General Affairs Committee, 
which had intentionally not requested a joint 
meeting with the Council whilst developments 
in Europe were leaving the member governments 
with particularly delicate problems to solve, felt 
during the summer of 1974 that such meetings 
might be resumed. It felt that the moratorium 
on econ01nic and political discussions in WEU 
due to the rejection of Britain's application to 
join the European Communities had been raised 
and, on the surface at least, the differences be-
tween the seven member countries were far less 
than theretofore. Yet in November 1974 the 
Council informed the General Affairs Cominittee 
that it was not in a position to hold a joint 
meeting with it on the basis of the questionnaire 
drawn up by the Committee. 
23. Following this refusal, Mr. Sieglerschinidt, 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, met 
Sir John Killick, British permanent represent-
ative on the WEU Council, during the December 
1974 session and at the request of the Council. 
He proposed radical changes to the questionnaire 
so that a joint meeting could be held at a rela-
tively early date. He also urged the Council to 
reply in writing to the Committee's request. The 
Assembly has now received this reply, which 
holds little hope of a real joint meeting being 
held between the Council and the Committee in 
the foreseeable future. The argument invoked 
was that there was not sufficient agreement be-
tween the WEU member countries on the four 
main topics which the Committee wished to 
discuss at a joint meeting with the Council, i.e. 
_ propects of European union, relations between 
Europe and the United States, evolution of East-
West relations and Mediterranean questions, all 
of which quite evidently come within the purview 
of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
The proposal to hold an "informal meeting" at 
an unspecified date can in no event be accepted 
in the stead of a joint meeting, since it would 
place no obligation on the seven member countries 
to seek even the lowest possible common denoini-
nator of agreement. 
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24. The fact that the General Affairs Committee 
finally accepted the Council's proposal to hold 
an informal meeting must be interpreted as a 
sign of its desire to maintain a dialogue with the 
Council at all cost. This does not mean that it 
has abandoned the principle, accepted by the 
Council for many years, of holding joint meetings 
at which the Council as such replies to questions 
put by the Committee before holding an informal 
discussion on them. 
25. The Assembly, to which all the Ministers 
readily paid tribute in recent statements, cannot 
exist on its own. Statutorily it holds a dialogue 
with the Council which means that the Council 
must be able to express itself as such and not 
only through the individual voices of its members. 
It is hardly conceivable that the Assembly should 
continue to adopt recommendations which lead 
to no political action other than a Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs drafting a reply which is as 
vague as possible, and rendered still more vague 
by the intervention of officials from the other 
six Ministries. 
26. There is no question of calling upon the 
Council to increase the number of ministerial 
meetings which it considers pointless ; it should 
rather, in its present form, make the effort to 
specify, in the ·light of intergovernmental discus-
sions which may be held in fora other than WEU, 
how far the seven governments are able to express 
a common political view on matters raised by 
the Assembly. 
27. Your Rapporteur has no reason to think 
that the differences between the various WEU 
member countries on these matters were greater 
in 1974 than in other years since the creation of 
WEU. Quite the contrary; on several matters, 
particularly East-West relations and European 
union, the seven member countries have reached 
agreement on joint action in frameworks other 
than WEU. 
28. If, therefore, the Council uses wch an argu-
ment to turn down the Committee's request for 
a joint meeting, it is because it is reluctant to 
inform European parliamentarians of current 
differences between its members. This is a dis-
turbing consideration at a time when the shape 
of a European political union is beginning to 
emerge. 
29. Thus, however cordial relations may be 
between each member government and the 
Assembly, one might wonder whether relations 
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between the Council as such and the Assembly 
are not seriously threatened by the political atti-
tude adopted by these same governments towards 
European union. 
m. Political evolution of the Council 
30. This evolution is marked by four restrictions 
which the Council has imposed on its tasks as 
a whole. 
31. (i) Its relations with the Assembly are deli-
berately restricted as discussed above. 
32. (ii) It has placed a deliberate restriction on 
its own activities. The Assembly has always 
accepted the principle of such a restriction in 
that a large part of the Council's former political 
activities has been transferred to other fora, 
with particular regard to nine-power political 
consultations. It is indeed logical that whatever 
can be done in a wider framework than WEU 
should not be confined to a relatively limited 
framework. Nevertheless, such a restriction is 
acceptable only if the full application of the 
Brussels Treaty is really envisaged in the frame-
work of the Nine. A priori, this seems hardly 
feasible insofar as two of the Nine did not wish 
to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. This 
was of course because they did not wish to accept 
all the commitments. Hence there is every indica-
tion that the political aspects of questions affect-
ing European defence cannot be dealt with fully 
in the nine-power framework. 
33. Moreover, the Council's report does not 
conceal the fact that this is so, since it states : 
"In the case of defence policy which both 
the Assembly and the Council look upon as 
WEU's essential concern, it was even more 
apparent that the Council could not reply 
to the Assembly in the desired manner 
because co-operation in Eill'opean defence 
policy had not yet reached a stage at which 
governments could state a joint view to the 
Assembly." 
34. In these circumstances, could the Council of 
Ministers not be asked to instruct the Permanent 
Council to consider precisely how the political 
aspects of the modified Brussels Treaty are being 
applied? Your Rapporteur feels this to be the 
only way of reconciling the two elements of the 
situation : the maintenance of WEU and its 
Assembly and the development of nine-power 
political consultations. This would mean the 
Permanent Council taking the initiative of decid-
ing which foreign policy or defence matters con-
cern it and examining the implications for the 
modified Brussels Treaty in each case without 
any special steps being taken by governments. 
The Secretary-~neral would then have to take 
the initiative of regularly including on the 
agenda of the Permanent Council consideration 
of a specific aspect of the implementation of the 
Brussels Treaty. 
35. Such a decision would make the Permanent 
Council WEU's advocate in relations with the 
governments whereas everything indicates that 
it merely speaks for the lack of political will on 
the part of governments. 
36. The Council should in fact promote the 
application of the treaty as a collegiate body and 
not just as a group of persons who defend their 
own governments' policies. .As such, it could be 
a real intermediary between the .Assembly and 
the seven governments. The example of the per-
manent representatives to NATO shows that this 
is not impossible. 
37. (iii) A deliberate restriction on its own res-
ponsibilities is evident from some of its texts, 
particularly its reply to Recommendation 254 in 
which it is stated that "the Indian Ocean is out-
side the area ... of Western European Union". 
38. In reply to a question by Mr. Leynen on 
this subject at the December 1974 session, Lord 
Goronwy-Roberts, British Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-
Office of the Council, had to admit that, while 
Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty con-
cerned only Europe itself, the application of 
Article VIII was subject to no territorial limit. 
Yet Recommendation 254 quite obviously referred 
to the application of Article VIII and not 
Article V. 
39. Your Rapporteur therefore put the following 
written question to the Council : 
"In its reply to Recommendation 254, the 
Council stated that the Indian Ocean was 
outside the area of WEU. In his reply to 
an oral question put by Mr. Leynen in the 
Assembly on 5th December 197 4, Lord 
Goronwy-Roberts admitted that the notion 
of the area of WEU concerned the applica-
tion of Article V and not Article VIII of 
the modified Brussels Treaty, even if other 
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organisations, including NATO, could be 
called upon to study matters within the field 
of application of the latter article. 
Can the Council indicate in what framework 
the seven member countries gave joint con-
sideration to possible threats to peace in the 
Indian' Ocean in 1973 and 1974?" 
40. The Council's reply admits that the treaty 
does not limit the area of responsibilities of either 
the Council or, a fortiori, the Assembly: 
"The member of the .Assembly is right in 
pointing out that under the provisions of 
Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty 
no restrictions are placed upon the Council's 
competence to discuss any situation which 
may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever 
area this threat should arise. However, in 
answer to his question, the Council inform 
the member of the .Assembly that they did 
not discuss possible threats to peace in the 
Indian Ocean in 1973 or 197 4. This question 
was occasionally discussed among member 
governments in other contexts." 
41. However, such a reply cannot be considered 
satisfactory since, although satisfying the 
Assembly as regards the principles, the Council 
gives no reply to the specific question put. It 
also runs counter to the principle of the Council 
reporting to the .Assembly on matters discussed 
in other frameworks if they concern the applica-
tion of the modified Brussels Treaty. 
42. Like the refusal to hold a joint meeting and 
like most replies to recommendations, it portrays 
lack of will on the part of the governments, as if 
they were resigned not to take seriously either 
the application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
or the work of the Assembly which Ministers 
often seem to inundate with praise in order to 
keep it quiet. 
43. Finally, the exact meaning of the word 
"occasionally" should be clarified. Does it not 
mean in reality that attentive consideration of 
this matter has not been on the agenda of any 
mea;nin.gful intergovernmental discussions ? 
44. In the same reply to Recommendation 254, 
the Council also stated that it was : 
"not in a position to express an opinion on 
a point concerning France's relations with 
the military command structure of the 
At1antic Alliance ". 
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45. But is it not precisely the role of WEU to 
deal with relations between its members and the 
Atlantic Alliance 1 Although the exercise of some 
of its responsibilities has been transferred to the 
North Atlantic Council, the Council has never 
legally relinquished them and an essential task 
is thus to watch over relations between each of 
its members and the Alliance. The Assembly 
should not agree to the de facto relinquishment 
by the Council of rights and duties assigned to 
it by the modified Brussels Treaty and the 
appended Protocols. 
46. (iv) Finally, the Council appears to go too 
far in taking a deliberately restricted view of 
its political role. This emerges from its reasons 
for refusing a joint meeting with the General 
Affairs Committee since it thus admitted to 
making no attempt to find elements of agreement 
between the Seven, even on matters where there 
were still considerable differences between its 
members. 
47. Conversely, one of the Council's tasks might 
be to draw up a list of problems on which its 
members hold differing views and at least try 
to set them out in a concerted manner. 
IV. The Secretary-General 
48. At its meeting on 17th March 1975, the 
General Affairs Committee devoted a large part 
of its discussion on this report to consideration 
of problems raised by the prolonged interim 
period without a Secretary-General. The last 
Secretary-General, Georges Heisbourg, left to 
take up a new post in the Luxembourg diplomatic 
service in September 1974. There had been several 
months' warning of his departure. However, the 
seven member countries have still not managed 
to appoint a new Secretary-General. The Deputy 
Secretary-General, Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, is thus 
acting as Secretary-General, and the present 
annual report bears witness to his ability. 
49. It is common knowledge - the press has 
referred to the matter on several occasions -that 
two member governments have nominated candi-
dates and that the unanimity rule which governs 
Council decisions will prevent one of them being 
appointed until the other country agrees. Your 
Rapporteur does not wish to go into the question 
of persons or nationality. 
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50. The General Affairs Committee first under-
lined the abnormality of prolonging this interim 
situation and made it clear that parliamentarians 
could not remain aloof from a matter which was 
particularly important since at the present junc-
ture the Secretary-General effectively carries out 
the duties of Chairman of the Council which now 
meets practically never at ministerial level. It 
seems difficult to ask the Permanent Council to 
extend the scope of its activities if the Chairman 
has not been appointed to the post. This situation 
is evidently detrimental to the authority of WEU 
and shows a disregard for the European institu-
tions on the part of the seven governments which 
the Committee wishes to underline. 
51. Secondly, the Committee wishes to recall that 
it has asked several times that a prominent per-
sonality be appointed Secretary-General. Present 
circumstances appear to make such an appoint-
ment more necessary than ever. The General 
Affairs Committee strongly reiterates this sug-
gestion since the governments have not yet 
appointed a full Secretary-General. 
52. The maintenance of an interim situation for 
almost a year casts serious doubts on the govern-
ments' determination to pursue the task entrusted 
to the Council in the modified Brussels Treaty. 
The Assembly cannot remain indifferent to such 
a state of affairs which, at a time when it is 
celebrating its twentieth anniversary, may well 
become symbolic. 
V. Conclusions 
53. Your Rapporteur therefore considers the 
Council must be congratulated for the unusual 
frankness with which, in its twentieth annual 
report, it records its total inactivity in political 
matters. This is largely due to developments in 
Europe and cannot be remedied in the framework 
of WEU alone. However, your Rapporteur feels 
the Council in its present form, i.e. barely exist-
ing except at the level of the Permanent Council, 
might and should take certain steps which, as 
matters now stand, would inject some new life 
into WEU and allow the .Assembly to pursue its 
work. To do this, the seven governments would 
have to show willing, and the kind words of the 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs must take the form 
of instructions to the Council. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Political activities of the Council 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. de Niet 
28th Hay 1975 
1. In the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the word "Noting" insert 
the words "and regretting". 
2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft Recommendation. 
3. In paragraph 5 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "with full powers". 
Signed : de N iel 
1. See 6th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment negatived). 
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Considering that detente should be accompanied by a balanced reduction in the level of forces 
and armaments in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance only in the framework of reciprocal agreements 
with the Warsaw Pact countries; 
Concerned that present economic difficulties in Western Europe may tempt the Soviet Union to 
take advantage of them with a view to extending its influence ; 
Considering that the fight against inflation may incite the democratic countries to reduce their 
defence budgets to an extent which might endanger their security ; 
Welcoming the development of bilateral relations between EEC and Warsaw Pact countries; 
Recalling nevertheless that those trends require close and continuing consultations between the 
western countries if their joint security is not to be jeopardised ; 
Noting the Soviet Union's desire for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to be 
concluded without delay ; 
Considering that to achieve this end many divergencies still have to be overcome, particularly with 
regard to the movement of persons and ideas ; 
Noting that the German Democratic Republic, followed to a great extent by the Soviet Union, still 
adheres to a most restrictive interpretation of the basic agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the quadripartite agreement on Berlin, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
l. Ensure that the development of bilateral relations between individual members and members of 
the Warsaw Pact is not allowed to undermine the positions adopted jointly by the western countries towards 
the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, trade and the attendant financial arrangements ; 
2. Ensure that the wish to bring the conference on security and co-operation in Europe to a speedy 
conclusion does not lead to the principal positions adopted jointly by the Nine at this conference being 
weakened or abandoned ; 
3. Propose that the North Atlantic Council review in a liberal manner the agreements concluded for 
limiting credits granted by its members to member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the framework of trade 
agreements ; 
4. Ensure that in their relations with the German Democratic Republic its members take account of 
the special situation resulting from the existence of two States in Germany and the responsibility of the 
four powers towards Germany as a whole ; 
5. Continue to consider the full application and strict maintenance of the quadripartite agreement 




(submitted by Mr. Sieglersehmidt, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. As with relations between individuals, inter-
national relations, whether bilateral or multi-
lateral, are by nature more dynamic than static. 
Only by taking account of this fundamental 
lesson of history can a valid definition be made 
of the three concepts which for several years have 
been playing a decisive role in Eas~ West rela-
tions, i.e. detente, peaceful coexistence and the 
status quo. 
2. Detente was and still is the goal of a policy 
which, since about 1960, has been seeking to bring 
East-West relations out of the confrontation of 
the cold war and steer them into the calmer 
waters of limited co-operation, and in the mean-
time it has indeed managed to do so. There are 
two elements in the policy of detente : content 
and method, the two being connected. The joint 
effort to discuss the interests of both sides 
through traditional diplomatic channels or meet-
ings between responsible statesmen could be 
pursued only because there was some agreement 
on the content. However, this partial concordance 
of interests called for forms of contact other than 
those practised during the cold war. 
3. The policy of detente as just described could 
not and still cannot succeed unless it is quite 
clear what the concepts of peaceful coexistence 
and recognition of the status quo mean in Soviet 
terminology. Here, peaceful coexistence certainly 
does not mean ideological coexistence. In this 
respect, there is full agreement between all 
responsible political forces in both East and West. 
Nor, according to the Soviet concept, does peace-
ful coexistence mean abandoning attempts to 
transform, by means other than war, the balance 
of strength in the world, particularly in Europe, 
to the advantage of the bloc dominated by the 
Soviet Union. Admittedly there are signs that 
the Soviet Union's present policy - first bearing 
in mind the conflict with China - is primarily 
concerned with maintaining the present balance 
of strength. But there is nothing to indicate that 
the Soviet Union is ready to make &ny fundamen-
tal change in the interpretation of peaceful co-
existence which has prevailed so far. 
4. However, this also means that insistence on 
recognition of the status quo must not be taken as 
a wish to maintain the present situation for an 
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indefinite period. Moreover, this is also true of 
the western definition of this concept. In view 
of the conflicting interests which still exist bet-
ween East and West, it would be running against 
the current of history and unrealistic to think 
that the present situation might be kept 
unchanged for an indefinite period. This is not 
only true of the division of Germany ; it would 
also contradict the policy of detente as understood 
by the West, because the pursuit of detente 
means that differences between East and 
West must be reduced. Thus, the status quo was 
not "recognised" in the Moscow treaty between 
the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union. On 
the contrary, Article 1 stated that the High 
Contracting Parties "affirm their endeavour to 
further the normalisation of the situation in 
Europe and the development of peaceful rela-
tions among all European States, and in so doing 
proceed from the actual situation existing in this 
region". The status quo is thus defined as a 
starting point and. not as the aim of the policy 
of detente. One may of course have the impres-
sion that the Soviet Union considers the status 
quo, at least in the foreseeable future, as an aim 
and not a starting-point. But this does not alter 
the substance of the text quoted. 
5. In this sense, the policy of detente of the 
western countries is to establish normal relations 
between States and also between peoples, i.e. the 
simultaneous opening of frontiers for the free 
movement of goods, persons and ideas. 
6. It is to be hoped that free exchanges, not a 
Soviet aim, can to a certain extent become a lesser 
evil for them, this being a condition for detente 
based on compromise. 
7. As long as the Eastern European countries 
consider such opening to be dangerous for their 
survival or in any event for the survival of their 
economic regime, the policy of detente will remain 
a rather empty formula, as it is today, and 
prospects of disarmament will remain limited. 
There are still many and often insuperable differ-
ences over essential matters. Nevertheless, the 
United States and the Soviet Union have managed 
to reach effective agreement on a number of 
aspects of their foreign policy. 
8. In recent years, co-operation in bilateral 
economic relations between the West and Eastern 
European countries or the Soviet Union has pro-
-------- -------
gressed considerably. Differences are narrowing 
between CMEA 1 and the EEC and although no 
concrete results have yet been achieved the very 
fact that these two organisations seem determined 
to continue considering a number of problems 
together is a hopeful sign that real co-operation 
between the two European economic organisa-
tions might be achieved in the next few years. 
9. However, detente is already an undeniable 
fact : international tension has fallen consider-
ably since 1954." Even the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968 did not raise tension in Europe 
to the same degree as the Hungarian revolution. 
This is perhaps due to the fact that all the west-
ern countries have at least tacitly accepted the 
permanent nature of the extension of Soviet 
influence within the limits defined however 
vaguely and in not very clear conditions at the 
Yalta conference. Although the West was 
unanimous in expressing disapproval of the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was equally 
unanimous in wishing to avoid any measure liable 
to cause a major conflict on that occasion. The 
West's lack of firmness in this connection is to be 
deplored, but one may also wonder whether 
better results would have been achieved had they 
been firmer. Finally, it must be noted that the 
western powers' conduct was not very different 
from that of the Soviets at the time of the earlier 
Cuban crisis when they were forced to respect 
the reciprocal restrictions agreed to by common 
agreement at Yalta. 
10. This reduced tension has allowed very real 
progress to be made in a number of agreements : 
11. ( i) In the SALT I agreements, some balance 
of nuclear forces between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was achieved. 
12. (ii) In numerous bilateral agreements, the 
first being concluded between France and the 
Soviet Union at the time of General de Gaulle, 
but which now extend to almost all the Eastern 
and Western European countries, co-operation 
has increased considerably, mainly in economic 
matters. These agreements are of a permanent 
nature thanks to the creation of bilateral com-
mittees to supervise their application. 
13. (iii) Trade between the two parts of Europe 
has increased. The energy crisis and the rise in 
prices of oil, coal, raw materials and agricultural 
produce helped to re-establish a balance of trade 
1. Council for Mutual Economic Aid set up after the 
reform of COMECON. 
6° - I 
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which was weighted against the Eastern Euro-
pean countries as importers of manufactured 
products and the way is now open for further 
progress in this field. Until now, in fact, insuf-
ficient purchases by the western countries had 
limited the application of the trade agreements 
with the eastern countries. 
14. (iv) Finally, in a wide range of bilateral and 
multilateral international talks in the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe and in 
other relevant fora, many technical problems are 
discussed and often solved. 
15. However, reduced tension is not always 
advantageous for the Western European coun-
tries and there is a danger of their efforts to 
ensure their collective security being relaxed. It 
is indeed difficult in a democratic society to 
convince public opinion that important sacrifices 
must still be made to ensure its defence when 
the threat seems more remote and vague than 
it used to be. 
16. Conversely, with State control of information 
media the Eastern European nations seem less 
affected by such thinking and find it easier to 
continue a large-scale defence effort despite the 
process of detente. 
17. In fact, in the military field, the positive 
results of detente are confined to a slowing down 
in the strategic arms race. Where ideological 
confrontation is concerned, no positive results 
have been achieved and the fact that the confer-
ence on security and co-operation in Europe has 
been marking time for more than a year bears 
witness to the obstacles to the preparation of an 
agreement. 
18. It must also be noted that Soviet foreign 
policy is no longer very clear. First, observers 
thought in recent months that there were signs 
heralding a change in the leadership of the Soviet 
communist party. It is a moot point whether this 
possible shift is due solely to the age and state 
of health of the present leaders or whether it 
also stems from differences within the communist 
party over the country's economic development 
or foreign policy. Past experience has shown us 
that it is often a mixture of such considerations 
that is behind changes on the Soviet political 
scene. 
19. One might wonder what is the Soviet view 
of the serious economic recession now facing the 
West. Is it thought to be a limited, temporary 
crisis or on the contrary a serious and possibly 
protracted one which may considerably weaken 
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the western position ? Is serious unrest expected 
in the western countries ? All this is very difficult 
to know. However, Europe must fully realise that 
the more it is affected by economic difficulties 
the more Soviet leaders will be tempted to 
strengthen their own positions and take advan-
tage of any breach they may discover in the 
western economic and political system. This 
means that it would be extremely dangerous for 
the western countries to make budgetary savings 
at the expense of their defence policy in order to 
solve domestic problems. 
20. It is in any event too soon to say whether 
there are signs of a shift in Soviet foreign policy 
or even in the general policy of the international 
communist movement because of the changing 
situation. The West's attention has nevertheless 
been aroused by the annulment of the trade 
agreement between the United States and the 
Soviet Union as a result of the United States 
Congress's insistence that the Soviet Union must 
adopt a more liberal attitude towards Jews wish-
ing to emigrate. It is moreover evident that the 
oil crisis has served the Soviet Union which, 
in December 1974, became the world's leading oil 
producer and has derived important benefits 
from the policy of high prices pursued by the 
OPEC countries, since the oil it sells to the 
West is paid for at world rates and in 1974 it 
doubled the price of the oil for the people's 
democracies from some $3 to $6 per barrel. With 
the exception of Romania, the European people's 
democracies are all major oil importers and their 
economies are now even more dependent on the 
Soviet Union because of the oil crisis. 
21. Finally, developments in Portugal and the 
way in which the Portuguese communist party 
seems to be taking advantage of the situation 
resulting from the fall of the dictatorial govern-
ment which had held power in Portugal for more 
than fifty years make one follow most closely 
the evolution of the situation in Portugal. 
22. The holding of elections is a first step 
towards democracy and demonstrates that a large 
majority of the Portuguese people wishes a demo-
cratic regime. However, Ferdinand Lassalle's 
remark that constitutional matters are a question 
of the balance of force also applies here. Because 
of the so-called pact and the armed forces move-
ment, constituant power is still mainly in the 
hands of the AF:M:. It will be seen in the next few 
months how far this movement is prepared to 
respect the results of the 25th April elections in 
political practice. This will largely depend on 
the attitude of the European Communities and 
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whether they will be able to afford Portugal 
early and effective assistance to meet its serious 
economic difficulties. This country, whose 
geographical position makes it particularly 
vulnerable strategically, must also remain a 
reliable partner in the Western Alliance. Above 
all, the WEU member countries must see that 
the military balance in Europe is not jeopardised 
by outside interference in Portuguese internal 
affairs. It must be realised that anything of this 
nature would deeply disturb East-West detente. 
23. In short, East-West 'relations must now be 
considered in the light of an extremely fluid 
situation which makes long-term forecasts very 
difficult. Such a situation is hardly favourable 
for the conclusion of political or military agree-
ments likely to secure a lasting solution for 
European problems. This prospect must not be 
overlooked in considering developments in the 
ongoing multilateral negotiations. 
D. The ongoing negotiations 
24. A feature of the first stage of detente was 
the development of bilateral relations between 
eastern and western countries. In the military 
field, the Soviet Union and the United States set 
the example after President Kennedy had shown, 
during the Cuban crisis, that the United States 
would not tolerate Soviet action which might 
upset the balance of strategic forces. At the 
economic level, General de Gaulle took steps 
which allowed considerable progress to be made. 
Multilateral relations have since made good 
headway due inter alia to the affirmation of 
the EEC's role in economic matters and the 
development of political consultations between 
the Nine and in NATO. These relations are 
reassuring all round since progress cannot be 
made without general agreement and they do not 
·call in question the system of alliances on which 
the security of both sides and peace in Europe 
are based. Negotiations are conducted in a frame-
work which is not purely European. The Western 
European countries did not wish to face a group 
of powers which included the Soviet Union 
without being accompanied by the United States 
and Canada, as the North Atlantic Council 
stipulated in Reykjavik in June 1968. This means 
that multilateral relations cannot be developed 
without the agreement of the United States and 
the Soviet Union on the aims of the negotiations. 
25. It cannot however be claimed that this situa-
tion has reduced the margin of independence of 
the Western or Eastern European countries 
within their respective alliances. Quite the 
contrary, there is every indication that this 
margin is now much wider as can be seen from 
initiatives taken by some of the people's demo-
cracies in the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe and also in the affirmation 
of the role of the European Community in both 
trade and political negotiations, thanks to the 
nine-power political consultations. 
26. It is clear that the economic difficulties now 
facing the European countries stimulate the 
development of economic co-operation and 
emphasise interdependence which, in the long 
run, is an important factor of detente. 
27. In the last few years, the international 
balance has been changed considerably by the 
growth of Chinese strength, the emergence of a 
nuclear capability in India, increasing Middle 
Eastern independence of the great powers and 
the new means wielded by the OPEC countries 
due to the rise in oil prices. All these factors 
have led the Soviet Union and the United States 
to seek agreement which is very necessary if 
they do not wish to become involved in hostilities 
which might degenerate into a nuclear exchange. 
The United States took advantage of its improved 
relations with the Soviet Union and China to 
terminate its military engagement in Vietnam, 
which was essential for the reorientation of 
American foreign policy and the pursuit of 
detente. 
28. In addition, the oil crisis has allowed 
Atlantic solidarity to be tightened and co-opera-
tion between the non-communist industrialised 
countries in financial and energy matters to be 
extended to Japan. It may now be said therefore 
that detente can be developed without endanger-
ing the balance on which international peace is 
based and it might even strengthen it. 
A. Soviet-American rapprochement 
29. Since achieving a degree of nuclear parity, 
the United States and Soviet Union have been 
seeking agreement on limiting the dangers of 
nuclear war. Here they have made meaningful 
progress since, after the 1963 Moscow treaty 
banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere and the 
non-profileration treaty signed in 1968, the treaty 
of 26th May 1972, prepared by the SALT I 
negotiations, established their first agreement on 
limiting strategic arms. The agreement of 22nd 
June 1973 provided an institutional framework 
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for continuing consultations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States in political matters. 
Finally, on 23rd and 24th November 1974, Pres-
ident Ford and Mr. Brezhnev, accompanied by 
their Foreign Ministers, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. 
Gromyko, held talks near Vladivostok on the 
conditions in which this rapprochement might be 
pursued. The Vladivostok talks did not produce 
radical changes but confirmed that the periodical 
consultations between the two great powers were 
working outside periods of crisis when the red 
teleprinter would facilitate the solution of prob-
lems and above all avert the possibility of 
recourse to force. 
30. Thus, this is a continuous process of consulta-
tion, not intended to make either side give up the 
guidelines of its foreign policy but to find com-
promise solutions to matters on which there might 
be conflicting views at any given time. There is 
no reason to think that the Soviet Union and the 
United States are at present considering conclud-
ing a real disarmament agreement or bringing 
their economic systems and ideological positions 
closer together. They are merely preparing a set 
of rules to govern the inevitable rivalry between 
the two States and their economic systems, ensur-
ing that it is peaceful, while increasing con-
fidence in each other. 
31. In this context, measures concerning nuclear 
weapons play an essential part in relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
as the subject of their negotiations and the risk 
of proliferation of nuclear arms in the world can 
but strengthen their desire to achieve results. 
Although modest, the results of the SALT I 
negotiations have demonstrated to public opinion 
in each country and throughout the world the 
concrete results of a concerted policy regarding 
the control of nuclear arms. The treaty of 26th 
March 1972 allowed the United States, thanks to 
the superiority of its MIRV system, to agree to 
the number of vehicles deployed on each side to 
be frozen in conditions particularly advantageous 
to the Soviet Union. In 1974, the Soviet Union, 
in view of its technical progress with multiple 
warhead vehicles, agreed to start the SALT II 
negotiations in order to restore a qualitative and 
quantitative balance of nuclear weapons. 
32. It is not for the General Affairs Committee's 
Rapporteur to go into the details o.f these nuclear 
negotiations, but what he considers essential in 
the Vladivostok talks is the public demonstration 
that the replacement of President Nixon by Pres-
ident Ford did nothing to change the procedure 
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for permanent consultations set up in 1973 or 
attempts to limit conventional and nuclear forces. 
33. This is the more important in so far as one 
may wonder whether the growing possibility of a 
proliferation of nuclear weapons will not induce 
the two great powers to make sacrifices which 
they had so far always refused, i.e. to pass from 
the limitation of strategic weapons to real dis-
armament in order to avoid further proliferation. 
34. Finally, the fact that the United States and 
the Soviet Union were able to discuss the evolu-
tion of the situation in Vietnam and the Middle 
East certainly helped to clear the way for 
American diplomacy to seek a political solution 
to the differences which have been bringing 
Israel into conflict with the Arab countries since 
1949. Mr. Kissinger, the United States Secretary 
of State, has devoted considerable efforts to 
these matters since the October 1973 war and 
despite possible setbacks it is to be hoped that 
the re-establishment of friendly relations between 
the United States and Egypt will be sufficiently 
important to allow concrete results to be achieved 
in the end, either through Mr. Kissinger's 
bilateral talks or through multilateral negotia-
tions in the framework of another Geneva confer-
ence on the Middle East. This is possible only 
because of Soviet reserve in this field, due most 
certainly to renewed confidence between the two 
great powers. 
35. Although some Europeans have on occasion 
been rather fearful lest the two great powers 
agree to settle world affairs over their heads, 
one may wonder what contribution Europe could 
make to a solution if no such agreement existed. 
B. Political conditions for reducing conventional 
forces 
36. Negotiations on mutual force reductions in 
Europe were proposed by the West at the 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Reykjavik in June 1968 because it did not 
wish a conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe, then being proposed by the East, to start 
until there had been some attempt to find a 
solution to the problem of force levels on the 
central European front. The aim was to avoid 
the risk of a political settlement which might 
mask an increased military threat. 
37. The invasion of Czechoslovakia having 
delayed the opening of preliminary negotiations, 
the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in 
Vienna did not start until January 1973. With 
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the exception of France, all the Warsaw and 
Atlantic Pact countries are taking part either as 
observers or as participants. 
38. On 28th June 1973, the conference described 
its aim as being to achieve a more stable balance 
of forces in Central Europe, with lower levels 
of forces, without reducing security. It had been 
accepted that the area considered would com-
prise the territories of Belgium, Czecho-
slovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Poland. There was a reserva-
tion in respect of Hungary, which the West 
wished and the East refused to include. 
39. These negotiations are being held in camera 
and in any event it is not for the General Mfairs 
Committee to examine any news which may filter 
through in this connection. The indications are, 
however, that the negotiations are marking time 
and that the offer made by the Soviet Union and 
its allies at the end of 1974 for freezing forces 
in Central Europe in their present positions 
cannot be accepted by the western countries 
because it would put the seal on a situation which 
is unfavourable to them. 
40. Progress will probably be extremely slow 
and the prospect of simultaneously disbanding 
the two alliances, which initially some had set 
as a goal, is likely to be abandoned. It is highly 
improbable that the Soviet Union will agree to 
break up an alliance on which its domination 
of Central Europe is based and, should it do so, 
it would probably be because it had other means 
of exercising its influence. Conversely, if NATO 
were to be dissolved, the western countries would 
lose their only instrument for global political and 
military consultation and their only guarantee 
of security. 
41. The only realistic prospect is a cut in force 
levels, starting with a cut in the level of Soviet 
and American forces stationed on the territory 
of their allies, with a view to eliminating or at 
least reducing the imbalance between the forces 
on each side. 
C. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe 
42. The conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe probably offered the best prospects 
of far-reaching changes in relations between 
Eastern and Western Europe. 
43. This conference was an aim of the Soviet 
Union and, perhaps even more, of its allies. How-
ever, it could not start until, first, the Soviet 
Union and its allies had agreed to the United 
States and Canada taking part and, second, the 
Federal Republic had settled differences with 
the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia going back to just 
after the second world war. Finally, the western 
powers insisted that the status of Berlin be the 
subject of a four-power agreement and this was 
done on 3rd September 1971. 
44. The preparatory stage of the conference 
started in Helsinki on 22nd September 1972 for 
working out procedure. It was concluded on lOth 
June 1973 with final recommendations that the 
conference be held in three stages : 
( i) a meeting of Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs (which was held in Helsinki 
from 3rd to 7th July 1973) ; 
(ii) committee work (which has been going 
on in Geneva since the end of 1973) ; 
(iii) a high-level meeting in Helsinki to 
record the results achieved and decide 
on further action to be taken by the 
conference. 
45. There were three items on the agenda of the 
conference : 
(i) statement of the main principles of 
policy and security which all partici-
pants undertake to observe ; 
(ii) development of economic relations and 
co-operation in all fields ; 
(iii) a more liberal approach to the free 
exchange of ideas and persons. 
46. The military aspects of the first item concern 
the Defence Committee. It also includes recogni-
tion of existing States and frontiers. 'l'he western 
powers were prepared to accept this and under· 
take not to resort to force to obtain changes in 
the political map of Europe. However, the Soviet 
Union and its allies also asked for recognition of 
the political regimes, which was tantamount to 
making the Brezhnev doctrine, announced 
immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
a principle of European law. 
47. At the Geneva talks, the Soviet Union and 
its allies finally gave in to the West's insistence 
that the possibility of changing frontiers by 
means of agreements be specifically mentioned in 
the declaration of principles of the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe. 
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48. The western countries would also have had 
to give up two aims to which they had so far 
been attached: the reunification of Germany, to 
which all the Federal Republic's allies were com-
mitted, and the reunification of Europe. Since 
there is still disagreement about the application 
of military measures too, the Geneva negotiations 
on the first item on the agenda of the conference 
are still far :from a conclusion. 
49. On the other hand, the development of 
economic relations raised no problems of principle 
:for the West, which was prepared to improve 
all forms of co-operation with the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, whether bilateral or multilateral. 
No decision has yet been taken on the question 
of introducing a most-favoured-nation clause to 
meet the wishes of the eastern countries, but the 
EEC countries are prepared to invite members 
of the CMEA to hold talks on preferential tariffs 
on a reciprocal basis once the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe is over. This 
also seems to be the wish of the eastern countries, 
which are anxious to obtain the equipment items 
necessary for their industrialisation programmes. 
50. In view of the development and importance 
of the European Economic Community, however, 
the Soviet Union and its allies, which were 
fundamentally and unswervingly hostile to any 
economic organisation of Western Europe, had to 
take account of this new fact. This it now seems 
to have done, and the second CSCE basket is 
presenting the fewest difficulties. 
51. The greatest difficulties were raised by the 
question of the free movement of ideas and 
persons. The Soviet Union and its allies clearly 
consider that watertight frontiers are essential 
:for the maintenance of their regimes and they are 
hardly prepared to make concessions in this 
respect. Progress has therefore been very limited. 
The western countries, however, believe that 
substantial improvements in the exchange of 
persons and ideas is a primary aim of the CSCE. 
Germany particularly cannot accept the political 
division of the country unless the effects are 
alleviated at cultural and human level. 
52. From the outset, the western countries have 
maintained that the conference could not be 
successful unless worthwhile results were obtained 
in respect of each of the three baskets. At the 
stage now reached in the Geneva negotiations, this 
seems likely for the first two baskets, but, un-
fortunately, nothing can be said about the free 
movement of ideas and persons. In this respect, 
it would not be realistic at this first conference 
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to expect concessions from the communist coun-
tries which might jeopardise the maintenance of 
their constitutional and social systems. But within 
these limits there is an area in which negotiations 
are possible and the West must make the most 
of this. 
53. But the main point perhaps lies outside the 
agenda : it is the question of follow-up action. 
Here there is no common front, either in the 
East or elsewhere. At the Helsinki consultations, 
a compromise was reached linking progress 
achieved during the conference with considera-
tion of proC'edure for implementing the decisions 
taken. Switzlerland, the Scandinavian countries 
and Spain were in favour of setting up a perma-
nent all-European body, but no special committee 
was set up to deal with this matter during the 
second stage of the conference and the question 
was considered in private, bilateral or group 
negotiations. 
54. The following are the main arguments 
quoted for setting up such a body : 
55. (i) Although the Swiss plan for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes, linked with the first item 
on the agenda of the conference, was generally 
agreed to, the necessarily very vague undertaking 
not to resort to force but to use peaceful means 
of settlement must be accompanied by a compuls-
ory arbitration clause to which the eastern coun-
tries are not very favourably inclined although 
they willingly accept the principle of arbitration 
in trade matters. If lasting results are to be 
achieved in the security field it might seem wise 
to introduce compulsory legal procedure to avoid 
recourse to force in the event of disputes. 
56. (ii) Spain submitted a proposal to the confer-
ence for the creation of a diplomatic committee 
for security and co-operation in Europe. This 
proposal appears to have been welcomed by the 
smaller countries and particularly the non-aligned 
countries for which procedure adopted by the 
CSCE is the only means of making themselves 
heard at the side of the great powers on matters 
affecting European security. Further, some 
eastern countries such as Romania and Czecho-
slovakia have asked for a consultative committee 
to be set up to promote the application of deci-
sions taken at the CSCE and if necessary to 
convene other conferences. On 3rd July 1973, 
Mr. Gromyko too referred to the creation of a 
permanent security body. 
57. It is certainly not by chance that, apart 
from the Soviet Union, the non-aligned European 
countries were the most in favour of such a body, 
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whereas the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
were rather sceptical about it. In practice, if this 
plan were to be implemented, it might lead to 
the Soviet Union and its allies attempting to 
exploit their position in the affairs of members 
of the Western Alliance, whereas the latter would 
find it difficult to act to the same extent in rela-
tions within the eastern bloc. Moreover, the 
Soviet Union, invoking the existence of an all-
European organisation, would probably oppose 
any strengthening of European integration in 
the framework of the Nine and even co-operation 
between democratic countries in the framework 
of the Council of Europe. 
58. However, your Rapporteur considers that 
the creation of such a body must not be rejected 
outright. Substantial concessions in fields covered 
by the third basket might open the way to 
reconciling views on this matter. However, great 
caution seems necessary to avoid negative effects. 
At the present stage therefore there can be no 
question of setting up an institution but at the 
most machinery for consultations, which is less 
binding. The western countries have opted for a 
Danish proposal for the conference on security 
and co-operation in Europe to be followed by an 
interim period. Participants would meet again in 
1977 to discuss the next stage. There are signs 
that the eastern countries are considering conven-
ing a second conference on security and co-opera-
tion in Europe. 
59. It should be noted that the third basket is 
one matter on which major results have been 
achieved in nine-power political co-operation. 
Whereas the United States seems prepared to 
give up trying to obtain from the Soviet Union 
and its allies the opening which was the main 
reason why the western countries agreed to the 
principle of an all-European conference, the Nine 
have agreed to maintain their requirements in 
this field. 
60. Advantage should therefore be taken of the 
fact that many countries are anxious for the 
CSCE to conclude its work in order to press with 
renewed strength the unchallengeable arguments 
of the Nine for promoting the free movement of 
ideas and persons. 
61. It is now important on the one hand not to 
discourage those in the Soviet Union who are in 
favour of detente but to provide them with the 
means they need and, on the other hand, to 
consider carefully and favourably the problem 
of the follow-up to the conference, taking account 
inter alia of the wishes of the smaller powers, 
the neutral countries and certain people's demo-
cracies. But it would be disastrous for the West 
to give its official blessing to a settlement which 
in fact covered only recognition of so-called 
"security" frontiers and strengthened the division 
of Europe and the burden of Soviet domination 
over part of our continent. This means the West 
must not succumb to lassitude and the Soviet 
wish for a hasty conclusion. 
W. The development of bilateral relations 
62. Although it has been seen that current multi-
lateral negotiations may be very long drawn out 
and not produce very important results, this is 
not so for bilateral relations which until now 
at least have provided the most substantial pro-
gress in detente. International conferences have 
been held only insofar as the development of 
bilateral relations has allowed. In this respect 
mention has already been made of the major 
importance of the SALT negotiations for agree-
ment between East and West and the extremely 
positive nature of the regular consultations bet-
ween American and Soviet leaders on problems 
which might jeopardise world peace. 
63. In recent weeks the most serious setback to 
Soviet-American relations was in economic mat-
ters when, in view of the objections raised by 
the United States Congress to ratification of the 
trade agreement concluded between the two 
powers in 1973, the Soviet Union unilaterally 
decided to break the agreement in protest to what 
it called intrusion in its internal affairs. 
64. At least this may be to the advantage of the 
countries of Western Europe in developing their 
own relations with the Soviet Union and the 
countries of Eastern Europe. In General de 
Gaulle's time, the French Government took 
spectacular steps in this field leading to the con-
clusion of a treaty of agreement and co-operation 
providing for regular meetings between Heads of 
State, Ministers, or delegations from the two 
countries to examine all bilateral problems and 
the international situation. This policy was 
continued, although perhaps to a lesser degree, by 
successors to General de Gaulle but the economic 
content of Franco-Soviet relations has steadily 
been developed. The United Kingdom's relations 
with the Soviet Union and several countries of 
Eastern Europe w:hich had deteriorated after a 
series of cases of spying by Soviet or allied agents 
on British territory have recently taken a new 
turn. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold 
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Wilson, went to the Soviet Union in February 
1975 and held important conversations with the 
Soviet leaders leading to wider economic co-
operation and co-ordination of views on major 
questions of world policy. This is probably the 
point of departure for closer, lasting relations 
between the United Kingdom and Eastern 
Europe. 
65. It is essential however to ensure that the 
multiplication of bilateral exchanges does not 
allow the Soviet Union or its allies to obtain 
from one or other of their western partners con-
cessions or advantages which have been refused 
in wider groupings, whether in terms of credits 
or political gains. Rightly or wrongly, this fear 
has been expressed in respect of recent bilateral 
meetings, particularly as regards future stages 
of the conference on security and co-operation 
in Europe. 
66. During Chancellor Brandt's term of office, 
the Federal Republic started the policy of rap-
prochement with the Soviet Union and with the 
German Democratic Republic, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. These discussions led to the draw-
ing up of a political agreement on important 
outstanding questions in Central Europe and the 
development of economic and trade relations 
between the Federal Republic and its eastern 
neighbours. 
67. Other members of WEU such as Italy, 
Belgium and the Netherlands have also tightened 
their links with the Soviet Union and increased 
economic and trade agreements with the people's 
democracies. This has led to a considerable 
development of trade between Eastern and 
Western Europe in 1974 and it is expected to 
increase still further in the future. Trade 
between Eastern and Western Europe had been 
hampered by the unbalanced position of the 
eastern countries. Their main exports are energy, 
raw materials and agricultural products; they 
import manufactured goods including both 
equipment items and consumer goods. Recent 
increases in the cost of oil, most raw materials 
and agricultural produce seem to be re-estab-
lishing a trade balance which will allow trade 
to develop throughout Europe in the next few 
years. 
68. There are limits to this trade however, some 
of which stem from agreements negotiated in the 
framework of NATO on the loans members of 
that organisation are authorised to grant to their 
clients in the East. Thus the Federal Republic 
has so far been encouraged not to grant Poland 
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the increased loans it had requested following 
the German-Polish agreement in which the 
Federal Republic recognised the Oder-Neisse line 
as Germany's eastern frontier. Poland had then 
asked for a loan of DM 1,000 million at some 
4 %. Subsequently it asked for this sum to be 
increased to DM 3 or 4,000 million, but the 
Federal Government has not yet been able to 
meet this request with the result that the full 
economic benefits expected of the German-Polish 
treaty have not yet been reaped. 
69. In addition to these purely bilateral rela-
tion.<J are those the EEC intends to develop with 
the CMEA. For many years the Soviet Union 
and its allies insisted on not recognising any 
Western European organisation, restricting their 
economic relations to the bilateral level. In 1974, 
however, the CMEA invited Mr. Ortoli, President 
of the EEC Commission, to visit Moscow in order 
to examine the possibility of a global agreement 
between the two economic organisations. 
70. There must be no mistake about the nature 
of such agreements whose aim can but be limited. 
The organisations are obviously not of the same 
type for while the aim of the CMEA is purely 
economic and commercial, the EEC for its part 
seeks to integrate the economies of Western 
Europe in a global system. This difference was 
not a major obstacle for the EEC however and 
it can be considered as a major step forward 
that by agreeing to open trade negotiations the 
CMEA countries recognised the economic reality 
of the EEC today. 
71. However, the visit by a CMEA delegation 
to Brussels in February 1975 failed to produce 
the results expected because, although it was in 
a position to negotiate on the programme of 
Mr. Ortoli's visit, it was not authorised to take 
a.ny steps regarding the subject of the negotia-
tions that might be conducted on that occasion. 
Negotiations will probably be long and difficult 
before agreements are concluded between the 
two organisations. Caution is therefore required 
in respect of any mention of the possibility of 
an all-European organisation in this context. But 
at the same time it is gratifying that all the 
countries of Eastern Europe are showing so much 
goodwill towards the improvement of their eco-
nomic and trade relations with Western Europe. 
Here, one must be highly pragmatic and not seek 
advantages on questions of principle but rather 
endeavour to use every means of developing trade 
of all kinds. 
72. Relations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States have developed mainly in the 
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political sphere. Conversely, relations between 
the Eastern European countries including the 
Soviet Union and the countries of Western 
Europe have developed considerably in recent 
years in the field of economic co-operation. There 
might be some danger in this situation if there 
were not close and effective co-ordination 
between Europe and the United States in NATO 
for political and military matters and more ~if­
ficult co-ordination of economic matters which 
lack a framework in which continuing discussions 
can be held. Co-ordination must be developed, 
however if European trade is not to suffer from 
the ups 'and downs of Soviet-American relations 
and is to free itself of the restrictions which are 
still applied today under the regulations .adop~ed 
in NATO at a time when they were fully JUStified 
by East-West tension but which no longer cor-
respond to the situation today. 
IV. The German problem 
73. Since the serious Cuban crisis in September 
1962, contacts established between the two great 
world powers on that occasion have developed 
eonsiderablv and East-West relations have 
evolved fai~ly steadily towards greater detente. 
This trend has made the so-called German prob-
lem one of the main obstacles to a rapproche-
ment between Eastern and Western Europe. It 
embraced all the problems raised by the division 
of Germany after the second world war by the 
unilateral and arbitrary establishment of fron-
tiers between the German Democratic Republic 
and its eastern neighbours and by the mainten-
ance of an occupation statute in Berlin. 
74. As far as it was able, the Federal Govern-
ment's Ostpolitik mastered this obstacle to the 
policy of detente in Europe by concluding 
treaties with the Soviet Union, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia and the basic treaty with the 
German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, the 
conclusion of the four-power agreement on Ber-
lin, linked with the Ostpolitik, ensured greater 
security for West Berlin and also allowed greater 
freedom of movement and more possibilities for 
contacts in Berlin and its neighbourhood, mainly 
between inhabitants of Berlin but also between 
all inhabitants of the Federal Republic and the 
German Democratic Republic. The Federal 
Government and the governments of the three 
western powers which share responsibility for 
Germany as a whole with the Soviet Union were 
well aware that these treaties provided no solu-
tion to Germany's problems arising from the 
second world war. It was merely a matter of 
finding a rrwdus vivendi which would allow a 
peaceful settlement of this question to be worked 
out in agreement with all the powers concerned. 
75. Just as the legal texts calling for co-opera-
tion will remain mere pieces of paper until the 
citizens of the countries concerned bring them 
to life it will be possible to apply such treaties 
and a~eements smoothly only if the contracting 
countries are prepared to show their trust in 
co-operation. 
76. From the outset, it was clearly evident to 
the Federal Government that the signing of these 
treaties and agreements was but a first step along 
the long road towards their implementation. It 
was therefore no surprise either for the Federal 
Republic or for your Rapporteur who, as a 
Berliner, does his best to understand his eastern 
counterparts and ascertain whether attempts 
have been or will be made by the East to inter-
pret the treaties and agreements unilaterally. In 
this connection, it is sometimes claimed that the 
negotiations were not conducted with sufficient 
care or energy to avoid ambiguity. This can be 
argued about indefinitely since no one can or 
needs to show whether or not it was possible to 
obtain more. Anyone with experience of inter-
national agreements knows full well that practi-
cally no text of this kind is safe from some form 
of queriabl(l interpretation. This is equally true 
of the treaties mentioned here. But as to whether 
it might have been better not to conclude one 
or other of them rather than have something 
questionable, your Rapporteur is very much in 
favour of the conclusion of the treaties. 
77. In any event, the question is whether the 
Federal Republic and its allies, and above all 
the three great western powers, are doing their 
utmost to oppose such attempts to extend the 
commitments entered into and to ensure the full 
application of the treaties and the strictest 
respect for their wording. This policy will 
certainly not be sheltered from future difficulties 
and attacks, but it has already obtained far more 
for the inhabitants of Germany than they had 
before the treaties were concluded. 
78. One mav also wonder what alternative there 
was to the policy of understanding between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and its eastern 
neighbours. Had it remained inflexible, the 
Federal Republic might have cut itself off from 
its own allies, which would have been in the 
interests neither of Germany nor of Europe nor 
of the Western Alliance. 
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79. A problem which has not yet been solved 
in Germany is the question of nationality on 
which, as specifically stated in the treaty, the 
Federal Republic and the German Democratic 
Republic could not agree. As an example for 
future difficulties, this problem must be 
described in detail. Over eight years ago, the 
German Democratic Republic introduced separate 
citizenship for its inhabitants by law. However, 
the Federal Republic, in accordance with its 
Basic Law, continues to abide by the principle 
that there is only one German citizenship for all 
Germans, which implies that there is no separate 
citizenship of the Federal Republic. It is fully 
aware that it cannot compel the German Demo-
cratic Republic to recognise this point of law. 
But several countries recognise the right of 
subjects to dual citizenship, although this 
naturally requires the agreement of those con-
cerned. As matters stand, all that concerns the 
Federal Republic is that Germans from the 
German Democratic Republic who are outside the 
eastern bloc should be able, if they so wish, to 
place themselves under the consular protection of 
the Federal Republic and leave the country in 
which they happen to be with a Federal German 
passport. In this respect, moreover, there have 
so far been no difficulties. Nor does it require 
special provisions in a consular agreement 
between the German Democratic Republic and 
the country concerned. In any event, consular 
agreements between the Federal Republic and 
certain countries with which it is on friendly 
terms include a specific provision in this sense. 
80. It is generally believed in the Western 
Alliance that the most decisive test of whether 
the Soviet Union and the German Democratic 
Republic want detente is still their attitude 
towards Berlin. If these two countries continue 
to interpret the four-power agreement in such 
an obviously false manner in favour of the 
eastern side, or deprive it of substance as they 
have done with regard to the establishment of 
the Federal Office for the Environment and the 
proposed creation of a European Community 
vocational training centre in Berlin and, con-
trary to the treaties, by imposing controls on 
transit routes, this cannot fail to have an effect 
on the pursuit or outcome of the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe. In the latter 
negotiations, reference is made in another context 
to measures for establishing confidence. This is 
certainly no way to establish the confidence 




81. As a result of this analysis detente seems 
uncertain and the economic crisis through which 
the West is now passing is creating new dangers, 
not the least being a weakening of the West and 
of its determination to resist any infringement 
by the Soviet Union and its allies, another pos-
sibility being that the Soviet Union might 
Rpeculate on the division of the West to improve 
its positions in Europe. 
82. The development of economic relations 
between Eastern and Western Europe, however, 
may help the western countries to overcome their 
present economic difficulties by providing new 
outlets. It may also improve detente and help 
to overcome this crisis more than international 
conferences. Today, entente and co-operation are 
becoming more than ever the true means of con-
solidating detente which alone is no longer suf-
ficient. Entente and co-operation, however, mean 
that the West must retain its full defensive 
powers and not relinquish the positions it has 
held so far in the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe and in the negotiations 
on the mutual reduction of forces. There must 
also be greater co-ordination between the Euro-
pean and North American members of the 
Atlantic Alliance in regard to their economic 
and financial relations with Eastern Europe and 
political matters too. 
83. Despite all the uncertainty and dangers, a 
retrospective glance at the period of the cold 
war makes it clear that much has been gained 
by the policy of detente. On both sides, determina-
tion to contain hostilities and thus prevent a 
chain reaction which might lead to a third world 
war has gained ground. In this respect both East 
and West are thus on the right road. But assured 
peace is still a long way away. This must be 
faced squarely with courage and firmness if pro-
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gress is to be made towards detente with imagina-
tion and willingness to reach understanding. 
VI. The discussion in the General Affairs 
Committee 
84. The present report has been discussed twice 
by the General Affairs Committee, on 17th March 
and 28th April 1975. Although comments by 
Committee members on 17th March have to a 
large extent been taken into account by the Rap-
porteur, this is not so for comments made on 
28th April, partly because they arose from fairly 
conflicting views on the development of East-
West relations. Several Committee members 
found the report too pessimistic, others, on the 
contrary, considered it over-optimistic. Further-
more, many comments concerned fields which 
your Rapporteur had deliberately left out of his 
explanatory memorandum because they touched 
on defence matters which are the responsibility 
of another committee, or relations between 
Europe and the United States, which are being 
dealt with in another report of the General 
Affairs Committee. 
85. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur felt that 
many Committee members were rather more pes-
simistic than he was about the future of East-
West relations. They did not expect any sub-
stantial change in Soviet policy and considered 
that the only possible outcome of the ongoing 
negotiations, whether on limiting arms of various 
kinds or on European security, could but be to 
strengthen the Soviet position in Europe. 
86. Your Rapporteur thought it was essential to 
~ention the ~d of remarks made before having 
his text published, although he is unable to 
elaborate further on each of the points made. 
He trusts that the public debate on this report 
will allow a wide-ranging exchange of views on 
these matters. 
Document 668 
Amendment No. 1 
East-West relations 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Amrehn 
26th May 1975 
In paragraph 3 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "in a liberal manner" 
and insert the words "under present circumstances". 
Signed: Amrekn 
1. See 2nd Sitting, 26th May 1975 (Amendment adopted). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on co-operation with the United Statu 
The Assembly, 
A 
Considering that the WEU member countries, like most other European countries and the United 
States, are threatened by continuous, dangerous and increasing inflation, encouraged by high energy prices 
(which in themselves have negative effects on the economy), resulting in unacceptable unemployment; 
Considering that continuous and, in many countries, accelerated inflation is a challenge to all demo-
cratic countries and may. even endanger the survival of democracy; 
Considering that inflation is also threatening the budgetary position of western countries, thus having 
repercuaaiona on the level of defence budgets ; 
Noting that co-ordinated economic, social, financial and monetary policies are essential if imminent 
danger to our society's structure is to be tackled ; 
Questioning the will of the democratic countries to co-ordinate policies sufficiently ; 
Considering it essential for the western world to present a united front in the field of energy 
requirements; 
Taking into account the fact that the countries concerned are already co-operating in the framework 
of OECD; 
Considering that OECD does not have adequate machinery for parliamentary supervision ; 
B 
Considering that the security of Western Europe is ensured by the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
integration of European and American armed forces ; 
Considering that the United States (approaching its bicentennial) and the Soviet Union (preparing 
for its Twenty-Fifth Party Congress) have achieved and will each try to maintain a military balance on 
a very high level ; 
Considering that it must be regarded as a ·positive factor for detente that a number of major problems 
are being discussed regularly by the two super powers in purely bilateral negotiations ; 
Considering however that doubts must be expressed as to whether today's complex problems can 
still be handled by a small number of persona in the two countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
A 
1. Urge member governments to : 
(a) hold frequent exchanges of views leading to real co-ordination of long-term policy and research 
into the economic use of and substitutes for energy resources ; 
(b) consider OECD as a. permanent forum for discussing energy problems; 
(c) should OECD not be able to play this r8le, set up a special organisation for this purpose; 




2. Consider that westem co-operation would be better ensured if France joined the International Energy 
Agency; 
B 
1. Ensure that frequent exchanges of views between member countries and the United States, parti-
cularly in the framework of NATO, lead to increased participation and influence of European States in 
respect of all major problems ; 
2. Study the possibilities of truly European decision-making on all security matters, including the 




(submitted by Mr. de K08ter, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur notes that the General 
Affairs Committee has followed the evolution of 
relations between Europe and the United States 
closely for a number of years. This report is thus 
one of a series and your Rapporteur will refrain 
from reverting to matters which the Assembly 
has already discussed. 
2. He will therefore deal briefly with the 
evolution of earlier relations between Europe 
and the United States and at greater length with 
the position at the beginning of 1975. But it is 
quite evident that between January, when this 
first text is being drafted, and April, when the 
Committee will have to adopt a draft report, 
many things will have changed. 
3. Although suggestions were made for a visit 
to the United States it was decided that further 
contacts with members of the Administration 
and Congress should be postponed until 1976. 
Your Rapporteur has therefore confined himself 
to setting out a number of basic aspects of rela-
tions between Europe and the United States and 
will subsequently add to it in the light of events 
in the next few months, adding more detailed 
thoughts after studying the documents avail-
able more thoroughly. 
* 
** 
4. It is quite evident that in recent years the 
world political balance has experienced a series 
of upheavals whose revolutionary nature cannot 
yet be fully assessed. The emergence of 'a large 
number of recently-independent States has con-
siderably disturbed the balance and this is parti-
cularly clear in the United Nations where all 
countries are on an equal footing whatever their 
wealth and power. However, despite these 
c~anges, a number of elements have persisted 
smce the second world war, particularly the near-
monopoly of power of the United States - in 
the West a~ l~ast - in the political, military 
and economic fields. The United States has there-
fore been playing a preponderant role for thirty 
years and for a long time it went practically 
unchallenged both at home and in the Atlantic 
world. 
5. While it might have been thought after 
1950 that Europe would assert itself as a lead-
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ing political and economic entity on the world 
stage, it must now be accepted that our continent 
has been incapable of playing such a role. Inter-
national life is still based on the national State 
and even the European countries which have 
constantly affirmed their desire to see Europe 
play an increasingly important part in foreign 
policy matters have proved singularly hesitant 
about agreeing to a transfer of national 
sovereignty to supranational bodies. 
6. For several years, the United States has 
however no longer been the undisputed leader 
of the western world, although NATO has 
retained American nuclear power as its basis. 
United States economic power is no longer as 
overwhelming as it was and the Vietnam war 
provoked a number of reactions, sometimes quite 
serious, against American preponderance. Ame-
rican society has been passing through a serious 
crisis which has had an enormous effect on pub-
lic opinion producing changes which had hitherto 
seemed impossible. 
7. The discussion about democratic institu-
tions has also had its impact on the decision-
making process with certain repercussions on 
foreign affairs and the United States role in the 
world. 
8. Although the Vietnam war and Watergate 
were the main reasons for a reappraisal, account 
must also be taken of race relations which con-
cern a group which, although a minority, is 
nevertheless important since it represents more 
than 10 % of the population. 
9. Finally, the recession, which turned into 
an economic crisis, also urged a review of the 
United States' role. 
10. In your Rapporteur's view, these develop-
ments have only stressed the urgency for the 
countries with a democratic regime - and which 
are but a minority - to pursue co-operation as 
far as possible if they wish their liberal and 
democratic structure to survive. Centrifugal 
tendencies at the heart of the western world are 
too numerous and are already having a some-
times dangerous influence on the very delicate 
network of relations in the Atlantic world. 
11. Above all, therefore, the Western Euro-
pean countries must consider their relations with 
the United States in the light of the common 
DOOUIIENT 669 
aim of upholding a democratic society. Any other 
aim, whether it concerns national interests or 
the building of Europe, is secondary in rela-
tion to this overall aim in the light of which 
relations between Europe and the United States 
must be considered in the context of the major 
problems of the day. 
12. The relative lack of decision-making by the 
political leaden~ of the free world is unaccept-
able. Proposals must be worked out that might 
help to create a better framework for co-operation 
in the democratic world. 
D. Historical background 
13. The study completed by William Watts 
and Lloyd E. Free 1 in 1972 reveals the follow-
ing figures on Ameriean public opinion on inter-
nationalism: 
- 13 % can be considered as real inter-
nationalists ; 
- 41 % may be judged as accepting inter-
national relationships ; 
- 33 % have no positive reaction to inter-
national commitments ; 
- 13 % are completely isolationist. 
14. Compared to earlier figures, the picture 
is less encouraging. 
15. There seems to be a swing away from 
internationalism and your Rapporteur will there-
fore refer to a few historieal facts a;bout the 
United States' attitude towards isolaJtionism and 
internationalism. 
16. The history of the United States shows that 
both its independence and its national identity 
were based on the extent to which a nation born 
of European colonisation could break away from 
the United Kingdom first and then the whole 
of Europe. While until the 1812 war the Ame-
ricans could be considered as English colonials 
revolting against their mother country, the 
destruction of public buildings in Washington 
by the British army in 1814 produced a feeling 
of profound unity S~mong Americans and 
aroused their determination to found a real 
State. 
1. State of the nation. 
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17. The Treaty of Ghent concluded between 
the British and the Americans on 24th Decem-
ber 1814 put an end to the war. It was a return 
to the status quo ante but this very fact meant 
that the treaty was a victory for the United 
States after a war which had made the British 
respect the Americans rather than love them. 
18. Once the dispute between Britain and the 
United States was settled, President James 
Monroe, who had been elooted in 1816 as a 
Democratic Republican, laid down the broad 
lines of what was to be United States policy for 
at least a century. 
19. This definition was based on general dis-
engagement from Europe and on an American 
continental view of United States policy. This 
became known 88 the Monroe doctrine. Pro-
mulgated largely by John Quincy Adams, the 
Secretary of State, this doctrine aimed primar-
ily at keeping Europeans out of Latin America. 
20. Thus, in his am.nual message to Congress 
in December 1823 President Monroe declared : 
"The American continents ... are henceforth 
not to 'be considered as subject for future 
colonisation by any European power." 
21. In the nineteenth century therefore two 
fundamentally different international systems 
developed in the old and new worlds, the United 
States being careful not to interfere in any way 
with purely European affairs. The immense 
western territories then provided a vast area for 
developing the union whose interests only 
occasionally ran up against the designs of Euro-
pean powers. Foreign ·affairs therefore occupied 
only a small place in United States policy until 
well after the war of secession. 
22. American isolationism, which emerged 
during this period, was based on the idoo. that 
American civilisation was a phenomenon unique 
in the world, that its task was to populrute and 
develop an immense continent, while nineteenth 
century Americans considered the hazards of 
domestic history and international relations with 
European countries as liable to introduce dan-
gerous and intolera;ble ideologies which were 
either revolutionary or conservative or imperia-
list. This idea was underlined inter alia during 
Benjamin Harrison's election campaign in 1888, 
when he expressed the popular feeling that the 
United States was a nation apart and should 
remain so. And 88 James Bryce said in his book 
"The American Commonwealth", "Happy Ame-
rica stood apart in a world of her own, safe even 
from menace." 
23. However, although foreign affairs did not 
count and the State Department was not to play 
much of a role the United States always showed 
some interest in the fate of Latin America. More-
over, as from 1880, economic progress in the 
United States led it to pay more attention to its 
trade relations with the old world. Its trade, 
which amounted to slightly over $500 million 
annually between 1851·and 1860, exceeded $1,000 
million as from 1871 and reached $2,500 million 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. The 
development of European colonial imperialism 
during the same period induced the Americans to 
concern themselves with their own expansion. 
They were afraid that a division of the world 
between European imperialists at a time when 
trade protectionism was emerging might close 
very large parts of the world to rapidly expand-
ing American trade. 
24. Thus, as from the mid-nineteenth century, 
the United States intervened in the Pacific 
Ocean and the Far East, first to compel Japan 
and ·China to pursue the open door trade system 
and then, particularly following the Spanish-
American war of 1898, to bring the Philippines, 
Guam, Hawaii and also Porto Rico within their 
sphere of influence. 
25. An imperialist ideology then appeared in 
the United States, influenced in particular by 
Darwin's theories of evolution. In his message 
to Congress in December 1904, President Theo-
dore Roosevelt stated the "corollary to the 
Monroe doctrine", which was in ract an affirma-
tion of the new American policy. He stated that 
"in the western hemisphere the adherence of the 
United States to the Monroe doctrine may force 
the United States, however reluctantly, in fla-
grant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to 
the exercise of an international police power". 
26. Nevertheless, the United States, like many 
other nations throughout the world, was not at 
all prepared psychologically ror the outbreak of 
the firm world war in 1914. The war did not 
seem to concern the Americans, despite the fact 
that of a population of almost 100 million more 
than a third consisted of immigrants or children 
of immigrants from the belligerent countries. 
President Wilson began by proclaiming United 
States neutrality. 
27. However, the Americans gradually realised 
that they could hardly remain aloof from a con-
flict in which the freedom of the seas was at 
stake and which threatened to upset the balance 
in Europe at a time when technical progress was 
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placing limits on the security which the breadth 
of the Atlantic had hitherto afforded the United 
States. 
28. However, it needed the profound emotional 
shook caused by the torpedoing of the Lusitania 
in which many Americans perished to prepare 
American public opinion for war. Even after 
the outbreak of total submarine war, President 
Wilson hesitated for some time before deciding 
to commit his country. In the end, it was in the 
name of justice and humanity that he presented 
to the American people his decision to declare 
war - a state which events had forced upon 
him. But immediately after the war American 
public opinion struck away from the course 
advocated by Wilson whereby the United States 
would have been permanently committed to 
pursue an active foreign policy in the framework 
of the League of Nations for the maintenance 
of a balance and peace in Europe and throughout 
the world, and eventually Wilson failed to obtain 
a majority in Congress to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
29. Isolationism again dominated American 
policy during the period between the two world 
wars. In 1937, a Gallup poll showed that 94% 
of Americans thought United States policy 
should be to keep out of all foreign wars rather 
than try to prevent such wars. 
30. Also during the second world war Congress 
passed several laws affirming United States 
neutrality and imposing embargo measures. Iso-
lationism triumphed until Franklin D. Roose-
velt's declaration in 1941 that aid to the United 
Kingdom was to be considered as part of the 
United States defence effort. 
31. Whether or not the United States would 
have entered the war if the Japanese had not 
attacked Pearl Harbour is a moot point. Presi-
dent Roosevelt probably wanted to do so, but 
on 11th December 1941, four days after the 
Japanese attack, Congress adopted a declaration 
of war on Japan but not on Germany or Italy. 
It was the Axis powers which honoured their 
obligations to Japan and declared war on the 
United States. 
32. It is evident that after the second world 
war, particularly under the influence of such 
historians and political scientists as Hans Mor-
genthau, the United States Government came to 
pay greater attention to the implications of the 
power deriving from the economic development 
of the United States. These considerations were 
behind the American desire to foster the econo-
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mic recovery of Europe through the MarshaLl 
plan and the defence of free Europe through the 
Atlantic Pact. The Truman doctrine defined a 
world policy as one of containing the grip of 
communism within the area already controlled 
by the Soviet Union. 
33. However, a section of American public opi-
nion, first discouraged by the setbacks encoun-
tered by plans for European union and subse-
quently by the United States' difficulties in 
various parts of the world and particularly Viet-
nam, still considers that American intervention 
in other parts of the world should be temporary 
and that the long-term aim should be disen-
gagement. 
34. This historical background must be borne 
in mind in studying the state of relations between 
Europe and the United States. Isolationism is a 
tradition of the past but is still at least on 
. ' occaswn, a force to be contended with which the 
United States' partners should still take into 
account. 
35. The undermining of the American admin-
istrllltion following the Watergate affair has 
ce~ainly made it necessary for American foreign 
pohcy to take greater account of the reactions 
o.f p~blic opinion, however momentarily. Proof 
hes m the weakness of American policy in 
Cyprus and Vietnam and the European part. 
ners fully realise this and weigh up the danger 
of systematically opposing the United States. 
III. The situation today 
36. On 6th December 1974 the United States 
Ambassador to the United Nations, John Scalin 
informed the General Assembly that the United 
States would be reviewing its policies towards 
the United Nations. 
37. Consideration was being given to means of 
reversing the current tendency to adopt biased 
unrealistic resolutions. 
38. This United States review also covered the 
thirteen associated United Nations agencies. 
Congress had reduced the American contribution 
to UNESCO by $19 million since Israel was 
barred from some of its activities. 
39. Without doubt developments in the United 
Nations are having a negative effect on the role 
the United States might play as a leading nation. 
40. At the same time it has become clear that 
the role of Western European nations in the 
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United Nations has likewise been diminished by 
the unexpectedly close co-operation on the part 
of the third world. 
41. One might expect the United States and 
Western Europe's voting behaviour in the United 
Nations to be similar. In reality, western votes 
have been split on a number of problems. Dif-
ferences were not limited to the United States 
on one side and Europe on the other. It should 
be noted that consultations between the members 
of WE U have not always led to harmonised opi-
nions. 
42. As Mr. Kissinger wrote in "The Troubled 
Partnership" : 
"The availability of resources does not 
guarantee an interest in assuming world-
wide responsibilities as is demonstrated by 
United States policy prior to World War 
II ... 
In other words, we are now the only mem-
ber of NATO with worldwide interests, and 
this produces unavoidable differences in 
perspective." 
43. Mr. Kissinger reiterated this idea in a state-
ment at the end of 1973 concerning the Middle 
East question and it was not always well received 
in the European capitals. J.t nevertheless expres-
ses a profound truth. Because of changes in the 
world balance, the United States has a de facto 
monopoly of power, at least in the West, and all 
the European cQuntries accept this. Europe as 
such has not become a world power and the 
Western European countries today hardly seem 
to wish this to be so. Since the end of the second 
world war, the United States has constantly sup-
ported or even provoked Western European 
attempts to unite in the hope, sometime at lea.EJt, 
of gaining a partner capable of sharing responsi-
bilities which it feels are too heavy. It has not 
succeeded and Mr. Kissinger seems to have 
accepted this situation better than others. 
44. Yet European union would be the only way 
for Europeans to exercise some degree of power 
in the world. This aim h81S never been considered 
sufficiently important by the European States 
for them to feel they should play more than a 
limited role in the world in pursuit of national 
aims with a singularly narrow outlook. 
45. NATO, the security system of the western 
world, is largely based on United States nuclear 
power. Although public opinion does not seem in 
favour of a European deterrent, we cannot per-
mit ourselves not to establish the machinery for 
decision-making which is needed. The British 
nuclear forces integrated in NATO and the 
French independent forces could together form 
a European deterrent. Whether or not the exist-
ing nuclear forces are integrated depends on the 
future of NATO and the relationship between 
the United States and Western Europe on the 
one hand and between the European States, 
especially France and Britain, on the other. The 
negative attitude resulting from the imminent 
danger inherent in any nuclear force under-
standably leads to hesitation about discussing 
the related problems. As long as nuclear forces 
exist, it is essential to discuss and prepare for 
possible future changes. 
46. There should be no illusions about the long 
drawn-out war waged by the United States in 
Vietnam. Adverse comments by certain Euro-
pean governments or political parties about 
United States policy in the Far East went, in 
certain cases, hand in hand with unawareness of 
the world-wide responsibilities of the United 
States. 
47. Insofar as Europe was determined not to 
intervene in Vietnam, it was difficult to insist 
that the United States take account of a Euro-
pean point of view which, moreover, was never 
expressed as such. 
48. However, this war was not without conse-
quence in so far as it aroused doubts among the 
people of America regarding the moral value of 
the cause defended by the United States and 
hence encouraged the re-emergence of isolationist 
feelings. But whatever errors may be attributed 
to American policy in Vietnam, they cannot 
justify an overall condemnation of United States 
policy. 
49. However this may be, some Committee 
members underlined that the Vietnam war and 
the Watergate crisis had served to demonstrate 
that American society had reacted in a democra-
tic manner devoid of imperiaJ.ism. and they oon-
sidered the democracy of American society to 
be the best guarantee of continued United States 
participation in the defence of Europe. 
50. Although for a long time some Europeans 
had the illusion that Western Europe might one 
day form an entity capable of ensuring its own 
defence, this is no longer true today. In an inter-
view with the IPU on 14th January 1975, Mr. 
Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, stated that: 
"What you heard a couple of years ago 
about Europe going it alone with a Euro-
pean defence has completely disappeared 
in all countries of the Alliance." 
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51. In present circumstances this remark is 
fully justified. Some Committee members, how-
ever, felt that there was uncertainty about the 
future trend of American foreign policy and its 
defence policy, particularly in the conventional 
field. They considered it ~ntial for Europe to 
provide itself with the wherewithal to pursue a 
true defence policy so as to be able to face what-
ever situation might arise. 
52. Your Rapporteur entirely agrees with them 
that the Western European countries' defence 
effort should not be relaxed, but he believes that 
their fears concern only the long term and that 
in any event preparation for remote and 
questionable situations should in no case be 
allowed to call in question what will for long 
remain the only possible basis for European 
security: the integration of its defence with that 
of the United States and Canada. 
53. Even history cannot supply the answer to 
the following question : If Mr. Luns as Foreign 
Minister of the Netherlands had not blocked the 
de Gaulle proposals for political co-operation in 
the sixties, would Europe today have been united, 
and would this have prevented France from 
opting out of NATO's integrated military struc-
tureY 
54. In this hypothetical and theoretical case 
the British electorate would not have been given 
the chance to vote in a positive way to continue 
EEC membership. The United Kin~om would 
not have been invited to discuss membership. 
55. In any event, some Committee members 
stressed that western co-operation and European 
defence would be served better if France resumed 
its place in NATO, as the WEU Assembly has 
already urged on several occasions. 
56. In fact, the United States has taken in 
hand a cause which is not only its own but that 
of the western world. This was evidenced again 
recently when President Ford, taking up Mr. 
Kissinger's remarks, affirmed that the United 
States would do its utmost to prevent the West 
being strangled by the oil-producing countries. 
57. United States world-wide policy is at 
present concerned with three essential questions : 
relations with the Soviet Union, the problem of 
the third world and defence policy. There is also 
increasing restlessness about the role of the 
United Nations. 
58. (i) Relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union have in recent years been 
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traversing a period of what has frequently been 
called detente. There should be no illusions about 
this word. In fact, since 1945, the basis of rela-
tions between the two great powers has hardly 
changed. Whether one spoke of peaceful 
coexistence or detente, the aim was to avoid 
armed conflict between two powers which did 
not conceal their fundamental antagonism. The 
Soviet Union has definitely not given up its 
ideology aimed at terminating the capitalist 
system throughout the world. Similarly, the 
liberal countries consider western-type democracy 
to be a particularly highly-developed political 
and economic system which alone can ensure 
individual freedom and well-being. 
59. Nevertheless, in the last five years, it was 
thought that meaningful progress could be made 
with detente and that international peace could 
be based on agreements and organised internatio-
nal relations which excluded war from the com-
petition between the two economic and political 
systems. 
60. Several series of negotiations were launched 
between the United States and its allies on the 
one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on 
the other. While it was possible for a time to 
hope that these negotiations would lead to far-
reaching changes in relations between the two 
groups of countries, this seems unlikely at the 
present juncture, at least for the foreseeable 
future. 
61. (a) In the strategic arms limitation talks 
(SALT), the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached a number of agreements on limiting their 
strategic nuclear weapons and it is to be expected 
that a forthcoming SALT II agreement will 
complete the agreements already reached. How-
ever, such agreements are of fairly limited scope 
since they allow both sides to maintain nuclear 
means capable of destroying the whole planet 
and their sole aim is to limit by common agree-
ment the expenditure which the two major 
nuclear powers might have had to make to 
increase their armaments stiN further. 
62. (b) The talks on mutual and balanced 
force reductions (MBFR) which might have led 
to real disarmament in Europe are still a long 
way from completion since after more than two 
yeal'S no agreement has been reached on the aims 
of the talks. On 13th December 1974, the North 
Atlantic Council reaffirmed the commitment of 
member countries "to the establishment of 
approximate parity in the form of an agreed 
common ceiling for the ground force manpower 
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of NATO and the Warsaw Poot in the area of 
reductions. They considered that a first phase 
reduction agreement covering United States and 
Soviet ground forces would be an important and 
practical first step in this direction". 
63. The same day, Mr. Kissinger said he did 
not have the impression that the Soviet Union 
was prepared to accept the common ceiling for 
the reduction of forces in Central Europe and 
hence the principle of parity for strategic 
weapons decided on between the Americans and 
the Soviets at the Vladivostok meeting. 
64. It is not therefore to be expected that the 
MBFR talks will allow armed forces in Europe 
to be reduced in the near future. From the 
European viewpoint, however, they have the 
advantage of allowing the United States Govern-
ment to withstand pressure to cut back American 
forces in Europe. Thus, the North Atlantic 
Council reaffirmed "that NATO forces should 
not be reduced except in the context of a mutual 
and balanced force reduction agreement with 
the East". 
65. (c) The conference on security and co-
operation in Europe has also been marking time 
for some months and no agreement has been 
reached on the main questions, whether they 
concern measures to re-establish confidence 
between the two great powers or to encourage the 
exchange of persons and ideas between the two 
blocs. 
66. (d) Finally, in January 1975, Mr. Kissin-
ger had to announce that the Soviet Union had 
denounced the trade agreements concluded with 
the United States as a result of Congress's 
insistence on linking them with the liberalisa-
tion of Soviet policy in respect of Jewish immi-
gration. 
67. All these facts lead to the conclusion that 
detente can now hardly go beyond purely tech-
nical measures designed to limit the two great 
powers' expenditure on armaments and that any 
attempt to establish understanding or co-opera-
tion between East and West will be difficult 
because of radically opposite political and eco-
nomic systems. 
68. Furthermore, some observers are now 
wondering whether the West's present economic 
difficulties may not make the pursuit of detente 
still more difficult inasmuch as they may give 
the Eastern European countries the impression 
that international capitalism is facing a serious 
and perhaps fatal crisis and consequently the 
march towaros world revolution might be acce-
lerated in the ne:x:t few months. In the circum-
stances, the Soviet Union would have Uttle inter-
est in stabilising the present situation and this 
has so far been the constant aim of its foreign 
policy. 
69. The Soviet Union has very probably not 
taken a definite decision in this connection, but 
rumours of coming changes in the leadership of 
the Soviet Communist Party indicate that East-
West relations, a subject of much effort by Mr. 
Brezhnev, will be entirely reconsidered and in 
the meantime will be frozen for a fairly long 
transitional period. However this may be, it 
seems difficult to speak of detente before agree-
ment has been reached on a major programme 
of arms reductions, including tactical nuclear 
weapons, by the Warsaw Pact in Europe. 
70. (ii) In the last twenty years, the under-
developed countries have provided a breeding 
ground for the rivaary between the two economic 
and political systems. Whereas fronts were frozen 
in Europe, abrupt and far-reaching changes were 
poSsible in Latin America, Africa, the Middle 
East and Asia at both economic and political 
level, not to mention the military level. 
71. The people's struggle to free themselves 
from the aftermath of colonialism allowed the 
Soviet Union to increase its influence consider-
ably in these immense areas. The balance was re-
established with the emergence of independent 
States with pressing economic demands which 
could not be met without their markets being 
opened to the great indUBtrial powers of the West 
or even direct financial and technical assistance 
from these countries. The rapid rise in the price 
of oil and certain raw materials as from the end 
of 1973 caused further upheavals. There is no 
longer one third world but two, for there are 
countries which are both wealthy and under-
developed, i.e. which have sometimes vast mone-
tary reserves and which have been growing at a 
very fast rate since the oil crisis in October 1973 
but which are UD.alble to advance quickly towards 
economic development because of the state of 
their society. They are short of technical experts, 
have insufficient consumer markets and experi-
ence difficulties in converting the population, 
most of whom are engaged in primitive farming, 
to modern industrial ootivilties. 
72. The West had decided to earmark 1 % of 
the gross national product of each industrialised 
country for assistance to the third world. In 
view of the balance-of-payments crisis now facing 
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most of these countries, it is quite probable that 
many of them will not manage to attain this aim. 
In any event, only very few have done so. On 
the other hand, the wealthy underdeveloped 
countries could allocate a far greater proportion 
of their gross national product to assistance to 
other underdeveloped countries because they can-
not invest very much of their revenue from oil 
or raw materials in their own countries. This is 
all the more essential since the increased cost 
of oil and raw materials has added to the already 
insupportable burden on the balance of payments 
of the poorest underdeveloped countries. The 
position of India, for instance, may quickly 
become 'absolutely catastrophic, wheareas a coun-
try such as Indonesia has difficulty in finding 
immediate and useful investments for its profits 
from the marketing of its metals and oil. Some 
form of mutual assistance already exists, parti-
cularly in the Arab world where Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait hand out large sums to Egypt and 
Jordan. Moreover, the only way to allow the 
whole world to benefit from the considemble 
increase in the monetary reserves which the 
OPEC countries are in the process of accumulat-
ing would be a widespread transformation of 
international trade aimed inter alia at encourag-
ing these countries to purchase more from other 
countries of the third world. 
73. All these problems call for a considerable 
increase in international co-operation and trade 
of all kinds. But this may well be hampered by 
the economic difficulties now facing the OECD 
countries since they may be obliged to take pro-
tectionist measures to curb their balance-of-
payments deficit. 
7 4. This is a field in which it would perhaps 
be possible for the Western European countries 
to bring considerable influence to bear on the 
United States in organisations which work 
satisfactorily such as OECD, IMF or the World 
Bank. They will be able to do so, however, only 
insofar as they have agreed on their own doctrine 
and aims in this field and if their overaLl eco-
nomic, monetary and trade policy has been 
closely concerted with the United States. As 
opposed to what has only too often been the 
case in the past, the IMF should no longer be 
taken for a debating society in which various 
economic doctrines are eloquently defended. It 
is certain that in this connection the United 
States has done much to achieve results in the 
past year. 
75. (iii) In the defence field, Eurogroup 
clearly showed at its meeting on 9th December 
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197 4 that the European members of the Atlantic 
Alliance were not being taken in by prospects 
of detente and affirmed that they were deter-
mined to maintain their al'IJD.aments effort in 
order to preserve NATO's deterrent capability 
to which Europe owes thirty years of peace. 
"In the light of the constantly increasing 
military capability of the Warsaw Pact, 
Ministers noted with concern the adverse 
effects of inflation and cost escalation on 
western defence programmes, which could 
be seriously weakened. They stressed the 
need for closer eo-operation within the 
Eurogroup, particularly in the field of 
equipment procurement. 
Ministers reaffirmed their determination to 
improve co-operation in the Eurogroup, 
thus developing a strong and cohesive con-
tribution to Mliance defence as a whole 
and strengthening public awareness of the 
need for an effective defence posture in the 
West's search for genuine detente." 
76. It is abundantly clear, however, that the 
western economic situation is making it increas-
ingly difficult for governments to pursue an 
armaments effort, although this is more essential 
than ever now that future Soviet policy is arous-
ing serious doubts. 
77. The "Europackage 1974" appended to the 
Eurogroup communique at least shows that on 
one essential point the European members of 
NATO have given the United States the satis-
faction it needed since it specifies that : 
" ... Recent calculations suggest that the net 
foreign exchange costs incurred by the 
United States during United States fiscal 
year 197 4 in basing their forces in Europe 
were offset by European purchases of 
United States milirtary equipment and 
bilateral United States I Federal Republic 
of Germany offset arrangements." 
78. Cost was in fact one of the main objections 
from a large section of Congress to maintaining 
American forces on the mainland of Europe. It 
is obviously essential for the credibility of the 
American nuclear deterrent for these troops to 
remain on European territory since their pre-
sence assures the Soviet Union that the United 
States will be committed in the event of aggres-
sion in Europe. Europe must therefore give 
absolute priority to the financial effort which 
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will ensure the continued presence of these troops 
whatever the difficulties in a period of recession. 
IV. The consequences of the energy crisis 
79. In a report which he submitted on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee in 1968, Mr. 
Peter Kirk wrote : 
"The position of the world economy in 
1968 is in many respects reminiscent of 
that in 1929. Monetary conditions are 
similar ·and the recession setting in almost 
everywhere may well lead to catastrophic 
consequences if monetary confidence is 
undermined at the same time." 
80. There is no point in stressing the prophesy 
of this remark, although it may seem premature 
to have envisaged in 1968 a situation comparable 
to that of 1929. 
81. In fact, it was the oiJ crisis which came to 
a head in autumn 1973 and triggered off a suc-
cession of events not confined to oil and which 
will probably have a far-reaching effect on the 
structure of the western economy. 
82. Because the crisis arose from the increased 
price and reduced output of oil, Europe was 
particularly affected because it had only very 
limited oil and energy resources. But the whole 
world is now affected and the search for solu-
tions seems even harder since a major recession 
is now looming up throughout the world. A 
distinction must however be made between the 
oil - or energy - aspect of the crisis and its 
financial aspects, however closely linked they 
may be. 
(i) The oil crisis 
83. The oil crisis started at the beginning of 
1973 when certain countries such as Kuwait 
reduced their output and restrictions were placed 
on the consumption of oil products, apparently 
because the refining and distrilbuting systems 
were not well organised in several western coun-
tries. 
84. However, it gathered its full momentum 
after the Israeli-Arab war in Oetober 1973, with 
the twofold decision taken first by the Arab 
countries and then by all the oil-producing coun-
tries, to limit output and increase the price of 
oil considerably. World production has since 
stagnated, increasing by only 0.8% in 1974. 
Prices have levelled off at about $10 per barrel 
at source and consumption has also been reduced 
in most western countries. 
85. The crisis thus has both political and eco-
nomic roots and the measures which must be 
taken affect both fields. 
86. (a) In the political field, the aim of all the 
oil-consuming countries is to avoid being boycot-
ted, as was the case beginning in October 1973, 
and to put an end to the inconskl.erate rise in oil 
prices. This implies : 
87. (i) Immediate measures to meet the most 
serious supply problems. At the end of 1973, the 
United States Government suggested that the 
industrialised countries concert their policies of 
reserves and organise mutual assistance to help 
any countries which might be boycotted. The 
Washington conference on 15th January 1974 
resulted in decisions in this field which afford 
some form of guarantee for all member coun-
tries of the International Energy Agency. 
88. (ii) Nevertheless, it is essential to seek 
peace and stability in the Middle East if situa-
tions such as existed in that area in October 1973 
are to be avoided. This is probably one of the 
reasons why the United States Secretary of State, 
Mr. Kissinger, devoted much time and effort in 
197 4 and at the beginning of 1975 to attempting 
by every means to reconcile the views of the 
1973 belligerents and induce them to reach com-
promises on which lasting peace might be estab-
lished in the Middle East. 
89. At the beginning of April 1975, these 
attempts seem to have failed. The very serious 
consequences which may ensue at a time of pos-
sible internal unrest in the Arab world 'and when 
the Geneva conference is emerging as the only 
forum in which Middle East affairs can be con-
sidered- but with the Soviet Union- render 
the cohesion of western policies in the area even 
more essential. 
90. It is quite evident that some aspects of 
United States policy in the area do not meet 
with the full approval of the European allies of 
the United States. However, Europe has too 
much interest in the success of the United States' 
peace efforts to do anything which might thwart 
this policy. Europe and the United States must 
therefore work closely together on matters affect-
ing the Middle East, and the NATO fl"8Jllework 
seems the most appropriate place to do so. It is 
known that much of the North Atlantic Council's 




91. (iii) The search for stable prices does not 
necessarily mean a reduction in present prices, 
for the maintenance of relatively high prices 
can but encourage researeh for and the develop-
ment of new energy resources, whether they be 
high cost oil drawn from American oil-shale and 
tar-sands or from the bed of the North Sea or 
nuclear energy. Stabilisation of prices impHes 
agreement between producer and consumer coun-
tries and perhaps indexation of the price of oil 
as is claimed by the producer countries. But if 
the consumer countries do not wish to start 
global negotiations with the producer countries 
at a disadvantage they must first reach a degree 
of agreement among themselves. Here too the 
United States Government has made a consider-
able effort since autumn 1973 and the Group of 
Twelve has directed most of its work towards 
such an agreement between the industrialised 
countries. 
92. Some European governments felt that a 
conference of producer and consum.er countries 
would be better able to reach general agreement 
on prices, although the United States Government 
was not very much in favour of the idea. How-
ever, it fell in with the proposal and a prepara-
tory meeting was held in Paris at the beginning 
of April 1975. The difficulties encountered stem 
less from opposition between the United States 
and the Western European countries than from 
divergencies between producer countries, between 
producers ·and consumers ·and, finaJlly, between 
the EEC member countries. There are differences 
mainly over the preparation of the agenda and 
the list of participants. They prove, if proof 
were necessary, the risk of holding conferences 
on a world scale when western views have not 
been harmonised by means of serious consulta-
tions. 
93. (b) In the economic field, it is evident that 
the increased price of oil and of some raw 
materials and agricultural produce must lead the 
industrialised countries to follow a new course. 
94. (i) Energy savings have been made in the 
industrialised countries. Because, on the one 
hand, the low price of energy had encouraged a 
certain amount of waste and, on the other, a 
depressionary economic situation has led to a 
slow-down in industry, it has been possible to 
reduce oil consumption in the West in 1974, 
varying, among the EEC member countries, from 
3.7 % in Ireland to 25.7 % in Denmark. While 
it seems necessary to combat waste, it may be 
suspected that should the economic situation 
recover energy consumption would again rise 
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and the economy measures, which have moreover 
not usually •been very stringently applied by 
the governments, will have no lasting effect. 
95. Moreover, it must be realised thaJt savings 
were mainly due to a reduction in economic 
activity throughout the West and, accessoriily, to 
the particularly mild winter of 197 4-75. It would 
therefore be wrong to attribute them to the 
successful policies pursued by the various 
western governments. 
96. (ii) Most western countries decided in 
1973 and 197 4 to increase oil drilling and pro-
duction. However, the expected results do not yet 
appear to have materialised. A typical example 
is that ·although President Nixon had asked the 
United States in his speech on the state of the 
union in January 197 4 to speed up oil drilling 
and production, American o:iJl output was in fact 
3.78% lower in 1974. Similarly, in Western 
Europe production of North Sea oil does not 
seem to have been so successful as had been 
expected. 
97. There is every reason to fear that the 
temporary reduction in oil consumption ·and the 
relative easing of prices at the beginning of 1975, 
together with measures taken by many European 
countries to support their currencies, may 
further delay a policy of large-scale investment, 
however necessary. 
98. It should be added that world oil output 
rose by only 0.8% in 1974 and that it fell by 
26.4 % in Libya, 18 % in Kuwait, 11 % in V ene-
zuela, 4.4 % in Iraq and 3.1 % in Canada. 
99. (iii) This is probably why the United States 
Government is now considering fixing •a lower 
price for oil as well as a ceiling. A sharp fall in 
oil prices would discourage efforts to prospect 
for and extract oil in North America, offshore 
or in the Arctic since its cost price would inevit-
ably be high. Similarly, the search for alternative 
sources of energy might be slowed down con-
sidembly, and this would be a serious threat for 
the future. 
100. In 197 4 and particularly in the first 
months of 1975, there was a noticeable reduction 
in demand for oil on the world market. While 
this reduction has so far had favourable reper-
cussions since it has led to a stabilisation or 
even a slight lowering of Middle East oil prices, 
there is now considerable uncertainty a;bout the 
future of the oil market. For instance, in 
February 1975, it was learnt that although the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi, with a population of 
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60,000, an oil output of 68 million tons and 
revenues of $4,000 million in 1974, seemed cer-
tain of having a high income, it was in reality 
experiencing serious financial diificulties. The 
Emir apparently thought he could speculate on 
an increase in oil prices and subsidise Ban-
gladesh, Somaliland, Egypt, Syria and Jordan, 
as well as nationrulist movements in the Philip-
pines and Eritrea, lend the IMF $100 million 
and invest large sums on the spot. An unforeseen 
reduction in the quantities of oil extracted on its 
territory and a slight lowering of prices sufficed 
to reverse the situation. A similar situation has 
also been reported in Oman which earned about 
$1,000 million in 1974 with an output of 14.2 
million tons of oil. 
101. Produoor '8Jld consumer countries therefore 
seem to have a common interest in reaching 
agreement on stabilising demand and prices for 
oiJ.. The United States, after initial reservations 
about the European proposal for a world energy 
conference, seems to have rallied to the idea in 
February 1975. This should allow the western 
countries to move forward together in preparing 
this conference which may be of considemble 
importance for the future of the world economy 
in the next few years. 
(li) The financial crisis 
102. This is closely linked with the oil cns1s 
although, to a large extent, it started earlier. The 
over-r81pid deV'aluation of western currencies was 
one of the reasons why the oi!l-producing coun-
tries reduced output and sharply increased 
prices. On the other hand, the oil crisis led to 
huge tmns:fers of money fu countries which had 
no means of investing large sums on the spot 
and brou~t an influx of speculative capitaJl into 
the West at the same time •as payments were 
being thrown out of balance in a number of 
industrialised countries. Thus, measures which 
had for a long time been considered essential if 
the international monetary system was to be put 
in order have now assumed even greaJter 
importance and additional measures must also 
be taken to correct the balance-of-paYJilents 
deficit and reintroduce into the economic cycle 
money accumulated by the oN-producing coun-
tries. 
(a) Balance-of-payments problems 
103. There are wide variations in the way in 
which the western countries are affected by 
increased oil prices. Some, such as the Federal 
Republic and the Netherlands, have managed to 
maintain ·a surplus balance of payments. Others, 
such as France, had extremely large deficits in 
1974, but have hopes of correcting the situation 
fairly quickly. In others, such as Italy and the 
United Kingdom, .the deficit has worsened and 
they may soon be in an extremely difficult posi-
tion. 
104. According to statistics for July 1974, ItaJy, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark have suf-
ficient reserves to meet the deficit in their 
balance of payments for eight months, Fmnce 
for sixteen months, Ireland seventeen months, 
Canada four years and four months, the United 
States fifteen years and Belgium forty-four 
years. Although these forecasts improved during 
the second half of 1974, the situation is still 
serious. 
105. In general, the western countries have had 
to try to increase their exports in order to buy 
the oil they needed and curb their consumption 
in order to reduce their balance-of-payments 
deficit and retain a surplus production for their 
exports. Measures to limit consumption have 
generally increased unemployment which few 
countries will be oB~ble to stand for long. There is 
also a danger that in order to meet the situation 
countries with the greatest difficulties may be 
tempted to resort to protectionist measures which 
would inevitably extend the crisis to the supplier 
countries and break down the economic solidarity 
of the West. 
106. When the Group of Ten met in Washington 
in January 1975 it 1lherefore decided to set up 
a solidarity fund ·as soon as possible, open to all 
OECD countries, with $25,000 million available 
for •a period of two years. 
107. The aim is to allow countries which have 
completely exhausted all other sources of loans 
to draw on the fund if the situation becomes too 
serious. Although there is still some uncertainty 
about the conditions in whicll assistance will be 
granted, it is quite obviously in the general 
interest of the West for the solidarity of the 
members of the Atlantic Alliance to be brought 
into play to save the West from a crisis which 
might soon become catastrophic. 
(b) Recycling petrodollars 
108. The very sharp rise in the price of oil 
caused far-reaching upheav81ls in the distribu-
tion of wealth throughout the world. This hap-
pened so quickly that a large number of oil-
producing countries are now incapable of rein-
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vesting anything more than a small part of their 
revenues in their own countries. In 1974, for 
instance, Libya was able to spend only 50 % of 
its income from oil on its own development, Iran 
45 %, Saudi Arabia 25 %, Kuwait 20 %, the 
Emirates 9 % and Qatar 10 %. Even the more 
populated countries do not have nearly enough 
outlets on the spot for their oil income. 
109. For instance, in 197 4 Venezuela was able 
to invest only 45 % of its income on the spot, 
Nigeria 70 % and Iraq, Indonesia and Algeria 
90%. 
110. Thus from year to year these countries are 
building up sizeable monetary reserves. On 30th 
November 1974, Saudi Arabia had reserves of 
$12,730 million, the fourth highest in the world 
after the Federal Republic, the United States 
and Japan, and before France. Iran is in seventh 
place with more than $7,000 million and Vene-
zuela tenth with $5,570 million. Nigeria, Libya 
and Kuwait aJso hold large monetary reserves. 
111. The fact that in 1973 Saudi Arabia had 
only $2,500 million demonstrates the extent of 
the revolution in the distribution of monetary 
reserves throughout the world. A reasonable sup-
position was that, if the present tendency con-
tinued, within the next ten years the oil-producing 
countries would have accumulated almost all 
the international monetary reserves despite their 
efforts to use their oil income to purchase heavy 
equipment from the industrialised countries in 
order to develop their overall economic structure. 
It now seems that large-seaJ.e requirements in the 
OPEC countries are increasing steadily. 
112. The problem therefore remains how to 
increase recycling of the vast sums which the 
oil-producing countries are now accumulating. 
If this problem is not solved the industrialised 
countries will be forced to slow down productiOID. 
structurally in order to reduce their purchases 
of oil and raw materials and this will have 
disastrous effects on the countries of the third 
world. In short, a major crisis would then 
threaten the whole world. 
113. Assistance by oil-producing countries to 
other underdeveloped countries with the greatest 
investment needs cam. naturally help to make the 
world economy work. It is nevertheless clear that 
the oil-producing countries wil!l retain large sur-
pluses and will seek, as they are already doing, 
to make worthwhile investments in the industria-
lised countries. In many respects, it is important 
to attract this new wealth to the possibilities of 
investment in the industrialised countries, and it 
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is in the interest of the western countries to faci-
litate such investment of petrodollars. 
114. However, the search for the highest returns 
when currencies are fluctuating means that these 
investments are often unst.able and large-scale 
movements of capital lead to the excessive infla-
tion of some western currencies and the collapse 
of others. Thus, at the beginning of 1975, the 
decision of the Kuwait Government not to accept 
the pound as payment for the oil it sold led to 
a fall in the pound whereas the flow of dollars 
into Switzerland compelled the Swiss Govern-
ment to take drastic measures to prevent specula-
tion inflating the value of the SwU:s franc on a 
scale which the Swiss economy could not bear. 
115. The influx of petrodollars is thus forcing 
the West to take a whole series of measures to 
maintain monetary stability and to allow the 
poorest countries to meet the crisis. Thus, at its 
meeting in J am.uary 1975, the International 
Monetary Fund decided to open a special account 
with funds provided jointly by the oil-exporting 
countries and the industrialised countries in 
order to lend money to the poorer countries at 
fairly low interest rates. 
116. It was also necessary to give the oil-pro-
ducing countries, which now hold a large pro-
portion of the world's monetary reserves, a much 
larger share than before in the IMF itself. The 
IMF therefore decided to raise the total quotas 
of member countries by 32.5 % by doubling the 
quota of the oil-producing countries and limiting 
the quota of countries whose monetary reserves 
had fallen the mOEit as a result of the crisis, as 
in the case of the United Kingdom. At the same 
time, the IMF decided to abolish the official 
price for gold and its members' obligation to 
guarantee part of their contribution to the fund 
in gold. Thus, the role of gold in the inter-
national monetary system should gradually be 
reduced, perhaps to disappear altogether in the 
very near future. 
117. This is probably a wise step for there is 
no longer much connection between the value 
of national currencies and gold reserves held by 
the central banks. However, gold played a major 
role in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies in forcing States to accept monetary 
discipline since they could not create new cur-
rency if they did not have corresponding reserves 
of gold, otherwise the exchange rate for their 
currency would collapse. 
118. One of the IMF's main tasks should be to 
find means of imposing such discipline without 
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recourse to gold. This is particularly important 
since the United States Government, which 
obviously plays a leading role in the world eco-
nomy, seems to be relaxing the measures it had 
taken to stamp out inflation. 
(c) The United States and the crisis 
119. In his speech on the state of the union in 
Washington on 16th January 1975, President 
Ford stressed the need to revive the American 
economy to combat stagnation, a declining gross 
national product, the falling value of the dollar 
and growing unemployment. 
120. The deflationary measures taken by the 
Nixon government produced a sharp fall in 
American economic activity in the last months 
of 197 4. During the fourth quarter of 197 4, the 
American gross national product, calculated in 
constant dollars, shrank at an annual rate of 
9.1 % as compared with 1.9 % in the previous 
quarter, making a total of 2.2 % for 197 4 ·as a 
whole, whereas in 1973 the gross national pro-
duct, at constant value, had risen by 5.9 %. This 
is the largest reduction since the American recon-
version crisis in 1946. 
121. Further, during the last quarter of 197 4 
inflation in the United States reached a record 
13.7 %, the highest since the second world war, 
giving an inflation rate of 10.2% for 1974, the 
highest since 1947. A budgetary deficit of 
$60,000 million has been announced for the 
financial year 1975, which might stimulate the 
inflation which so far had been contained. 
122 But consumption expenditure fell by $4,500 
million during the last quarter of 1974. Stocks 
of unsold goods rose by $14,400 million during 
the same quarter, while productive investment 
slowed down considerably to only $1,800 million 
compared with $2,700 million during the pre-
VIous quarter. There ·is every indication that this 
reduction in the gross national product will 
continue for some months. 
123. These various factors of United States 
domestic policy have thus led the American 
Government to give priority to resuming indus-
trial activity over defending its currency. The 
immediate result was a further fall in the dolLar 
on the international market and resumed specu-
lation in certain European currencies. It is still 
difficult to asseES the full consequences. 
124. It is evidently in the interests of the whole 
western world for the United States to take steps 
to contain the crisis and prevent it from spread-
ing. It is nevertheless obvious that the anti-
inflationary polricies hitherto pursued by these 
countries will have to be completely revised to 
meet the new situation. by great increase in 
the exchange rate of certain. currencies will 
cause export and production problems for 
Western Europe. 
125. The question now facing the western world 
as a whole is what rate of inflation it can stand 
and for how long. It has proved capable of 
bearing the consequences for a short time at the 
price of very high unemployment. The liberal 
economy is being put to the test, also 88 regards 
a minimum of essenti:a.l co-operation and harmon-
isation in order to tackle the dangers on a multi-
lateral basis. by relapse into inflation threatens 
other economies. Harmonisation should not be 
limited to government co-operation alone. In our 
democracies, parliaments have to play a most 
important and resp0118ible role. The European 
parliamentary assemblies can also promote an 
exchange of information between members of 
national parliaments. 
126. It therefore appears that the international 
monetary situation as it has developed since the 
October 1973 crisis calls for urgent and close 
co-ordination between the United States and its 
European and Japanese partners so that the 
safeguard measures each country takes in turn 
do not increase the rate of inflation throughout 
the world even more than in 197 4 nor aggravate 
and extend the crisis and underemployment and 
further reduce the gross national product. 
127. The majority of the OECD countries 
decided to take effective measures to meet oil 
supply emergencies by establishing an inter-
national energy programme to be implemented 
through an International Energy Agency. 
128. They are to maintain reserves sufficient to 
meet consumption for at least sixty days. 
129. Each participating country is to prepare 
a programme of contingent oil demand restraint 
measures. 
130. They are determined to reduce their 
dependence on imported oil in the longer term 
by developing alternative sources of energy, 
finding ways and means of reducing the growth 
of consumption and comb:itning research and 
development efforts. 
131. AlthQugh it is regrettable that no agree-
ment has been reached on a unified policy for 
all OECD countries, the international energy 
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programme certainly provides a means of 
making a multHateral effort to tackle future 
energy problems. 
V. Conclusions 
132. A cursory analysis of the international 
situation in the political, defence, economic and 
financial fields leads to the conclusion that the 
West is now facing dangers more serious for its 
survival than any since 1955. 
133. In the relatively calm period of steady 
economic progress from 1965 to 1973, the build-
ing of Europe appeared to be an essential aim 
of the Western European countries. In view of 
the gravity of present-day problems and the 
increasing interdependence of Europe and the 
United States in face of a crisis whose pro-
portions may soon become catastrophic for the 
very survival of the West and the values which 
are the basis of its liberal and democratic poli-
tical system, absolute priority must be given to 
agreement between Europe and the United 
States on meeting security problems and those 
raised by the energy crisis and the redistribu-
tion of the world's wealth. 
134. Recent developments in Vietnllim and the 
statement on behalf of President Ford that 
"this is not our war" have created further hesita-
tions about the fulfilment of United States com-
mitments towards its allies throughout the world. 
There is a fall in public support for any kind 
of commitment. Will the United States continue 
to be one of the two powers competing in Asia, 
Africa and elsewhere Y Your Rapporteur believes 
that Americans will first look after their own 
interests. A threat to Europe is also a threat to 
the United States. Even when world leadership 
is no longer accepted, the Atlantic Alliance wiU 
still be able to count on full American support. 
It is essential for President Ford to reassure the 
allies as to the NATO commitments. 
135. Although it is desira;ble to strive for Euro-
pean union, particularly so that Europeans may 
assert their views within the western world, 
union alone is not ca'Pable of solving the prob-
lems facing the West. A global effort is eE~~ential 
to meet the dangers now looming up and it 
cannot wait for Europeans to reach agreement 
on the often mythical maJtters which divide them. 
136. This priority is in no way intended to 
maintain the privileges enjoyed by the indus-
trialised countries but rather to allow the har-
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monious development of the world economy for 
the particular benefit of the underdeveloped 
countries which have no natural wealth in the 
form of oil or raw materials. 
137. A question which arises is whether or not 
the West requires a different framework for the 
latter part of the seventies and for the eighties. 
138. The decision-m.aking centres of the West 
should make arrangements which take account 
of shifts of military and eeonomic power and the 
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need for the democratic nations to co-operate in 
an expanding world. 
139. Europe was the cradle of the major poll• 
tical systems deriving from Christianity, liberal-
ism and Marxism. 
140. Europe should again demonstrate its creat-
ive abilities and develop a framework for pre-
serving peace and for internationalism further-
ing the spirit of co-operation. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Co-operation with the United States 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Plket 
28th May 1975 
In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraphs I (b) and (c) and repla.oe them by the 
following: 
"(b) promote the extension of OECD's activities in the energy field;" 
Signed : Piket 
1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment adopted). 
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Amendment No. 2 
Co-operation with the United States 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Reale 
l. In the draft Recommendation proper, delete paragraph 1 (c). 
29th May 1975 
2. Alternatively: in paragraph (c), leave out "played this rale" a.nd insert "play its rale", a.nd reverse 
the order of paragraphs (c) and (d). 
Signed : Reale 
1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment negatived by the adoption of Amendment No. 1). 
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Amendment No. 3 
Co-operation with the United States 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Bettiol 
Leave out paragraph B.2 of the draft Recommendation proper. 
1. See 7th Sitting, 29th May 1975 (Amendment negatived). 
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29th May 1975 
Signed : Bettiol 
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Recommendation 248 on the European Space Agency and the reply of the Council 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Oommittu: Mr. de Montuquiou 
(Chairman); MM. WatTen, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Adriaensens, Boucheny, Oarler, Cornelissen, Fletcher 
(Substitute: Brown), GiJUer, Lemer, Lewis (Substitute: 
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Lester), Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Pecoraro, Schmitt 
(Substitute : Oemeau), Bckwencke, de Stexhe (Substitute : 
de Bmyne), Treu, VaZlei:l:. 
N. B. The names of Repreaentatitlu who took part in the 
vote are primed m italicB. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the EuropeGII Space Agency 
DOOUMBNT 670 
Congratulating the governments of the member countries of the European Space Agency on the 
establishment of a new European space organisation ; 
Aware of the need to give priority to the European space activities pursued within the Agency and 
noting governments' willingness to integrate their future national programmes in a. joint European pro-
gramme; 
Considering the agreed programme on scientific and application satellites and the Ariane launcher 
and the vast sums of money involved ; 
Convinced of the need to devote the closest attention to the application of space research and develop-
ment in preparation for subsequent commercial use ; 
Considering that in the early 1980s space activities will leave the experimental phase and start a 
new era of operational utilisation ; 
Considering especia.lly Europe's present r6le in the new space transportation system : the American 
shuttle and the European development of Spacelab ; 
Impressed by the importance of the American military space programme and its applications which 
will revolutionise existing strategic and tactical concepts, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THB CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To define Europe's common space policy for the future in world-wide application satellite systems 
and the ways and means of collaborating with the United States in the use of Spacelab and its successors ; 
2. To use the good offices of ESA for concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the policies of the 
member States in all their space activities in the United Nations and other agencies, including in particular 
the United Nations Outer Space Committee; 
3. To complete the programmes already agreed to and undertake not to query their validity which 
would create uncertainty in industry ; 
4. To formulate a policy with regard to the new era of easier and cheaper access to space through 
Spacelab; 
5. To formulate an industrial policy on application satellites with a view to exporting European satellite 
systems and other space hardware especia.lly to the developing countries ; 
6. To preserve Kourou not only as a launch base for the Ariane development phase but as a general 
launch facility for Europe in the future ; 
7. To work out a European military space programme and provide the means for its implementation 





(submitted by Mr. Richter, Rapporteur) 
CHAPTER I 
Reply to the twentieth annual report 
of the Council 
1. As your Rapporteur was unable to parti-
cipate in the Committee's visit to the United 
States from 16th to 23rd March 1975, he is not 
in a position to incorporate in his report all 
the findings and information acquired by the 
Committee during the visit. However, the Chair-
man of the Committee, Mr. de Montesquiou, who 
will report on the visit in a separate document, 
has kindly provided your Rapporteur with 
certain American policy statements of interest 
for this report. 
2. Your Rapporteur has noted with satisfaction 
that American political leaders are convinced of 
the need for close co-operation between NASA 
and the European Space Agency. At its meeting 
on 15th April 1975 the ESA Council appointed 
the Director-General. The agreement setting up 
the Agency has now been signed and ratification 
can take place in the national parliaments. Your 
Rapporteur is glad that the wish expressed in 
many of the Assembly's recommendations has 
now materialised and that a European "NASA" 
has been born. At last a competent authority and 
organisation has been established to implement 
both at home and abroad the programme agreed 
to at the European Space Conference on 31st 
July 1973. 
3. Europe can participate in the post-Apollo 
programme by constructing the Spacelab. ESA 
will also design and construct a European 
maritime orbital test satellite and develop the 
Ariane launcher. It will continue the general 
studies as well as the scientific programme 
started by the European Space Research Organi-
sation (ESRO). 
4. Your Rapporteur therefore welcomes the 
positive attitude shown in Chapter II of the 
twentieth annual report of the Council where it 
is stated that the Council welcomes the Agency 
and the wider participation which has now been 
agreed to. Once solutions are found to political 
difficulties, the Agency will have every chance 
of making a good start. One of the problems 
which still had to be solved was that of Kourou. 
The solution found is that the Kourou base will 
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be maintained for launching Ariane ; the other 
members of ESA will contribute towards its 
upkeep. 
5. In its report the Council also discussed, 
within the framework of scientific, technical and 
space questions, civil and military aviation and 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. On both 
questions your Rapporteur has to remark on the 
lack of co-operation between Western European 
governments : no coherent European energy 
programme has been established and your Rap-
porteur regrets that the Council of Ministers 
has not shown more concern about military 
aviation in Europe, one of the main pillars of 
successful defence. The European military air-
craft must be standardised and the industry kept 
in being in order to ensure a constant flow of 
new aircraft should there be a demand for them. 
Time and again history has shown that it is not 
possible to rely solely on external resources if a 
speedy resupply becomes necessary. 
6. To say that the importance of the military 
sector has been recognised in the context of an 
overall nine-power industrial policy does not 
indicate the urgency with which your Rap-
porteur feels this matter should be dealt. It is 
all very well to formulate the principle of a 
concerted approach in national policies but 
experience in NATO and WEU has clearly shown 
that this is not enough. It has often been stated 
both inside and outside the Assembly that the 
formulation of a European military procurement 
policy is a desirable goal and that a study 
should be made of the procurement of defence 
equipment, including military aircraft. However, 
your Rapporteur is of the opinion that military 
aircraft should not be considered within the 
overall framework of defence equipment pro-
curement but as a separate item in view of their 
high cost and sophisticated technology. Even 
relatively simple fighter aircraft now cost $5-8 
million, while the cost of the B-1 bomber, for 
example, is estimated by the Pentagon at some 
$80 million. A country's aviation budget is often 
so high that it affects most of its industrial, 
social and economic policy and it should there-
fore be examined separately. As no individual 
European country is able to bear the research 
and development as well as the production costs 
of such an item of military hardware, a Euro-
pean approach is essential. 
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7. Your Rapporteur found the Council's report 
lacking in expression of serious concern with 
regard to the problems of civil and military avia-
tion and energy problems which are vital for the 
economic future of Europe and extremely 
important for its defence and independence. 
CHAPTER II 
The new space transportation system 
(a) Spacelab developments 
8. In 1973 and 1974, practical details were 
being worked out for the establishment of the 
European Space Agency. The ESRO structure 
has been transformed and three programme 
directorates have been set up: Spacelab, com-
munications programmes, and science and meteo-
rological programmes. 
9. The Spacelab programme is midway between 
science and applications. Spacelab itself is a 
highly sophisticated vehicle and a very expensive 
one - 300 million accounting units - and its 
exploitation will be extremely interesting. In 
order to have a better idea of Spacelab, on 30th 
October 1974 the Committee visited VFW-
Fokker in Bremen where Spacelab is being 
constructed. It was briefed on its development 
and inspected the Spacelab mock-up. 
10. The Fokker group has a 100 % subsidiary 
company - ERNO - which deals with all 
problems related to space technology and system 
engineering for VFW-Fokker. In mid-1973 the 
European Space Conference dooided to pursue 
the Spacelab programme and last year ESRO 
entrusted the building of Spacelab to ERNO. 
With the Spacelab programme Europe has 
entered into a real partnership with the United 
States. ESRO's ten member States 1 are parti-
cipating in this programme together with Aus-
tria. The main share, over 50 %, and the system 
management are the responsibility of the Federal 
Republic. 
11. With ERNO as the prime contractor, a con-
sortium has been formed with sixteen companies 
from the participating European countries. 
1. Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
and, United Kingdom. 
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Development started in June 1974 and will be 
completed in 1979 with the delivery of the first 
flight unit. The initial flight is scheduled in 
1980. 
12. Current plans call for the production of 
several Spacelabs. Planned experiments are in the 
scientific and economic fields. Under space con-
ditions experiments will be conducted in the 
following fields : astronomy, atmospheric physics, 
earth observation, communication/navigation, 
space processing, technology, life science. The 
current planning of NASA shows Spacelab 
flights to 1989 with approximately 500 missions 
and 682 payloads, i.e. various experiment com-
binations that will be self-contained, of which 
346 are automatic and 336 are Spacelab payloads. 
It is estimated that approximately 10 % of the 
economic and scientific experiments for Spacelab 
will be supplied by European countries. 
13. In the first half of this year the user com-
munity in Europe and the United States will be 
invited to propose specific experiments for 
Spacelab's first mission within the framework of 
the experimental objectives defined by ESRO 
and NASA. The selection of experiments will 
begin around July this year. 
14. Spacelab - Europe's contribution to the 
post-Apollo programme - is the largest and 
most ambitious European space project ever 
undertaken and provides a means for entry into 
the manned spaceflight field. It also demon-
strates true co-operation between the United 
States and Europe with the present alignment 
of responsibility as follows : NASA will build 
the shuttle, Western Europe the Spacelab and, 
later, NASA will build the tug. 
(b) The shuttle developments 
15. In Mr. de Montesquiou's report on an earlier 
visit to the United States (18th-22nd October 
1971) a. he described the shuttle as consisting of 
two vehicles, each with a two-man crew : the 
launch vehicle and the orbiter which straddled 
the booster. This was the design most favoured 
by NASA but it had to be abandoned for budget-
ary reasons. In January 1972 NASA decided that 
it should be replaced by a solid rocket booster, 
which would be retrieved after use and refitted 
for use again. The external tank providing fuel 
for the shuttle's main engine will be the only 
expendable element of the shuttle system. 
1. Document 564. 
SPACE SHUTTLE MISSION PROFILE 
16. The orbiter too will be fully reusable and 
about the size of a DC-9. It will carry a crew of 
two, plus two passengers, and will be capable of 
carrying more passengers in special modules in 
the payload bay. The flight environment will not 
require special training. The orbiter will stay in 
orbit for periods ranging from a week to a 
month. Its tasks will be to ferry people and 
supplies, or to act as a rescue ship. 
17. By replacing most existing launch vehicles, 
the shuttle is expected to reduce the launch cost 
per kilo of payload from the present minimum 
of $1,300-1,500 to about $330. 
SPACE SHUTTLE USES 
COMMUNICATIONS ~ 
~ 0 






18. With the shuttle, NASA will be able to con-
tinue a manned programme and use the shuttle 
for unmanned flights too. The Spacelab will be 
placed in low orbit by the shuttle system. 
19. The shuttle is the largest item in the present 
American space programme and dominates the 
NASA budget. When NASA began the space 
shuttle programme, research and development 
costs were estimated at $5.15 billion in 1971 
dollars. Because of budgetary constraints the 
programme has been slowed down by 13 to 15 
months and the cost estimate in 1971 dollars has 





~NATIONAL ~ DEFENSE 
~ INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 
The uses of the space shuttie will include launching .of unmanned 
spacecraf{ into orbit for missions such as those indicated. 
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today's dollars. Although the space shuttle pro-
gramme is encountering technical problems they 
are not of such magnitude as to cause a delay in 
the programme or otherwise increase the cost. 
20. The basic purpose of the space shuttle is to 
make it easier and less costly to go from the 
earth into space. The promise of space is such 
that space operations will become routine and 
the space shuttle is a step in that direction. 
21. The United States Department of Defence 
is committed to support and utilise the NASA 
space shuttle. 
(c) The tug and the interim upper stage 
22. From the very beginning it was clear that 
the space tug should be built as the third element 
of the post-Apollo programme. The tug will be 
used to bring satellites from low earth orbit into 
high synchronous orbit - a task which goes 
beyond the capability of the shuttle. The main 
reasons for developing the space tug are the high 
traffic rate to synchronous orbits, the high 
energy requirement of planetary payloads and 
the payload bay space availability with long 
payloads. 
23. For budgetary reasons NASA will not build 
an operational space tug before 1983. However, 
the Department of Defence needs such a vehicle 
to continue its satellites programme and it there-
fore decided to develop an interim tug which is 
now called the interim upper stage. It has six 
contractors studying this element of the space 
transportation system which, as forerunner of 
the space tug, will have to handle all missions 
from 1979 to 1983. 
24. The NASA space tug will incorporate 
advanced technology and be designed to handle 
all the NASA, Department of Defence and non-
United States Government space missions. 
CHAPTER III 
The Ariane launcher 
25. During the Committee's previous visit to the 
United States in 1971 it had a number of discus-
sions on the possibilities of using American 
launchers for European satellites. The result of 
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these discussions can be found in the report by 
Mrs. Walz 1 • 
26. The situation on the availability of Ameri-
can launchers was set out in September 1971 in 
an exchange of letters between the then United 
States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. U. Alexis 
Johnson, and the then Chairman of the European 
Space Conference, Mr. Theo Lefevre, Belgian 
Minister for Scientific Policy and Planning. Mrs. 
W alz summarised the position in paragraph 53 
of her report as follows : 
"Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the 
recent American proposals give more assur-
ance to the Europeans that American launch 
facilities will be available ; they are certainly 
a step forward compared to earlier pro-
posals. Nevertheless, if the European govern-
ments agree to act on the basis of Mr. John-
son's latest letter, there will still be a certain 
risk. However, in order to collaborate one 
must have confidence in one's partner. The 
American authorities have already made it 
clear that the existing plan for an opera-
tional regional system of communication 
satellites, as proposed by the European 
Space Conference, is acceptable to them ; it 
would 'cause measurable but not significant 
economic harm to INTELSAT'." 
27. During the Committee's recent visit to the 
United States this question was again raised. 
Senator Moss, Chairman of the Senate Commit-
tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, made a 
statement on this subject, and pointed out that he 
supported the United States policy of providing 
launch assistance on an appropriate reimbursable 
basis to other countries and organisations where 
the spacecraft were intended for peaceful pur-
poses. He referred to the White House press 
release of 9th October 1972 and said : 
"In this respect I will make a number of 
points: 
( i) there has never been an occasion when 
the European Community, collectively 
through ESRO, or a European govern-
ment singly, has been denied United 
States lalmch services ; 
( ii) the United States experience in 
working with the Europeans has been 
1. Document 562, 29th November 1971, paragraphs 
45 to 52. 
good and the launch vehicle policy to 
date has wide acceptance ; 
(iii) the Congress has never insisted on any 
restriction other than fair and equi-
table reimbursement ; 
(iv) the President of the United States has 
declared that United States launcher 
capability is available to all nations 
on a non-discriminatory reimbursable 
basis to launch spacecraft which are 
intended for peaceful purposes." 
28. It is logical to suppose that European coun-
tries have to implement international treaties 
such as the INTELSAT agreement once they 
have acceded to them. Senator Moss ended his 
statement by declaring that he did not foresee 
any situation in which a serious problem would 
arise for any of the European States. 
29. The American position is therefore less rigid 
than it was some years ago. 
30. In the meantime, on 28th December 1973, 
the ESRO countries decided to start the Ariane 
launcher programme. The execution of the pro-
gramme was entrusted to the French space 
agency (ONES) which would bear 62.5% of the 
cost of the programme, which was estimated at 
371 million accounting units. The participants in 
the programme would contribute, in their 
national currency, the following percentages or 





of Germany DM. 320 m. 1 





Other countries 1.37% 
31. The United Kingdom would not make a 
direct contribution but reached a bilateral agree-
ment with France whereby it contributed indi-
rectly. 
1. Fixed contribution, subject to revision in 1978. 
2. Fixed contribution. 
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32. The Ariane launcher project definition was 
completed at the end of 1973 and in February 
1974 ONES was authorised to initiate the 
development activities. 
33. On 16th October 1974 the French Govern-
ment agreed that ONES could go ahead with the 
Ariane programme but at the same time several 
French national experiments were reduced. The 
French Government hoped that the other govern-
ments would agree to implement the decisions 
taken in Brussels in July 1973 concerning the 
Europeanisation of the national programmes, i.e. 
that the nine other ESRO countries would parti-
cipate in the maintenance of the French base at 
Kourou. 
34. As the Ariane launcher programme has been 
agreed to, Europe will need Kourou as the laun-
ching base. There is no point in having Ariane 
without Kourou since the Agency cannot nego-
tiate an agreement with NASA to launch Ariane 
from Cape Kennedy. Even if this were politically 
possible, the building of the launch tower at 
Cape Kennedy would be extremely complicated 
and in the long run the Agency would still be 
dependent on the United States. 
35. During the Committee's visit to the United 
States it became clear that many American 
authorities believed that in the last two years 
Europe had made great strides in building satel-
lites. In general they are equal to the American 
satellites and in some respects have a superior 
technology, although of course in certain other 
fields of satellite technology the Americans are 
ahead. However, useful collaboration is possible 
only if both sides are able to contribute a signi-
ficant level of technology. This is the main dif-
ference between now and several years ago. The 
satellites launched have been successful, their 
cost quite reasonable and management by both 
the Agency and industry adequate. 
36. Proof of this is that Comsat General (a 
subsidiary of Comsat) has invited the Agency to 
collaborate in maritime satellites. The infra-
structure for space activities in industry and in 
the Agency now exists in Europe. Consequently, 
the European governments having agreed that 
the Agency would handle application, telecom-
munications, air navigation, marine and meteor-
ological satellites, the system should be exploited 
outside member countries and outside Europe 
and the Agency should therefore support Euro-
pean industry in its efforts to find markets for 
the system. 
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37. There is no doubt whatsoever that to find 
these markets Europe should offer a complete 
system, i.e. launchers, launch facilities, satellites 
and ground stations. 
Conclusions 
38. When your Rapporteur submitted Recom-
mendation 248 on the European Space Agency 
to the Committee in April last year, he stressed 
the political reasons for losing no time in pro-
viding this Agency with the wherewithal to fulfil 
its task. The recommendation was adopted by 
the Assembly on 18th June 1974. The Council 
replied on 16th September 1974 1 that negotia-
tions on the appointment of a director-general 
and on other outstanding issues were taking 
place at the European Space Conference. 
However, it was a year before solutions were 
found for the questions outstanding. This again 
shows the slowness with which the European 
governments act on relatively minor points and 
how difficult it is to set the decision-making 
machinery in motion. However, in the meantime 
ESRO has set up a new organisation and pro-
gramme directorates have been established. 
39. Europe's role in the development of the 
new space transportation system, especially in 
Spacelab, has been confirmed and thoughts 
should now be given as to how to widen colla-
boration with the United States and what form 
it should take in the long term. What is Europe 
going to propose with regard to the future 
management of the shuttle Y How should Europe's 
role be defined in the use of future Spacelabs Y 
The present agreements should be extended in 
the 1980s. A new policy should therefore be 
established. The governments must now begin to 
discuss the long-term programme of collaboration 
with the United States. 
40. The ten participating countries of ESA have 
agreed that the Agency should be a forum for 
concerting, harmonising and co-ordinating the 
space policies of member States. The new orga-
nisation has a mandate to integrate new national 
programmes into a common European space pro-
gramme. The drop in the amount of money which 
the national governments are prepared to spend 
on space will force them to eliminate overlap-
ping. This is possible only if all national activ-
1. See Appendix. 
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ities are openly discussed within the Agency. 
Duplication and rivalry could then be avoided. 
In the new era of easy and cheap access to 
space this will be more necessary than before. 
41. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that in 
the United Nations, and in particular in its 
Outer Space Committee, serious discussions are 
being held on space law. Significant space 
treaties have already come into being. This work 
will assume even greater importance with full 
recognition of the usefulness of television broad-
casting by satellite to community receivers and 
remote sensing. It is in Europe's highest interest 
for the member countries of ESA to speak 
insofar as possible with one voice and to this 
end they must hold discussions amongst them-
selves before adopting a public stand in the 
United Nations. 
42. In the days of ELDO and ESRO, the 
validity of programmes was sometimes queried 
after they had been agreed to. The govern-
ments of the member countries should undertake 
not to give grounds for a renewal of such uncer-
tainty for the new organisation and for industry. 
Vast sums of money are involved and if govern-
ments go back on decisions already taken, money, 
time and opportunities will be lost. 
43. By replacing most existing launch vehicles, 
the shuttle is expected to reduce the launch cost 
per kilo of payload from the present minimum 
of $1,300-1,500 to about $330. Although the con-
sequences of this cost reduction cannot yet be 
foreseen, it is likely that, just as with any other 
new transportation system, the demand will 
increase very quickly and become many times 
greater than with the old expensive system. 
Application satellites will be in demand by many 
countries and Europe should therefore formulate 
an industrial policy with a view to external 
markets. The European space industry will wish 
to reap the benefits of its space research and 
development and governments should create an 
atmosphere in which this legitimate desire can 
be fulfilled. 
44. Without Kourou it would be extremely dif-
ficult to have an independent industrial policy 
and to offer third countries a complete appli-
cation satellite system. 
45. In his statement to the Senate Committee 
on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, the Director 
of Defence Research and Engineering of the 
Pentagon declared that the new navigational 
satellite system called NAVSTAR was leaving 
its research and development stage. The highly 
accurate position and velocity measurements to 
any element of the United States forces equipped 
with NAVSTAR receivers would have a revolu-
tionary effect on the strategic and tactical forces. 
46. On the Soviet Union's defence space pro-
gramme he declared that the Soviet Union was 
spending very important sums on its military 
space programme - considered far more than is 
included in the American budget. For fiscal year 
1976 the United States space programme budget 
amounts to about $2,700 million, which is higher 
than for fiscal year 197 4. 
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4 7. As the European space effort in the military 
field cannot be handled by the European Space 
Agency because of its membership, a common 
European military space programme should be 
discussed between the defence ministers and 
other competent ministers of the member coun-
tries. In view of existing links between the 
United States and these countries, such a pro-
gramme should be in line with the United States 
military space programme. This could also be 
important for the aerospace industry in Europe. 
48. Your Rapporteur has presented these 
thoughts in the preliminary draft recommen-
dation attached to this report. 
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RECOMMENDATION 248 1 
on the European Space Agency 2 
The Assembly, 
I. Taking note of the parts of the nineteenth annual report of the Council on scientific, technological 
and space questions and considering the time taken by the Council in answering the Assembly's recom-
mendations on aviation and nuclear policies ; 
* 
** 
II. Welcoming the draft convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency ; 
Noting that it did not prove possible to bring the European space activities into the framework of 
the European Communities and hence into that of the future European political union, but considering 
that the situation might be turned to better account by promoting & wider membership of the agency ; 
Regretting that through delays in nominating & director-general and other senior officials the Euro-
pean Space Agency could not start work on 1st April 1974; 
Aware of the draft resolution on the establishment of relations between the agency and the Council 
of Europe, appended to the final act ; 
Conscious of the need made evident by the energy crisis to accelerate study, research and develop-
ment on European earth resources satellites to conduct surveys, inter alia, for deposits of concentrated 
minerals, 
RECOMMENDS TJUT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Answer in an appropriate manner and with greater alacrity the Assembly's recommendations on 
topical questions such as "&n aviation policy for Europe" and "nuclear policies" ; 
:. 
II. Invite all free Western European countries to join or be &SSociated with the European Space Agency 
and its scientific and technological work or its application satellites ; 
Convey to the governments concerned the political reasons for losing no time in providing the agency 
with the wherewithal to fulfil its task and urge the immediate appointment of & director-general and other 
senior officials in order to &SSure that the programme will be executed as foreseen ; 
Seek to include in the abovementioned convention & commitment by the European Space Agency 
to co-operate with the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union as well as with 
the national parliaments of the member countries, and to submit to them an annual report for information 
or an opinion and, if it is not possible to include this in the convention, to amend the resolution accordingly ; 
Urge the Council of the European Space Agency to implement its programme without forgetting 
to promote in the near future, in the framework of its application satellites programme, research and develop-
ment of earth resources satellites. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 duriug the Firat Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Seasion (2nd 
Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aeroepace QueatioDa (Document 639). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 148 
1. On the substance and speed of replies to Assembly recommendations, the Council draw attention 
to their reply to Assembly Recommendation 249. 
2. The Council would welcome wider participation in the European Space Agency as suggested in the 
first sub-paragraph of paragraph II of the recommendation. Those participating in the European Space 
Conference, from which the European Space Agency will be formed, include all member governments of 
the European Communities (with the exception of Luxembourg) and several other governments. The draft 
European Space Agency Convention contains provision for new membership, associate membership and 
participation by non-member States in particular programmes. 
The Council share the Assembly's concern about the delay in the appointment of a Director-General 
and other senior officials to the European Space Agency. Negotiations on this and other outstanding issues 
are at present taking place at the European Space Conference. 
As for co-operation with parliamentary bodies, draft Resolution No. 5 appended to the draft Final 
Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries set up to establish the European Space Agency is designed to 
maintain the arrangements which have applied hitherto to ELDO and ESRO. Parliamentary discussion 
of the work of these organisations was facilitated by an arrangement by which their annual reports were 
sent for information to the Council of Europe where they were debated in the Consultative Assembly. The 
texts of the draft convention and the draft resolution a.re the product of much negotiation between all the 
member States of the European Space Conference, some of whom are members of neither the European 
Communities, nor the Council of Europe nor Western European Union. Consequently, the Council do not 
consider it desirable to amend them. 
The programme agreed at the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference on 31st July 1973 
for creation of the European Space Agency, participation in the United States post-Apollo programme 
by the construction of the European Space Laboratory (SPACELAB), design and construction of a European 
Maritime Orbital Test Satellite (MAROTS) and development of a European heavy rocket launcher (Ariane), 
is already well under way. The importance of the research and development of earth resources satellites 
is recognised by most member States of the European Space Conference, several of which a.re developing 
their own earth resources surveying facilities. It is expected that earth resources satellites will be discussed 
when future programmes for applications satellites are discussed in the Council of the European Space 
Agency. 
l. Communicated to the Alllembly on 16th September 1974. 
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In preparing this report the Rapporteurs had interviews as follows : 





U nitetl States 
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Associate Deputy Minister (Policy), Department of National 
Defence, Mr. D. H. Kirkwood 
Chief of the Defence Staff, General J. A. Dextraze 
Vice-Chief, Lt.-General A. C. Hull 
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External Affairs, Mr. E. P. Black ' 
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Chef d'Etat-Major des Forces Armees, General de I' Armee Paris 
Aerienne Fran90is Maurin 20th May 1974 
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Vice-Admiral Steinhaus 20th June 1974 
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Defence Minister, Mr. H. Vredeling 
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ment, Mr. James G. Lowenstein 
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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Andrew Goodpaster 
(USA) 
Deputy Chief-of-Staff, SHAPE, Lt.-General Franz Josef Schulze 
(GEA) 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, General Ernst 
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Ferber (GEA) 5th June 1974 
Commander Central Army Group, General Davidson (USA) ~ 
Chief-of-Staff, HQ Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force, GM Barkhom 1st July 1974 
(GEAF) , 
Commander Northern Army Group, General Sir Harry Tuzo (UK) ! 
Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force, Air Marshal Sir 12th July 1974 
Nigel Maynard (UKAF) 
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H. E. Sir Edward Peck, Permanent Representative, and 
Mr. William Perry 
Dr. Gardiner Tucker, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence 
Support 
Mr. G. SchOner, Director of Armaments and Defence Research 
Mr. J. Stone, Director of Planning and Logistics 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton, Chairman of the 
Military Committee 
Aerospatiale 
21st November 1974 
Monsieur R. Chevalier, Directeur, Engins-Espace, General Crepin, ~ 2 d De be 1974 President, Euromissile, and General Chaboreau ~ n cem r 
British Aircraft Corporation 
Colonel H. Lacy, London Director, Guided Weapons Division 19th December 1974 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics 
Mr. J. B. Waite, Sales Manager, SRAAM Division 
Engins M atra 
Monsieur Jean-Luc Lagardere, General Manager, General van l 
Hinh, Military Division, Mr. Robert Wimphen, Military Division i 20th February 1975 
Selenw 
Dr. P. Pique, Director, Radar and MiBBiles 
Dr. Della Chiesa 
Dr. Marra 
General Pandolfini 
Oto M elara and Breda M eccanica Brescwna 
Admiral Glicerio Azzoni 
Dr. Andrea Francavilla 
Sistel 
Professor Giovanni Malaman, Managing Director 
Dr. M. Bartoli, Technical Director 
5th - 6th March 1975 
Mr. Lemmrick (Chapter VI) 
Paris Ministry of Defence 
Monsieur Gerard Hibon, Minister Plenipotentiary in the Private ( 
Office of the Minister I 21st April 1975 
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The Committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 18th February where it met 
with the Chairmen of the Defence Committees in the national parliaments of the WEU countries, and was 
briefed by Mr. R. Chevalier, Directeur Engins-Espace, of Aerospatiale, and by Mr. L.A. Sanson, Sales 
and Service Director, assisted by Mr. J.P. Corbett, Europe Sales Manager of British Aircraft Corporation. 
The Committee then held a joint meeting with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (the joint body 
being known as the Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments), attended by: 
Colonel J. Quaniers (Belgium), General P. Brindeau (France), Colonel R. Acker (Federal Republic 
of Germany), General V. Campana (Italy), Mr. R. P. M. van Wensen (Netherlands), Mr. W. Perry (United 
Kingdom), H. E. Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, Acting Secretary-General of WEU, H. E. Mr. Alain Plantey, 
Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, Head of the Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat. 
On 19th February the Committee with the Chairmen of the national defence committees visited 
the ballistic missile submarine base of the French Force Oceanique Strategique, where it was briefed by 
Rear-Admiral Pierre Emeury, commanding the Force Oceanique Strategique, and by Capitaine de Vaisseau 
Fages, commanding the ballistic missile submarine base. Members visited the French ballistic missile sub-
marine Foudroyant and the missile assembly shop. 
The Committee as a whole visited Athens on 18th March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. 
D. Bitsios, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with H. E. Mr. Constantin Stavropoulos, 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the following members of the Greek Parliament : MM. 
Theocharis Rendis, Andre Andrianopoulos, Demetre Franghos, Constantin Ghiatracos, Jean Mineos, 
Zacharias Kratsas, Agnelos Pnevmaticos, Achilles Papaloucas, Georges Iordanides, Constantin Coniotakis, 
Anastas Minis, Jean Charalambopoulos. The Committee much regretted that the address by H. E. Mr. E. 
Averoff, Greek Minister of Defence, had to be cancelled because of travel difficulties arising from an airport 
strike. 
The Committee visited Ankara on 20th and 21st March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. Ilhami 
San9ar, Minister of Defence, General Ol(}&y, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence, with Mr. Ereciiment 
Yavuzalp, Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Committee was then addressed by H. E. Mr. 
M. Esenbel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with the following members of the Turkish 
Parliament: Mr. Hasan Isik, Chairman; Senator Orhan Alp; Senator Ahat Alpan; General Muksin Batur; 
Senator Celikleas; Mr. Kemalettin Crokakin; Mr. llyas Inlic; Mr. Ozer Ol9men; Mr. Hasan Tosyali; 
Mr. Sirri Turanli; Senator Ahmet Yildiz. 
The Committee visited the CENTO Secretariat-General where it was received by General Ali 
Karimloo (Iran), Chairman of the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group, and the Permanent Military 
Deputies of Pakistan, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States, and by Major-General Colin C. 
Hamilton (USAF), Chief of Staff, and briefed on CENTO and its activities. 
The Committee visited the Makina Kimya Kurumu small-arms ammunition factory, where it was 
welcomed by Mr. Reci Baturalp, Director General, and briefed by Mr. Nejat Akyak, Marketing and Export 
Manager. 
On 22nd March the Committee visited HQ Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and HQ 6 Allied 
Tactical Air Force at Izmir, where it was briefed by General Melvin Zais (US Army), Commander Allied 
Land Forces South-East Europe, and by Lt.-General Sanford K. Moats, Commander 6th Allied Tactical 
Air Force, and their staffs. 
The Committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 29th April1975, when it discussed 
and adopted the present report. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers 
who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise 




on the state of European security 
The Assembly, 
( i) Having debated the state of European security in the light of the report of its Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments ; 
(ii) Believing that satisfactory detente through the various East-West negotiations can be achieved 
only if the real military capability of the Soviet Union is borne in mind, if the cohesion of the Atlantic 
Alliance is assured, and if sufficient collective defences are maintained by the NATO powers through the 
allocation of adequate resources and their most rational joint use ; 
(iii) Calling for certain organisational and planning changes on the central front; 
(iv) Stressing the importance of the northern and southern flanks to the security of Europe, and the 
need for political and military measures to prevent their isolation from the centre ; 
(v) Calling for practical measures to achieve much greater joint production of armaments, especially 
tactical missiles; 
(vi) Calling for the collective defence commitment of the Brussels Treaty to be retained in any future 
European union, and stressing the importance of Eurogroup meanwhile, as the framework for practical 
expression of the European defence identity, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
I. That it bear in mind the need for greater cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance at a time when parity 
between the superpowers has made international relations as a whole more complex and less predictable; 
2. (a) That it welcome the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at summit level to prepare the con-
ference on security and co-operation in Europe ; 
(b) That all proposals advanced by NATO countries in the MBFR negotiations should be subject 
to prior agreement in NATO, and that any reductions agreed in the MBFR negotiations should 
( i) concern first the forces of the superpowers, and ( ii) be asymmetric so as to reduce the present 
Warsaw Pact conventional superiority; (iii) may include theatre nuclear weapons; 
3. That it request the North Atlantic Council to take note of the study by General de Ma.iziere and: 
(a) to consider the availability of new and reserve formations to make any improvements in the 
deployment pattern of forces on the central front ; 
(b) to improve political decision-making procedures to make full use of available warning time in 
the event of threatened aggression ; 
(c) to revise the dictum that logistics are a national responsibility; 
(d) to modify the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons ; 
(e) to press for greater specialisation in defence tasks by country; 
4. That it ask member governments to urge : 
(a) in the North Atlantic Council (i) that full support be given to all political and military measures 
necessary to prevent the isolation of the flanks, and to ensure the necessary conditions for 
maintaining a regular supply of armaments to all allied countries; (ii) that advantage be taken 




(b) in the International Civil Aviation Organisation, that Greece and Turkey be invited to withdraw 
their respective NOTAMs that prevent aircraft flying freely between the two countries; 
5. That it request the North Atlantic Council to ensure that all bodies concerned with arms production 
concentrate on the immediate need for the introduction of standardised tactical missile systems, and that 
it adopt the following procedures : ( i) make the Military Committee responsible for determining the standard 
military characteristics to be applied in deciding on the development and the procurement of weapons 
systems, beginning with tactical missiles; (ii) make initially 1% of national research and development 
budgets available for NATO development projects to be decided by the Military Committee and Defence 
Support Division ; 
6. (a) That it draw the attention of all members to the importance of Eurogroup as the most appropriate 
organ at present in which to arrange practical matters of European defence co-operation that are 
not effectively dealt with in NATO, on the understanding that problems of nuclear defence are 
the responsibility of the Alliance as a whole ; 
(b) That it instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. Tindemans before the end of June 1975 
the views of the Council on the place of defence in a future European union, with the request 




(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman, and MM. Dankert, Duvieusart, 
WaU and Lemmrich, Rapporteurs) 
I. Introduction 
(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1.1 To mark the twentieth anniversary of the 
WEU Assembly, the Committee has produced 
a comprehensive report on the state of European 
security comprising a drwt recommendation with 
several distinct paragraphs, and an explanatory 
memorandum with correspondingly numbered 
chapters by different Rapporteurs, which com-
ment on some of the chief problems, but by no 
means all the problems, of European security 
today. 
1.2 In 1961, after the first six years of its 
activity, the Committee submitted a similar com-
prehensive report 1, on which the Assembly, in 
December 1961, adopted Recommendation 69 2• 
In this introduction it is instructive to recall 
the points made in that recommendation, and 
compare them with the problems dealt with in 
the present report. Many of the Committee's 
preoccupations are the same today ; S()me have 
changed because of changed circumstances in 
European and world relations. 
1.3 The year 1961 was a year of confrontation. 
The Soviet Union had unquestioned superiority 
in conventional forces in Europe. President 
Kennedy took office in the United States after 
an election campaign in which the "missile gap" 
figured prominently. Despite, or because of, the 
shoek to the West in 1957, when the Soviet 
Union became the first country to launch a satel-
lite, the United States missile programme proved 
to be far more sophisticated and was already 
providing "hardened" second-generation "second 
strike" missiles that were to ensure clear United 
States strategic superiority in the 1960s. The 
Soviet navy, except for submarines, was a negli-
gible force, operating close to its own coasts. In 
June 1961 came the Soviet threats to Berlin 
leading to the most serious confrontation between 
the two alliances. The next year Mr. Khrushchev 
1. State of European security, Document 215, lOth 
November 1961. 
2. Text at Appendix I. 
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had to back down, but after confronting the 
United States over Cuba the Soviet Union imme-
diately started its large naval construction pro-
gramme, the consequences of which have only 
recently been felt. Both countries launched a man 
into orbit for the first time in 1961, and the 
Soviet Union shattered hopes for a test ban 
with a new series of nuclear tests in the atmo-
sphere. Britain had nuclear weapons ; France 
had conducted nuclear tests ; China did not do 
so until1964. 
1.4. In 1975 there is more emphasis on detente 
than on confrontation between the superpowers 
and the two military alliances. The basic policy 
of NATO today is declared to be "based on the 
twin principles of defence and detente". Inter-
national treaties have banned, with varying 
degrees of success : nuclear tests in the atmo-
sphere ; nuclear weapons in outer space and 
Latin America ; military installations and nuclear 
tests in Antarctica ; and the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
In 1975, half a dozen different international 
conferences are dealing with various aspects of 
arms control, disarmament and the relaxation of 
tension. Y ert the Soviet Union now has a formi-
dable navy operating in ·the world's oceans, and 
strategic nuclear parity with the United States; 
it has maintained its conventional superiority 
in Europe. With stalemate between the super-
powers, their ability to influence events in the 
rest of the world has declined. The bargaining 
power of the third world has increased through 
its control of raw materials. 
1.5 In 1961, in Recommendation 69, the Assem-
bly first stressed the need to bring NATO land 
forces on the ceilltrail front up to the agreed 
minimum of thirty divisions ; today the Com-
mittee calls for the allocation of adequate resour-
ces to defence, and for asymmetric reductions in 
any MBFR agreemeillt designed to reduce War-
saw Pact superiority. Recommendation 69 called 
for genuine standardisation and common develop-
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ment and production, and for development pro-
jects to be put into production only if adopted 
by at least three countries ; the Committee has 
to make a similar recommendation today ; the 
large number of national weapons projects com-
peting for procurement bears pathetic witness 
to the failure to achieve reaJ. progress. Recom-
mendation 69 called for "nuclear anarchy" to be 
avoided, as the Committee's report devoted a 
chapter of its report to the problems of ensur-
ing the availability and political control of 
nuclear weapons ; the Committee today is less 
urgently concerned with these problems - no 
doubt the Nuclear Planning Group and particip-
ation of SHAPE officers from European coun-
tries in the United States strategic planning in 
Omaha have solved some of them - and it now 
recommends that the deployment of theatre 
nuclear weapons be modified and reduced, pre-
ferably through Eas!rWest agreement. Recom-
mendation 69 called for revisions in the command 
structures ; today the Baltic Command structure 
has been reorganised but the Committee has 
other more urgent recommendations concerning 
the flanks. In Recommendation 69 the Assembly 
called for the full application of the Brussels 
Treaty ; today the Committee, in another report 1 
calls attention to the same shortcomings. In 1961, 
the Assembly called for the better provision of 
defence information to the Defence Committee, 
I. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673. 
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and for better parliamentary control of defence 
expenditure ; today the Committee finds informal 
arrangements enable it to be better informed than 
in its earlier days. FinaJly, in 1961 the Commit-
tee's report expressed concern at the development 
of space capabilities by the Soviet Union and 
the prospect that they might affect the defence 
posture of the West ; today space problems do 
not concern the Committee - satellites now play 
a vital part in military communications, observ-
ation and navigation, and may have contributed 
indirectly to detente. 
1.6 In 1975 the unsolved problems of the 
Middle East with the permanent risk of conflict ; 
the inevitable suffering that accompanies United 
States disengagement from South-East Asia; 
world-wide inflation and recession; the differ-
ences between two NATO allies, Greece and 
Turkey ; and the reduction in real terms of 
defence expenditure in the countries of the West 
at a time of rising Soviet expenditure, all these 
problems leave many uncertainties in any assess-
ment of the state of European security. But since 
its inception NATO has served the interests of 
European security well. If the effort is main-
tained and the defence resources of the European 
members are used in common, the Committee 
should be able to make a more favourable report 
when next it undertakes a comprehensive review. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Warsaw Pact and East-West negotiations 
(•ubmitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
2.1 We can measure Soviet power, but what 
of its intentions ? Despite detente, the Russians 
continue to strengthen the forces of the Warsaw 
Pact, which enjoy a superiority both in ready-
forces and reinforcements way beyond what is 
necessary for defence. At the same time the West 
is faced by a three-way erosion of its security: 
military, economic, and political. 
2.2 In the West, a high rate of inflation, grow-
ing balance-of-payments deficits and industrial 
recession are compelling reductions in defence 
spending, and at a time when defence costs are 
themselves rising rapidly, thus eroding the mar-
gin of technological superiority vitally important 
for the weaker side. As living standards fa11, 
limited public support for spending on defence 
against a threat which is neither readily per-
ceived nor broadly understood could also fall. 
2.3 At one level the "era of negotiation" con-
tinues. The Soviet-American entente has been 
reconfirmed by the meeting at Vladivostok in 
November 1974, and their agreed framework 
for a possible S.ALT agreement. 
2.4 At Vladivostok, President Ford and Mr. 
Brezhnev reached agreement on the principles 
to be included in a ten-year treaty to replace the 
May 1972 five-year interim agreement on stra-
tegic offensive arms. Under the Vladivostok prin-
ciples, each side will be limited to a ceiling of 
2,400 for the total of ICBMs, SLBMs, airborne 
ballistic missiles with a range exceeding 600 km, 
and heavy bombers in service ; of that total, not 
more than: 1,320 missiles will be fitted with 
MIRVs. The 1972 restrictions on new launching 
sites are maintained. No other limitations are 
placed on improvements to existing missiles, or 
the introduction of MIRVs, and no on-site inspec-
tion is provided for. This agreement would permit 
the United States to increase its present total 
of some 2,150 strategic systems, but whether 
it does so will depend on Soviet actions as the 
United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Schle-
singer, has made clear in his annual report for 
the financial years 1976 and 1977 : 
"Assuming that the Soviet leaders exhibit 
restraint in their application of the agree-
ment's principles, we are prepared to exer-
cise restraint as well. However, until we 
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obtain solid evidence of Soviet restraint, 
we shall plan for deployment of approxim-
ately 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles and 
1,320 MIRVed missiles. How we proceed 
on these accounts will depend essentially 
on the actions of the Soviet Union. They 
currently have the initiative, and it is up 
to them to decide how much additional 
effort the two sides should put into these 
programmes. In making their decision, they 
should remember that the tortoise won 
because the hare did not try very hard 
very often. This hare may be different." 
The outcome in the immediate future is 
likely to be the introduction of MIRVed systems 
in the Soviet Union to add to the numerical 
missile advantage that country already enjoys. 
2.5 The MBFR talks appear to have made little 
if any progress while the Soviet Union, which 
seeks an early "summit" in order to conclude the 
conference on security and co-operation, may be 
at the point of making modest concessions both 
on basket three, the freer movement of people, 
ideas and information, and on the confidence-
buillding measures (CBM) which might enhance 
security by the notification of military movements 
and manoeuvres in advance. It has been often 
asserted that the Russian motive for calling for 
a European security conference was the ratifica-
tion of the status quo ; given recent changes in 
the comparative position of the West, which has 
been much weakened by a series of events, this 
could turn out to be of greater advantage than 
was originally thought I 
2.6 The West must avoid reaching agreements 
which provide an illusion of security. With regard 
to CBM, it is important that the West extracts 
from the Soviet Union several weeks' notice of 
manoeuvres that take place within 700 km of 
frontiers, notice which covers military formations 
down to divisional size ; and that information of 
this kind be given to all European States. On 
basket three, we should seek freedom for indi-
vidual travel. With regard to any permanent 
machinery that might be set up, the most advan-
tageous arrangement would be the calling of a 
review conference after two years have elapsed. 
Finally, the West should not sign four separate 
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documents, but a single document only, in order 
to demonst:l"ate that all baskets rank equally in 
importance. 
2. 7 Historians love dates. If so, then October 
1973 is a date of quite remarkable importance. 
The oil embargo, and the rise in oil prices at the 
insistence of a cartel, OPEC - not an act of 
trade- marks the end of the post-war period. 
It has put an end to the inevitability of progress 
in the West. It was an act of force, the effect 
of which was to accelerate inflation, and endan-
ger international monetary and economic co-
operation. It implies that the threat to Europe's 
financial stability is to be considered more im-
portant than the threat to Europe's security. By 
its action, OPEC has raised the spectre of conflict 
within Western Europe between two kinds of 
security : miLitary security which is a factor of 
the .American commitment to Europe ; and econo-
mic security, which is dependent upon supplies 
of oil. The Arab oil embargo has become the 
central fact of Europe's existence. 
2.8 In Europe, the inability of governments to 
cope with the economic crises, the threat of sub-
version, a growing sense of cultural pessimism, 
and a lack of progress towards unity, are com-
bining to create a crisis of confidence in our 
political leaders and in our institutions. Demo-
cracy is seen either as having failed to respond 
effectively to the demands of a changing economic 
or political situation or to safeguard an estab-
lished way of life. Greece has returned to demo-
cracy but is embroiled with Turkey over Cyprus 
and the Aegean, and wishes to quit the military 
organisation of NATO. Portugal may be in the 
process of exchanging one form of authoritarian 
rule for another. The economic situation has put 
considerable pressure on defence budgets in all 
Western European countries (and in some, 
including Britain, this has led to decisions to 
make significant reductions). In which case we 
ought to focus our attention upon the concentra-
tion of military power in Eastern Europe. 
2.9 While accepting a legitimate Soviet interest 
in its security, a fact which of itself would justify 
a proportion at least of its contribution t'O the 
Warsaw Pact, there are two distinctively different 
views as to the objectives of Russian foreign 
policy. It can be argued that a self-confident 
Soviet Union seeks only to safeguard its interests, 
and those of its allies. Thus, Russia is prepared 
to move cautiously from confrontation to detente, 
providing that the West responds in similar 
fashion. The Russian leaders need assurance that 
the West is without aggressive intent, and does 
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not seek to "intervene" in the internal affairs of 
either the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. A 
sizeable Soviet armoury can serve both to defend 
Russia and to permit it to control the rate 
of polltical change among its allies. Soviet stra-
tegic nuclear power is sufficient to deter either 
the United States or China and, given this funda-
mentally defensive character, it seeks only to 
further its own development by peaceful means. 
2.10 The rival opinion as to the objectives of 
Soviet foreign policy is based upon the belief 
that Russia is seeking to consolidate and enhance 
its status as a superpower, and to extend its 
influence world-wide. Thus, while fully aware of 
the penalties of nuclear warfare, the Russians 
pursue those policies, including blackmail, which 
fall short of war but which further their expan-
sionist aims. They follow a policy of accommoda-
tion with the United States, and of advantage 
elsewhere. They pose as the upholders of the 
existing order in Europe, where they pursue their 
objectives through conference politics at Vienna, 
Geneva and Helsinki, while playing the revolu-
tionary in the Middle East. They gave full sup-
port to OPEC, and are partisans of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organisation, whose inclusion 
in the discussion of the Arab-Israel dispute can 
only make a settlement less likely. They talk of 
security but practice hegemony. They talk of 
detente but follow the politics of advantage. They 
have no need to exploit present western dis-
contents. They have only to play a waiting game. 
The sword of Damocles has been responsible for 
more victories than the sword of Caesar. 
2.11 In any event, whatever Russian intentions 
may be, detente and peaceful coexistence will be 
the means it will adopt. To threaten Europe 
directly would be to strengthen NATO's resolve, 
an act that would be counter-productive. Dr. E.M. 
Chossudovsky, Representative in Europe of the 
United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research, writing in a personal capacity in 
the London Times of 3rd July 1974, but no 
doubt reflecting a Soviet "establishment" view· 
point, defined peaceful coexistence as fol· 
lows: "a form of historic conflict on a global 
scale between capitalism and socialism, linked 
with the revolutionary process and the concom-
itant class struggle, though it implies, at the 
same time, the possibility of mutually advantage-
ous co-operative inter-systems' transactions in 
diverse fields." As a means of ideological and 
economic conflict, peaceful coexistence should 
be recognised as "the guiding principle of a new 
international system that might emerge from the 
process of detente" but it is "ultimately bound to 
be superseded by an era of soc~"· Faced 
with this definition, it would be naive for the 
West to believe that it implied a "live and let 
live" attitude. 
2.12 If the Russians are seeking to extend their 
influence when the opportunity occurs, they 
could be constrained by a policy of detente. Any 
Soviet initiative would need to be weighed in the 
balance against its effect upon the Americans 
and upon Europe. Such considerations must have 
been taken into account at the time of the inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, of the October war, of 
the Cyprus crisis, and of the continuing crisis 
in Portugal. If Mr. Cunhal still keeps Portuguese 
officers in NATO, and sends a representative to 
Radio Free Europe in Munich, it is only because 
he has received Russian advice to do so. Even so, 
there are western fears that by using detente as 
a means and not an end - as a tactic and not 
a goal - the Soviet Union could successfully 
shift the world balance of power in its favour. 
A sense of false security is a situation in which 
security is no longer seen as a f~ctor of military 
and political power. By neglectmg defence, the 
West may come to relearn this lesson were Russia 
to re-apply military and political pressures upon 
an adversary weakened in power and resolution. 
2.13 Herein lies the rub. Arguments over inten-
tions and capabilities are well-rehearsed; 
although intentions can change overnight, the 
power to achieve these intentions takes a great 
deal longer to create. Whether the a~ms. of the 
Soviet Union be peaceful or expans10mst, the 
strength of the Warsaw Pact cannot be ignored. In 
Central Europe, in general terms, the Warsaw 
Pact has 20% more soldiers than NATO; 30 to 
40 % more soldiers in fighting units ; . two-and-a-
half times the number of tanks, and tWice as many 
guns. An overall ratio of . two to on? a;g~inst 
NATO in combat aircraft h1des more significant 
imbalances when specific aircraft roles are taken 
into account,particularly those of ~ir defence and 
ground attack. Overall, the trend IS one of a co~­
tinuing shift in favour of the East, for not only IS 
the quantitative gap increasing, the weapons ~ys­
tems of the Warsaw Pact forces are also becommg 
more sophisticated. Moreover, with lines of com-
munication which are shorter than those of NATO, 
thus facilitating the reinforcement of Warsaw 
Pact forces - another factor where they enjoy 
a short- and middle-term superiority - and 
with the added ail.vantage of the initiative, the 
asymmetry in force levels could be tilted even 
more in favour of the eastern bloc should a 
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crisis occur and NATO be slow to respond to 
political warning. 
2.14 One can only conclude that should the 
Soviet Union have expansionist aspirations, and 
be content to permit the consequences of detente 
to weaken the forces of NATO before exerting 
pressure on individual members of the Alliance, 
then the force levels maintained at present by 
the Pact have a rational basis. On the other 
hand if Russian aims are solely peaceful, if it is 
a "~tisfied power", then Warsaw Pact forces 
appear far in excess of tlwse il'equired ~~Y for 
defence. What is fundamental to a reVISion of 
the foreign policy objective of the Soviet Union 
is that it has a military capability which could 
enable it to adopt a policy of expansionism (power 
commands respect : respeet commands obedience) 
whenever it might wish to do so - no matter 
what it may proclaim its intentions to be in the 
meantime. 
2.15 Soviet Russia, national and revolutionary, 
has one dominant political ideology and strategy ; 
but all the practical problems of NATO, as a 
collective defence organisation, derive from the 
variety and mutability of interests and opini~ns 
in its fifteen different States. It is hard to arnve 
at common positions. The beginnings of a joint 
approach to the problems of inflation, finance 
and energy have only been achieved afte~ a serU:s 
of summit meetings. Nevertheless, m their 
dealings with the eastern bloc, the aims of western 
nations have a similar basis and that is a desire 
for stability conducive to rational and business-
like discussions, and where proper account is 
taken of the v.iews of the participants. By jointly 
involving both sides in an increasing number of 
contacts and arrangements, in which each has 
a clearly-defined incentive for their continuance, 
a system may be developed for further progress 
and closer co-operation in East-West relations. 
Thus, any dissension may be kept within bounds, 
and resolved without recourse to force. However, 
the West believes that further progress should 
now come from a freer interchange of people, 
information and ideas. At present, the Soviet 
Union seems to accept that it should be free to 
disseminate its views in the West but that a 
reciprocal freedom constitutes an interference 
in the internal affairs of the communist coun-
tries. 
2.16 Unless the Warsaw Paot agrees to asym-
metrical reductions in military strength between 
the two sides in Central Europe, while itself 
taking the larger cuts so that the present asym-
metry in force levels is corrected, then the West 
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is faced with the task of arresting a trend which 
must lead, if unchecked, to an increasing imba-
lance. The basic resources of the West in terms 
of maDJpower, gross national product, technical 
inventiveness are, if not superior to the Pact, at 
least comparable. Furthermore, as the Alliance 
has no intention whatever of being the aggressor 
in a European conflict, it should not be necessary 
to maintain more forces than the Warsaw Pact, 
nor even to match them. NATO's military JA>Wer 
needs to be sufficient to deter an. attack against 
it, and manifestly to reflect the political resolve 
to do so. The dilemma arises in squaring this 
vital necessity with the political pressures to 
reduce defence spending in most allied countries. 
In short, the Alliance must make better use of its 
defence resources. 
2.17 Western aims may be summarised as the 
"pragmatic development of a dynamic balance of 
power", recognjsing the political, economic and 
strategic elements of that power. Should the 
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equilibrium be upset, then the restraint and 
moderation upon which the balance of power 
depends for its maintenance may disappear. It 
is already feared that continuing inflation, or a 
fifth round in the Arab-Israel conflict, could have 
the most serious repercussions upon our social, 
economic, and political security. With its present 
military superiority, the Soviet Union could then 
be tempted to further its interests by coercion, 
if not by the lllCtual use of force. Therefore, to 
maintain an effective balance of power, it is neces-
sary to counter Soviet military strength, and the 
possible weakening of other political and econo-
mic constraints only gives emphasis to this need. 
Without the military capacity to deter possible 
Soviet expansionist policies, the security of 
Western Europe could be put at risk. Whereas 
Russia has the capacity to match a variety of 
intentions, the West could find many of its 
options foreclosed if it cannot maintain its 
strength and cohesion should the balance of 
power be destabilised. 
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CHAPTER III 
The central front 
(aubmitfed by Mr. Danltert, Rapporteur) 
A. Introduction 
3.1 As your Rapporteur has said in his preface 
to the study "Rational deployment of forces on 
the central front" by General Ulrich de Maiziere 
(ret.)'\ that study contains a wealth of informa-
tion on the general situation on the central front 
and some of the particular problems of that area. 
It is not useful therefore to repeat that informa-
tion in a chapter on the same subject for largely 
the same group of readers, although responsibility 
for this chapter rests with the WEU Assembly's 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
and with its Rapporteur in particular, while the 
responsibility for the contents of the study on 
the rational deployment of forces on the central 
front is General de Maiziere's exclusively. 
3.2 The purpose of this chapter on the central 
front is therefore more limiOOd. It will incorporate 
some of the conclusions drawn by General de 
Maiziere, comment on others and, more generally, 
provide a framework in which the rational deploy-
ment of forces on the central front and some new 
related developments have to be seen. 
B. Change or no change? 
3.3 In order to set the frame of this study and 
the proposals resulting from it, General de Mai-
ziere has made a number of suppositions in regard 
to security and defence policy. Within the terms 
of reference laid down by the Assembly - which 
is to concentrate on the rational deployment of 
forces on the central front - it was inevitable for 
the author to proceed as he did, but it must be 
recognised that his study, because of these neces-
sary suppositions, is as speculative as a study 
with a somewhat different starting-point. 
There are therefore va1id reasons for 
examining, on the basis of actual developments 
and trends, how speculative General de Mai-
ziere's suppositions may be. 
1. Document 663. 
8- I 
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These suppositions are : 
" (i) A dramatic change in the political 
configuration between East and West 
is not to be expected. 
(ii) The Atlantic Alliance will retain its 
solidarity. All member nations will 
continue to base their policy on the 
agreed twin concept of d~tente and 
security. This implies that a relative 
military balance can. be maintained. 
(iii) The results of the negotiations on 
mutual balanced force reduction 
{MBFR) will not change the existing 
relative balance in Central Europe to 
the disadvantage of the West. Quick 
results are not to be expected from 
these negotiations. 
( iv) In the years to come, the member 
nations will not reduce their finan-
cial contributions to military defence 
but will provide for defence budgets 
which at least maintain the pur-
chasing power. 
( v) The United States will maintain a 
substantial conventional and tactical 
nuclear military presence in Europe. 
(vi) The member nations which take part 
in an integrated military defence 
organisation will continue to do so. 
(vii) The strategy of flexible response 
which includes forward defence will 
remain the basis of common defence 
planning. 
(viii) French forces will continue to be 
stationed in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The President of the 
French Republic will continue to 
reserve to himself the right to decide 
whether and at what time the French 
forces shall participate in the com-
bined defence against a military 
aggression by the Warsaw Pact. 
( ix) Finally, the author presumes that 
a breakthrough in technical develop-
ment comparable in dimension to the 
first employment of nuclear weapons 
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is not to be expected. On the other 
hand, the further development of 
conventional and nuclear weapon 
systems will bring forth remarkable 
improvements in regard to range, 
accuracy and lethality. The impor-
tance of electronic means of command 
and oontrol and combat will grow 
rapidly. 
The problems associated with nuclear 
weapons, especially the question as to what 
principles should govern their use and how 
these would affect defence planning, have 
been considered only inasmuch as they have 
direct bearing on the subject discussed, i.e. 
the study of a rational deployment in the 
central region." 1 
3.4 (i) Is a dramatic change in the political 
configuration between East and West not to be 
expected ? The current negotiations between East 
and West, whether bilateral like SALT or multi-
lateral like CSCE and MBFR, do not make one 
expect such a change. If there is progress it is 
extremely limited ·and these negotiations do not 
really threaten the cohesion of the blocs even if 
from time to time westem political commentators 
express anxiety about United States-USSR "col-
lusion" in SALT at the expense of Western Euro-
pean interests. However, these anxieties, provided 
there are broadly accepted United States-Euro-
pean policies in other fields, do not really threaten 
Atlantic solidarity as long as the agreements are 
of a very limited character or serve in a very clear 
way the wider global interests of peace and 
security (as, for example, the non-proliferation 
treaty). 
3.5 (ii) Whether the nations of the Atlantic 
Alliance will maintain their solidarity is a ques-
tion far more difficult to answer in a positive 
way. From that point of view, 1974, notwith-
standing a high-sounding declaration on Atlantic 
relations, was a bad year for NATO. There was: 
-the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus 
and the Aegean - two allies which 
nearly went to war with each other ; 
- a;nxieiy over developments in Portugal 
leading also to doubts about the con-
tinued availability of the Azores (the 
southern flank continues to be of the 
utmost importance to the security of 
I. Docwnent 663, page 68. 
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NATO as a whole, and hence to the 
central region). 
On the other hand, the difficulties with Iceland 
are over since the Icelandic elections. 
3.6 There are also the problems in Atlantic 
relationships, as seen from the United States, and 
identified by Dr. Kissinger in his speech of 23rd 
April1973: 
"The problems in Atlantic relationships are 
real. They have arisen in part because 
during the 1950s and 1960s the Atlantic 
community organised itself in different 
ways in the many different dimensions of 
its common enterprise. 
- In economic relations, the European 
Community has increasingly stressed its 
regional personality; the United States, 
at the same time, must act as part of, 
and be responsible for, a wider inter-
national trade and monetary system. We 
must reconcile these two perspectives. 
- In our collective defence, we are still 
organised on the principle of unity and 
integration, but in radically different 
strategic conditions. The full implica-
tions of this change have yet to be faced. 
- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent 
consultations, but is essentially being 
conducted by traditional nation States. 
The United States has global interests 
and responsibilities. Our European allies 
have regional interests. These are not 
necessarily in conflict, but in the new 
era neither are they automatically 
identical. 
In short, we deal with each other regionally 
and competitively in economic matters, on 
an integrated basis in defence, and as nation 
States in diplomacy." 
These problems have not been solved, the 
declaration on Artlantic relations notwithstanding. 
The United States Administration is well aware 
of the difficulties and the need to solve them -
but what of Congress and United States public 
opinion ? Is the new Congress more responsive to 
the mood of America ? Opinion polls indicate that 
things are not going the right way : in a 1964 poll 
on the priorities of the United States citizen the 
first six subjects concerned international ~la­
tions and defence: in a 1974 poll the first item 
relating to international relations and defence 
came six;teenth, and referred only to the need 
for the United States to have a strong defence. 
3.7 In Europe also, nationalism is on the 
increase. The aftermath of the oil crisis, economic 
difficulties, politiocal instability in some coun-
tries, all have made their contribution. Atlantic 
solidarity is still there - but it no longer seems 
to be the emotional solidarity of the late forties 
and the fifties but a Realpolitik solidarity of a 
rather different character. There are no indica-
tions so far that the agreed twin concept of 
detente and security will suffer from these new 
circumstances. But it might well be that this is 
a consequence more of the lack of progress with 
detente than of general consensus on that twin 
concept. 
3.8 (iii) MBFR- As long as the twin concept 
of detente and security holds and Mansfield con-
tinues to be defeated in the United States Con-
gress, General de Maiziere's supposition is prob-
ably right. 
3.9 (iv) As far as the financial contribution to 
military defence is concerned, the ability to main-
tain the real purchasing power of defence budgets, 
this is a field where uncertainty is great, because 
of: 
- the economic difficulties of the western 
world; 
- the high rate of inflation which endan-
gers military investment in the United 
States and in Europe (the United States 
defence report for the financial year 
1976-77 shows inflation on defence bud-
get outlays of 9.4% from 1973 to 1974; 
14.4 % from 1974 to 1975) ; 
- the United Kingdom defence review and 
the reductions announced in the 1975 
statement on the defence estimates. 
It is still too early to conclude that General 
de Maiziere's supposition will not be borne out-
but actual developments give no grounds for 
optimism on this point. 
3.10 '(v) The United States' conventional and 
tactical nuclear presence in Europe is subject to 
certain pressures. There is pressure from Senator 
Mansfield and his allies - so far resisted by 
the Senate - for the large-scale withdrawal of 
United States forces. There is the Nunn amend-
ment calling for a review of the numbers of tac-
tical nuclear weapons in Europe and the condi-
tions in which they are maintained there. There 
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is a recent report 1 from the Brookings Institution 
which concludes, inter alia, that such weapons 
should be reduced from 7,000 to 2,000 and 
deployed in a less vulnerable manner. 
3.11 Nevertheless, there is not much doubt as to 
the continuing importance of Europe for the 
security of the United States ; even the disengage-
ment from South-East Asia is unlikely to change 
this perception of United States interest. How-
ever, there are indications that the quality of the 
security relationship will change, mainly because 
of the changing strategic balance of power. To 
quote again from Dr. Kissinger's speech of 23rd 
April1973: 
"Today we remain united on the objective 
of collective defence, but we face the new 
challenge of maintaining it under radically 
changed strategic conditions and with the 
new opportunity of enhancing our security 
through negotiated reductions of forces. 
The West no longer holds the nuclear pre-
dominance that permitted it in the 1950s 
and 1960s to rely almost solely on a stra-
tegy of massive nuclear retaliation... The 
collective ability to resist attack in Western 
Europe by means of flexible responses has 
become central to a rational strategy and 
crucial to the maintenance of peace. 
A great deal remains to be accomplished to 
give reality to the goal of flexible response : 
There are still unresolved issues in our 
doctrine, for example, on the crucial ques-
tion of the role of tactical nuclear weapons." 
This problem is mentioned in paragraphs 3.18 
et seq. below. 
3.12 Supposition (vi) that members now partici-
pating will oontinue to participate in the inte-
grated military defence organisation presents no 
problem for your Rapporteur. 
3.13 In general, your Rapporteur supports sup-
position (vii) that flexible response, inclusive of 
forward defence, will remain the basis of oommon 
defence planning, but not unimportant changes 
in flexible response are highly probable. There is 
the nuclear problem. Professor Lawrence Martin 
1. "United States nuclear weapons in Europe" 
Record assisted by Anderson, October 1974. 
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has suggested ·1 a new approach to theatre nuclear 
weapons designed first to reduce this present 
vulnerability to sabotage or pre-emptive strike, 
and seoond to permit early decision from above, 
in the event of loss of ground, on interdiction 
strikes within 200 to 300 km of the battle. This 
proposal is probably close to the views of Mr. 
Schlesinger 2 • 
Secondly, there is the need of increased flex-
ibility in the land forces in order to be able to 
deal rapidly with the problem of closing the gap 
in case of a possible breakthrough (North German 
Plain- Fulda Gap). 
3.14 As for supposition (viii) concerning the 
position of the French forces, a number of ques-
tions arise. The declaration of Atlantic relations, 
signed by the fifteen NATO countries on 26th 
June 1974, recognised that two of the European 
members "possess nuclear forces capable of play-
ing a deterrent role of their own, contributing 
to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of 
the Alliance ... ". The communique issued after the 
meeting between Presidents Ford and Giscard 
d'Estaing on 16th December 1974 said " ... they 
agreed that the co-operation between France and 
NATO is a significant factor in the security of 
Europe". The French press attached political 
significance to the appointment of General Ches-
nais, a former member of the SHAPE staff, as 
head of the French Military Mission to NATO. 
There is no information concerning concrete 
changes in French relations with NATO, how-
ever. 
Are these developments indications of a 
change in French policy or are they not ? The 
question cannot yet be answered. Certainly 
change is needed. Some American opinion has 
been highly critical of the previous situation 8 : 
"Thus, as a practical matter, France by its 
policies reduces the possibility of a con-
ventional defence, and significantly lowers 
the nuclear threshold by refusing to col-
laborate in advance for a strong conven-
tional defence. In addition, by refusing to 
a:llow use of French territory for practice 
or detailed planning for dependent evacua-
tion, France jeopardise& the safety of some 
250,000 United States women and children 
1. "Theatre nuclear weapons and Europe", Survival, 
November /December 1974. 
2. United States Defence Department report for the 
financial years 1976 and 1977, pages lll 2 and 3. 
3. "Policy troops and the NATO Alliance", report by 
Senator Nunn to the United States Senate Armed Services 
Committee, 2nd April 1974, page 3. 
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who are dependents of United States per-
sonnel in Europe. 
Actual French participation with NATO is 
an entangled deal, and includes some limited 
co-oper&~tion on a military but not a political 
level. Evidently the situation within the 
French Government is also confused, with 
some senior Frenchmen talking &~bout 
increased co-operation but without any 
action. 
Paradoxically, the French insist that United 
States conventional forces must remain in 
Europe. However, without French conven-
tional military co-operation and with uni-
lateral French planning and control of 
their nuclear capability French tactical 
nuclear weapons, if used in the midst of a 
conventional engagement between NATO 
(including United States) and Warsaw Pact 
forces, could force the United States into 
a nuclear war. The Alliance has been able 
to tolerate this had situation during the 
period of United States nuclear superiority, 
but strategic parity makes the French posi-
.tion totally at odds with the best interest 
of NATO and stability in Central Europe. 
The French position is also incompatible 
with a long-term United States commitment 
in Europe and the Alliance must find ways 
of resolving this dangerous situation." 
3.15 Your Rapporteur accepts supposition (ix) 
that fundamental technological changes of the 
magnitude of that brought about by the intro-
duction of nuclear weapons are unJ.ikely. 
C. Rational deployment 
3.16 General de Maiziere's study makes it quite 
clear that present deployment is far from ratio-
nal. Yet he believes that "in terms of figures, the 
deployment of theM-day divisions and brigades 
in these two areas approximately corresponds 
to the importance of the mentioned defence 
tasks"P. 
To him the main problem is that, in con-
trast to CENTAG, NORTHAG can rely on only 
a few reserve brigades for reinforcements. This is 
well illustrated in a report by Lawrence and 
Record 2 : 
1. Document 663, paragraph 107. 
2. "United States force structure in NATO - An 







































Current and proposed NATO division disposition in the central region opposing Warsaw Pact diuisions, 
and their projected augmentation, M-day to M + 120 
NATO Warsaw Pact (c) 
Current disposition of divisions (a) Proposed disposition of divisions (b) Axis of attack or 
M M+ M+ M+ M+ M+ M+ M M+ M+ M+ M+ M+ M+ country M M+M+M+M+ M+ M+ 
day 7 15 30 60 90 120 day 7 15 30 60 90 120 day 7 15 30 60 90 120 
Major axis 
2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 
(North German 
Plain) 
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 East Germany 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
3 3 3 4 5 5 5 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 Poland 2 10 10 10 10 10 10 
2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 Soviet Union 15 17 20 30 37 37 41 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . .. 2 3 4 6 8 8 11 
11 12 12 15 16 16 16 13 16 17 22 25 25 28 Total 20 30 33 43 50 50 54 
11 16 17 22 25 25 27 11 16 17 22 25 25 27 
0 -4 -5-7-9-9 -11 +2 0 0 0 0 0 +1 
Minor azis 
(Fulda Gap) 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 East Germany 
4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 Poland ... 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Ya Ya Ya 1 1 1 1 Ya Ya Ya 1 1 1 l Soviet Union 10 12 14 20 25 25 27 
. . . ... . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. ... 2 2 2 4 4 4 
2 3 4 8 10 10 11 2 3 3 5 5 6 7 
6Ya 8% 9Ya 14 16 16 17 6Ya 10% 10% 13 15 16 17 Total 13 18 20 26 31 31 33 
7 10 10 13 16 16 17 7 10 10 13 16 16 17 
-%-1% -% +1 0 0 0-?'s +Ya +Ya 0 -1 0 0 
Secondary zone 
(south) 
Czechoslovakia 10 10 10 12 12 12 12 
3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Soviet Union 2 2 3 5 5 5 6 
2 5 5 7 10 10 10 2 3 3 5 6 6 6 
2 3 3 3 3 4 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . 
7 12 12 14 17 18 21 5 6 6 8 9 9 9 Total 12 12 13 17 17 17 18 
6 6 7 9 9 9 9 6 6 7 9 9 9 9 
+1 +6 +5 +5 +8 +9 +12 -1 0 -1-1 0 0 0 
(a) For non-United States NATO countries, NATO build-ups use national command forces as postulated in Table A-1 (Case II). Nations on line deploy 
forces to current corps areas. The French and the C&nadians are considered deployed near their current locations. For United States deployments, divi-
sions are allocated to current United States corps dispositions with more weight to northern corps. 
(b) For non-United States NATO countries, NATO build-ups use national command forces as postulated in Table A-1 (Case II). Nations on line deploy 
forces to corps areas shown. Canadians are deployed in vicinity of current location near the centre. French forces are initially deployed in southern sector; 
some French reinforcements are postulated for deployment to the central sector. For United States deployments, it is recommended that one corps be 
deployed to the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) and reinforced with greatest weight. The West German corps in NORTHAG gets an additional division. 
(c) Disposition shown postulates tactical plan to conduct major attack in the north (North German Plain) with minor attack in the centre (Fulda Gap-
Frankfurt axis) and economy-of-force operations in the secondary zone (along the Czech border). Consequently about 55 % of Soviet divisions are disposed 
in the north, 35 to 40% in the centre, and 5-10% in the south. 
(d) NATO divisions required are based on the definitions of Condition 2 for M-day and M+7 and on Condition 3 for M+15 to M+120, which were 
described in Appendix C. United States divisions deployed are based on assessed requirements in Appendix C. 
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3.17 What can be done about this situation ! 
(a) Peacetime depwyment 
The Committee shares General de Maiziere's 
concLusion that, in view of the cost, major peace-
time redeployment should be avoided ; only minor 
adjustments should be undertaken : 
(i) those advocated in General de Mai-
ziere's study; 
(ii) combat elements resulting from teeth 
to tail ratio revision in the United 
States army should, at least in part, 
be deployed in the NORTHAG area. 
Press reports following Mr. Schlesin-
ger's visit to Germany on 4th Novem-
ber 1974 suggested that a new United 
States brigade would be stationed in 
the Hanover area :1. ; 
(iii) General de Maiziere stresses the 
need for full use to be made of any 
warning time by making early poli-
tical decisions 2• The Committee endor-
ses the second option which calls for 
financial resources to be devoted pri-
marily to weapons and equipment, 
while compensating bad deployment 
through early political decisions. 
(b) Reserves - reinforcement 
3.18 Table D-1 of the Brookings study repro-
duced above clearly illustrates the size of the 
problems of reserves and reinforcements, even if 
there has been some limited improvement. The 
Netherlands white paper on defence (which 
brings down the size of a division from eleven 
battalions to nine) introduces a new division 
(the 5th Mechanised) which will be available 
between M and M + 7, instead of the former 5th 
Division, with four tank and seven infantry 
battalions, available at M + 30. Two-thirds of the 
divisions can be mobilised without cumbersome 
political procedures, merely by decision by a 
ministerial sub-council, because of what is known 
as its RIM status. 
3.19 The Committee concludes first that better 
procedures should be introduced to secure early 
political decisions in the event of aggression or 
threat of aggression - the Netherlands RIM 
system is an example. Secondly, there is a need 
to maintain conscript armies (because of the 
need for reserves) in the countries close to the 
1. Daily Telegraph, 5th November 1974. 
2. Document 663, page 91. 
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likely battlefield (Benelux, Germany) because 
volunteer armies do not automatically provide 
the well-trained readily available reserves that 
conscript armies do. Thirdly, redeployment of 
ready forces is difficult and costly - it is far 
more easy to reconsider the deployment of 
reserves, augmentation forces and other reinfor-
cements. The possibilities are greatest in the 
case of United States forces, and possibly the 
German forces (cadre brigades, etc.). Lastly, a 
more common or integrated logistic system must 
be achieved. 
D. Central Europe 
and tactical nuclear weapons 
3.20 The indieations are that Warsaw Pact tact-
ical nuclear warheads are deployed rather far 
to the East, in Western Russia or possibly 
Poland. The United States tactical nuclear 
weapons, on the other hand, are very unevenly 
spread. The nature of their deployment poses 
problems of command and control, as Mr. Schle-
singer has admitted \ The concentration of tact-
ical nuclear weapons in special storage sites -
albeit over 100 - invites a pre-emptive strike 
by Warsaw Pact forces. Professor Martin 2 has 
proposed the regrouping of tactical nuclear 
weapons into a centrally controlled covering force, 
based on existing systems such as Lance and a 
more accurate Pershing, equipped in time with 
lower-yield warheads designed to reduce unwant-
ed damage. This arrangement would prove a 
valid option in defence, prevent unauthorised use, 
yet still provide the essential linkage with the 
United States' strategic deterrent. It would 
require fewer warheads than are now deployed. 
Care must be taken, however, to ensure 
that such a ·covering force did not develop into 
an independent European nuclear force in the 
event of political disagreement between Europe 
and the United States. 
3.21 The Rapporteur consequently recommends : 
(i) that levels of tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe be raised in the MBFR 
negotiations ; 
(ii) that tactical nuclear weapons be 
deployed further to the rear with 
emphasis on surface-to-surface mis-
siles. 
1. United States Secretary of Defence, first annual 
report to Congress on the United States defence position, 
3rd March 1974. 





(submitted by Mr. Duvieusart, Rapporteur) 
A. Introduction 
4.1 European security requires a stable military 
situation on both flanks of the European com-
mand and on the central front. The flanks include 
Denmark, Norway and their surrounding waters 
and the Mediterranean countries and sea. ' 
4.2 The Committee reported on the situation 
on the northern flank in 1972 J.. The lack of 
military baLance in that area is still a matter of 
concern. The recently announced cuts in the 
United Kingdom's defence effort concerned in 
partie~ two airborne brigades, two parachute 
battalions and one Royal Marine brigade origin-
ally assigned as reinforcements for the northern 
flank, but they will thus no longer be available. 
How~ver, the forces on the ground in that region 
remam unchanged. The political situation is sta-
ble, but Norway's decision not to join the Euro-
pean Community is a factor which weakens polit-
ical cohesion in. the area. In the absence of 
significant changes in the overall situation the 
Committee has not visited the area since '1972 
and, for the time being, has not prepared a 
special report on the northern flank. 
4.3 Conversely, there have been continual and 
sometimes surprising changes on the southern 
flank. On 14th November 1974 the Committee 
adopted its last report on the 'Mediterranean 2 
devoted to the Cyprus crisis. Recommendatio~ 
256 subsequently adopted by the Assembly 
adv:ocated, inter alia, that "the good offices of 
the1r partners and allies and in particular of the 
members of the European Community continue 
to be available to all parties", and urged the 
Council to "impress upon all parties to the con-
flict the manifold advantages which active mem-
bership of NATO bestows on each and every 
member". The Committee welcomes the Council's 
~pl;y of 24th March 1975, affirming its con-
tmumg concern for the sovereignty, independence 
and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
I. Document 568, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato, adopted 
on 25th April 1972. 
2. Document 651, European security and the situation 
in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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Cyprus and drawing attention to the fact that at 
their meeting in Dublin on 13th February 1975 
the Foreign Ministers of the nine countries of 
the European Communities asked the Chairman 
of the Council of the Communities to approach 
the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey 
to inform them : 
"- that they continue to regard as highly 
desirable the search for a just and 
lasting negotiated settlement through 
consultation between the two commun-
ities in Cyprus ; 
- that, in order to facilitate the achieve-
ment of this aim, the Nine are ready 
to hold talks with the representatives 
of all the interested parties." 
B. Greece and Turkey 
4.4 Aware of the seriousness of the situation 
in this area, the Committee visited Greece and 
':f'urkey in March. It had already visited Turkey 
m 1971, but it was the first time the whole 
Committee had visited Greece since it felt this 
would have been inappropriate during the colo-
nel's regime. In both countries, the Committee 
was received most courteously by the Ministers, 
members of parliament and generals listed in the 
preliminary note. The Committee was able to 
have very frank and useful talks, and much 
regrets that a transport strike forced it to cancel 
its appointment with Mr. Averoff, the Greek 
Minister of Defence. The Committee also visited 
the secretariat-general of the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) in Ankara and the 
NATO headquarters in Izmir. The Committee 
wishes to thank everyone with whom it had talks. 
C. The military situation 
4.5 In strategic terms, Greece and Turkey com-
prise a land mass of about 2,200 km from east to 
west and 800 km from north to south which has 
common :frontiers with Albania, Yugoslavia Bul-
garia, the Soviet Union, Iraq and Syria, dn the 
one hand, and Iran, on the other, this latter 
forming a link with CENTO. At military level, 
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this area is thus very exposed to possible threats 
of attack, and since it controls the passage for 
the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet it is of capital 
importance for NATO. 
4.6 The Committee learnt that in the event of 
attack the Warsaw Pact forces would be able 
to deploy some thirty-one mechamsoo and 
armoured divisions against Northern Greece and 
Turkish Thrace. NATO has only twenty-six divi-
sions in the area (sixteen of which are Greek and 
not all up to strength), most of them infantry 
divisions. The Warsaw Pact has a 2 to 1 supe-
riority in tanks in this area. 
4.7 In Eastern Turkey, military operations 
would be more qifficult and the ten available 
Soviet divisions wou1d probably be delayed by 
the seven Turkish divisions opposite them, but 
in this area Soviet tank superiority is 2 1/2 to 1. 
4.8 Finally, in the southern sector, there are 
four divisions of the Iraqi and Syrian armies 
compared with four Turkish divisions, but there 
again, Iraq and Syria, which have Soviet mate-
riel, have a 2 to 1 superiority over Turkish 
forces. 
4.9 The possibilities of defending this area 
have been considerably enhanced by NATO 
infrastructure projects costing $1,200 million, i.e. 
20% of all SHAPE infrastructure projects. 
4.10 With regard to air forces, although the 
position has improved somewhat since the Com-
mittee's last visit to Turkey by the introduction 
of a few F-4 and F-104 S (new version) aircraft, 
modernisation needs to be pursued, and the sus-
pension of spare part supplies is detrimental to 
the maintenance of aircraft in service. Greece 
and Turkey will always need materiel from their 
allies, particularly tanks, anti-tank weapons and 
communications equipment. Both countries, mem-
bers of Eurogroup and Euronad, take part in 
that framework in preparations for the joint 
production of certain armaments. When sharing 
sub-oontracts among the European countries 
which are the principal armaments manufac-
turers, it would be desirable to take account of 
existing capabilities in these countries, and, 
wherever possible, facilitate the communication 
of new technology. 
D. The navy 
4.11 The Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has 
on average some sixty fighting and support 
craft. Its Black Sea fleet has a total of 500 
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ships. Two Soviet helicopter-carriers have been 
in service for several years and regularly pass 
through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean. 
Two conventional aircraft-carriers are also being 
built in the Crimea and the first is to be com-
missioned in 1975. However, it is not clear 
whether the Soviet Union h88 suitable aircraft. 
In Recommendation 256, adopted by the .Assem-
bly on 4th December 1974, the Assembly reiter-
ated "its earlier recommendation for the correct 
application of the Montreux Convention to pre-
vent the passage of aircraft-carriers through 
the Dardanelles". The Council's reply contains 
no reference to this reminder. 
4.12 The Committee considered the naval 88pects 
of the situation in the Mediterranean in the 
report on security and the Mediterranean 
adopted on 21st May 1974·1 • The Committee noted 
that the on-call force of ships from several NATO 
countries had still not been made into a perma-
nent naval force as in the Atlantic and Channel. 
However, it continues to operate from time to 
time, and the United Kingdom, despite the cuts 
announced in its defence effort, h88 agreed to 
NATO's request that it maintain its contribution 
to this force during national deployments. 
E. Indian Ocean 
4.13 On 31st March, President Sadat announced 
that the Suez Canal would be reopened on 5th 
June, which will certainly lead to an incre88ed 
Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 
Soviet naval units are more or less permanently 
present off Mauritius and visit Beira and the 
Malagasy Republic more frequently. The Soviet 
Union has naval and air installations in Aden, on 
the island of Socotra at the entrance to the 
Gulf of Aden, and in Berber Somalia. 
4.14 The Committee has already drawn attention 
to the need for the total naval presence main-
tained by NATO countries in the Indian Ocean 
to be commensurate with that of the Soviet Union. 
It regrets the United Kingdom's decision in the 
defence review to abandon the staging post on 
Gan and the naval communications' station on 
Mauritius, but notes with satisfaction that the 
installations in Diego Garcia, to be built up by 
the United States, will be used by the United 
Kingdom if need be. 
1. Document 637. 
F. CENTO 
4.15 In Ankara, the Committee was satisfied 
to learn that military co-operation between the 
CENTO countries - Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States -
had improved considerably since the Committee's 
previous visit. The Midlink-74 naval exercise 
was held in November 197 4 with units from 
all the CENTO countries taking part in naval 
manoeuvres in the Indian Ocean and the Persian 
Gulf led by the American aircraft-carrier Con-
steLlation. Nuclear submarines, a helicopter-car-
rier, 21 destroyers, 6 supply ships and 143 air-
craft also took part. The force was based in 
Karachi for these manoeuvres. 
4.16 The Committee welcomes the improvement 
in official links between NATO and CENTO, 
particWa.rly in respect of radar, which allows 
NATO cover to be extended far to the east a.nd 
south, and naval communications. It hopes it 
will be possible to implement further projects. 
G. Relations between Greece, Turkey and 
NATO 
4.17 In both Athens and Ankara, the Com-
mittee, during its visit, found itself in countries 
with democratic parliamentary regimes which 
belong to NATO, are associated with the Euro-
pean Community and are anxious to take part 
in nine-power political consultations through the 
Community's Council of .Association and through 
permanent contacts by their ambassadors in the 
capital of the Community's President. 
4.18 Turkey is very attached to NATO and its 
military structure, and is also aware of its own 
strategic importance and contribution to the 
defence of Europe. It is very concerned about 
the suspension of deliveries of American equip-
ment. Turkey also has a military alliance with 
Iran and Pakistan in CENTO, as mentioned 
above, but nevertheless has good relations with 
Iraq, some economic interdependence having 
been established through their sharing the waters 
of the Euphrates and the fact that Iraqi oil 
will soon start flowing through the pipeline 
crossing Turkey. It also maintains good relations 
with Syria without, however, breaking off rela-
tions with Israel. 
4.19 An important consequence of the state of 




considered in the Committee's last report t, is 
the almost complete breakdown of communica-
tions - particularly air - between Turkey and 
Greece, and consequently between Turkey and 
the other NATO countries and Western Europe. 
Aircraft have to make a wide detour by the 
Southern Mediterranean or overfly communist 
territory. Turkey is thereby isolated from NATO 
and the Committee particularly regrets that it 
has therefore been unable to take part in NATO 
manoeuvres. There are also serious economic 
drawbacks for both countries, tourism being con-
siderably reduced. It appears that during the 
period of tension in 1974, Turkey, in NOTAM 
No. 714, required aircraft in the Aegean FIR 
to report their positions to Turkish air control 
when crossing the mid-point of the sea. (Radar 
cross-telling between Greece and Turkey had 
been suspended at the time.) Greece then issued 
a NOTAM declaring the Aegean a dangerous 
area. Since then, all flights over the Aegean have 
been suspended. 
4.20 Greece, very disappointed over NATO's 
inability to prevent a second military interven-
tion in Cyprus following the fall of the colonels' 
regime in Greece, withdrew its forces from NATO 
and announced its intention of negotiating its 
withdrawal from the integrated military struc-
ture although maintaining its political particip-
ation. It is planned to hold negotiations with 
NATO to this end, which will probably follow 
the negotiations now getting under way with 
the United States on bilateral military co-opera-
tion. 
4.21 It is clearly difficult for Greece at present 
to agree to the military integration of its forces 
when in reality this implies, in the geographical 
area concerned, integrating them only with Tur-
kish forces. But the NATO military structure 
concerns all the member countries and contains 
many other elements than the mere assignment 
of national forces. In these other aspects of mili-
tary co-operation in the Alliance Greece plays 
a vital role for the functioning of the defence 
structure as a whole. Well-prepared negotiations 
between Greece and NATO should lead to solu-
tions allowing all NATO defence forces to operate 
normally and affording Greece all the resulting 
military advantages. 
4.22 It is not for the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments to propose solutions 
1. Document 651. 
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to the problems of Cyprus and relations between 
Greece and Turkey. These problems were des-
cribed in the last report. It notes, however, that 
as a consequence of the Cyprus crisis the whole 
of the defensive arrangements of the Alliance 
have been weakened, with militarily disadvanta-
geous effects for both Greece and Turkey. Having 
visited the area, the Committee can report that 
both countries expressed their well-known posi-
tions very firmly. However, normalisation of 
relations is of major importance for these coun-
tries and the Alliance as a whole. 
4.23 The Committee can but list the positive 
indications which it noted : 
- negotiations between representatives of 
the two Cypriot communities - alone 
ca;pable of finding the basis for a lasting 
solution - were resumed in Vienna on 
28th April in the presence of Mr. Wald-
heim; 
- in Athens, it is recognised that a price 
will have to be paid for the Cyprus coup 
d'etat organised by the former military 
government in Greece ; 
- in Ankara, it is recognised that the posi-
tion of the present demarcation line of 
the de facto Turkish Cypriot area can 
be negotiated ; 
- Greece and Turkey have agreed to sub-
mit their dispute over the Aegean Sea 
to the International Court in The Hague 
through the consensus procedure (requir-
ing a meeting between representatives 
of the two countries, which would be 
facilitated by an improvement in the 
situation). 
4.24 The Committee considers that the summit 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council which 
is to prepare for the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe will provide a useful 
opportunity for Greece and Turkey to meet in 
the framework of the Alliance. The Committee 
also considers that the WEU countries should 
arrange, in the framework of ICAO, for Greece 
and Turkey to withdraw the NOTAMs which 
led to the suspension of commercial flights over 
the area of the Aegean Sea. 
H. The Iberian Peninsula 
4.25 The Committee considered the situation in 
the Iberian Peninsula in its report on security 
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and the Mediterranean adopted on 21st May 
1974 1 • This area is also capital for the defence 
of Europe since it controls the western outlet of 
the Mediterranean. The Committee hopes that 
after the elections to the Constituent Assembly 
on 25th April it will be possible to visit the 
country for talks with the Portuguese authorities 
and the Commander of the IBERLANT area 
which has its headquarters near Lisbon. It would 
be premature to consider the situation in Portugal 
in this report. 
4.26 In the abovementioned report, the Rappor-
teur noted that : 
"Spain is fully conscious of its European 
identity and would no doubt welcome an 
invitation to join both the European Com-
munity and NATO. But Spain does not 
consider itself a suppliant ... 
For Spain to play a more active and direct 
part in the defence of Europe as a whole 
as well as in its immediate Mediterranean 
region, it would no doubt be necessary for 
the European countries to extend an invita-
tion to Spain to join both NATO and the 
European Community. While your Rap-
porteur sees a positive evolution in Euro-
pean opinon as far as Spain is concerned, 
he recognises that there is no immediate 
prospect of such invitations being forth-
coming and that such proposals would cer-
tainly have a detrimental effect on public 
support for NATO in many member coun-
tries. The evolution of the political regime 
in Spain is a matter for that country alone, 
but it cannot fail to have a determining 
effect on the closer association of Spain 
with the rest of the European Commun-
ity ... " 
4.27 Mr. Genscher, Federal German Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, who visited Madrid on 3rd 
April 1975, told the press that the aim of his 
visit was to discuss with the Spanish Government 
how to bring the country closer to the European 
Community and NATO. The Committee follows 
the evolution of the political situation in Spain 
with great interest, and notes with satisfaction 
certain statements by the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Carlos Aris, who, on 18th February 1975, in the 
first interview ever granted to foreign journalists 
1. Document 637. 
by a Spanish Prime Minister, said that political 
reforms in Spain should go "very far and very 
high". He saw no objection to Christian Democrat 
or Socialist groups playing a part in the country's 
politics. 
I. Conclusion 
4.28 In the draft recommendation the Committee 
stresses the importance of the flanks and the 
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need to avoid their being isolated. Among the 
political and military measures concerned, the 
Committee has in mind the Allied Command 
Europe Mobile Force, to which Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom contribute, and which can 
be deployed in Norway, Greece or Turkey. The 
Committee also stresses the need for a concrete 
study to be made of the legal and political aspects 
of the arms embargo imposed by the United 
States Congress and its compatibility with the 
functioning of the Alliance. 
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CHAPTER v 
Production of missiles in Europe 
(submitted by Mr. WaU, Rapporteur) 
Object 
5.1 Your Rapporteur was asked to review exist-
ing missile production capability in the Euro-
pean NATO countries for the whole range of 
military missiles from short-range anti-tank and 
anti-aircraft missiles to strategic missiles, and to 
make recommendations concerning the equipment 
of NATO forces and the future development of 
missile production in Europe. 
Method 
5.2 The method adopted is to examine and clas-
sify the existing and next generation of missiles 
and the companies manufacturing them ; inter-
company and international arrangements for co-
operation in missile produeti.on are also described. 
From this data recommendations are made as to 
the requirements for European missiles in 7 to 
10 years' time, and possible consortia for their 
production are suggested. 
Summary of missile classification 
(see Appendix II) 
5.3 Missile in this chapter is used in the sense 
of guided missile - a missile whose trajectory 
can be modified after the moment of launch, 
either by an inertial or homing guidance device 
contained within the missile itself, or by com-
mands transmitted to the missile from the ground. 
This definition therefore excludes simple rockets 
and various bazooka-type weapons. At Appendix 
II to this report is a comprehensive classifica-
tion of missiles in service or under development, 
by principal manufacturing country and by type. 
While the table lists missiles by country of pro-
duction, it should be noted that many NATO 
countries which do not produce particular cate-
gories of missiles have procured them from other 
producing countries. This is particularly true of 
nuclear capable tactical missiles in service with 
the European NATO countries other than France, 
and with the submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles Polaris A. 3 in service with the British-built 
Polaris submarines. France alone of the Euro-
pean NATO countries has a national production 
capability in these areas, and also produces 
IRBMs. 
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5.4 True guided missiles have almost all been 
developed since the end of the second world war. 
In that thirty-year period, some countries have 
produced as many as three generations of missiles 
for certain applications. Earlier versions of 
Soviet surface-to-air missiles and various United 
States airborne missiles were used in Vietnam, and 
in the 1973 Middle East hostilities the more 
sophisticated Soviet SAM.6 and the Sagger and 
Snapper anti-tank missiles were used. Losses in 
that war are said to have been : 2,800 tanks, 
500 aircraft, 80 helicopters and 20 ships. Missiles 
are reported to have accounted for 70 % of the 
aircraft losses, a large proportion of the tank 
losses, and many of the naval losses. The lessons 
for Europe are inescapable 1 • 
5.5 The missiles currently available to the NATO 
forces, listed at Appendix II, vary enormously in 
size, weight, sophistication and cost, depending 
first on the role for which they are intended, and 
secondly the degree of sophistication built into 
them. At one end of the scale is the very heavy 
intercontinental ballistic missile fitted with very 
accurate inertial guidance systems, and which are 
produced only by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The somewhat smaller SLBMs and 
IRBMs are produced also by France. At the 
other end of the scale are the relatively short-
range and inexpensive anti-tank missiles, the 
earlier generations of which depended on con-
tinual guidance by the operator from the firing 
position up to the time of impact. Such missiles 
have been produced by several European coun-
tries. 
5.6 The few operational details given in Appen-
dix II - chiefly range and a very brief descrip-
tion of the guidance technology - are intended 
solely as a guide to classification of missile types, 
and do not provide sufficient information to 
judge the suitability of a missile to meet parti-
cular military requirements. Moreover, informa-
tion concerning cost of missiles is not readily 
available and has not therefore been included. 
1. A proper mix of tactical missiles and guns is ell86ntial ; 
rates of consumption are far higher than previously 
thought. Both the densities of missiles in service with 
units and the levels of reserve stocks need to be increased. 
Together with the detailed military capabilities 
of a missile, cost is inevitably a major factor in 
determining a choice between competing missile 
systems, as, where defence budgets are as always 
limited, cost must determine the numbers of 
missiles that can be procured. 
5.7 The following is a summary table of missiles 
which are produced or are under development 
in the European NATO countries, together with 
United States missiles (shown in brackets), which 
are either produced under licence in Europe for 
the forces of certain European NATO countries, 
or which have been or may be procured directly 
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Apparent duplication in European missiles 
5.8 The foregoing table reveals, in the case of 
the cheaper types of missile, many different 
types in service at present, which has, of course, 
resulted in a serious lack of standardisation 
throughout the NATO forces, as well as much 
duplicated, and hence wasted, research and 
development effort in the past. In the case of 
more recent, more sophisticated (second genera-
tion) weapons, just entering service or at present 
in research and development, there is still much 
duplication, both between weapons developed by 
European NATO countries rund between Euro-
pean production and certain United States 
weapons which are likely to be procured by 
European countries. The following particular 
cases of duplication have been noted by your 
Rapporteur : 
A. Ship-bome missiles 
Long-range ship-borne surface-to-surface missiles 
(a) Exocet MM.38: Produced by Aerospatiale, 
France. Fitted to FPBs up to cruisers. Missile 
weight: 735 kg. Range over 40 km (normal limit 
of ship-borne radar acquisition). Reaction time: 
100 seconds. A sea-skimming missile, inertial 
guidance to proximity of target, with active 
radar homing thereafter. 160 kg warhead deton-
ated by impact and proximity fuze. May be fired 
when the (fixed) launcher-container axis is 
within ± 30° of the direction of the target. 
Development from 1968, entering service with 
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French, British and German navies from 1972 
onwards. Derived versions AM39 and MM40 
(greater range) offer other possibilities. 
(b) Otomat : Produced by Oto Melara (Italy) 
and Engins Matra (France) to be fitted to Italian 
navy hydrofoils and frigates. MK.I missile weight 
about 700 kg. Range up to 60-80 km if target 
position data available (propulsive endurance 
about 200 km). Reaction time: 30 seconds. 
A sea-skimming missile with a terminal 
"pop-up and dive" trajectory, pseudo inertial 
guidance to proximity of target with active radar 
homing thereafter, with additional capability to 
home on any source of jamming. 210 kg warhead. 
May be fired when the (fixed) launcher-container 
is within about ± 300° of the direction of the 
target. 
Development from 1969, in production 
1975. Sold to Italian and one non-NATO navy. 
Shore-to-ship and air-ship versions can make 
greater use of missile's inherent range. 
(c) Harpoon (United States) : Has comparable 
characteristics to Otomat and is intended to enter 
service with the United States navy in 1975. 
Shorter-range ship-borne surface-to-surface mis-
siles 
(a) Sea Killer Mk.ll: Produced by Sistel, Italy. 
A simple beam-riding missile ; range about 20 km. 
Missile weight 270 kg ; warhead 70 kg. Opera-
tional in non-NATO countries. Said to cost one-
third of Exocet or one-quarter of Otomat missile. 
(b) Penguin: Produced by Kongsberg Vaapen-
fabrikk, Norway. 20 km range. Inertial guidance; 
infra-red homing. Missile weight : 330 kg. War-
head: 120 g. Operational on Norwegian navy 
patrol boats and frigates. 
Ship-borne surface-air misst'les - long-range 
(a) Sea Dart: (replacing Sea Slug). Produced 
by Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics, United Kingdom. 
Can be fitted to frigates upwards. Missile weight : 
550 kg. Range over 35 km. Semi-active radar 
homing. Development from 1962. Operational in 
British destroyers 1972 ; sold to Argentina ; has 
an anti-ship capability. 
(b) Masurca: Produced by French navy and 
Matra. Range: 40-50 km. Semi-active radar 
homing. Operational with French navy. 
(c) Standard : Produced by General Dynamics, 
United States. Various versions in service with 
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United States navy since 1969, or under further 
development. Extended range version over 55 km. 
Weight : 1,060 kg (said to be anti-ship and, in 
some versions, anti-missile capability). 
Ship-borne surface-air missiles - medium-range 
(a) Marine Roland II: Proposed navalised ver-
sion of army SAM (see below) being developed 
jointly by Aerospatiale (France) and MBB (Ger-
many). Missile weight: 63 kg. Range: 6 1/2 km. 
Anti-missile capability said to be under investiga-
tion (see Sea Wolf below). 
(b) Naval Grot ale : Proposed version of the 
army SAM (see below). Developed by Matra 
(France). Missile weight : 80 kg. Range : 8 1/2 
km. 
(c) Albatross : Air defence system produced 
by Selenia, Italy, using Sparrow Ill (United 
States) (see below) or Aspide multi-role missile 
developed by Selenia. Weight : 200 kg. Produc-
tion scheduled later. 
Ship-borne anti-missile missiles 
Sea Wolf : Being developed by British Aircraft 
Corporation (United Kingdom) for Royal Navy 
for short-range anti-ship missile interception ; 
could be operational in the mid-1970s. Line-of-
sight auto-guidance. France reported to be 
interested in a larger-range system (see naval 
Roland above). 
Ship-borne anti-submarine weapons 
(a) Malafon : Produced by Latecoere (France) 
for French navy. Weight: 1,500 kg. Range: 
13 km airborne. A command guidance missile-
delivered homing torpedo. Operational since about 
1965. 
(b) Ikara: Developed by Australian navy. 
Fitted to ships of 1,500 tons upwards. Command 
guidance missile delivering a homing torpedo. 
In service with Australian, United Kingdom 
navies ; ordered by Brazil. Operational since 
about 1972. 
Helicopter-borne anti-ship misst'les 
(a) Marte: Produced by Sistel (Italy) for 
Italian navy. Helicopter-borne version of Sea 
Killer II (see above). Beam-riding missile 
employing helicopter search radar. Under 
development since 1969. Operational 1977 ? 
(b) AM.39: Produced by Aerospatiale (France). 
A helicopter-borne version of Exocet (see above). 
Weight: less than 650 kg. Range: 50 km from 
helicopter launch (more from fixed-wing aircraft). 
Production expected to begin 1976. 
(c) Sea Skua: Under development by BAC 
for United Kingdom navy since 1972 as heli-
copter-borne missile with anti-ship capability 
against light vessels - FPBs and hydrofoils. 
Weight: 200 kg. Range: to be greater than size 
of FPB anti-aircraft systems. Sea-skimming mis-
sile; semi-active radar homing. 
(d) Hellcat : Manufactured by Short Bros. 
(United Kingdom). Helicopter~borne version of 
ship-air missile. Weight : 68 kg ; range : 3 1/2 km. 
Introduced into Royal Navy 1968. 
(e) H awkswing : A development of Swingfire 
anti-tank missile with an anti-FPB capability. 
B. Land-based missiles 
Army (tactical) SSMs 
(a) Pluton : Produced by Aerospatiale (France) 
for French army. Tactical nuclear warhead. 
Range : 120 km. Weight : 2,350 kg. Solid pro-
pellant, inertial guidance. In service since 1974. 
(b) Lance: Produced by LTV Aerospace 
(United States) for United States army. Tactical 
nuclear warhead ; range about 110 km ; weight : 
1,500 kg. Pre-packed storable liquid propellant, 
inertial guidance. Ordered by most Eurogroup 
countries to replace Sergeant and Honest John. 
In service since 1972. 
Surface-air missiles : 
Long-range 
There appears to be no European weapon 
system under development to replace the longer-
range United States Nike, or British Thunderbird 
and Bloodhound systems. The United States 
SAM D, under development since 1965, is 
expected to replace Hawk and Nike. Engineering 
development began after initial firings in 1972. 
Improved Hawk: To be produced by Raytheon 
and, under licence, the SETEL Consortium in 
Belgium, France, Italy, the NetherLands and 
Germany; also Japan. Range (altitude) : 





(a) Roland : Produced jointly by Aerospatiale 
(France) and MBB (Germany). All components 
can be mounted on single tank chassis for for-
ward defence of mobile army units. Missile launch 
weight : 62.5 kg. Range over 6,000 m up to 
3,000 m height. Reaction time : 6-8 seconds first 
engagement, 2-6 seconds subsequent. Automatic 
command guidance from IR missile data to 
optical line of sight or automatic radar command 
guidance to line of sight. Warhead : 6.5 kg. 
Development since 1964. Shortly to enter service 
with French and German armies ; also to be 
produced under licence in the United States. 
(b) Rapier : Produced by BAC (United King-
dom). Lightweight system carried on two Land-
rovers and trailers for forward unit air defence. 
Missile launch weight : about 65 kg. Range : 
about 7,000 m. Simi1ar automatic optical com-
mand guidance to Roland. Optional blind fire 
radar tracking available. Development since 1963. 
In service with British army and Iran. Sold to 
other non-NATO countries. SP tracked vehicle 
being developed. Modular system, i.e. additional 
units can be controlled by the same man. 
(c) Orotale : Produced by Matra, France. 
System can be carried on two tracked vehicles. 
Missile launch weight : 80 kg. Range : 8,500 m. 
Reaction time : 6 seconds. Radar tracking com-
mand guidance from IR missile data. Warhead : 
15 kg. Development since 1964. In service with 
French air force and South Africa since 1971. 
(d) Indigo: Produced by Sistel, Italy. SAM for 
Italian army. Missile total weight: 120 kg. Range 
10 km. Beam riding or command guidance with 
optical tracking. Production 1977. 
(e) SPADA system produced by Selenia, Italy. 
Low-altitude system for permanent target 
defence. Modular shelter mounted air transport-
able elements. Missile launch weight (.Aspide) : 
220 kg. Range 15 km. Reaction time: 9 seconds. 
Semi-active radar homing. Optical tracking 
available. In development since 1969. In service 
Italian air force late 1978. 
Short-range infantry SA missiles 
(a) Blowpipe : Produced by Short and Harland 
(United Kingdom). Man-portable, fired from the 
shoulder. Total weight : 21 kg. Very short range. 
Manual radio command on line of sight with 
automatic gathering. Incorporated IFF available. 
Development since 1967. In service with British 
army and sold to Canada. 
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(b) Red Eye: Produced by General Dynamics 
(United States). Man-portable, fired from shou1-
der. Total weight : 13 kg. Range about 3 km. 
Passive infra-red homing, no IFF, receding 
targets only. Development since 1959. In service 
with United States forces, Australia, Sweden. 
(c) Stinger: Under development by General 
Dynamics (United States) since 1970, to replace 
Red Eye. More sensitive IR homing to engage 
approaching targets, fitted with optional IFF ; 
total weight : 15 kg. 
Anti-tank missiles 
Heavy, vehicle-borne 
(a) Swingfire: Produced by BAC (United 
Kingdom). Tank- or vehicle-carried system; the 
only missile that can be fired from behind cover 
(possible helicopter version under development 
would be called Hawkswing). Range: 4,000 m. 
Manual wire guidance with automatic guidance. 
Operator can be separated from launch point. 
Development since 1958 ; in service with British 
army since 1969, and with Belgian army. 
(b) Hot : Produced jointly by Aerospatia;le 
(France) and MBB (Germany). Tank- or heli-
copter-mounted system. Launch weight : 22 kg. 
Range : 4,000 m. Automatic wire guidance to 
optical line of sight. Development since 1964. Now 
in limited production for French and German 
armies. Said to have anti-heLicopter capability. 
(c) H arpon : Produced by Aerospatiale 
(France). A precursor of Hot, in service with 
France and Germany. Range: 3,000 m. 
(d) Tow : Produced by Hughes Aircraft (United 
States). Vehicle- or helicopter-mounted or 2-man 
portable. Total weight : 78 kg. Missile launch 
weight: 18 kg. Range: 3,000 m. Automatic wire 
guidance to optical line of sight. Development 
since 1962. In service United States army. Sold 
to Italy, Netherlands, Israel. 
Light-weight anti-tank missiles 
(a) Milan: Produced jointly by Aerospatiale 
(France) and MBB '(Germany). Man-portable, 
fired from tripod. Total weight : 12 kg. Missile 
1aunch weight: 6.7 kg. Range: 2,000 m. Auto-
matic wire guidance to optical line of sight. 
Development since 1963. Operational with French 
and German armies. 
(b) Sparviero : Developed by Breda Meccanicca 
Bresciana (Italy). Man-, vehicle- or helicopter-
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mounted. Total weight : 69 kg. Missile launch 
weight : 16 kg. Range up to 4,000 m. Automatic 
infra-red guidance to opticaL line of sight. Could 
be in production by 1978. 
(c) Vigilant: Produced by Vickers (United 
Kingdom). Man-portable or vehicle-mounted. 
Total weight : 22 kg. Missile launch weight : 
15 kg. Range : 1,300 m. Manual wire guidance. 
Development since 1956. In service with British 
army since 1963. Sold to non-NATO countries. 
(d) Cobra, Mamba: Produced by MBB (Ger-
many). Weight: 11 kg. Range: 2,000 m. Manual 
wire guidance. In service Germany 1972. To be 
replaced by Milan. 
(e) Mosquito: P.roduced by Contraves (Italy). 
Total weight: 22 kg. Missile weight: 14 kg. 
Range : 2,300 m. Manual wire guidance. In 
service with Italian army. 
C. Airborne missiles 
Air-to-surface -long-range 
(See also heLicopter-borne and other anti-
ship missiles, and helicopter-borne anti-tank mis-
siles, above.) 
(a) Martel: Produced jointly by Matra 
(France) and Hawker-Siddeley (United King-
dom). Weight: 550 kg. France produces only 
the anti-radar version with passive homing. 
United Kingdom produces TV guidance version 
guided from launching aircraft. Under develop-
ment since 1964. In service 1973 - anti-radar 
version in France, both in United Kingdom. 
(b) Otomat : (See anti-ship missiles above.) 
Air-to-surface - medium-range 
(a) AS.30: Produced by Aerospatiale (France). 
Range : 12 km. Weight : 500 kg. Warhead : 
230 kg. Manual radio command guidance from 
launch aircraft (automatic line of sight, radio 
command guidance in service with French air 
force). In service with French, German, United 
Kingdom air forces and non-NATO countries. 
(b) Bullpup : A range of missiles produced by 
Martin Marietta ·(United States). Range: 11 to 
17 km. Weight : 110 to 450 kg. Conventional or 
nUJClear warhead. Visual radio command guidance. 
Development since 1954. Operational since 1959 
with United States forces. Manufactured under 
licence by NATO Consortium under Kongsberg 
Vaapenfabrikk for Denmark, Norway, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom. 
(c) Sea Skua: (See anti-ship missiles above.) 
(d) Kormoran: Produced by MBB (Germany) ; 
jointly designed with A~rospatia:le (France). 
Anti-ship missilil ; range : 35 km. Weight : 580 kg. 
Inertial guidance and radar homing head. 
Development from 1964. Test firings since 1971. 
Air-to-surface - short-range 
AS.20: Produced by A~rospatiale (France). 
Weight : 140 kg. Range : 7 km. Manual radio 
command guidance. Produced by MBB (Ger-
many) under licence. In service France, Ger-
many, Italy. Used as training missile for AS.30. 
Air-to-air - medium-range 
(a) Super 530 : Developed by Matra (France) 
from earlier R530. Range : 18 km, operational 
over 10,000 m difference in altitude. Weight : 
200 kg. Semi-active radar homing. Mach. 4.5. 
Development launches for French air force sche-
duled from 1974 to 1977. 
(b) XJ 521 : Developed by Hawker-Siddeley 
Dynamics (United Kingdom) in co-operation with 
Raytheon (United States)- an improved United 
States Sparrow. Performance better than Spar-
row (see below). Semi-a:ctive radar homing. Speed 
over Mach. 3.5. Development since 1973. In pro-
duction. 
(c) Aspide: Developed by Selenia (Italy). S-A 
or A-A missile. Range : 15 km in S-A role -
operates from aircraft up to 30,000 m. Weight : 
220 kg. Semi-active radar homing. Deliveries 
expected later. 
(d) Sparrow : Produced by Raytheon (United 
States). Range : 44 km. Weight : 230 kg. Semi-
active radar homing. Also anti-ship capability, 
semi-active doppler radar homing. In service in 
United States, British and Italian air forces, 
and non-NATO countries. 
(e) Red Top : Produced by Hawker-Siddeley 
Dynamics (United Kingdom). Range: 11 km. 
Weight : 150 kg. Passive infra-red homing. 
Developed since 1957. In service with British and 
non-NATO air forces. 
Air-to-air - close combat 
(a) R550 "Magic": Developed by Matra 
(France). Range : 400 m-2 1/2 km or 10 km at 
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high altitude. Highly manoeuvrable up to 50 g. 
Weight : 80 kg. Passive infra-red homing. 
Development from 1968. Delivery to French air 
force expected shortly. 
(b) SRAAM : Developed by Hawker-Siddeley 
Dynamics (United Kingdom). P8B8ive infra-red 
homing. In 1975 United Kingdom ordered reduced 
rate of development only. 
(c) Sidewinder : Various versions produced by 
Philco-Ford {United States) and NATO Europe 
Consortium in Germany. Weight: 75 kg; range: 
1.1 km sea-level. Mach. 2. Passive infra-red 
homing. In service since late 1950s with many 
countries. 
D. Future developments for the 1980s and 1990s 
5. 9 The missiles described above are mostly in 
service or in a late stage of development. Most 
of the possible advantages of joint development 
and standardised production have already been 
lost. Looking ahead to missiles that would enter 
service in the late 1980s, it appears that at least 
one crucial decision about a future development 
programme may be taken in 197·5. 
(a) Underwater-to-surface guided weapon 
(USGW) 
Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics (United King-
dom) with A~rospatiale and Matra (France). 
Hawker-Siddeley has a United Kingdom 
Government project definition contract for an 
anti-ship USGW which would be based on the 
Martel missile, designed to be launched from a 
submarine's torpedo tubes. The United States is 
also developing the Harpoon anti-ship missile for 
underwater launch, possibly ready by 1978. 
(b) Future anti-ship missile 
The NATO Conference of National Arma-
ments Directors (CNADs) (composed of govern-
ment representatives) is harmonising requirements 
for a single research, development and procure-
ment programme for a new anti-ship missile for 
the mid-1980s, the need for which CNAD has 
recognised. The NATO National Industrial Advi-
sory Group (NIAG) (composed of representatives 
of the arms industry) is examining a pre-feasibil-
ity study from multinational industrial groups. 
A~rospatiale (France) is interested in working 
with MBB (Germany) on a super Exocet MM.40 
with a range of 100 to 120 km and speed of 
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Mach. 2, and has also approached BAC (United 
Kingdom) in this connection. 
(c) Future anti-tank missile 
BAC (United Kingdom) is interested in 
developing a replacement for Swingfire, which is 
probably obsolescent compared with the Franco-
German Hot. It would be a "fire and forget" 
homing system, obviating any need for post-
launch tracking. A joint development contract 
could be awarded to British, French and German 
consortia. 
CNAD decided at the end of 1974 to 
encourage NATO countries to restrict immediate 
procurement to a very few specific models of 
anti-tank missiles in the 1,000 to 4,000 m range. 
CNAD is defining a single family of four 
future missiles in this range, requirements for 
which will be harmonised by the Army Arma-
ments Group. 
(d) Future long-range surface-air missiles 
In addition to an immediate choice on a 
short-range army system such as Roland or 
Rapier, CNAD air defence experts are looking 
for a single missile to replace Hawk, improved 
Hawk and Nike in the late 1980s. The United 
States SAM-D research and development pro-
gramme, based on a proper "track-via-missile" 
guidance system, will not complete tests of the 
associated controlled test vehicle until 1976. 
Engineering development is planned after that. 
E. Companies and their missiles 
5.10 France 
Aerospatiale '(Societe Nationale Industrielle Aero-
spatiale- SNIAS). 
A nationalised company exporting 50 to 
70 % of its missile production. 
Co-operates with MBB in the international 
consortium "Euromissile" on S-S and S-A mis-
siles. Wider co-operation envisaged with Hawker-
Siddeley for submarine-launched missiles. Turn-
over (tactical missiles only) : F.frs. 960 million 







SSM SS 12M 
Exocet 1 
MM 40 1 
SAM Roland 2M 1 (with MBB) 
Helicopter AM 39 1 
SSM Pluton 1 
SAM Roland 1 (with MBB) 
Anti-tank Entac 
SS 11 and 12 
HarponJ. 
Hot 1 (with MBB) 
Milan a (with MBB) 
An independent public company ; control-
ling interest owned by Floirat-Chassagny Finance 
Group. 4,500 employees. 55 % military produc-
tion, 15-20 % space, 20 % cars, 5-10 % civil 
engineering. Exports 47% of missile production. 
Turnover {1975) (estimated) : F.frs. 1,000 
million (of which 550 million military). 
Misst"les 
Ship-borne 
SSM Otomat 1 (with Oto Melara) 
Ship/land 
SAM Crotale :t ;cactus 
Air-to-ground 
Air-to-OJir 
Martel with Hawker-Siddeley 
R.511 in Vautour aircraft 
R.530 in Mirage III aircraft 




Independent company owned by Blohm, 
Messerschmitt and Bolkow families. Boeing 
(United States) and Aerospatiale (France) own 
8.9% each. 
Missiles 
SAM Roland 1 with Aerospatiale 
Anti-tank 
Cobra and Mamba 
Armbrust;! 
1. Second-generation missiles. 
Hot 1 with Aerospatiale 
Milan 1 with Aerospatiale 
Air-to-ground 




Controlled by government through IRI, 
the State-owned holding company which has 
interests in more than 130 industrial or utility 
companies. 
Selenia employs 5,200 persons. Turnover 
1975 : Ita:lian Lire 70 billion. 
Missiles 
Ship-borne 
SAM Albatross with Sparrow or Aspide 
Land-based 
SAM improved Hawk with Raytheon 
Spada with Sparrow or Aspide 
Airborne 
Air-to-ground 




Part of the State-controlled EFIM Group 
which operates through five incorporated finance 
companies including Finanziaria Ernesto Breda 
(capital 50 % EFIM and 50 % private) which 
controls, among other companies, Oto Melara and 
Breda Meccanica Bresciana. 
Oto Melara is specialised in army and naval 
artillery, and in heavy and light tanks. Employs 
1,800. Turnover 1975: Italian l~re 45 billion. 
s.hip-borne 
SSM Otomat 1 with Matra. 
Breda Meccanica Bresciana 
Employs 750. Turnover 1975 : Italian lire 
15 million. Specialises in automatic anti-aircraft 
weapons and mulitiple rocket launchers. 







Owned 35 % by Montedison, 20 % Con-
traves Italiana, 20 % Finmeccanica, the latter 
being controlled by the State holding company 
IRI. 
Employs directly 243 on headquarters, 
management and design staff. Research, develop-




SSM Sea Killer II 
Sea Killer III 1 
Grou~based 





Airtos - project only. 
5.13 United Kingdom 
Note : The government, early in 1975, 
announced its intention to nationalise BAC missile 
division, and Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics, which 
will be merged. 
British Aircraft Corporation 
Capita1 : £21 million. 
Owned 50 % by GEC and 50% by Vickers. 
Guided weapons division, one of three divi-
sions of B.A!C, employs 8,100 people. 
Missiles 
Ship-borne 
SAM Sea Wolf 1 
Helicopter Sea Skua 1 
Land-based 
SAM Bloodhound 2 
Thunderbird 2 
Rapier 1 







H awker-Siddeley Dynamics 
Wholly-owned subsidiary of Hawker-Sid-
deley Group Ltd. Hawker-Siddeley Dynamics 
employs 7,500 people. Turnover 1975 : £40 million. 
Missiles 
Ship-borne 
SAM Sea Dart 1. with SSM capability 













SSM SS 12M Otoma.t 
Exooet 
MM40 





Army SSM Pluton -
Army SAM Roland 
-
1. Second-generation mill8iles. 
SRAAM1. 
XJ 521 1 
F. Future development 
(a) Present position of companies 
5.14 Most companies agree that international 
co-operation is essential for the development of 
the next generation of European missiles. Existing 
co-operation is as follows : 
Aerospatiale - MBB : e.g. Roland, Hot, 
Milan; 
H awker-Siddeley - Aerospatiale - Matra : 
e.g. USGW; 
Matra- Oto Melara: e.g. Otomat ; 
Matra - H awker-Siddeley : e.g. Martel. 
British, German and French companies 
seem to find co-operation relatively easy but all 
demand clear specification as to the type and 
capability for the European missiles required. At 
present there are ten basic types {excluding ICBM 
land and submarine and air nuclear) in which 
fifteen companies are involved as prime contrac-
tors. 
However, five companies carry out the 
majority of this work, as shown : 
Germany United Kingdom 
MBB BAC Hawker-Siddeley 
- -
Sea. Dart 
Roland Sea Wolf Sea Slug II 
- -
USGW 










France Germany United Kingdom 
Aerospa.tiale Matra MBB BAC Ha.wker-Siddeley 




ss. 11 Mamba. Swingfire 
















R.530 Red Top 




A grand total of 46 different missiles out 
of a European production of 70 different missiles. 
(b) Intergovernmental planning 
5.15 NATO has made several attempts to achieve 
a general NATO-wide so1Iution to the problem of 
joint production. Earlier formulae have been 
abandoned. 
5.16 The present preferred solution is through 
the Conference of National Armaments Directors 
~CNAD), established in 1966 and supported by 
the Defence Research Group, the tri-service 
Group for Air Defence and the Industrial Advi-
sory Oroup. CNAD has had some effects on 
standardisation but members tended to be 
national- and service-minded and not enough has 
been achieved. There has, however, been a recent 
success in that CNAD decided in October 1974 
to harmonise requirements for the next generation 
of SSM with a view to a single research, develop-
ment and procurement programme for the mid-
1980s. They had also decided to persuade NATO 
countries to restrict procurement to specific 
models of anti-tank missiles in the 1,000 to 
4,000 m range and to define a single family of 
four missiles in this range for the next generation. 
This compares with the 13 different anti-tank 
missiles in the central region today. CNAD would 
then discuss the future generation of short-range 
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SAM ground defence insta11ations and a large 
medium- and long-range SAM. 
5.17 Progress is being made by the NATO 
Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support, 
Dr. Gardiner Tucker. A questionnaire asking 
about national projects in the field of short-
range surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank missiles 
has been sent out to governments and the replies 
are now being analysed. Assistance is also being 
given by the Advisory Group on Aerospace 
Research and Development (AGARD) in NATO 
in analysing future technologies available for 
missile production. 
5.18 NATO natioDa'l Defence Ministers are com-
mitted not to start to develop national equipment 
without first checking whether similar equipment 
from another NATO oountry exists or will be 
developed. This, however, is not always done 
and, in any case, does not go far enough. 
The companies require a clear basic design 
study but there are, as yet, no European facil-
ities to prepare such a study. At present the 
Military Committee of NATO could not under-
take this work. 
5.19 The key requirement appears to be the 
need for co-ordination at the top in order to 
achieve agreed basic design studies. The Com-
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mittee proposes that this should be initiated by 
the NATO staff and they should be given ade-
quate facilities and manpower. Companies on 
receipt of the design study would then form their 
own international consortia for development. 
As far as research and development is con-
cerned, the waste on duplication has been estim-
ated at 50%. This could be cheeked by each 
member country allocating 1 % of its proposed 
research and development expenditure to a com-
mon-funded NATO budget in a similar manner to 
the existing S.A!CLANT ASW Research Centre, 
the SHAPE Technical Centre and AGARD. 
5.20 A recent United States study has pointed 
out that the United Stat€8 spends $5 billion a 
year on weapons research and development, 
while NATO spends $2.6 billion. As all European 
research and development projects are duplicated 
at wast once over by United States projects, 
this represents a net waste in NATO of at least 
$2.6 billion a year, which could be far more 
effectively devoted to procurement. What is 
required is research and development and pro-
curement assigned on a NATO-wide basis, but 
this must not involve the loss of research and 
development capability in Europe - it may, 
however, mean certain European NATO countries 
specialising in particular fields of weapons 
research and development with actual production 
more widely shared. The recent United States 
decision to produce the Franco-German Roland 
SAM under licence is a sign of a new United 
States willingness to rely on European research 
and development. In his annual Defence Depart-
ment report for the financial years 1976 and 
1977, the United States Defence Secretary, Mr. 
Schlesinger, has stated : 
"Last year we had proposed to evaluate 
the results of United States-conducted pre-
liminary firing tests of three short-range 
air defence missile systems... the French 
Crota:oo, the German Roland II and the 
United Kingdom Rapier, with the view of 
selecting one of them for production under 
licence in the United States. We proposed 
this approach because a major improve-
ment in our low-altitude, all-weather, 
mobile SAM capacity for our forces and 
bases is urgently needed and the develop-
ment of these foreign systems had already 
been completed. 
The reaction of the Congress to this pro-
posal ranged from very favourable to very 
unfavourable. The conference report of the 
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House and Senate Armed Services Com-
mittees states explicitly that 'it is (not) 
necessary to procure a foreign developed 
SHORAD system ... (simply) because of the 
earlier availability of test firing data'. The 
SenaJte Appropriations Committee, however, 
stated that 'it will not tolerate a drawn-
out SHORAD research and development 
programme' and directed that 'the most 
economical and easily deployed system 
under consideration' be selected. To com-
plicate the problem further, the Congress 
in the Department of Defence Appropri-
ation Authorisation Act of 1975 {PL 93-
365) directed : 'The Secretary of Defence 
shall undertake a specific assessment of 
the costs and possible loss of non-nuclear 
combat effectiveness of the military forces 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
countries caused by the failure of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation members, 
including the United States, to standar-
dise weapons systems ... '. 
Let me say at the outset that I fully agree 
with the intent of the provision incorpor-
ated in PL 93-365. Given the ever-rising costs 
of defence, we and our NATO allies simply 
can no longer afford any unnecessary dupli-
cation of effort. While I certainly agree 
that key weapon systems used by our 
forces should be produced in the United 
States as a matter of prudence, I can think 
of no logical reason why we cannot pro-
duce in this country suitable weapon 
systems developed by our allies. Indeed, this 
is the one area where the greatest degree 
of mutual exchange and co-operative effort 
should take place. We have no monopoly 
on good ideas or inventiveness. Some of our 
allies, and it should be acknowledged, even 
some of our adversaries, are ahead of us in 
certain fields of military technology. It is in 
our interest, as well as in the interest of 
our NATO allies and the Alliance as a 
whole, to make maximum use of each other's 
inventiveness. And where feasible, weapon 
systems should be selected and standardised 
for use NATO-wide. Suitable arrangements 
can be made for joint production in the 
United States as well as in Europe. We 
have had such joint programmes in the 
past, and there is no reason why we cannot 
have even more of them in the future. 
The United States is pre-eminent in certain 
fields such as aircraft, but our allies have 
developed some outstanding guns, surface-
to-air missiles and armoured vehicles. 
Where these systems meet our needs it is 
sheer waste to duplicate the development 
effort in the United States, just as it is 
sheer waste for our a1lies to duplicate our 
development efforts." 
(c) Future European requirements 
5.21 The total numbers of types of missile in 
service somewhere in Europe 1, or projected, are 
as follows (see Appendix II) : 
European- Purchased from built United States 
Naval SSM fS.AM. IS 2 
Submarine ICBM 3 I 
Submarine anti-ship I I 
Anti-submarine 3 
-
Helicopter anti-ship 5 -
ICBMfiRBM 2 
-
Army SSM Tao Nuc I 3 
Army SAM IO 2 
Army anti-tank I6 I 
Air-to-ground I5 2 
Air-to-air 9 2 
TOTAL 84 I4 
5.22 While there must be some duplication, this 
is clearly excessive. The loss of available product-
ivity and increased oost must be eliminated. 
First categories should be standardised. The 
following suggested : 
Navy surface-to-surface Sea-skimming 
Underwater-to-surface 
Navy surface-to-air Area self-defence 
Point defence 
Army ground-to-ground Tactical nuclear 
Anti-tank 
Army ground-to-air 
Medium-range area self-defence 
Short-range - point defence 
Short-range - vehicle-mounted 
I. "Europe" here includes European countries not 








Long-range- stand-off missile 
Short-range- anti-FPB 
Medium.J.ong-range- all-weather 
Short-range- dog fight 
In these categories your Rapporteur draws 
attention to the foLlowing missiles which already 
exist whose life could be prolonged for over 
ten years: 
Navy sea-skimming 
Exocet and developments ; Otomat 
Navy underwater-to-surface 
USGW or United States Harpoon 
Navy area self-defence 
Sea Dart ; Roland M 
Navy point defence 
Sea Wolf 
Army ground-to-ground 
Tac Nuc anti-tank ; Atlas ; United States 
Lance 




Air-to-ground short-range anti-tank 
Hot ; Milan ; United States Tow 
Air-to-ship long-range stand-off 
Martel ; Otomat ; United States Harpoon 
Air-to-ship short-range anti-FPB 
Sea Sirna ; Exocet AM 39 
Air-to-air medium/long-range 
Super 530 
Air-to-air short-range dogfight 
550 
5.23 It would seem, therefore, that the :first 
requirement is to standardise on these existing 
missiles and to arrange for a European develop-
ment. Second, to decide in ·which category to 
purchase United States missiles and to make 
this conditional on United States purchase of 
European equipment. Thirdly, to give priority 
DOO'UJONT 671 
to development of European missiles in the fol-
lowing categories : 
Army ground-to-air - Medium range ; 
Air-to-ship anti-FPB in which category 
some European projects already exist ; 
Ground-to-air - single man-portable mis-
sile ; 
Anti-tank - single man-portable missile. 
5.24 It is recommended that these suggestions 
be examined on a high priority and an approx-
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imate life of each missile selection estimated. 
Planning for the next generation of missiles 
must be performed at a high level and on a 
European basis in harmony with the United 
States (i.e. by NATO) and companies must be 
given basic design studies when they will then 
form their own international consortia for deve-
lopment and production, The objective should be 
to produce if possible only one European missile 
in each category, the development being control-
led by international consortia, appropriate sub-
contracts being shared by all NATO nations, 
particUJI.arly the small States. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Future organisation of European defence 
(submitted by Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur) 
A. Introduction 
6.1 The Committee last reported on the future 
organisation of European defence in November 
1971 :1, i.e. before the enlargement of the Euro-
pean Community had taken effect. 
It is necessary to review the situation at 
the present time, if only for the sake of com-
pleteness in a report devoted to the state of 
European security, but the many political uncer-
tainties in the Atlantic world at the time this 
chapter is drafted make your Rapporteur's task 
especially difficult. The long-term effects of the 
present tragedy in South-East Asia cannot now 
be foreseen. The forthcoming British referendum 
on the Common Market inhibits authoritative 
comment on British policy in this field. There 
are signs but little tangible evidence of a changed 
attitude in France to relations with NATO. Two 
members of NATO, Greece and Turkey, have 
been on the verge of hostilities, and are still far 
from settling their differences. The Committee 
believes it useful, nevertheless, to review the 
situation since the last report was adopted. 
6.2 At the beginning of 1973, the Americans, 
our partners in the Alliance, said that it would 
be the year of Europe. They were impressed by 
the prosperity of the countries of the European 
Economic Community which had increased over 
the years, though with a tinge of anxiety towards 
their unprecedented economic strength and com-
petitivity. Finally, they cherished the hope that 
the process of European political unification 
would be speeded up, which was far from a dream 
immediately after the Paris summit conference 
of October 1972, when a Europe with new dimen-
sions seemed possible. The United States had 
ample reason to proclaim 1973 the year of 
Europe, to quote the most famous American of 
the seventies, Dr. Kissinger. The North Atlantic 
Alliance, aware of the many new facts facing 
it in the next decade, was to have a new structure 
to revive it. There were great expectations of 
the creativeness of Europe, which was again 
called a real partner for sharing tasks in the 
framework of the Alliance. 
1. Document 557, Rapporteur: Mr. Boyden. 
249 
6.3 This was the position during the first half 
of 1973, but now, two years later, it is quite dif-
ferent. High hopes of the prospects offered by 
Europe's quick advance towards political union 
(hitherto almost uninterrupted) have subsided. 
Unfortunate incidents have arisen in relations 
between the United States and Europe through 
economic, monetary and political disagreements. 
Europe's paralysis during the energy crisis trig-
gered off by events in the Middle East and the 
return by some European countries to a deliber-
ately nationalist policy for reasons of "special 
interests", have certainly discouraged those who 
thought a European identity was close at hand. 
In the meantime, it has become normal to refer 
to the "stagnation of European unification", 
and rightly so, in view of the serious economic 
setbacks encountered. In the circumstances, one 
may well wonder how European unification can 
be pursued. 
6.4 The question of European defence comes 
immediately to the fore, since it depends on 
unification. The European defence identity, 
about which there has been so much talk (i.e. a 
European Defence Minister), is certainly the last 
stone to crown a politically-united European 
edifice. Therefore, it can but be the consequence 
- and not a precondition - of a joint European 
foreign policy. No one who considers the failure 
of the efforts in 1955 to set up a European 
Defence Community (EDC) -however promis-
ing at the outset - could think otherwise. Since 
then, calls for greater integration of European 
defence have certainly not diminished since 
everyone realises that it is necessary, but every-
one likewise knows that to entrust national 
defence to a supranational body means giving up 
a very special piece of sovereignty, which States 
are hardly prepared to do as long as they are 
independent. 
6.5 The fact that fully-integrated European 
defence is hardly possible without prior political 
unification and that there are still many obstacles 
to be overcome on the road to European union 
does not imply resignation of European security 
and defence policy. The security of Western 
Europe is a constant which must be taken into 
account, however adverse the situation. It was 
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therefore realised thaJt Western Europeans have 
to strengthen and improve their practical defence 
co-operation independently of organisational and 
institutional matters. This is both possible and 
necessary and must not await the unification of 
Europe. 
6.6 If we do not manage in years to come -
whether in the short or in the long term - to 
improve co-operation between the European 
members of the Alliance and hence maintain 
and strengthen its defence posture, European 
security will run up against serious difficulties. 
The tremendous defence effort made by the 
Warsaw Pact may disturb the balance in Europe, 
with consequent repercussions on the stability 
of European security. Those who speak of detente 
and its results - for instance, in the framework 
of the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, 
the conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe, the strategic arms limitation talks - to 
justify a relaxation of European or NATO 
efforts have not understood the position. Every-
one expects positive results from efforts to 
achieve a detente, but results must first be 
obtained if they are to be taken as a basis for our 
security policy. It is rightly stated in paragraph 
2 of the declaration on Atlantic relations 1 that : 
"The allies share a common desire to reduce 
the burden of arms expenditure on their 
peoples. But States that wish to preserve 
peace have never achieved this aim by 
neglecting their own security." 
B. Requirements 
6. 7 Thoughts on European defence co-operation 
and its organisational aspects must take account 
of the following basic requirements : 
(i) The Atlantic Alliance is the basis of Euro-
pean security. Member countries' security 
depends on the combined and harmonious action 
of the North American and European partners. 
According to the declaration on Atlantic rela-
tions, members of the Alliance consider their 
common defence to be one and indivisible (para-
graph 3) and the United States states its resolve, 
together with its allies, to maintain forces in 
Europe at the level required to sustain the cre-
dibility of the strategy of deterrence and to main-
1. Declaration agreed to by the North Atlantic Council 
in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 and signed by the Heads 
of State in Brussels on 26th June 1974. 
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tain the capacity to defend the North Atlantic 
area should deterrence fail (paragraph 7). 
It is thus certain that in this respect Europe 
cannot turn its back on the United States in its 
co-operation in the military field. It would be 
presumptuous and rash to think that Europe 
might be able to a'Ct alone. 
(ii) To guarantee the soourity of the whole 
Alliance, large numbers of American troops must 
be stationed in Europe. Only in the framework 
of the talks on mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions could troop levels possibly be cut, other-
wise there would be doubts about the credibility 
of our strategy of deterrence. Here, too, the 
declaration on Atlantic relations is unequivocal 
(paragraphs 5, 7 and 9). 
(iii) Since NATO's strategy of deterrence 
accords the same importance to tactical and 
strategic nuclear weapons as to conventional 
weapons, the American nuclear shield will con-
tinue to be important for Europe. Two European 
NATO countries (Britain am.d France) admittedly 
have their own nuclear strike forces which are of 
value as a deterrent but not enough to offset 
Soviet means. European contributions cannot 
replace the United States' nuclear umbrella. On 
present knowledge, this will also be so during 
the period after European unification, even if 
then - and only then - there were to be Euro-
pean co-operation in the nuclear field. 
6.8 This report therefore covers the period 
during which the political unification of Europe 
is also expected to be developed. Parallel to 
efforts to achieve European union, other efforts 
are being made to protect Western Europe's 
external security. These military efforts call for 
practical co-operation with an eye to integration 
and which can be effected in a variety of fields. 
The main aims of such co-operation are to 
strengthen the Western European pillar of the 
Alliance, and thereby strengthen the whole 
Alliance. 
6.9 Consideration will now be given to the 
practical conditions for co-operation and the 
opportunities which are or should be taken. 
6.10 The conditions are mainly determined by 
three factors : 
- the threat from the potential enemy ; 
- national budget restrictions on troops 
and armaments in periods of inflation ; 
- cuts in troop levels. 
The threat 
6.11 In the German Democratic Republic, the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland and the 
three western military regions (Baltic, White 
Russia and Carpathians), the Warsaw Pact has 
90 divisions of land forces ready to intervene at 
short notice. These divisions, of some 8,000 to 
12,000 troops each, have about 22,300 tanks. In 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Benelux, NATO land forces consist of 28 2/3 
divisions 1 with 6,200 tanks. The Warsaw Pact 
also has more air forces in Europe than NATO. 
6.12 The enormous development of the Soviet 
navy in recent years has made it a very powerful 
instrument constituting a considerable threat. 
6.13 Soviet weapons have also increased. Admit-
tedly, the Soviet Union is also facing the pressing 
need to increase civil production, but the thirst 
for consumer goods in the Warsaw Pact countries 
is not so strong as in the West, where it is in 
danger of getting out of hand. This allows the 
Soviet Union to earmark 10% of its GNP for 
defence 2, which is high compared with the aver-
age of 5.6 % for NATO as a whole and 4.4 % 
for the European NATO countries. 
6.14 Thus, the military capability of the Soviet 
Union and the other members of the Warsaw 
Pact produces a strong defence posture and 
allows them, when necessary, to use this power 
at least to back up their overall policy. 
The financial position 
6.15 One must learn to live with the price 
explosion in the West. Claims on the national 
budgets come from all sides. They compete with 
each other and each one is more important than 
the others. In this battle defence expenditure 
is easily the loser on the grounds that it is no 
longer necessary at a time when the policy of 
detente is so prominent. Personnel costs are 
continually rising in every field, including 
defence. They have gone past the 50 % mark 
or even 60 % in countries with a professional 
ar~y. Conversely, in the Soviet Union, expen-
diture on personnel amounts to only 25 % to 
27 % of the total defence budget. The situation 
is still worse where investments for the develop-
ment of materiel and weapons are concerned, and 
1. NATO divisions have from 7,000 to 17,000 men. 
2. GNP for the Soviet Union is calculated differently 
from western GNPs. 
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no significant improvement can be expected in 
the immediate future. No country will vote for 
any great increase in defence expenditure. 
Strengths 
6.16 In his report on foreign policy, President 
Nixon pointed out that by 1980 all the allies 
would be confronted with enormous costs for 
the maintenance of 'Complex armaments, and 
would also have to face personnel costs and main-
tain a high level of operational readiness, while 
compulsory military service would have been 
largely abolished or the period of service reduced. 
6.17 What is implied in this statement, i.e. the 
impossibility of maintaining force levels and 
consequent cuts in combat force levels, makes 
one wonder how the same fighting strength can 
be maintained with fewer troops. There is admit-
tedly some truth in the reply so often given that 
quality compensates for quantity, but improved 
quality, thanks to progress in armaments tech-
nology giving greater technicality and mechanisa-
tion of the armed forces, means that the best 
possible use must be made of the means available 
in view of budgetary restrictions. 
C. Closer co-operation 
6.18 Two requirements make closer co-operation 
inevitable. Rationalisation and standardisation 
are magic terms, which should and could be the 
hub of co-operation and which would solve many 
of our troubles. By these means, the maximum 
economic use can be made of limited resources. 
6.19 The armaments sector is a case in point. 
The European members of NATO, like all the 
members of the Alliance, are sovereign States 
with their own economic requirements, plans and 
achievements. This has led, for instance, to a 
widespread proliferation of weapons systems 
which are perhaps all good in themselves but in 
the long run neither in quantity nor quality 
can they be maintained at the level required by 
the Alliance to offset the military capability of 
the Warsaw Pact and consequently maintain the 
balance of forces in Europe between East and 
West. This matter has been dealt with in the 
study by General de Maiziere 1 and in another of 
the Committee's reports 2• 
1. Study on the rational deployment of forces on the 
central front, Document 663. 
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty, Document 673. 
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The specific question of tactical missiles is 
dealt with in Chapter V of the present report. 
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the 
problem raised by the lack of standardisation. 
- Air forces have no common system for 
friend or foe identification. In air defence, such 
systems involve the use of radar images repre-
senting friendly or enemy aircraft allowing anti-
aircraft defence weapons to be deployed quickly 
and effectivel;y. 
- In the navy, the number of types of 
combat units is increasing ; there are, for 
instance, more than 100 classes of ships of 
destroyer-size and above. There are 36 different 
types of radar installations for directing fire and 
40 models of heavy artillery, which means 40 dif-
ferent sorts of munitions. 
- Similarly, mention must also be made 
of excessive requirements regarding modification 
of existing or planned weapons systems. On 
delivery, buyers generally start converting them 
to meet German, Netherlands, Italian or other 
requirements, thus involving further expenditure 
which could be avoided. Good management means 
above all buying equipment which is compatible 
with national logistic systems. 
6.20 Well-thought-out standardisation by the 
Western European partners of the Alliance 
means the participation of national industries 
and their views must be taken into account in 
compromise solutions, which is difficult, Indus-
tries in all countries are mainly concerned with 
making as much profit as possible. Sufficient 
attention has not yet been paid to finding hal-
lanced solutions and making international 
co-operation attractive. As Mr. Leber said at the 
last Eurogroup ministerial meeting in June 1974, 
nations and their industries should be brought 
to admit that a joint project which meets only 
85 % of a nation's requirements is preferable to 
a national project meeting its requirements 
100%. 
6.21 In this connection, consideration must be 
given to sharing weapons production out among 
the European partners, making one country 
responsible for the requirements of all the others 
in a given sector of production. This would 
undoubtedly involve difficulties at the outset. 
The question of employment in a country which 
was to give up a branch of weapons production 
would raise problems which could be solved only 
in the event of greater European integration 
in all fields. 
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6.22 In this connection, standardisation in 
Europe should always be viewed from the stand-
point of strengthening the Alliance. Co-operation 
with the North American partners must not 
therefore be forgotten. A balance of armaments 
procurement between Europe and the United 
States and vice versa must be guaranteed. 
6.23 Another field is closely linked with arma-
ments, i.e. logistics (supplies and stockpiling), 
with which General de 1\faiziere deals at length 
in his study~. Like armaments, logistics is a 
purely national matter which each State organises 
in accordance with different plans and systems. 
This means that allied armed forces which, for 
instance, would have to carry out integrated 
operations on German territory in the event of 
war, could not draw on German depots failing 
interchangeability and ability to co-operate 
between different national elements. Integration 
of logistics is a means of increasing fighting 
strength while lowering costs. 
6.24 Finally, training is an area in which 
co-operation can be tested with a view to achiev-
ing rational results. General de Maiziere has 
devoted a semion of his study to this matter 1 • 
Joint training of soldiers of various nationalities 
with the same tanks and weapons should give 
tangible shape to a modern European defence 
system. 
6.25 Another possibility for practical co-opera-
tion between the Western European partners is 
the harmonisation of strategic and tactical con-
cepts with particular regard to long-term arma-
ments planning. So far, each country has followed 
different national principles for the command 
and deployment of armed forces in the event of 
war. Thus, military requirements for weapons 
and mat~riel differ from one country to another. 
If joint concepts could be agreed to, perhaps 
only in certain sectors at the outset, such as 
anti-tank defence or the conduct of air operations, 
a decisive step would be taken. In the event of 
war, armed forces could then be deployed with-
out incident and joint long-term armaments 
plans could be co-ordinated from the outset and 
the action of troops integrated subsequently. 
Joint tactics presumes agreement on military 
requirements which should constitute a guide-
line for weapons technology. 
6.26 Rationalisation by task-sharing between 
countries - specialisation is recently being dis-
I. Document 663. 
cussed more and more. Thoughts on this matter 
are at least an attempt to plan the future organ-
isation of the Alliance's forces and hence Euro-
pean defence from a more economical standpoint. 
Without mincing words, this means that States 
must pay growing attention to essential tasks 
in order to make the best use of the means 
available to them. General de Maiziere studies the 
possibilities in detail ·1 • 
6.27 Specialisation also has a definite impact 
on each country's sovereignty, however. It requi-
res greater military integration. The political 
repercussions of greater integration depend on 
the tasks earmarked for specialisation in the 
conventional and nuclear fields and hence the 
weapons systems adopted. Specialisation and 
integration must be decided on in conjunction 
and as far as possible be developed in a balanced 
manner. Everyone will benefit from this, parti-
cularly the smaller States, which find it totally 
out of the question to cover the full range of 
necessary tasks. 
D. Options 
Options available in organising Western Euro-
pean defence co-operation 
6.28 So far, the requirements of future Euro-
pean defence have been described. Concrete means 
of making European defence dynamic and effec-
tive have been set out. It is obviously quite impos-
sible to overlook the institutionalisation of Euro-
pean defence efforts any longer. However, it 
mU!St not be concluded that problems are easier 
to solve when studied in a formal and bureau-
cratic organised framework. 
6.29 European forces need to be merged, but 
the kind of organisation is of secondary impor-
tance. It is more important to recognise that 
independent national defence is an anachronism. 
Ever greater integration - first limited and 
subsequently total - should in the long run 
lead to the merging of economic, military and 
political interests and tasks. 
6.30 There are groups which, from the outset, 
have adopted a pragmatic approach : 
(a) Eurogroup 
1. Document 663. 
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(i) This is an unofficial group consisting of 
the Ministers of Defence of the European members 
of NATO except France, Portugal and Iceland. 
It has no fixed framework, little bureaucracy, 
no statute and no costly administrative hierar-
chy. This allows Ministers to commit themselves 
personally and directly when a particular project 
has to be dealt with quickly. 
(ii) It works on four levels : 
- Ministers, who usually meet twice a 
year (in the spring and December) ; 
- permanent representatives of the Euro-
group countries to NATO in Brussels; 
- Staff Group, a working group of the 
military and political advisers of the 
permanent representatives in Brussels ; 
- sub-groups responsible for specific pro-
jects for practical co-operation. 
(iii) The aim of Eurogroup is to strengthen the 
whole Alliance by means of a greater European 
contribution. At the start, this aim stemmed 
~inly from the 1ri.sh to help the United States 
Go~rnment to maintain troops in Europe. 
Demonstrating an increase in European defence 
expenditure was a concession to the American 
request for burden-sharing. 
(iv) In December 1970, Eurogroup drew up a 
three-part European defence improvement pro-
gramme (EDIP), a five-year programme involv-
ing expenditure of about $1,000 million. This 
additional expenditure for the Eurogroup mem-
bers was mainly earmarked for NATO infra-
structure. This programme is practically com-
pleted but European expenditure is continuing 
in other fields. Since December 1971, such expen-
diture has been set out in Europackage and is 
published as an appendix to the communiques 
issued after ministerial meetings. 
(v) An important aspect of Eurogroup's work 
is the practical co-operation between its members. 
The aim is to make the maximum joint use of the 
means available. The sub-groups referred to 
above are active in this field, and particularly : 
(a) Euronad : a group of Eurogroup 
national armaments directors ; 
(b) Eurolongterm : a group responsible for 
working out joint tactics and strategy 
prior to joint long-term armaments 
planning; 
(c) Eurotraining : a sub-group for 
co-operation in respect of training ; 
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(d) Eurolog : a sub-group responsible for 
co-operation in respect of logistic sup-
port for troops assigned to NATO. 
6.31 For some time, these sub-groups have been 
dealing with rationalisation, standardisation, 
harmonisation and specialisation, particularly in 
respect of armaments, training, long-term plan-
ning and logistics, as referred to in Section C. 
Success does not come overnight. Obstacles con-
tinually needed to be removed. These obstacles 
largely stem from the fact that States are not 
yet ready to pass from nationalism to supra-
nationality. There is considerable political will, 
but more is needed. 
(b) Western European Union (WEU) 
6.32 This organisation has seven member coun-
tries, including France, which are all members 
of NATO (the six members of Eurogroup plus 
France) and of the European Communities. Not 
all the European members of NATO belong to 
WEU (particularly the flank countries), nor do 
all the members of the enlarged European Com-
munity. The exercise of its military responsibili-
ties was transferred to NATO a long time ago. 
Its specific activities are mainly the control of 
armaments and work carried out in the frame-
work of the Standing Armaments Committee 
(SAC). 
6.33 During President Pompidou's term of 
office, France tried to root European defence 
co-operation in WEU. It sought to reactivate the 
SAC to make it the forum for European co-
operation in defence matters, starting with arma-
ments. The other Eurogroup partners showed 
little enthusiasm. Armaments co-operation in 
Eurogroup and the SAC might have drained 
Eurogroup of its substance or led to overlapping, 
both of which had to be avoided at all costs. 
Ways were sought of linking Euronad and the 
SAC on the grounds that France might thus be 
induced to co-operate in joint projects, but to no 
avail. 
Because of government changes in France 
and Britain, work is again at a standstill. 
(c) The enlarged European Communities 
6.34 The Nine - eight European members of 
NATO plus Ireland, or the seven members of 
Eurogroup plus France plus Ireland - are the 
nucleus of attempts at European unification. The 
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summit conferences in Paris in October 1972, 
Copenhagen in December 1973 and in Paris again 
in December 1974 marked the course of the Nine's 
aims in terms of Europe's identity. 
6.35 For a long time, the EEC completely 
refrained from dealing with security and defence 
policy. It confined itself to economic, monetary, 
social and industrial integration and security 
policy remained in the hands of NATO. Only 
since the abovementioned summit conferences has 
it shown interest in fields linked with security 
policy, due to the fact that, since then, political 
questions in general, and particularly those 
relating to foreign policy, have been discussed in 
greater detail by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs with a view to drawing up guidelines 
for all relations between the EEC countries up 
to 1980. In the meantime, European political 
co-operation through "travelling" Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs has become well-established, i.e. 
ministerial meetings are held in turn in the 
respective capitals of the nine countries. In this 
framework, discussions have been held, inter alia, 
on preparing the conference on security and co-
operation in Europe and the implications for 
European unification of the talks on mutual and 
balanced force reductions, i.e. matters directly 
relating to security policy. 
6.36 Addressing the Assembly on 5th December 
1974, Mr. Van Elslande, Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, said : 
"But transcending these studies, projects 
and cogitations, a common armaments policy 
soon comes to imply that decisions must be 
taken at the political level... Undoubtedly 
the proposed European union bears within 
it a political design. It must be woven 
around the existing institutions of the Com-
mon Market and of political co-operation. 
It is therefore undoubtedly at this level 
that the centre of gravity of a European 
armaments policy should be situated. Of 
course, European union is only in a rough-
hewn state and European defence is in the 
clouds, but among the Nine there is a 
political orientation aimed at incorporating 
all Community and inter-State relations. A 
European armaments policy, therefore, 
forms an integral part of this design. In 
addition, such a project is by its nature 
closely associated with substantive issues 
that fall within the competence of the Com-
mon Market. But the Treaty of Rome 
excludes armaments from common policies. 
It remains true that any attempts at inte-
gration, because of its consequences in the 
economic and industrial fields, and in that 
of exports, can only be conceived as closely 
related to the European Economic Com-
munity. To sum up, at the moment when 
we shall proceed to implement a genuine 
plan of standardisation, and independently 
of the sectoral activities which are mainly 
pursued within Eurogroup and which 
should continue to receive our full support, 
we must act in as close association as pos-
sible with the political activities of the 
Nine. It is there that the focus of political 
decisions regarding unification, including 
military integration, will normally be 
situated." 
E. Consideration of the options 
(a) Eurogroup 
6.37 This group has never claimed to be a model 
for identity in European defence. Its political 
(external policy) basis is not sufficient for that 
and this was intentional since there was no 
question of Eurogroup being an organisation in 
the legal sense. Now as in the past, its aim is 
to strengthen the Alliance by improving the 
European contribution. One advantage of Euro-
group is that Ministers of Defence in person 
meet twice a year in this framework. Pragmatic 
action is its motto, as is testified by the Federal 
German Government's statement of 18th January 
that: 
"The Federal Government will endeavour to 
strengthen the European pillar of the 
Alliance ; Eurogroup is a realistic starting-
point for this." 
6.38 The abovementioned aim of Eurogroup has 
not changed. In this group, practical measures 
for European military co-operation must be pur-
sued and intensified pending a better solution. 
Should the occasion arise, there would be no 
difficulty in merging Eurogroup, whose links are 
loose, in another form of organisation. Since it 
has no official stamp, it is no obstacle to parallel 
action or other forms of organisation which might 
emerge at a later date. However, fruitless over-
lapping must be avoided in the security and 
defence policy field. 
6.39 The great weakness of Eurogroup is that 
France is not a member. Without France, Euro-
pean efforts are difficult and incomplete. France 
is most important for Western Europe in the 
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security policy field, in view of its geographical 
situation (lines of communication and supply 
routes with the Atlantic), its military potential, 
including nuclear capability, and its important 
armaments industry. French co-operation would 
be an advantage, even if at the outset it related 
to only some of Eurogroup 's activities. The 
Euronad sub-group should also be quite inter-
esting for France, whose excess armaments pro-
duction must be used. 
6.40 Armaments, moreover, are likely to be the 
hub of European defence co-operation. Here are 
the greatest requirements and the most striking 
possibilities of effective co-operation. All the 
States are interested for perhaps selfish but 
understandable reasons. A flourishing armaments 
industry spells the well-being of industry as a 
whole. Better use must be made of these factors 
to increase co-operation in the field of armaments, 
which should be a nucleus extending to other 
fields leading to wider co-operation (logistics, 
training). It has therefore been suggested on 
several occasions that the Euronad sub-group 
should be institutionalised as a European arma-
ments agency. Such a pool might be organised 
in two ways: 
- the agency might become a supranational 
body in which decisions are taken by 
majority, or 
- member States might take decisions 
unanimously in the framework of multi-
national co-operation. 
6.41 Only the first alternative would have an 
obvious advantage, since it would allow joint 
solutions to be defined through majority deci-
sions which each State would accept. 
Conversely, the second alternative is but 
another form of the present situation, coupled 
with what would certainly be a more costly 
administrative and bureaucratic system. The 
introduction of a system of common funding 
would make little difference. Difficulties might 
arise from the unanimity rule for choosing arma-
ments to be manufactured or procured. If there-
fore the first solution cannot be adopted since 
there is not yet sufficient political will for such 
full integration, the present situation should be 
maintained. A good start has been made, from 
which further progress is possible. 
(b) WEU 
6.42 The fact that WEU has transferred the 
exercise of all its military and defence policy 
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responsibilities to NATO - apart from arms 
control and the definition of methods of arma-
ments co-operation in the SAC - and that it 
includes only seven of the thirteen European 
members of NATO limits its poBBibilities for prac-
tical European co-operation in security and 
defence matters. In this respect it must be 
emphasised that the States situated on the flanks 
(Turkey, Greece, Norway and Denmark) are not 
members, although they are obviously important 
for the security policy of Western Europe's 
defence. However, WEU is still of political impor-
tance for the future, because of its secretariat 
and Assembly, which for the time being is the 
only European parliamentary assembly dealing 
with security and defence matters, and because 
of the assistance commitments embodied in the 
treaty. The full importance of these facts may 
be felt when the institutionalisation of European 
defence seeks official guidelines. 
(c) EEO 
6.43 An ideal solution would be for the EEC 
to become a federal European political union. 
Europe would thus find its identity, including 
a defence identity represented by a single Euro-
pean Minister of Defence. 
6.44 The North Atlantic Alliance would still be 
necessary and would consist of : 
- the European federal State ; 
- other European States, members of the 
Alliance but not of the EEC ; 
- the transatlantic partners. 
The structure of the Alliance should be 
re-examined. Integration of the armed forces of 
the European partners, on the one hand, and of 
the North American partners, on the other, 
would not be in the present NATO form, where 
there is still an American Supreme Commander 
of the Alliance's integrated forces. With a federal 
European State, including France, which would 
emerge as a "new" member of the Alliance, this 
would no longer be automatic. 
6.45 Close to the federal solution would be a 
European structure allowing political sovereignty 
and integration in certain fields (confederation). 
Should foreign and security policy be transferred 
from the States to the confederation, the practical 
consequences for defence would be virtually the 
same as in the federal solution. A confederation 
without federal responsibility for foreign and 
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security policy would be little different from the 
present situation where defence is concerned. 
6.46 Despite many recent setbacks in the EEC 
compromising its original high aims, matters 
relating to the organisation of Western European 
defence will also be discussed in this framework. 
6.47 It is already being said that, apart from 
political consultations between the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs, there should be European co-
operation on defence policy in which the Min-
isters of Defence would take part. Apart from 
organisational problems - lack of permanent 
secretariat and fixed headquarters - there are 
other problems : Denmark is not particularly 
anxious for questions of this kind to be discUBBed 
in the framework of the Nine ; Ireland is a 
member of the EEC but not of NATO. The 
interests of States on the flanks and their impor-
tance for European and Atlantic defence must 
be borne constantly in mind. The Cyprus crisis 
and its pOBBible repercussions on western security 
are evidence of this. 
F. Conclusions on the future organisation of 
European defence 
6.48 These may be summarised as follows : 
6.49 The creation of a European defence identity 
is a worthwhile aim. It increases the importance 
of Europe's contribution to western defence and 
should be a decisive improvement, but much 
ground still has to be covered. 
6.50 Parallel to aJttempts to achieve this in the 
evolution towards European political union, a 
practical approach to the Alliance's policy and 
military matters must shape Western European 
defence co-operation according to the following 
criteria: 
- as far as possible, all the European mem-
bers of NATO should take part; 
- nothing should prejudice the future 
institutionalisation of European defence. 
6.51 Eurogroup amply meets these conditions 
in the interim pending the development of the 
European Community. 
6.52 The Committee therefore recommends (i) 
that the Council again draw the attention of all 
members of WEU to the importance of Euro-
group as the most appropriate organ at present 
in which to arrange that closer practical Euro-
pean defence co-operation that is now essential 
- especially in the fields of joint production and 
standardisation of armaments ; common logistics ; 
common training ; and specialisation by countries 
in certain defence tasks. Recalling that Mr. Tin-
demans, the Belgian Prime Minister, has been 
invited by the Nine to collate the views of the 
governments, the organs of the Community and 




the end of the year a report on European union, 
the Committee recommends (ii) that the Council 
instruct the Secretary-General to submit to Mr. 
Tindemans, before the end of June, the views 
of the Council on the place of the Brussels Treaty, 
and its mutual defence obligations, in the Euro-
pean union into which "the whole oomplex of the 
relations of member States" is to be transformed 
by 1980 "with the fullest respect for the treaties 
already signed" 1 • 
1. Words of the summit communique of the Nine, 
Paris, 21st October 1972. 
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VU. Conclusions 
7.1 The Committee's chief conclusions are set 
forth in the draft recommendation. For ease of 
reference, the various chapters of the explanatory 
memorandum are numbered to correspond with 
the paragraphs of the preamble· and of the oper-
ative text to which they refer. 
Preamble 
7.2 First paragraph. The introduction (I) of the 
explanatory memorandum recalls the previous 
comprehensive report of 1961, comparing it with 
the present report. The remaining paragraphs (ii) 
to (vi) introduce the various proposals emanating 
from the corresponding chapters of the explana-
tory memorandum. 
Operative text 
7.3 Paragraph 1. The introduction (I) compares 
the world of 1975 with that of 1961, reaching a 
short conclusion in paragraph 1.6. 
7.4 Paragraph 2(a). The prospects for the con-
ference on soourity and co-operation in Europe 
are described in Chapter II, paragraphs 2.5, 2.6 
and 2.15 ; the need for cohesion in the Alliance 
in the face of Soviet power is stressed in para-
graph 2.16. 
7.5 Paragraphs 2(b) (i) and (ii). The lack of 
real progress in the MBFR negotiations is men-
tioned in Chapter II, paragraph 2.5, the need 
for reductions, to be acceptable to the West, to 
be asymmetrical, in paragraph 2.15. 
7.6 Paragraph 2(b) (iii). The problem of theatre 
nuclear weapons is discussed in Chapter III; the 
possibility of introducing them into the MBFR 
negotiations is mentioned in paragraph 3.21. 
7.7 Paragraph 3. General de Maiziere's impor-
tant study ·1 (to which reference should also be 
made in connection with paragraph 3 of the 
recommendation), and the particular problems of 
the central front are discussed in Chapter III. 
(a) The conclusions of that study concerning 
1. Document 663. 
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deployment are largely supported, but with dif-
ferent emphasis, in paragraphs 3.16 to 3.19. 
(b) Warning time is mentioned in paragraph 
3.17(a) (iii). (c) Logistics are dealt with by 
General de Maiziere in Document 663, paragraphs 
355 to 386. (d) Tactical nuclear weapons are 
mentioned in paragraphs 3.20 and 3.21 of the 
explanatory memorandum. (e) Specialisation is 
mentioned in Document 663, paragraphs 339 to 
353. 
7.8 Paragraph 4(a) (i). The problems of the 
flanks are discussed in Chapter IV. (a) The parti-
cular problems of isolation and means of over-
coming them are discussed in paragraphs 4.2, 
4.16, 4.19 to 4.21 and 4.28 ; the problem of the 
supply of armaments in paragraph 4.10 (ii) ; the 
differences between Greece and Turkey are dis-
cussed in paragraphs 4.17 to 4.24. (b) The prob-
lems of aviation in the Aegean are described in 
paragraph 4.19. 
7.9 Paragraph 5. The problems of standardisa-
tion and joint production of tactical missile sys-
tems are described in Chapter V of the explana-
tory memorandum. Pa,rticular choices concerning 
tactical missiles are discussed in paragraphs 5.9 
and 5.22 to 5.24. (i) Responsibility for the Military 
Committee and NATO staff is mentioned in 
paragraphs 5.19 and 5.24. (ii) The 1 % proposal 
is mentioned in paragraph 5.19. 
7.10 Paragraph 6. (a) The value of Eurogroup 
at the present time is described in paragraphs 
6.30, 6.31, 6.37 to 6.39 and 6.49 to 6.51. (b) The 
importance of European union in the future 
and the collective defence commitment of the 
Brussels Treaty are mentioned in paragraphs 
6.32 to 6.35, 6.42 to 6.49 and 7.52. 
7.11 The report as a whole was adopted by the 
Committee by 8 votes to 4 with 4 abstentions. 
Members unable to support the report included 
those who objected to references to Spain in 
Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.2'6 and 4.27, those who 
felt that in Chapter VI too much emphasis was 
placed on the United States contribution to the 
defence of Europe, and also those who objected 
to the European Community referred to in the 
same chapter. 
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APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 69 1 
on the state of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
I 
Taking note of the conclusions reached by the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, after surveying its work over the past five years and studying the attitudes of the free 
western countries to the key issues of defence ; 
Aware that, owing to recent acts of the Soviet bloc in resuming massive atomic tests in the 
atmosphere and attempting to intimidate the free world, the threat to world peace has increased ; 
Calling on all members of the western alliance to bear their full part in facing these threats ; 
Recognising that, in spite of the danger, the same deficiencies have been allowed to enfeeble 
western security for too many years ; 
Convinced that these deficiencies would disappear if the member governments of the western 
alliance were willing to abandon outmoded nationalistic concepts of defence in favour of common 
defence; 
Equally convinced that, to be efficient, common defence must be effectively supervised by 
national and international parliamentary bodies, which are essential features of western defence 
itself; 
Stressing the need for a. dynamic political will to achieve results, 
RECOMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that, in accordance with their undertakings to NATO, member governments bring 
their armed forces in the European theatre up to the full strength necessary to avoid automatic 
recourse to nuclear weapons, namely to bring their land forces assigned to NATO up to the agreed 
minimum figure of 30 divisions on the central front ; 
2. Impress on the NATO Council the need to give greater authority to allied commanders in the 
deployment of these forces and at least the right to determine their supply requirements ; 
3. Invite member governments : 
(a) to call for NATO strategic planning to be extended to the pooling of the technical and 
industrial resources of the alliance, with a. view to achieving genuine standardisation and the common 
research, development and production of armaments, taking full account of European views and 
experience ; 
(b) to put into production only those armaments projets adopted for joint production by at 
least three member countries ; 
4. Take every step to ensure that western nuclear anarchy is avoided at all costs ; 
5. Recommend to the North Atlantic Council that the deficiencies in the allied command structure 
be remedied in the Baltic approaches, the Channel and the Mediterranean, basing the reform not on 
prestige considerations but on military efficiency ; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 13th December 1961 during the Second Part of the Seventh Ordinary Session 
(12th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Fens, Bourgoin, Goedhart, Cadorna, Kershaw, de Ia 
Vallee Poussin and Kliesing on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 215). 
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6. (a) Observe in every respect the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, and in particular 
determine the levels of internal defence and police forces of member countries on the mainland of 
Europe; 
(b) Instruct national representatives of member States in the North Atlantic Council to press 
for the implementation of the resolution adopted by that Council in October 1954 providing, in 
particular, that the levels of forces for the common defence which member countries retain under 
national command be determined by that Council ; 
(c) Request the governments of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to 
ratify forthwith the convention signed in December 1957, the failure to do which has prevented the 
provisions of the treaty relating to the control of armaments being implemented for four years ; 
7. Invite the North Atlantic Council to revise the present NATO ruling on the provision of 
information to the Defence Committee of the Assembly, thus enabling it properly to discharge its 
duties; 
8. Propose that the North Atlantic Council examine the possibility of satisfying the need for 
democratic parliamentary supervision of common defence expenditure, in particular expenditure on 
infrastructure. 
II 
Convinced that the cold war, which is threatening to reach out into space, constitutes a 
serious threat to world peace ; 
Equally convinced that peaceful co-operation between the two great powers in this scientific 
adventure could benefit all mankind ; 
Considering that this peaceful co-operation could better be guaranteed if a greater number of 
countries participated ; 
Considering also that the scientific resources of the European countries are such that co-
operation with the United States in this field would constitute an important contribution to further 
peaceful development of space research, 
R:acoMMBNns THAT THB CoUNCIL 
9. Make every effort to promote the conclusion of a world-wide convention on peaceful co-
operation in space ; 
10. Promote between the United States of America and the European States the joint preparation 
of a western space programme, meanwhile combining the technical and financial resources of the 




(see Chapter V) 
Missiles 1975 
A comprehensive list of guided missiles in service or under development by principal countries of manufacture 1 
(missiles of foreign dMign, procured abroad or produced under licence, are shown in braelcet8) 
1. General list of missiles by country 
2. Naval SSM/SAM 
3. Navy SLBM 
4. Submarine-la.unched anti-ship 
5. Navy anti-submarine systems 
6. Helicopter-launched anti-ship 
7. La.nd-ba.sed strategic missiles 













Submarine-launched ballistic missile 
Intercontinental ballistic missile 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile 
1. All information is from published sources and cannot be guaranteed. 
1. General list of missiles by country 
Country 
'Naval SLBM AJS Strategic ABM Army SSM Army SAM 
SSM/SAM 
China Sa.rk 
France Exocet MSBS-M1 Ma.la.fon SSBS S2 Pluton Crota.le 
MM.38 MSBS-M2 SSBSS3 Roland 
MM.40 MSBS-M4 
Masurca 
9. Army SSM 
10. Army SAM 
11. Army anti-tank 
12. Airborne missiles 
Anti-tank Air-to- Air-to-air 
surface 
Atlas AS-20 R511 







'SS-12M ssn AM-39 Super530 $· Naval Harpon (anti-ship) 550 1!!1 
Crotale SS-12 ~ 
France/ Roland 2M Milan ~ 
Germany Hot """ 1-4 
France/ Otomat Otomat 
Italy 
Germany (Hawk) Cobra Kormoran (Sidewinder) 
Mamba Jumbo 
(Bullpup) 
United (Exocet) (Ikara) Blowpipe Vigilant Hellcat Firestreak Blue Steel 
Kingdom Swing fire SeaSkua 
(anti-ship) 
Israel Gabriel Jericho 
Italy Sea Indigo Mosquito Airtos Aspide 
Killer II Spada Sparviero Marte (Sparrow) 
Sea (anti-ship) 
t.:l Killer III 
0) Albatross 1:1:1 
Japan KAM3 A.AM1 
KAM9 A.AM2 
Norway Penguin TerneS 
Sweden RBOSA Bantam RB04 
RB05 
United Seacat Rapier CL834 Red Top 
Kingdom Sea Dart Tigercat Hawkswing SRA.AM 
Sea Slug Bloodhound 2 X.J. 521 
Sea Wolf Thunderbird 2 
SLAM 
United t:l 
Kingdom/ Atlas 0 
Belgium I United 





Country I Naval SLBM AJS Strategic ABM Army SSM Army SAM Anti-tank Air-to- Air-to-air Air nuclear t:l 
SSM/SAM surface 0 
United Talos Polaris Asroc Minuteman Spartan Red eye Dragon Bull pup Agile Genie I States Tartar A.2 1 Sprint 1 Sergeant Stinger Tow Condor Falcon4 Hound Dog li 
Advanced Polaris Minuteman Sprint 2 Pershing Chaparral Schillelagh Harpoon Falcon 26 SRAM ~ Terrier A.3 2 1A (Roland) Shrike Maverick Falcon47 .... 
Aegis Poseidon Subroc Minuteman Lance Hawk Walleye Phoenix 
Harpoon ULMS 3 Sparrow Standard Sidewinder 
ISSM Harpoon Titan2 SAM-D ARM 1A 
Sea. (anti-ship) Nike Tow Sidewinder 
Sparrow Hercules Hellfire lC 
Standard Harm Sparrow 
ARM IIID 
Standard 1 Sparrow 
Standard 2 IIIE 
USSR Goa. Sa.rk Saddler Galosh Frog 1-7 Grail Snapper Kennel Alkali Kipper 
SAN1 SSN4 SS7 Scud A Gainful SA 6 Swatter Kelt Ana.b Kangaroo 
Guideline Serb Sa.sin SS 8 ScudB GanefSA4 Sa.gger Ash Kitchen 
SAN2 SSN5 ScarpSS 9 ScudC Goa.SA3 Atoll 
~ Goblet Sawfly Scrag Guideline SA 2 Awl ~ SAN3 SSN6 ss 10 
Scrubber SSN8 SSU 
SSN1 Savage 
Styx ss 13 
SSN2 SSX16 
Shaddock ss 17 
SSN3 ss 18 





2. Nauy SSMj SAM 
Country fName Manufacturer Range PropuJsion Guidance In aervice Remarks ~ France Exocet MM 38 Aerospatia.le 23 miles Solid Inertial/active homing 1972 SSM only 
MM 40 Aerospatia.le 40 km Solid Inertia.lfa.uto pilot Project 1:1 
... ~ • I Masurca DTCN 3lmiles Solid Command or semi-active ... 46 km homing 
SS 12M A&ospa.tia.le Solid ~ 
Naval Crota.le Ma.tra Skm Solid Radio command 1976 
= 
France/ Roland 2M A&ospa.tia.le fMBB 19,700 ft Solid Radio command Development SAM 
Germany 6km 
France/ Otomat Oto Melara/ 37 miles Turbojet Inertia.! /active homing 1975 SSM 
Italy Ma.tra 60 km+ solid 
boosters 
United Exocet See France 1974 SSM only 
Kingdom Se&cat Short Bros. 2.2 miles Solid Radio a.lso radar and TV 1970 SAM only in many 
Harland 3.5 km navies 
Sea Dart Ha.wker-Siddeley 20 miles Ramjet Semi-active homing 1974 SSM and SAM 
Dynamics 35 km+ with solid 
boosters 
Sea Slug II Hawker-Siddeley 30 miles Solid Beam riding 1970 SAM with SSM 
Dynamics 45 km capability 
t-:1 Sea Wolf BAC Solid Auto-radio command - 1976 SAM anti-missile 
= radar and TV trailing tn 
SLAM Vickers /Shorts Solid Radio command, Development SAM with SSM 
TV trailing capability for sub-
marines and FPBs 
Ita.ly Sea Killer II Sistel 17 miles Solid Beam rider or command 1970 SSM 
20 km 
Sea Killer III Sistel 50 miles+ Solid Radar homing Development SSM 
60km+ 
Albatross Selenia Solid Development SAM with Sparrow 
or Aspide 
Israel Gabriel Israel A/C 12.6 miles Solid Command plus homing 1970 SSM 
Industries 22 km 
Norway Penguin Kongsberg Vaapen- 17 miles Solid Inertia.! rm homing SSM 
fabrikk 27 km 1:::1 0 
Sweden RB OSA SAAB 135 miles Turbojet Auto pilot plus active 1968 SSM i solid radar homing booster ~ 
..... 
Country I Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks t::l 0 
0 
United Advanced General Dynamics 20 miles Solid Beam riding /semi-active 1963 SAM ; States Terrier 32 km homing 
Talos Bendix 70 miles Ramjet Beam riding fsemi-active 1968 SAM 
= 112 km with solid homing ... 
..... 
booster 
Tartar General Dynamics 10 miles Solid Semi-active radar homing 1960 SAM 
16 km 
Aegis USN System Solid Semi-active homing Development SAM 
Command 
Harpoon McDonnell 60 miles Turbojet Inertial active radar 1975 SSM air- or 
Douglas 95 km solid homing submarine-launched 
booster 
ISSM General Dynamics 25 miles Solid Semi-active homing An interim SSM 
40 km system 
Sea Sparrow Raytheon Canada 6.2 miles Solid Semi-active radar homing 1973 SAM 
10 km 
Standard General Dynamics 15.5 miles Solid Passive homing 1968 SAM 
ARM 25 km 
~ Standard I General Dynamics 15 miles Solid Semi-active homing 1971 SAM will replace = = 24 km Terrier and 
Advanced Terrier 
Standard II General Dynamics 35 miles Solid Semi-active homing 1971 SAM 
56 km 
USSR Goa SAN 1 USSR Government 15 miles Solid Radar command SAM similar to 
24 km Radar homing SAM 3 
Guideline USSR Government 25 miles Liquid Command Dzerzinski SAM 
SAN 2 40 km with solid 
booster 
Goblet USSR Government Solid Radar homing Moskva claBB and 
SAN 3 Kresta II SAM 
Scrubber USSR Government 150 miles Turbojet Command fiR homing Destroyers SAM 
SSN 1 240 km solid booster 
Styx SSN 2 USSR Government 29 miles Turbojet Auto pilot active homing Patrol boats SSM 
46 km solid ~ booster Shaddock USSR Government 100 to 350 miles Ram or Radio command/ General service - t::l 
SSN 3 160 to 560 km turbojet active homing SSM .... M 
solid booster 1-t 1-t 
SSN 7 USSR Government 30 miles Turbojet Mid-term guidance at Submarines under-
"" 50 km solid long range water launch SSM :3
booster Auto pilot active homing ~ 
~ 
SSN 9 USSR Government 150 miles Ram or Command ja.ctive homing DEs SSM 1-t 
240 km turbojet 1-t 
solid 
booster 
SSN 10 USSR Government 25 miles Kresta II class 
40 km Destroyers. 
Supersonic. SSM 
SSN 11 USSR Government 25 miles Patrol boats 
40 km High subsonic SSM 
SSN USSR Government 400 miles Development High supersonic 
640 km SSM 
3. Navy SLBM (all two-Btage) 
t-:1 Country jName Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
= ~
China Sark See USSR 
France MSBS M 1 Aerospatiale 1,400 miles Solid Inertial 1970 500KT 
2,250 km Development 
MSBS M 2 2,000 miles Solid 500KT 
3,200 km 
MSBS M 4 2,000 miles Solid Development 
3,200 km 
United (Polaris A3) See United 3 X 200 KT 
Kingdom States MRV 
United Polaris A2 Lockheed 1,750 miles Solid Inertial 
States 2,800 km 
Polaris A3 2,880 miles Solid Inertial 3 X 200 KT t::l 0 
4,600 km MRV 0 
Poseidon 2,880 miles Solid Inertial 1974 10 X 50 KT MIRV i 4,600 km 
ULMS Lockheed Development Trident system = ~
-
Country I Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks t:l 0 
USSR Sark SSN 4 USSR Government 380 miles Solid Obsolescent 1 MT I 500 km 
Serb SSN 5 USSR Government 750 miles Solid 1965 1MTinGandM (l) ~ 
1,200 km class submarines .... 
Sawfly SSN 6 USSR Government 1,750 miles Solid 1966 1 MT in Y class 
2,800 km submarines 
SSN 8 USSR Government 4,500 miles Solid Development MIRV 
7,200 km 
4. Navy submarine-launched anti-ship missiles 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
United USGW Hawker-Siddeley Solid Full active homing Study Alternative to 
Kingdom/ (Sub Martel) Aerospatiale f Harpoon 
France Ma.tra. Decision 1975 





5. Navy anti-submarine systems 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
France Ma.lafon La.tecoere 11 miles Solid Command 1965 
18 km boosters 
Norway Teme 8 A fS Kongsberg Solid None Rocket-propelled 
Vaapenfabrikk depth charge 
United Ikara. Australian 10 miles Solid Radio-Radar 1972 Torpedo dropping 
Kingdom Department of 18 km boosted cylinder 
Supply 
United Asroc Honeywell 6 miles Solid Unguided 1961 
States 9km 
Subroc Goodyear 30 miles Solid Inertial 1965 
48 km i 8. Anti-ship helicopter-launched missiles ~ 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
=:::: 
France AM 39 Aerospatiale 50 km Terminal homing Development A development of ~ Exocet Italy Marte Sistel 10 km Beam riding 1977 t;j 
United Sea. Skua BAC Semi-active housing Development Long-range stand- ~ 1-4 Kingdom off for Lynx 1-4 
helicopter 
Hawkswing BAC 
Hellcat Short Bros. 3.5 km 1968 A development of 
Swing fire 
7. Land-based strategic missiles 
Country jName Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
IOBM 
China 3,500 miles 1975 
5,600 km 
United Minuteman 1 Boeing 7,500 miles Solid Inertial 250 to 300 of 1 MT 
States 12,000 km 
Minuteman 2 Boeing 8,000 miles Solid Inertial 500 of 1-2 MT 
~ 12,800 km Minuteman 3 Boeing 8,000 miles Solid Inertial 200 to 250 of 1-2 MT 
12,800 km of 3 X 200 KT 
Titan 2 Martin 7,250 miles Liquid Inertial Obsolescent 54 of 5-10 MT 
Marietta 11,600 km 
USSR Saddler SS7 USSR Government 6,000 miles Storable 100 of 5 MT 
9,600 km liquid 
Sasin SS8 USSR Government 7,000 miles Storable Obsolescent 100 of 5 MT 
11,200 km liquid 
Scarp SS9 USSR Government 7,500 miles Liquid 1967 290 of 25 MT MRV. 
12,000 km World's most 
powerful weapon 
Scrag SSIO USSR Government Global Storable Development None 1 
In production 1 
SS11 USSR Government 6,500 miles Storable 970 of 1-2 MT 
10,400 km 
Savage SS13 USSR Government 5,500 miles Solid 1966 60 of 1 MT. t;j 0 8,800 km To replace SS11 ~ SS16 USSR Government 5,500 miles 1978 Replaces SS13 not 
8,800 km MIRVs l!l lzl 
SS17 USSR Government 5,500 miles 1978 Replaces SSU - I"J 0) 
8,800 km 4 MIRVs -t 
...... 
Country jName Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks I:! 0 
USSR SS18 USSR Government 7,000 miles 1978 Replaces SS11 -- ~ (cont.) 11,200 km 4 MIRVs SS19 USSR Government 4,500 miles 1978 6 MIRVs 
7,200 km ~ ~ 
IRBM ..... 
China. 2,500 miles Storable 15 to 20 KT range 
4,000 km 
France SSBS S2 Aerospatia.le 1,800 miles Solid Inertial 1970 18 +of 150 KT 
2,900 km 
SSBS S3 Aerospatia.le 1,900 miles Solid Inertial Development 1 MT 
3,200 km 
USSR Skean SS5 USSR Government 2,300 miles Liquid Obsolescent 100 of 1 MT 
3,700 km 
Scapegoat USSR Government 2,000 miles Solid 1965 Mobile. 1 MT 
SS14 3,200 km 
Scrooge SSX2 USSR Government 3,000 miles Solid Mobile. 1 MT 1 
4,800 km 
MRBM 
N> China. 1,200 miles Liquid About 50 of KT ;:! 
1,900 km range 
USSR Sandal SS4 USSR Government 1,200 miles Liquid Obsolescent 450 of 1 MT 
1,900 km 
8. Anti-ballistic missiles 
Country I Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Gudance In service Remarks 
United Spartan Western Electric 400 miles+ Solid Radio command Production MT range 
States 640 km 
Sprint 1 Martin Marietta 25 miles Solid Production 25 
40 km 
Sprint 2 Martin Marietta 25 miles Solid Development 
40 km 
USSR Galosh SA 7 200 miles+ Solid 64 of MT range 3 320 km + 
9. Army SSM s ~ 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
""" 
""" 
Franoe Pluton Aerospa.tiale 75 miles Solid Inertial 1974 10-15 KT 
"" 120 km :3 
= Israel Jericho 280 miles Inertial Nuclear ~ 
450 km ~ 
Italy 25 miles Inertial Study 
40 km 
United Sergeant Sperry Road 45 miles Solid Inertial 1962 KT range. About 
States 72 km 500 deployed 
Pershing 1A Martin Marietta 450 miles Solid Inertial 1962 High KT range. 
720 km About 250 deployed 
Lanoe LTV Aerospace 70 miles Storable Inertial 1972 KT range. Replace 
Corp. 112 km liquid Honest John and 
Sergeant 
USSR Frog 1-7 USSR Government 10-45 miles Solid None 1966 About 600 of KT 
16-72 km range 
Scud A USSR Government 50 miles Storable Command 1966 
I t-:) 80 km liquid -1 
-
Scud B USSR Government 185 miles Storable Inertial 1966 About 300 of KT 
300 km liquid ) range 
Scud C or USSR Government 500 miles Inertial \ Scale board 800 km 
10. Army SAM 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
Man-
pm-table 
United Blowpipe Short Bros. Short Solid Optical radio command 1974 Also in Canada 
Kingdom 
t;j 
United Red eye General Dynamics Short Solid IR homing 1964 0 ~ States 
Stinger General Dynamics Short Solid IR homing Development 
= 
i'i 




'Guideline Western Electric 45 km Liquid Command 1957 Also many Soviet ~ SA-2 with solid allies booster 
M 
11. Army anti-tank missiles 
~ 
~ 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
One-man 
portable 
Belgium Atlas BAC fFabrique Laser Development 
Nationale d' Armes 
de Guerre 
Belgium/ Vigilant BAC 200-1,375 m Solid Wire 1963 Also other NATO 
United countries 
Kingdom 
Germany Cobra Messerschmitt- 400-1,6001 Wire Also many western 
BOlkow-Blohm 2,000 m nations 
1)0 (MBB) 
--1 Mamba Messerschmitt- 300-2,000 m Wire Production Development of Col:> 
BOlkow-Blohm Cobra 
(MBB) 
Italy Mosquito Contraves 360-2,300 m Wire Production 
Japan KAM-3 Kawa.saki 350-1,800 m Solid Wire 1966 
Sweden Bantam Bofors 300-2,000 m Solid Wire 1970 
Heaflier 
portable 
France/ Milan Aerospatiale fMBB 25-2,000 m Solid Wire (semi-&uto) 1973 French and 
Germany German armies 
Italy Sparviero Breda 4,000 m Solid Infra red 1978 tf g 
Japan KAM-9 Kawa.saki Solid Wire (semi-auto) Development ~ United Dragon McDonnell Douglas 1,000 m Solid Wire (semi-auto) 1973 States 
= Tow Hughes 25-2,000 m Solid Wire (semi-auto) 1972 --1 
.... 
Country !Name Manufacturer Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks t:::l g 
Vehicle- i t'TW'U!Rtetl France A era. DTAT 3,000 m Solid In beam riding Development 
4,000 m (gun launch) = ~
-Enta.c Aerospatiale 400-2,000 m Solid Wire 1957 
SS-11 Aerospatiale 500-3,000 m Solid Wire 
Harpon Aerospatiale 400-3,000 m Solid Wire (semi-auto) Production A precursor of Hot 
SS-12 Aerospatiale 6,000 m Solid Wire (semi-auto) Production 
France/ Hot Aerospatiale fMBB 4,000 m Solid Wire (semi-auto) Development 
Germany 
United Swingfire BAC 4,000 m Solid Wire, automatic gathering 1969 
Kingdom 
United Shillelagh Philco-Ford 500-2,300 m Solid Wire + homing 1967 Gun launch 
States 
USSR Snapper USSR Government 500-2,300 m Solid Wire 1966 
Swatter USSR Government Solid Wire + homing 1971 
Snagger USSR Government Wire 
~ 
~ 12. Airborne missiles 
Country !Name Manufacturer Range Propulsion Guidance In service Remarks 
Air-to-
8'Urface 
France AS-20 Aerospatiale 7 km Solid Radio command Also Germany 
and Italy 
AS-30 Aerospatiale 12 km Solid Radio command Also RAF, Germa-
ny, Israel, South 
Africa and 
Switzerland 
AS-11 Aerospatiale 3km Solid Wire cf SS-11 
helicopters 
AS-12 Aerospatiale 6-8 km Solid Wire cf SS-12/AS 
AM-39 Aerospatiale 75 km Solid Inertial and active 1976 Anto-ship ; stand-
off 
United Hellcat Short Bros. Solid Command Development of. Seacat ~ Kingdom 
CL834 BAC 15 km Solid Semi-active homing Development !21 t:::l 
Hawkswing BAC 4km Solid Wire Development Helicopter-mounted ~ 
Swingfire 1:1 
United Martel Hawker-Siddeley f about 60 km 1 Solid Autopilot + passive homing 1973 ~ Kingdom{ Ma.tra. or TV guidance France 
t:l 
Germany Kormora.n Messerschmitt- 37 km Solid Inertial various homing 1974 ~ l-o4 
Bolkow-Blohm l-o4 
Jumbo Messerschmitt- Solid TV Development 
BOlkow-Blohm 
Italy Airtos Sistel 11 km Solid Active homing Project 
Italy I Otomat Oto Mela.ra {Ma.tra. 60-80 km Turbojet Inertial/active homing Development 
France 
Sweden Rb04 SAAB Solid Auto pilot active homing 1959 
Rb05 SAAB Solid Radio command 
United Bull pup Martin Marietta. 11-17 km Storable Radio command 1959 Also many 
States liquid western air forces 
Condor Rockwell Int. 60-80 km Solid TV Development 
~ Harpoon McDonnell Douglas 90km+ Turbojet Inertial/active homing 1978 
~ Maverick Hughes Solid TV 1972 
Shrike Texas{Sperry 18 km Solid Passive homing 1964 
Walleye Martin Marietta. None TV 1971 
Standard General Dynamics Solid P&SSive homing 1968 
ARM 
Tow Hughes 2 km+ Solid Wire 1970 Helicopters 
Hellfire United States army 2km+ Turbojet Command homing 
Harm Naval Weapons Development 
Centre 
USSR Kennel USSR Government 90 km Turbojet Command homing Anti-shipping in 
TU16 (Badger) 
Kelt USSR Government 180 km Liquid Radar homing Anti-shipping in 
TU16 (Badger) 
Air-to-air t:l 0 
France R-511 Matra 8-10 km Solid Radar homing Obsolescent ~ 
R-530 Matra 18 km Solid Semi-active or 1963 Also Australia, g 
EM or IR homing Israel and South 
= Africa. -.l 
.... 




Italy Asp ide Selenia Solid Semi-active radar guidance 
Japan AAM1 Mitsubishi Solid m homing 1970 
AAM2 Mitsubishi Solid Development 
South South African Solid Development 
Africa Ministry of Defence 
United Firestreak Hawker-Biddeley 1.2 to 8 km Solid m homing 1958 
Kingdom Dynamics 
Red Top Hawker-Biddeley 12 km+ Solid m homing 1961 Improved 
Dynamics Firestrea.k 
SRAAM Hawker-Siddeley Short Solid m homing Close combat 
Dynamics 
X.J.521 Hawker Siddeley Short Solid Semi-active 1975 Improved Sparrow 
~ Dynamics radar guidance ~ 
United Falcon 4 Hughes Solid m or semi-active homing 1955 Also Sweden and 
States Switzerland 
Falcon 26 Hughes Solid Semi-active homing 
Falcon 47 Hughes 185 km Solid Semi-active homing Development 
Agile Hughes 915 m Infra red Development Close combat 
Phoenix Hughes ll0-165 km Solid Radar homing 1973 For F-14 
Sidewinder lA Philco-Ford 1,100 m Solid m homing 1956 Most NATO 
nations 
Sidewinder 10 RaytheonfPhilco- 18 km Solid Semi-active radar homing 
Ford ;Motorola 
Sparrow IIID Raytheon 15 km Solid Semi-active radar homing Several NATO 
nations 
Sparrow IIIE Raytheon 26 km Solid Semi-active radar homing Several NATO 
nations 
USSR Alkali USSR Government 6-8 km Solid Passive radar homing MIG-19 ~ Anab USSR Government 8-10 km Solid Radar or IR homing SU-9 and YAK-28 Ash USSR Government Long Radar or m homing TU-28 
Atoll USSR Government Medium Solid m homing MIG-21 R 
Awl USSR Government Solid Radar1 or m homing 
= 
Air- ~ launched 1!1 
nuclear !21 
United Genie McDonnell Douglas 9-10 km Solid Unguided 1951 ~ 
States 1-1 1-1 
Hound Dog North American 600 miles Turbojet Inertial 1959 600 
Aviation 960 km 
SRAM Boeing 100 miles Solid Inertial Production 500 to 1 to 2 M.T 
160 km 
USSR Kipper AS2 100miles Turbojet 1961 From TU-20 (Bear) 
160 km bomber 
Kangaroo ASS 300 miles Turbojet 1961 From TU-16 
480 km (Badger) bombers 
Kitchen AS4 300 miles Rocket or 1961 From TU-22 
480 km ramjet (Blinder) 
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Country National currency unit 
(0) (1) 
Belgium ................... Million Frs. 
France .................... Million Frs. 
Federal Republic of Germany Million DM 
Italy .•.•..•.............. Million Lire 
Luxembourg ............... Million Frs. 
Netherlands ............... Million Guilders 
United Kingdom ........... Million £ Sterling 
TOTAL WEU •.•. 0. 0. 
Canada ................... Million $ 
Denmark .................. Million Kr. 
Greece .................... Million Drachmas 
Norway ................... Million Kr. 
Portugal .................. Million Escudos 
Turkey ................... Million L. 
United States ............. Million S 
TOTAL NON-WEU .... 
TOTAL NATO ........ 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1970-74 
A. nNANCIAL EFFORT 

















1971 1972 1973 
(-4) (-3) (-2) 
39 670 44140 49 075 
34 907 37 992 41460 
25 450 28 720 31597 
1 852 2 162 2 385 
442 517 575 
4 466 4 974 5 651 
2 815 3 258 3 481 
2 131 2 238 2 391 
3195 3 386 3 711 
15 480 17 211 19 478 
3 022 3 239 3 621 
14 699 16 046 15 528 
8 487 9 961 12 483 
74 862 77 639 78 462 
e = Preliminary estimate 
I= Forecast 
19741 1970 1971 
(-1) (1) (2) 
57 315 750 814 
47 570 5 882 6 285 
35 964 6 167 7 291 
2 676 2 499 2 990 
677 8 9 
6 437 1096 I 313 
4148 5 865 6 853 
22 267 25 555 
2 770 I 967 2 Ill 
4 343 368 431 
24 126 474 516 
4 081 388 430 
20 910 436 511 
15 831 549 585 
84 332 77 854 74 862 
82 036 79 446 
104 303 105 001 
1972 1973 19741 1970 1971 1972 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I 003 1 258 1 472 22 971 25 799 32 144 
7 435 9 466 9 880 121 189 135 004 164 686 
8 912 11 928 13 899 165 019 192 158 227 585 
3 705 4106 4 120 83 536 91 923 107 555 
12 15 17 980 1 013 1234 
I 535 1 954 2 392 28 572 34 127 40 747 
8 145 8 595 9 707 104 282 119 105 137 235 
30 747 37 322 41 487 526 549 599 129 711 186 
2 259 2 403 2 832 70 413 79 503 89 698 
487 582 713 13 104 14 496 17 428 
574 670 804 8 409 9 407 10 942 
491 602 739 9 639 10 882 12 681 
589 651 820 5 490 6129 7 384 
718 870 I 140 11 657 11 910 15 291 
77 639 78 473 84 332 897 370 967 018 1 064 012 
82 757 .84 251 91 380 1 016 082 I 099 345 1 217 436 
113 504 121 573 132 867 1 542 631 1 698 474 I 928 622 
GNP (f.c.): Gross national product at factor cost, current prices. (The decimal point is used throughout this table.) 
a. Figures affected by change in exchange rate. 
Source: Defence expenditures according to NATO definition from NATO press release M fDPC /2(74)9. 
of GNP (f.c.) 
1973 1974 e 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 e 1970 1971 1972 1973 174 f 1970 
------------------ --(9) (10) (ll) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
41 204 47 322 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.8 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 78 
214 164 228 401 50.8 51.3 51.7 52.2 52.6 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 116 
306 714 339 313 58.5 59.2 59.6 60.0 60.1 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.1 105 
126 547 136 301 53.7 54.0 54.4 54.9 55.3 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.2 3.0 47 
1 657 1 954 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 24 
53 530 62 546 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.8 84 
154 456 166 145 55.5 55.7 55.9 56.0 56.2 5.6 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.8 106 
----------------------
898 272 981 982 241.4 243.4 244.9 246.6 248.0 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 92 
----------------------
102 515 122 186 21.3 21.6 21.8 22.1 22.4 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.3 92 
23 226 26 646 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.7 75 
14 418 16 983 8.8 8.8 8.9 9.0 9.0 5.6 5.5 5.2 4.6 4.7 54 
16 319 19 880 3.9 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.7 100 
9 420 12 729 8.7 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 7.9 8.3 8.0 6.9 6.4 50 
19 465 27 894 35.3 36.2 37.0 37.9 38.9 4.7 4.9 4.7 4.5 4.1 16 
1 190 989 1 285 554 204.9 207.0 208.8 210.4 212.5 8.7 7.7 7.3 6.6 6.6 380 
----------------------
I 376 352 1 511 872 287.8 291.1 294.0 297.0 300.4 8.1 7.2 6.8 6.1 6.0 285 
-----------------------
2 274 624 2 493 854 529.2 534.5 538.9 543.6 548.4 6.8 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.3 197 
Notes: GNP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are not therefore always comparable 
between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GNP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion. 
For the period 1970-74, the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Oountry 











































































































































$ US per unit Units per $ us 
1.6 0.625000 
1.614380 0.619433 




























1971 1972 1973 1974/ 
----(22) (23) (24) (25) 
84 103 129 151 
123 144 181 188 
123 150 199 231 
55 68 75 75 
26 35 43 48 
100 115 145 176 
123 146 153 173 
--------
105 126 151 167 
--------
98 103 109 126 
87 98 116 141 
58 65 75 89 
110 125 152 185 
59 69 76 97 
16 19 23 29 
362 372 373 397 
--------
273 281 284 304 
--------
196 211 224 242 
APPliiNDIX III 
Defence expenditure as % of total WEU 
1970 1971 1972 1972 1974 I 
(26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
3.37 3.19 3.26 3.37 3.55 
26.42 24.59 24.18 25.36 23.81 
27.69 28.52 28.99 31.96 33.50 
11.22 11.70 12.05 11.00 9.93 
0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
4.92 5.14 4.99 5.24 5.77 
26.34 26.82 26.49 23.03 23.40 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
8.83 8.26 7.35 6.44 6.83 
1.65 1.69 1.58 1.56 1.72 
2.13 2.02 1.87 1.80 1.94 
1.74 1.68 1.60 1.61 1.78 
1.96 2.00 1.92 1.74 1.98 
2.47 2.29 2.34 2.33 2.75 
349.64 292.94 252.49 210.26 203.26 
368.42 310.88 269.15 225.74 220.26 
466.42 410.88 369.15 325.74 320.26 
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1 Belgium 0. 0 ••••••• 0 •••••• 12 7 90 
2 France ••• 0 •• 0 0 •••••• 0 ••• 12 503 
3 Germany ....... 0 0. 0 •••••• 15 490 
4 Italy ••• 0 •••• 0. 0 •• 0 0 •••• 0 15 I 421 
5 Luxembourg 0. 0 ••••••• 0 •• nil 0.55 
6 Netherlands .............. 16-18 8 114 
7 United Kingdom ......... nil 355 5 
8 TOTAL WEU ............. 1,973 
9 Canada .................. nil 83 
10 Denmark •••• 0 ••••••••••• 9 37 
11 Greece ................... 24 161 
12 Norway ••••••••••• 0 ••••• 12 8 35 
13 Portugal ................. 24 4 217 
14 Turkey ••••• 0 •••••••••• 0. 20 453 
15 United States ............ nill 2,174 
--
16 TOTAL NON-WEU ......... 3,160 
--
17 TOTAL NATO .......... 0 •• 5,133 
I. Selective draft calls were terminated on 27th January 1973; those previously drafted complete 24 months service. 
2. Navy 24. 
3. Air force 18.21 ; navy 18·21. 
4. Navy 48; air force 36. 
5. Including forces enlisted outside Britain (9,300). 
6. Air force 15 : navy 15. 
7. If serving in Germany a reduction to 10 months will take place from end 1974. 
Sourcu: Numbers in armed forces and period of military service: Institute for Strategic Studies uThe Military Balance, 1973.74". 
Labour Force: OECD Labour Forces Statistics, 1961·73, total employment. 
e · Estimate. 
APPENDIX III 
Total employment Total in armed forces 






















State of European security 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
26th May 1975 
In paragraph 6 (b) of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out the words "before the end of 
June 1975" and insert the words "as soon as possible and at the latest by September 1975". 
Sig'M(l : Roper 
I. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (Amendment amended and adopted). 
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Doeaaaeat6n 
Amentbaent No. 2 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tar.led r.y Mr. Tanglae 
27th May 1975 
At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add a. new pa.ragra.ph a.s follows: 
"7. That it follow up the proposals made by Mr. Va.n Elsla.nde, Minister for Foreign Affairs of 
BeJgium, in the Assembly in December 1974 on a. European a.rma.ments policy a.nd in pa.rticula.r: 
(a) undertake a. deta.iled study of the armaments sectors of industry in the economies of each 
member country ; 
(b) study the possibility of pooling research work a.nd its financing ; 
(c) examine what is the best course to follow towards progressive integration." 
1. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (AmenclmeDt adopted). 
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Signed : Tangke 
27th. May 1975 
State of European security 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
Doeameat671 
Amendment No. 3 
tabled by MM. Radius, Valleix and La Combe 
I. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, in sub-paragraph (a), leave out the words 
"Eurogroup as the most appropriate organ at present in which", and insert the words "the mission of the 
Standing Armaments Committee which could usefully undertake, in co-operation with Eurogroup," 
2. In paragraph 6 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert: 
"(b) that it examine with Mr. Tindema.ns the place which defence could take in a. future European 
union." 
1. See 5th Sitting, 28th May 1975 (.Amendment negatived). 
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Bignell : RadiU&, V alleix, La Combe 
Document 672 
Proliferation of nuclear weapons 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments a 
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
29th April 1975 
Introductory note 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
II. International regulation of nuclear weapons 
(a) Post-war efforts 
(b) Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(i) The position of the WEU and European Community countries 
(ii) The position of certain po88ible adversaries 
(iii) Safeguards provided for in the non-proliferation treaty 
(iv) The conference to review the operation of the non-proliferation 
treaty 
(c) SALT 
III. Proliferation of nuclear technology 
(a) Civil and military nuclear technology 
(b) Proliferation of the civil nuclear industry 
(c) Proliferation of military nuclear technology 
(i) Horizontal proliferation 
(ii) Vertical proliferation 
IV. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Text of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -
1st July 1968 
II. List of signatures, ratifications and acceBBions as at 31st March 1975 
1. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 
abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Chairman), 
MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Haase),Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute: Delorme), Bizet, 
Boulloche, Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, 
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Menard, Pawelczyk, Pendry, Prescott (Substitute : FauldB), 
Richter, Riviere, Roper, Schugens, Ta.nghe (Substitute: 
.Dtwieusart), Vedovato, WaZl, de Niet, Schmidt. 
N. B. The names of Repruentati1168 who took part in 
the wte are printed in italics. 
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Introductory note 
In preparing this report your Rapporteur had interviews as follows 
Geneva, 12th and 13th Marek 1975 
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 
H. E. Mr. Joseph Martin, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United States; 
Mr. Y. K. Nazarkin, Deputy Head of the Soviet Union Delegation; 
H. E. Mr. W. H. Barton, Ambassador, Representative of Canada; 
H. E. Mr. B. C. Mishra, Ambassador, Representative of India; 
H. E. Mr. Ma.sahiro Nisibori, Ambassador, Representative of Japan; 
Dr. Valeriu Tudor, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Romania.; 
Mr. R. Bjomerstedt, Acting Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations ; 
H. E. Mr. Mark Allen, Ambassador, United Kingdom Representative. 
The Committee as a whole met at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 18th February where it met 
with the Chairmen of the Defence Committees in the national parliaments of the WEU countries, and 
was briefed by Mr. R. Chevalier, Directeur Engins-Espa.ce, of Aerospatiale, and by Mr. L.A. Sanson, Sales 
and Service Director, assisted by Mr. J.P. Corbett, Europe Sales Manager of British Aircraft Corporation. 
The Committee then held a joint meeting with the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (the joint 
body being known as the Liaison Sub-Committee on the Joint Production of Armaments), attended by : 
Colonel J. Quaniers (Belgium), General P. Brindeau (France), Colonel R. Acker (Federal Republic 
of Germany), General V. Campana (Italy), Mr. R. P.M. van Wensen (Netherlands), Mr. W. Perry (United 
Kingdom), H. E. Mr. F.-K. von Plehwe, Acting Secretary-General of WEU, H. E. Mr. Alain Pla.ntey, 
Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, Head of the Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat. 
On 19th February the Committee with the Chairmen of the national defence committees visited 
the ballistic missile submarine base of the French Force Oceanique Strategique, where it was briefed by 
Rear-Admiral Pierre Emeury, commanding the Force Oceanique Strategique, and by Capitaine de Vaisseau 
Fages, commanding the ballistic missile submarine base. Members visited the French ballistic missile sub-
marine "Foudroyant" and the missile assembly shop. 
The Committee as a whole visited Athens on 18th March where it was addressed by H. E. 
Mr. D. Bitsios, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with H. E. Mr. Constantin 
Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the following members of the Greek Par-
liament : MM. Theocharis Rendis, Andre Andria.nopoulos, Demetre Franghos, Constantin Ghiatra.cos, 
Jean Mineos, Zacharias Kratsas, Agnelos Pnevmaticos, Achilles Papa.bolouicas, Georges Iordanides, 
Constantin Coniotakis, Anastas Minis, Jean Cha.rala.mbopoulos. The Committee much regretted that the 
address by H. E. Mr. E. Averoff, Greek Minister of Defence, had to be cancelled because of travel difficulties 
arising from an airport strike. 
The Committee visited Ankara on 20th and 21st March where it was addressed by H. E. Mr. Ilha.mi 
San911-r, Minister of Defence, General Olc;ay, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence, with Mr. Ereciiment 
Yavuzalp, Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The Committee was then addressed by H. E. 
Mr. M. Esenbel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and held a discussion with the following members of the 
Turkish Parliament: Mr. Hasan Isik, Chairman; Senator Orhan Alp; Senator Ahat Alpan; General Muksin 
Batur; Senator Fetin Celiklea.s; Mr. Kemalettin Crokakin; Mr. llyas Inlic;; Mr. Ozer Olc;men; Mr. Hasan 
Tosyali; Mr. Sirri Turanli; Senator Ahmet Yildiz. 
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The Committee visited the CENTO Secretariat-General where it was received by General Ali 
Ka.rimloo (Iran), Chairman of the CENTO Permanent Military Deputies Group, and the Permanent Military 
Deputies of Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, and by Major-General Colin 
C. Hamilton (USAF), Chief of Staff, and briefed on CENTO and its activities. 
The Committee visited the Makina Kimya Kurumu small-arms ammunition factory, where it 
was welcomed by Mr. Reci Baturalp, Director-General, and briefed by Mr. Nejat Akyak, Marketing and 
Export Manager. 
On 22nd March the Committee visited HQ Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and HQ 6th Allied 
Tactical Air Force at lzmir, where it was briefed by General Melvin Zais (US Army), Commander Allied 
Land Forces South-East Europe, and by Lt.-General Sanford K. Moats, Commander 6th Allied Tactical 
Air Force, and their staffs. 
The Committee met finally at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 29th Aprill975, when it discussed 
and adopted the present report. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers 
who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise 




on the proliferation of nuclear weapona 
The Assembly, 
Regretting that despite a certa.in progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of 
"essential equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons have 
continued to grow ; 
Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India threatens the stability of relations in 
the area, undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be made available by one country to another, 
while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India ; 
Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being available to all 
countries for civil applications ; 
Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on 
which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoid-
ing total nuclear anarchy, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL 
That it urge member countries: 
1. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit 
their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference ; 
2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty ; 
3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty, and to concert their policies 
with other supplying powers to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries 
dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their ter-
ritory or under their control ; 
4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to 
third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy ; 
5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving, through the various 
arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing the 




(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee ha.S asked your Rapporteur 
to prepare a report to follow earlier Committee 
reports on the non-proliferation treaty, and deal-
ing in particular with certain major events 
which have occurred since the treaty was signed. 
The report is to deal with both vertical and 
horizontal proliferation. 
2. On 19th September 1968, the Committee 
adopted the report on the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons \ analysing the 
provisions of the treaty and its implications for 
western defence, the European Community, 
world stability, peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
and safeguards. But East-West relations having 
seriously deteriorated following the Soviet inter-
vention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, shortly after 
the treaty was signed, it was not until 4th Decem-
ber 1969 that the Committee adopted a report on 
the same subject 2, the draft recommendation of 
which advocated, inter alia, the signature of the 
treaty by all the WEU countries at the earliest 
possible date and ratification of the treaty by all 
the Euratom countries immediately after the 
conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA. 
3. Many events have since occurred directly 
affecting the treaty provisions. There has been 
very extensive vertical proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and to a lesser degree in France, the 
United Kingdom and China. Horizontal proli-
feration at political level has been most import-
ant because of the explosion of a nuclear device 
by India on 18th May 1974. On 1st December 
1974, the President of Israel announced that his 
country was capable of producing nuclear 
weapons. Various statements have been made by 
Egypt, Iran and Libya. 
4. On the positive side, however, two other 
events can be recorded. A further treaty on the 
partial suspension of underground tests has been 
concluded by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and negotiations between those two coun-
tries on the problems raised by nuclear tests 
1. Document 454, Rapporteur Mr. Housiaux. 
2. Document 499, Rapporteur Mr. Mart. 
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for peaceful purposes have continued. A confer-
ence of parties to the non-proliferation treaty 
is to open in Geneva on 5th May 1975 to consider 
its application, but in view of the events 
mentioned above the prospects of this conference 
are not very encouraging. 
D. International regulation of nuclear weapons 
(a) Post-war efforts 
5. The first United States' proposals in the 
United Nations in June 1946 for giving a world 
monopoly of all activities in this field and a right 
of inspection and supervision to an international 
atomic development authority were not accepted 
by the Soviet Union, which called for the destruc-
tion of all nuclear weapons and a ban on their 
use prior to any further agreement on the subject. 
The cold war and armaments race - particularly 
nuclear - was threatened. In December 1959, 
for the first time provisions restricting nuclear 
weapons were incorporated in an international 
treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, banning military 
installations of any kind whatsoever and the 
holding of nuclear tests in the Antarctic. In 
August 1963, the treaty banning nuclear weapon 
tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under 
water was concluded. In January 1967, the outer 
space treaty banning the placing in orbit of 
nuclear weapons and their installation on celestial 
bodies was signed. 
(b) Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons 
6. Proposals for banning the spread of nuclear 
weapons seem to have been made for the first 
time by the United States in 1956 in the United 
Nations Disarmament Committee, but the pro-
posal took more definite shape in 1958, when 
Ireland tabled a draft resolution on this subject 
in the United Nations General Assembly. The 
proposal made very slow headway but finally, 
after some four years of negotiations, mainly in 
the eighteen-nation disarmament conference in 
Geneva, the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons was signed simultaneously in 
JJondon, Moscow and Washington - the capitals 
of the three depository States - on 1st July 
1968. 
7. The provisions of the treaty were considered 
in great detail in a report by the Committee 
the same year 1 ; in the present report, it will 
suffice to recall the main provisions 2 • Under 
Article 1, each nuclear-weapon State party to 
the treaty undertakes not to transfer "to any 
recipient whatsoever" nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices. The nuclear powers 
a.lso undertake not to assist or encourage a non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or acquire 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices, or control over such weapons or devices. 
Under Article II, each non-nuclear-weapon State 
party to the treaty undertakes not to acquire such 
weapons or explosive devices. Thus worded, 
Article I does not forbid a nuclear-weapon State 
to assist another nuclear-weapon State. Thus, 
the treaty does not ban nuclear co-operation for 
military purposes between the three nuclear-
weapon States of the Atlantic Alliance, although 
such co-operation seems to exist only between the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
8. Article IX of the treaty defines a nuclear-
weapon State as "one which has manufactured 
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device prior to 1st January 1967". Thus 
the five present nuclear powers are all defined 
as nuclear-weapon States although two of them-
France and China - have not yet signed the 
treaty. India, too, if it had exploded its so-called 
peaceful device before the time-limit, would have 
been included in the definition of a nuclear-
weapon State. 
9. All peaceful applications of nuclear energy 
are specifically authorised in Article IV, except 
for the ban in Articles I and II, i.e. on nuclear 
explo.~ions. Under the treaty, therefore, non-
nuclear-weapon States are free to establish a civil 
nuclear industry with reactors, fabrication of fuel 
elements, reprocessing of irradiated fuel and 
uranium isotope enrichment. The possession of 
fissile material suitable for use in the manu-
facture of nuclear explosive devices is not banned 
when used for civil purposes. However, all the 
nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon 
States are subject to control by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency which has to be satisfied 
that the fissile material is not diverted to military 
purposes. The nuclear powers are not subject 
to IAEA supervision. 
I. Document 454, Chapter II. 
2. Text of the treaty at Appendix I. 
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10. Furthermore, Article V requires nuclear-
weapon States to make available to non-nuclear-
weapon States by means of bilateral agreements 
or international procedure any peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear explosions. 
11. Under Article VI, the parties undertake to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disar-
mament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament. These provisions are strengthened 
by those of Article VIII which provides that five 
years after the entry into force of the treaty a 
conference of parties to the treaty shall be held 
in Geneva "in order to review the operation of 
this treaty with a view to assuring that the 
purposes of the preamble and the provisions of 
the treaty are being realised". It was in fact in 
the preamble that the parties recalled that the 
treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon 
tests expressed the determination of the parties 
"to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". The 
provisions on nuclear disarmament and assistance 
in the field of civil applications of nuclear energy 
are the quid pro quo for the renunciation 
accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States 
parties to the treaty. 
12. The treaty was signed on 1st July 1968 
and came into force on 5th March 1970 when 
43 ratifications had been deposited, including 
those of the three depository powers, all of them 
nuclear-weapons States- the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. On 31st 
March 1975, 87 States had acceded to the treaty, 
a further 23 had signed but not ratified it 1 • 
( i) The position of the WEU and European 
Community countries 
13. To date, three Community countries have 
acceded to the treaty - the United Kingdom, 
Denmark and Ireland. The Benelux countries, 
Germany and Italy have all signed the treaty 
and concluded safeguard agreements with the 
IAEA. They are thus all in a position to ratify 
the treaty, and the necessary constitutional pro-
cedure has been completed in all these countries 
except Italy, where it is under way. It is hoped 
that these five countries will deposit their 
instruments of ratification at the latest during 
the conference which is to open on 5th May. 
I. List of parties and other signatoiies at Appendix II. 
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14. France, a nuclear-weapon State according 
to the treaty, has not signed the treaty, which 
it considers discriminatory. The French repre-
sentative nevertheless told the United Nations 
General Assembly on 12th June 1968 that his 
country "will behave in the future in this field 
exactly as the States adhering to the treaty". 
More recently, Mr Sauvagnargues, the French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated in an inter-
view in Le Monde 1 that: 
"We do not intend to accede to the non-
proliferation treaty. We consider the prob-
lem of proliferation with due seriousness. 
We are fully aware of our responsibilities as 
a nuclear power and act accordingly in all 
the nuclear co-operation agreements which 
we have concluded with other States. More-
over as the President of the Republic has 
' . underlined, it is important to create a situa-
tion which reduces the temptation for non-
nuclear-weapon States to acquire a nuclear 
potential." 
The United Kingdom, a depository country, and 
The Netherlands in particular, have spoken for 
the treaty, Mr. Wilson having signed a bilateral 
declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in Moscow on 17th February 1975. 
15. Sixteen countries which supply fissile 
material, including the United Kingdom, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, have agreed 
on a joint interpretation of their undertakings in 
the framework of the IAEA concerning safe-
guards to be applied in the event of supplies 
of fissile material to non-nuclear-weapon States 2 • 
According to various press articles of 15th 
January 1975, President Giscard d'Estaing is also 
believed to ha'""e agreed with President Ford on 
this subject when they met in Martinique. 
( ii) The position of certain possible adversaries 
16. In the Middle East, Israel has not signed 
the treaty, but most Arab States have acceded, 
i.e. Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Egypt and 
Libya have signed it, but not Saudi Arabia. 
17. India, China, Bangladesh and Pakistan have 
not signed the treaty, Iran has ratified it. In 
Japan, the government has initiated the ratifica-
tion procedure in parliament, but there is some 
opposition. 
1. Ls Monde, 19th·20th January 1975. 
2. Foreign Office statement reported in Ls Monde on 
18th September 1974. 
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18. South Mrica, Tanzania and Zambia have 
not signed the treaty but most of the other 
black Mrican States have adhered to it. 
(iii) Safeguards provided for in the non-pro-
lit eration treaty 
19. Article III of the treaty provides that non-
nuclear-weapon States accept safeguards as set 
forth in an agreement to be concluded with the 
IAEA in accordance with the statute and safe-
guards system of that agency. Safeguard agree-
ments with the IAEA may be negotiated "either 
individually or together with other States." These 
provisions allowed the non-nuclear-weapon mem-
bers of Euratom to negotiate a collective agree-
ment with the Vienna Agency providing for 
the application of safeguards by staff of Euratom 
itself under the supervision of the IAEA. Japan 
subsequently took advantage of this model agree-
ment to conclude a similar one with the IAEA 
providing for Agency supervision of inspections 
carried out by Japanese officials. 
(iv) The conference to review the operation of 
the non-proliferation treaty 
20. The conference mentioned above is to open 
in Geneva on 5th May 1975. The work of the 
preparatory committee has been completed. It 
has been agreed that parties to the treaty will 
participate fully in the conference and th0;t .co~­
tries which have signed but not yet ratified It 
will have almost the same rights at the conference. 
Non-signatory countries may attend as observers. 
It is to be expected that the same discussions 
will be heard at the conference as accompanied 
the negotiation of the treaty, i.e. the assertion 
by non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear-
weapon States are violating the treaty by increas-
ing their stocks of nuclear weapons ; the asser-
tion by the nuclear-weapon States. that .the 
acquisition of such weapons or explosive deVIces 
by other States cannot strengthen their securi~y 
and might be detrimental to world peace. It 18 
hoped that before the conference opens several 
other States will have acceded to the treaty. But 
it is undeniable that there is a big gap, difficult 
to bridge, between the nuclear States and the 
others, especially after the modus viv~'ndi a~opted 
by the United States and the SoVIet Umon at 
Vladivostok. 
(c) SALT 
21. The chapter on the international regulation 
of nuclear weapons would not be complete 
without mention of the strategic arms limitation 
talks (SAIJT) between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. However, this matter is dealt 
with in another of the Committee's reports 1 • 
m. Proliferation of nuclear technology 
(a) Civil and military nuclear technology 
22. To understand the close relationship between 
the civil nuclear industry and the technology of 
nuclear explosions- the only technology renoun-
ced by the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the 
non-proliferation treaty - seven separate pro-
cesses must be identified, the first six of which 
are necessary to the civil nuclear industry, 
although all six are only rarely to be found on 
the territory of an individual State, if only 
because uranium deposits do not exist every-
where: 
( i) extraction of uranium ore ; 
( ii) refining of natural uranium metal ; 
(iii) manufacture of fuel elements for 
reactors from natural uranium or from 
enriched uranium produced by an 
enrichment plant (see (vi)) or pluto-
nium derived from reprocessing plants 
(see (v)) ; 
( iv) nuclear reactors fuelled by natural 
uranium (not very economical) or 
slightly enriched uranium or plutonium 
(future generations of breeder reac-
tors) ; 
( v) plant for reprocessing irradiated fuel 
elements (having been used in reactors) 
- extraction of plutonium ; 
(vi) isotope enrichment plant (by the gase-
ous diffusion or centrifuge system, a 
process now being developed) with 
production of uranium slightly 
enriched in isotope 235, or highly 
enriched (more than 80 %) . 
23. The seventh process concerns only the tech-
nology of nuclear explosions : 
(vii) manufacture of nuclear explosive 
devices from fissile material, either 





plutonium (from process ( v)) or ura-
nium highly enriched in isotope 235 
(from plant (vi)). 
24. The safeguards provided for in the civil 
nuclear industry are mainly intended to control 
and to follow the fissile material produced in 
reactors and extracted in reprocessing plants o:r 
produced in isotope enrichment plants. Only very 
accurate accounting for fissile material can offer 
a guarantee that it has not been diverted to use 
for explosions. 
25. With regard to the possibility of using 
nuclear explosions for civil purposes, several tests 
have been made, mainly in the United States but 
also in the Soviet Union. According to American 
experts, it would appear most difficult to use 
such devices to excavate canals or ports. The 
radioactive fallout from explosions of this kind, 
which would necessarily be released into the 
atmosphere, would be too dangerous. Experi-
ments have also been carried out with under-
ground nuclear explosions to crush oil-bearing 
layers of rock in order to increase the yield of 
oil wells. 
(b) Proliferation of the civil nuclear industry 
26. With the energy crisis, the civil nuclear 
industry is becoming an urgent necessity for 
many countries. Electricity-generating reactors 
are therefore becoming widespread throughout 
the world. But a country acquiring nuclear 
reactors will be tempted to set up on its territory 
all the installations needed for the full fuel cycle, 
i.e. elements (iii), (v) and (vi) mentioned above, 
because otherwise it would depend on other coun-
tries for the supply of reactor fuel and might 
thus risk being deprived of nuclear energy in 
the event of a world shortage of fissile material. 
27. Hence, in addition to the five so-called 
nuclear powers, fifteen to twenty other countries 
have nuclear installations and know-how which 
would allow them to manufacture nuclear explos-
ive devices, including Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzer-
land. Power reactors also exist in Austria, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Greece, 
South Korea, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and Yugoslavia. 
Egypt also has nuclear research installations and 
certainly has the necessary technological know-
how. The Stockholm International Peace Research 
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Institute considers that twenty countries now have 
the necessary know-how, plant and material to 
manufacture nuclear bombs and that this figure 
will rise by one or two countries each year 1 • 
28. Proliferation in the civil nuclear industry 
followed the "Atoms for Peace" programme 
announced by General Eisenhower at the end of 
1953. Canada, which had been associated with 
nuclear research programmes since the second 
world war military programme, France and the 
United Kingdom have become exporters of 
nuclear reactors and the technology required for 
their construction. The Federal Republic of 
Germany and Sweden are in the same position, 
and India now has reactors of its own design 
and might well think of exporting such tech-
nology. The Soviet Union has followed the 
example of the United States, but to a far lesser 
extent. Although a safeguard system to avoid 
fissile material being diverted to the manufacture 
of bombs is included in earlier contracts between 
exporting and importing countries, market con-
ditions soon produced competition between sup-
plying countries which led them to reduce their 
safeguards requirements - a profoundly regret-
table development. 
29. The non-proliferation treaty provided for 
the conclusion of subsequent agreements to give 
non-nuclear-weapon States access to the possible 
advantages of peaceful applications of nuclear 
explosions. Explosions in the atmosphere, even 
if experimental, would require prior modifica-
tion of the 1963 treaty on the suspension of 
nuclear tests. Article III of the treaty limiting 
underground tests, signed in Moscow on 3rd July 
1974 by President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, 
stipulates that the treaty does not cover under-
ground nuclear explosions by the two parties for 
peaceful purposes. Such explosions are to be 
governed by an agreement to be negotiated by 
the two parties as soon as possible. Negotiations 
between the Soviet Union and the United States 
for settling the problem of peaceful nuclear 
explosions were resumed in Moscow on lOth 
February. 
30. Addressing the general conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna 
on 16th September 1974, the Director of the 
Agency, Mr. Elkund, invited the five nuclear 
powers to accept international observers volun-
tarily when conducting nuclear explosions for 
peaceful purposes. 
1. "The Nuclear Age", published by SIPRI, Stockholm. 
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(c) Proliferation of military nuclear technology 
( i) Horizontal proliferation 
31. On 18th May 1974, India carried out an 
underground nuclear test concerning which the 
President of the Indian Atomic Energy Com-
mission, Professor Sethna, held a press conference 
in Bombay two days later. The Professor stated 
that the aim of the test was purely peaceful, the 
purpose being to study the dynamics of craters 
and rocks and how to use this knowledge for 
peaceful purposes such as building dams. He 
added that India wished to use this knowledge 
to obtain gas and oil. He pointed out that the 
United States and the Soviet Union had carried 
out similar tests, that it would take India six 
months to analyse the results, and that the data 
obtained from the test would be published later. 
Asked whether there would be another test, 
Professor Sethna said information from the first 
test would have to be studied first. 
32. The political and military importance of the 
test in India is that it is the only one to have 
been carried out by a country which does not 
claim to have nuclear weapons and that it 
completely upsets the fundamental principle of 
the non-proliferation treaty that a non-nuclear-
weapon State renounces both nuclear weapons 
and "nuclear explosive devices". India has, of 
course, not signed the treaty. It asserts that 
it does not intend to use explosive devices for 
military purposes, but this mere assertion of 
intention is no substitute for pure and simple 
renunciation of the technology whieh allows it to 
do so. India has sixty Canberra bombers perfectly 
capable of transporting nuclear explosive devices 
and dropping them on military objectives. India's 
neighbours will no longer be able to assume in 
their military contingency planning that India 
has no nuclear weapons. 
33. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Pakistani Minister of 
Defence and Foreign Affairs, told the conference 
of Islam Ministers for Foreign Affairs, meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur on 24th June 1974, that India 
had surreptitiously accumulated enough pluto-
nium to manufacture seventeen nuclear bombs. 
There is no doubt that the plutonium was 
extracted from irradiated fuel elements from the 
reactor at Trombay, supplied by Canada. The 
elements were probably manufactured in India 
and the reprocessing plant is of purely Indian 
design. Mr. Ahmed added that "the bomb has 
been exploded right outside our door. We know 
who are the target countries". 
34. World reactions to the Indian explosion 
were curiously restrained. Mr. Ahmed had to 
add, when addressing the Kuala Lumpur confer-
ence, that "nevertheless, in deference to the 
wishes of some of my colleagues, we have very 
considerably toned down our draft resolution, 
which merely 'notes the fact that India exploded 
a device.' This is a fact. In fact, India is very 
proud of it. I mention this because some members 
are not willing even to mention the fact". 
35. Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Minister for 
External Affairs, announced in Ottawa on 22nd 
May 1974 that there would be no further consign-
ments of installations or nuclear material for 
India and that exchanges of nuclear technology 
with India would be suspended. India did not 
deny that it was the Trombay reactor, supplied by 
Canada, which it used to produce the plutonium 
needed for the explosion. Negotiations between 
Canada and India about safeguards at the time 
the reactor was supplied proved difficult. It is 
evident that the safeguards finally accepted by 
India were not sufficient to prevent fissile 
material being diverted for explosive purposes. 
36. Reactions from other countries were mod-
erate. Although some western powers regretted 
the Indian test, the Soviet Union preferred to 
take note of the Indian assertion that the explo-
sion had purely peaceful aims. Your Rapporteur 
called on the leader of the Indian Delegation to 
the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, who 
reaffirmed the peaceful aims of the Indian explo-
sion. 
37. On 1st December 1974, Professor Katzir, 
President of Israel, stated that : "It has always 
been our intention to provide the potential for 
nuclear weapons development. We now have that 
potential. We will defend this country with all 
possible means at hand." Israel has not carried 
out a nuclear test but at Dimona, in the Negev 
desert, it has a small power reactor supplied 
by France which has been operational since 1963. 
Israel extracts uranium from phosphate in the 
Negev and it is quite possible for it to build its 
own reprocessing plant for irradiated elements. 
38. During his visit to the Middle East in June 
1974, President Nixon concluded agreements of 
principle with Israel and Egypt for the supply 
of nuclear power reactors to each country and 
the necessary enriched uranium fuel - 83 tons 
for each country. These agreements of principle 
provide for the negotiation of a co-operation 
agreement subject to agreed guarantees. On 26th 
June, only ten days after President Nixon's visit 
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to the Middle East, contracts for the supply of 
uranium were signed in Washington, Israel and 
Egypt having paid deposits of $725,000 and 
$660,000 respectively. However, in October 1974, 
the Washington press reported difficulties in the 
negotiation of safeguards to be applied in the 
framework of the nuclear co-operation agreements 
with the two countries. The United States is said 
to have insisted on the application of IAEA 
safeguards to all nuclear installations existing 
in the two countries ; but it was not certain that 
Israel would accept such conditions as it has 
never signed the non-proliferation treaty. Egypt, 
on the other hand, has signed the treaty but not 
ratified it. 
(ii) Vertical proliferation 
39. The strategic nuclear weapons of the two 
superpowers have increased considerably since 
the non-proliferation treaty was signed. In 1968. 
the United States had 1, 710 strategic missiles and 
595 strategic bombers. The Soviet Union had 
1,375 strategic missiles, about 700 intermediate-
range missiles and 1,250 strategic bombers. With 
the introduction of independent warheads 
(MIRV), the number of United States warheads 
now exceeds 6,000, although there are fewer 
bombers. The number of Soviet strategic missiles 
has reached 2,835. The ceiling for a future SALT 
agreement recently approved by President Ford 
and Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok provided for a 
total of 2,400 launchers of all kinds (missiles and 
bombers) for each country, with the possibility 
of mounting MIRV s on not more than 1,320 
missiles. With the present United States MIRV 
capability, these figures would allow each country 
to bring the number of independent warheads 
up to no less than 10,000 without transgressing 
the Vladivostok agreement. During the same 
period (1968-74), the number of strategic missiles 
in China rose from 0 to 75, in France from 0 to 
66, and in the United Kingdom from 0 to 64. 
It is hard to make the non-nuclear-weapon States 
believe that since the non-proliferation treaty 
was signed the nuclear powers have really 
pursued negotiations in good faith on the cessa-
tion of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disar-
mament, as they agreed to do on adhering to 
the treaty. 
40. Admittedly, the United States and the Soviet 
Union concluded a treaty on limiting under-
ground nuclear tests in Moscow on 3rd July 1974. 
But this treaty only bans underground explosions 
of more than 150 kilotons and takes effect only 
as from 31st March 1976. This agreement is 
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hardly likely to impress the conference to review 
the operation of the non-proliferation treaty, 
which opens in Geneva on 5th May 1975. 
41. The other nuclear powers continue to carry 
out tests. On 24th June 1974, the British Prime 
IDnister told parliament that a British under-
ground test had been carried out in Nevada 
(United States) a few weeks earlier. France's 
programme of atmospheric explosions continued 
in June 1974, but the future programme provides 
for underground tests. 
IV. Conclusions 
42. Despite events since the non-proliferation 
treaty was signed in 1968, the Committee reiter-
ates the opinion which it expressed at the time. 
The non-proliferation treaty, although establish-
ing some degree of discrimination between the 
contracting parties and thereby involving certain 
disadvantages for the non-nuclear-weapon coun-
tries, nevertheless presents substantial advantages 
for world stability and the prospects of progress 
towards disarmament. As regards the Atlantic 
Alliance and the WEU countries, the treaty does 
not preclude mutual nuclear assistance between 
countries which already have a nuclear capacity. 
Nor does it "bar accession by a new federated 
,E.uropean State to the nuclear status of one of 
its former components. A new federated Euro-
pean State would have to control all of its 
external security f1mctions, including defence and 
all foreign policy matters relating to external 
security, but would not have to be so centralised 
as to assume all governmental functions." This 
was the interpretation of Mr. Rusk, then United 
States Secretary of State, on lOth July 1968 ; 
Mr. Mulley, British Minister of Disarmament, 
expressed himself in almost identical terms in 
the House of Commons on 8th July 1968. The 
Committee hopes that all the WEU countries 
will accede to the treaty as soon as possible and 
stresses the importance of accessions announced 
during the conference to examine the application 
of the treaty, which opens on 5th May 1975. 
43. The Committee considers that in their 
external relations member countries should 
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encourage the largest possible number of coun-
tries to accede to the treaty. This policy must be 
completed by a policy of accepting the necessary 
safeguards and not providing assistance or 
nuclear technology to countries which have not 
fully accepted I AEA safeguards. Subject to 
this reservation, the Committee considers that all 
countries have the right to benefit from civil 
nuclear energy but that this right involves an 
obligation for non-nuclear-weapon States to 
accept formally the necessary safeguards and .for 
all countries to accept responsibility for keeping 
radioaetive nuclear waste in adequate security 
conditions on their own territory, and to abandon 
dumping it in the seas and oceans. 
44. The Committee would not be consistent if it 
failed to point out the importance of the bilateral 
strategic arms limitation talks and the reduction, 
subject to appropriate safeguards, of nuclear 
weapons in general. It considers that the nuclear 
balance should be established at levels lower than 
those allowed in the Vladivostok agreement. In 
another report \ the Committee advocates negotia-
tions on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons 
in Europe in the framework of the negotiations 
on mutual and balanced force reductions. 
45. Mter the conversations your Rapporteur had 
in Geneva with the Ambassadors or represent-
atives of Canada, India, Japan, Romania, the 
USSR, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, it is his duty to report to the Committee 
his feelings concerning the conference of 5th May 
which should make it possible to review the 
operation of safeguards applied by the Vienna 
Agency and their effectiveness. 
46. The Committee cannot underestimate the 
seriousness of infractions of the treaty that could 
be committed by non-nuclear nations, nor can it 
but regret the increase in the nuclear armouries 
of the nuclear powers, in contradiction with the 
terms and spirit of the treaty. 
47. These considerations raise problems which 
our Assembly cannot ignore. 
1. State of European security, Document 671, Chapter 
III. 
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Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 1 
signed in London, Moscow and Washington 
on 1st July 1968 
1. The States concluding this Treaty, herein-
after referred to as the "Parties to the Treatv" ~ , 
2. Considering the devastation that would be 
visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and 
the consequent need to make every effort to avert 
the danger of such a war and to take measures 
to safeguard the security of peoples, 
3. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons would seriously enhance the danger of 
nuclear war, 
4. In conformity with resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly calling for the con-
clusion Qf an agreement on the prevention of 
wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, 
5. Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the 
application of International Atomic Energy 
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities, 
6. Expressing their support for research, 
development and other efforts to further the 
application, within the framework of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency safeguards 
system, of the principle of safeguarding 
effectively the flow of source and special fission-
able materials by use of instruments and other 
techniques at certain strategic points, 
7. Affirming the principle that the benefitf of 
peaceful applications of nuclear technology, in-
cluding any technological by-products which may 
be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the 
development of nuclear explosive devices, should 
be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties 
to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-
nuclear-weapon States, 
8. Convinced that in furtherance of this prin-
ciple, all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of 
scientific information for, and to contribute alone 
or in co-operation with other States to, the 
further development of the applications of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes, 
1. Paragraph numbers have been added to the official 
test of the preamble for ease of reference. 
to•- 1 
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9. Declaring their intention to achieve at the 
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear 
arms race and to undertake effective measures in 
the direction of nuclear disarmament , 
10. Urging the co-operation of all States in the 
attainment of this objective, 
11. ~ecalling the determination expressed by the 
Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear 
weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water in its Preamble to seek to 
achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions 
of nuelear weapons for all time and to continue 
negotiations to this end, 
12. Desiring to further the easing of inter-
national tension and the strengthening of trust 
between States in order to facilitate the cessation 
of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the 
1iquidation of all their existing stockpiles and 
the elimination from national arsenals of n~clear 
weapons and the means of their delivery pur-
suant to a Treaty on general and complete dis-
armament under strict and effective international 
control, 
13. Recalling that, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, States must 
refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations, and that the 
establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security are to be promoted with the 
least diversion for armaments of the world's 
human and economic resources ; 
Have agreed as follows : 
Article I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly ; and not 
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any 
non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or 
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otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices. 
Article II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer 
from any tran..~feror whatsoever of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices 
directly, or indirectly ; not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices ; and not to seek or re-
ceive any assistance in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. 
Article III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set 
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and con-
cluded with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive 
purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its 
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a 
view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy 
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the 
safeguards required by this article shall be 
followed with respect to source or special fission-
able material whether it is being produced, pro-
cessed or used in any principal nuclear facility 
or is outside any such facility. The safeguards 
required by this article shall be applied on all 
source or special fissionable material in all peace-
ful nuclear activities within the territory of such 
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under 
its control anywhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable 
material, or (b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing use or 
production of special fissionable material, tQ any 
non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, 
unless the source or special fissionable material 
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this 
article. 
3. The safeguards required by this article shall 
be implemented in a manner designed to comply 
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with Article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid 
hampering the economic or technological develop-
ment of the parties or international co-operation 
in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, in-
cluding the international exchange of nuclear 
material and equipment for the processing, use 
or production of nuclear material for peaceful 
purposes in accordance with the provisions of 
this article and the principle of safeguarding set 
forth in the preamble of the Treaty. 
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty shall conclude agreements with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency to meet the 
requirements of this article either individually or 
together with other States in accordance with 
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. Negotiation of such agreements shall 
commence within 180 days from the original 
entry .into force of this Treaty. For States 
depositing their instruments of ratification or 
accession after the 180-day period, negotiation of 
such agreements shall commence not later than 
the date of such deposit. Such agreements shall 
enter into force not later than eighteen months 
after the date of initiation of negotiations. 
Article IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted 
as affecting the inalienable right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, 
production and use of nuclear energy for peace-
ful purposes without discrimination and in con-
formity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to 
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, 
the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scientific and technological 
information for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do 
so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or 
together with other States or international 
organisations to the further development of the 
applications of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due 
consideration for the needs of the developing 
areas of the world. 
Article V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take 
appropriate measures to ensure that, in accord-
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ance with this Treaty, under appropriate inter-
national observation and through appropriate 
international procedures, potential benefits from 
any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions 
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty on a non-dis-
criminatory basis and that the charge to such 
Parties for the explosive devices used will be as 
low as possible and exclude any charge for 
research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain 
such benefits, pursuant to a special international 
agreement or agreements, through an appropriate 
international body with adequate representation 
of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on 
this subject shall commence as soon as possible 
after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-
. weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring 
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bi-
lateral agreements. 
Article VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes 
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arm!! 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a Treaty on general and complete dis-. 
armament under strict and effective international 
control. 
Article VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of 
any group of States to conclude regional treaties 
in order to assure the total absence of nuclear 
weapons in their respective territories. 
Article VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amend-
ments to this 'freaty. The text of any proposed 
amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary 
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties 
to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so 
by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, 
the Depositary Governments shall convene a con-
ference, to which they shall invite all the 
Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amend-
ment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be 
approved by a majority of the votes of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all 
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nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and 
all other Parties which, on the date the amend-
ment is circulated, are members of the Board of 
Governors of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. The amendment shall enter into force 
for each Party that deposits its instrument of 
ratification of the amendment upon the deposit 
of such instruments of ratification by a majority 
of all the Parties, including the instruments of 
ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the 
date the amendment is circulated, are members 
of the Board of Governors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter 
into force for any other Party upon the deposit 
of its instrument of ratification of the amend-
ment . 
3. Five years after the entry into force of this 
Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall 
be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review 
the operation of this Treaty with a view to 
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and 
the provisions of the Treaty are being realised. 
At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority 
of the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by sub-
mitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary 
Governments, the convening of further con-
ferences with the same objective of reviewing thP. 
operation of the Treaty. 
Article IX 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for 
signature. Any State which does not sign the 
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it 
at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification 
by signatory States. Instruments of ratification 
and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America t, which are hereby designated 
the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its 
ratification by the States, the Governments of 
which are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, 
and forty other States signatory to this Treaty 
1. The names of the three countries appear in this order 
in the version signed in London. 
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and the deposit of their instruments of rati-
fication. For the purposes of this Treaty, a 
nuclear-weapon State is one which has manu-
factured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 
1967. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification 
or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry 
into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force 
on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly 
inform all signatory and acceding States of the 
date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrument of ratification or of accession, 
the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, 
and the date of receipt of any requests for con-
vening a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the De-
positary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national 
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the 
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, 
related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
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jeopardised the supreme interests of its country. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all 
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United 
Nations Security Council three months in ad-
vance. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardised its supreme interests. 
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force 
of the Treaty, a Conference shall be convened to 
decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force 
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods. This decision 
shall be taken by a mojority of the Parties to the 
Treaty. 
Article XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, 
Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of 
the Depositary Governments. Duly certified 
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the 
Depositary Governments to the Governments of 
the signatory and acceding States. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly 
authorised, have signed this Treaty. 
Done in triplicate at London, Moscow and 
Washington\ this first day of July 1968. 
1. The names of the three capitals appear in this order 
in the version signed in London. 
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Treaty on the non-proliferaton of nuclear weapons 1968 
List of signatures, ratifications and accf!B8ions 
as at 81st March 1916 
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Country 
Date of signature Date of ratification /accession 
London Moscow 'washington London Moscow Washington 




** Australia 27. 2.70 27. 2.70 27. 2.70 23. 1.73 23. 1.73 23. 1.73 
** Austria l. 7.68 1. 7.68 l. 7.68 27. 6.69 27. 6.69 27. 6.69 
**Bahamas 10. 7.73 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
* Barbados 1. 7.68 
*Belgium 20. 8.68 20. 8.68 20. 8.68 
Bhutan 
** Bolivia l. 7.68 26. 5.70 
**Botswana l. 7.68 28. 4.69 
Brazil 
** Bulgaria 1. 7.68 l. 7.68 1. 7.68 3.11.69 18. 9.69 5. 9.69 
Burma 
**Burundi 19. 3.71 
Byelorussia 
** Cameroon 18. 7.68 17. 7.68 8. 1.69 
** Canada 23. 7.68 29. 7.68 23. 7.68 8. 1.69 8. 1.69 8. 1.69 
** Cent. Afr. Rep. 25.10.70 
** Chad l. 7.68 23. 3.71 II. 3.71 10. 3.71 
Chile 
China 
* Colombia l. 7.68 
Congo, P.R. of 
** Costa Rica l. 7.68 3. 3.70 
Cuba 
** Cyprus I. 7.68 l. 7.68 I. 7.68 5. 3.70 10. 2.70 16. 2.70 
** Czechoslovakia I. 7.68 l. 7.68 I. 7.68 22. 7.69 22. 7.69 22. 7.69 
** Dahomey I. 7.68 31.10.72 
D.R.V. 
**Denmark l. 7.68 I. 7.68 I. 7.68 3. 1.69 3. 1.69 3. 1.69 
** Dom. Republic I. 7.68 24. 7.71 
** Ecuador 9. 7.68 7. 3.69 
* Egypt, A.R. of I. 7.68 I. 7.68 
** El Salvador I. 7.68 11. 7.72 
Equatorial Guinea 
** Ethiopia 5. 9.68 5. 9.68- 5. 9.68 5. 3.70 5. 2.70 5. 3.70 
** Fiji 14. 7.72 29. 8.72 18. 7.72 
** Finland I. 7.68 I. 7.68 I. 7.68 5. 2.69 5. 2.69 5. 2.69 
France 
**Gabon 19. 2.74 
*The Gambia 4. 9.68 24. 9.68 20. 9.68 
* Germany (Fed. Republic) 28.11.69 28.11.69 28.11.69 
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Country 
Date of signature Date of ratification /accession 
London Moscow Washington London Moscow Washington 
** Germany (Dem. Republic) 1. 7.68 31.10.69 
**Ghana 24. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 4. 5.70 11. 5.70 5. 5.70 
** Greece 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 ll. 3.70 
** Grenada 19. 5.74 
** Guatemala 26. 7.68 22. 9.70 
Guinea 
Guyana 
** Haiti 1. 7.68 2. 6.70 
** Holy See 25. 2.71 25. 2.71 25. 2.71 
** Honduras 1. 7.68 16. 5.73 
**Hungary 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 27. 5.69 27. 5.69 27. 5.69 
** Iceland 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 18. 7.69 18. 7.69 18. 7.69 
India 
* Indonesia 2. 3.70 2. 3.70 2. 3.70 
** Iran 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 5. 3.70 10. 2.70 2. 2.70 
*Iraq 1. 7.68 29.10.69 
** Ireland 4. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 4. 7.68 2. 7.68 1. 7.68 
Israel 
* Italy 28. 1.69 28. 1.69 28. 1.69 
** Ivory Coast 1. 7.68 6. 3.73 
** Jamaica 14. 4.69 14. 4.69 14. 4.69 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 
* Japan 3. 2.70 3. 2.70 3. 2.70 
**Jordan 10. 7.68 ll. 2.70 
**Kenya 1. 7.68 11. 6.70 
** Khmer Republic 2. 6.72 
* Korea (South) 1. 7.68 
Korea (North) 
* Kuwait 22. 8.68 15. 8.68 15. 8.68 
** Laos 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 5. 3.70 20. 2.70 5. 3.70 
** Lebanon 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 15. 7.70 15. 7.70 20.11.70 
** Lesotho 9. 7.68 20. 5.70 
** Liberia 1. 7.68 5. 3.70 
* Libya 18. 7.68 23. 7.68 19. 7.68 
Liechtenstein 
* Luxembourg 18. 8.68 14. 8.68 14. 8.68 
** Madagascar 22. 8.68 8.10.70 
Malawi 
** Malaysia 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 
** Maldives 11. 9.68 7. 4.70 
** Mali 15. 7.69 14. 7.69 10. 2.70 5. 3.70 
** Malta 17. 4.69 6. 2.70 
Mauritania 
** Mauritius 1. 7.68 14. 4.69 25. 4.69 8. 4.69 
** Mexico 26. 7.68 26. 7.68 26. 7.68 21. 1.69 21. 1.69 21. 1.69 
Monaco 
** Mongolia 1. 7.68 14. 5.69 
** Morocco 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 30.11.70 27.11.70 16.12.70 
** Nepal 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 3. 2.70 9. 1.70 5. 1.70 
* Netherlands 20. 8.68 20. 8.68 
** New Zealand 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 10. 9.69 10. 9.69 10. 9.69 
** Nicaragua 1. 7.68 1. 7.68 6. 3.73 
Niger 
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Country 
Date of signature Date of ratification facce88ion 
London Moscow Washington London Moscow Washington 
** Nigeria l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 27. 9.68 14.10.68 7.10.68 
**Norway l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 5. 2.69 5. 2.69 5. 2.69 
Oman 
Pakistan 
*Panama l. 7.68 
** Paraguay l. 7.68 5. 3.70 4. 2.70 
** Peru l. 7.68 3. 3.70 
** Philippines 18. 7.68 l. 7.68 16.10.72 20.10.72 5.10.72 
** Poland l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 12. 6.69 12. 6.69 12. 8.69 
Portugal 
Qatar 
**Romania l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 4. 2.70 4. 2.70 4. 2.70 
Rwanda 
Salvador 
** San Marino 29. 7.68 21.11.68 l. 7.68 10. 8.70 20. 8.70 31. 8.70 
Saudi Arabia 
** Senegal 26. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 15. 1.71 17.12.70 22.12.70 
** Sierra Leone 26. 2.75 
* Singapore 5. 2.70 5. 2.70 5. 2.70 
** Somali, D. R. of l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 5. 3.70 12.11.70 
South Africa 
Spain 
* Sri Lanka l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 
** Sudan 24.12.68 10.12.73 22.11.73 31.10.73 
** Swaziland 24. 6.69 11.12.69 12. 1.70 16.12.69 
** Sweden 19. 8.68 19. 8.68 19. 8.68 9. 1.70 9. 1.70 9. 1.70 
* Switzerland 27.11.69 27.11.69 
** Syria l. 7.68 24. 9.69 
** Taiwan l. 7.68 27. 1.70 
Tanzania 
** Thailand 7.12.72 
** Togo l. 7.68 26. 2.70 
** Tonga 7. 7.71 24. 8.71 7. 7.71 
* Trinidad and Tobago 22. 8.68 20. 8.68 
** Tunisia l. 7.68 l. 7.68 l. 7.68 26. 2.70 26. 2.70 26. 2.70 




** Upper Volta 11. 8.69 25.11.68 3. 3.70 
**Uruguay l. 7.68 31. 8.70 
* Venezuela l. 7.68 
** Vietnam (South) l. 7.68 10. 9.71 
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Date of signature 
Country 
London Moscow Washington 
** Western Samoa 
* Yemen Arab Republic 







At 31st March 1975 
Parties : 87 (including Taiwan) 
Signatories : 23 
23. 9.68 
14.11.68 
10. 7.68 10. 7.68 
17. 9.68 26. 7.68 
1. 7.68 1. 7.68 
1. 7.68 1. 7.68 
1. 7.68 1. 7.68 
NB ** States that have signed and ratified or acceded 








Date of ratification /accession 
London Moscow Washington 
26. 3.75 
5. 3.70 5. 3.70 4. 3.70 
4. 8.70 
27.11.68 29.11.68 27.11.68 
5. 3.70 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 
5. 3.70 5. 3.70 5. 3.70 
Document 672 
Amendment No. 1 
Proliferation of nuclear weapona 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. de Stexhe 
27th May 1975 
I. At the end of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, add the following two paragraphs : 
"Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU 
have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ; 
Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of 
WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe;" 
2. At the end of the draft Recommendation proper, add the following three paragraphs: 
"To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application 
of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty 
and of the IAEA; 
With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful 
progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest 
the treaty lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ; 
To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular : 
(a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United States 
by making their civil installations subject to IAEA safeguards ; 
(b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole 
nuclear fuel cycle." 
Signed : tle Btexhe 
1. See 4th Sitting, 27th May 1975 (Amendment adopted). 
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Application of the Brussels Treaty 
Reply to the Twentieth Annual Report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 11 
by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. de Niet, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
Chapter I: Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
Chapter II : Activities of the Council 
Chapter III : Armaments Control Agency 
Chapter IV : Standing Armaments Committee 
Conclusions 
29th April 1975 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Critchley (Chairman); 
MM. Klepsch (Substitute : Haase), Dankert (Vice-Chair-
men); MM. Averardi, Beauguitte (Substitute: Delorme), 
Bizet, Boulloohe, Kempinaire, Konen, de Koster, Lemmrich, 
Menard, Pawelczyk, Pendry, Prescott (Substitute : Fatdds) 
Richter, Riviere, Roper, Schugen,s, Tanghe (Substitute 
Duvieusart), Vedovato, Wall, de Niet, Schmidt. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the BrUIISels Treaty 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the prompt action by the Council which enabled the twentieth annual report to be 
communicated by 28th February and congratulating the Secretary-General on introducing the "appropriate 
administrative procedures to ensure that the preparation of its annual report is carried out on a current 
basis"; 
Stressing the close interest which the Council of WEU must necessarily take in the structure of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, since all organs of WEU are required by the modified Brussels Treaty 
to work in close co-operation with it ; 
Aware that the modified Brussels Treaty is a supranational treaty in that Council - decisions 
concerning the force level and arms control provisions of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV are not subject to 
a unanimous vote, and that no usage or agreement has formally modified the majority voting procedures 
of those protocols ; 
Aware that the credibility of any future East-West agreements on arms control, especially in the 
framework of the conference on European security and co-operation, or mutual and balanced force reductions, 
may be undermined by the failure to apply the controls provided for by the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
Regretting that since 1966 annual reports have omitted the numbers of inspections, by category 
of establishment visited, that have been carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments; 
Congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out 
in difficult circumstances the regrettably still too limited tasks assigned to it by the Council ; 
Recalling its recommendation that full use be made of the Standing Armaments Committee as a 
study and review body to eliminate duplication in other international bodies concerned with the stand-
ardisation and joint production of armaments, and endorsing the proposal of the Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to entrust that Committee with a study of the armaments production capabilities existing in Europe, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
1. Apply each year the new procedure for the prompt communication of the annual report ; 
2. Include in annual reports a statement of the numbers of inspections carried out by the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments, both by category of installation and by country visited ; 
3. Include in the conclusions of the arms control chapter of the annual report a full and clear statement 
of all those aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied ; 
4. Continue to press for ratification by the remaining member of WEU of the Convention on the due 
process of law signed on 14th December 1957; 
5. Instruct the Standing Armaments Committee to study and report on the arms production capabilities 
existing in the European NATO countries; 
6. Advise the North Atlantic Council to revise the terms of appointment of its Chairman and Secretary-




(submitted by Mr. Niet, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In examining the twentieth annual report 
of the Council covering the year 1974, it is 
interesting to recall the significant change of 
content compared with earlier reports. Those 
defence questions with which the Council rou-
tinely deals (see paragraph 14 below) account 
for the bulk of the present report, whereas the 
first report covering the period 1st June to 15th 
October 1955 inevitably reflected the earlier 
activities of the Bl'U88els Treaty Organisation 
prior to its modification in 1954, and included 
sections on the cultural and social activities of 
the Council. During periods in the intervening 
years, the Council has had responsibility for 
political consultation and for informing the 
United Kingdom about the activities of the Euro-
pean Community in the days before the United 
Kingdom acceded to it. 
2. The fact that the twentieth annual report 
has to concentrate on the routine defence mat-
ters with which the Council still deals, merely 
reflects the transfer of the Council's other func-
tions to wider fora mentioned in paragraph 6 
below. 
Regrettably, that part of the annual report 
which deals with the control of armaments - the 
most important statutory aspect of the annual 
report, in that it is the only aspect singled out 
in Artiele IX of the modified treaty as being a 
particular feature of the annual report - still 
has to record the failure of the Council to apply 
any of the more essential arms control provisions 
of the treaty. This matter is discussed in Chap-
ter III below. 
3. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out in 
the Council (see paragraph 10 below), the impor-
tance of the Brussels Treaty remains unchanged, 
and the -committee stresses that it provides an 
important basis, along with the North Atlantic 
Treaty, for the collective defence of the West. 
The Committee also welcomes the Council's 
readiness to prepare replies on many recommen-
dations and questions from the Assembly con-
cerning matters, including the more important 
defence matters, which the member countries deal 
with in fora other than that of WEU - chiefly 
NATO, the European Communities or the nine-
power political consultative machinery. 
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CHAPTER I 
Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
4. Rather curiously, the twentieth annual report 
points out (page 2) that the previous report was 
transmitted to the Assembly "within the shortest 
time compatible with the procedures of the Coun-
cil". Yet last year the Committee, in its reply, 
had to complain that the vital chapter on the 
control of armaments had been received only on 
19th April that year, giving the Rapporteur and 
the Committee insufficient time to consider it in 
preparing their reports for submission to the 
first part of the Assembly's session. This year 
the Committee notes with satisfaction that the 
whole of the annual report was communicated 
to the Assembly before the end of February. The 
Committee wishes to congratulate the Secretary-
General for introducing the "appropriate admin-
istrative procedures to ensure that the prepara-
tion of its annual report is carried out on a cur-
rent basis", advocated by the Assembly in Recom-
mendation 183 "1. This early communication has 
made it possible to give it the study and atten-
tion that it merits. 
5. The annual report points out (page 2) that: 
"When asked by the Assembly to provide 
information or state their attitude on current 
political questions, the Council had to refer, 
more often than in the past, to other agencies 
dealing with these matters, because their 
own activities in these fields have diminished 
as political co-operation between the Nine 
has developed. In the case of defence policy 
which both the Assembly and the Council 
look upon as WEU's essential concern, it was 
even more apparent that the Council could 
not reply to the Assembly in the desired 
manner because co-operation in European 
defence policy had not yet reached a stage 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1969, on 
the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 482, Rapporteur Mr. Vedova.to. 
at which governments could state a joint 
view to the Assembly." 
6. The Committee welcomes the fact that the 
growing cohesion <>f Europe has enabled matters 
which might at one time have been discussed 
within the framework of WEU, w be transferred 
w <>ther fora such as the North Atlantic Council, 
Eurogroup, the European Community, and the 
political consultation machinery of the nine mem-
bers of the European Community, where they can 
be more effectively dealt with than in the res-
tricted framework of WEU. The Committee notes 
the Council's assertion (page 2) that co-operation 
in the field of European defence policy has not 
reached the stage where governments could 
adopt a common position before the Assembly. 
The Committee reports elsewhere on the future 
organisation of European defence 1• 
7. The Committee welcomes the Council's 
acceptance of the proposal in Recommendation 
247 calling for the inclusion in annual reports 
of certain information concerning the method 
whereby the Council determines the appropriate 
levels of the armed forces of the member States 
(see paragraph 16 below). 
8. While the Council, during the peak of its 
political activity in the period prior to the 
accession of the United Kingdom to the Euro-
pean Community, met at ministerial level four 
times a year, it now appears to be the practice 
to meet once only at that level. In 1974, the Com-
mittee did not have occasion to meet the Council 
informally in conjunction with the single minis-
terial meeting held on 11th March. 
9. The meeting between the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments and the 
Standing Armaments Committee is referred to 
in Chapter IV below. 
CHAPTER II 
Activities of the: Council 
Twentieth anniversary of the modification of the 
Brussels Treaty 
10. The Committee endorses the statement by 
the Chairman-in-Office of the Council (see page 4 
I. See the report on the state of European security, 
Chapter VI, Rapporteur Mr. Lemmrich. 
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of the Council's report), made at the anniversary 
meeting on 23rd Ocrober 1974: 
"... The revised Brussels Treaty remains as 
valid today as when it was signed twenty 
years ago. It brings our seven countries 
rogether in a fifty-year alliance in which 
we accept the most binding obligation any 
country can assume with regard to another : 
the commitment to mutual defence. Not 
least, it is the origin of the Assembly which 
has since made such an important contribu-
tion w our work ... " 
11. It is for this reason that the Committee 
believes that the residual defence functions of 
the Council (paragraph 14 below) should be 
actively pursued. The credibility of any treaty 
declines with the passage of time when there is 
no regular and effective activity under its terms. 
East-West relations 
12. The Committee welcomes the continued dis-
cussion at ministerial meetings of the Council 
of the state of relations between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic (see page 5 of the Council's report). The 
annual report recalls the Council's reply to 
Recommendation 252 1 concerning the concerta-
tion of allied positions in the three important 
East-West conferences. The Committee has 
welcomed the common position which the allies 
continue to adopt at these conferences. The annual 
report further comments on the Defence Com-
mittee's recent report on European security and 
the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 2• 
The Council states in its report (page 6) 
that: 
"In the course of many discussions in the 
North Atlantic Council, the desire of the 
representatives of the member governments 
of WEU and of those of their allies, has all 
along been to maintain the coherence of the 
Alliance, to avoid conflict between two of its 
members, and to find an acceptable settle-
ment to the humanitarian problems of 
Cyprus;" 
It is difficult to discover how much substance 
there is in this assertion. Your Rapporteur is 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974, on 
the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Documents 635, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
2. Document 651, adopted by the Committee on 
14th November 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
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unaware of any reference in public statements 
or the media to any helpful steps taken by the 
North Atlantic Council as such or by its Chair-
man. The same inaction has been apparent over 
events in Portugal after the end of the Caetano 
regime. 
Relations between Europe and the United States 
13. The annual report similarly comments on 
the Committee's report on consultation and deci-
sions in the Atlantic Alliance 1 • The Committee 
welcomes the Council's assertion (page 6) that 
"Europe's ·development towards political unity 
was by no means inconsistent with the main-
tenance of solidarity within the Alliance", and 
(page 7) that "during 1974, informal practical 
arrangements for consultation between the Nine 
and the United States were worked out and put 
into effect... Such consultation in no way dero-
gated from the importance of the bilateral chan-
nels of information and consultation between 
each of the European partners and the United 
States to which the Assembly had referred". 
Defence questions 
14. The Council having transferred to NATO in 
1950 everyday responsibility for implementing 
the mutual defence obligations of the Brussels 
Treaty, a decision subsequently enshrined in 
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty in 
1954, the Council was led, in its second annual 
report 2, to define the scope of its residual defence 
and related activities. The seven governments 
considered that the activities of the Council in 
the field of defence questions and armaments 
should relate only to : 
" (a) matters which the contracting parties 
wish to raise, especially under Article 
VIII; 
(b) the level of forces of member States ; 
(c) the maintenance of certain United 
Kingdom forces on the continent ; 
(d) the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments; 
(e) the Standing Armaments Committee." 
15. As far as the Committee is aware, no member 
State has ever, so far, chosen to raise matters 
under Article VIII of the treaty (" ... any situa-
1. Document 635, adopted by the Committee on 
21st May 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
2. Document 37, 26th February 1957. 
306 
tion which may constitute a threat to peace, in 
whatever area this threat should arise ... ") so 
that the effective activities of the Council in the 
field of defence now relate to items (b) to (e) 
above. Items (d) and (e) are dealt with separately 
in Chapters III and IV of the annual report. 
Levels of forces of member States 
16. Under Protocol No. II of the Brussels Treaty, 
the Council has important functions concerning 
the determination of the levels of forces to be 
maintained by member countries. The Committee 
welcomes the full details now given by the Coun-
cil in the annual report (pages 9-10) of the 
various procedures, all of which were correctly 
applied during the year under review. The Com-
mittee particularly welcomes the inclusion of 
information concerning the parallel procedure 
involving the representatives of six of the member 
countries in the NATO framework. This informa-
tion has been incorporated in response to Written 
Questions 130 and 141 and Recommendation 247 
of the Assembly. 
17. Under Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom 
undertook to maintain specified levels of forces 
on the continent. In response to Written Question 
1221, the Council stated that : 
"... The level of British forces on the main-
land of Europe approved by the Council is 
therefore once more (subject to the temporary 
redeployment referred to above) 55,000 men 
plus the Second Tactical Air Force." 
In response to Recommendation 213 2, the United 
Kingdom undertook to state in the annual report 
each year the current actual level of British 
forces on the continent. The Committee notes 
witth great satisfaction that the level duly reported 
a.t 30th November 1974 amounted to 60,136 men 
plus the Second Tactical Air Force. Allowing for 
the temporary redeployment of some 4,000 men 
to Northern Ireland and 310 to Cyprus, there is 
no longer any doubt that the United Kingdom's 
obligation has been met. 
Amendments to the list of prohibited weapons 
18. On some twelve occasions since the conclusion 
of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954 the 
Council has amended the list at Annex Ih to 
1. Put by Mr. Vedovato on 13th April 1971. 
2. Adopted by the Assembly on 30th November 1971, 
on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, Document 558, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato. 
Protocol No. III which specified the weapons 
which the Federal Republic of Germany under-
takes not to manufacture on its territory. No 
amendments to this list have been reported by 
the Council during 1974, the year covered by the 
annual report. 
19. On 15th May 1974, Mr. Tanghe put the 
following Written Question 139 to the Council: 
"139. The annual report of the Council for 
1973 states that Protocol No. III to the 
modified Brussels Treaty was amended on 
26th September 1973 'to take account of 
technical developments' whereas previous 
references to such amendments have stated 
that they were designed 'to enable the 
Federal Republic of Germany to fulfil her 
NATO commitments'. 
Can the Council make the same statement on 
this occasion 1 " 
The Council, in its reply communicated on 
13th June 1974, failed to assert that the amend-
ment in question was designed to enable Germany 
to fulfil her NATO commitments. The full text 
of the reply is as follows : 
"139. In their nineteenth report to the 
Assembly, the Council stated that their reso-
lution of 26th September 1973 had been 
adopted 'following the procedure laid down 
in Protocol No. III to the modified Brussels 
Treaty'. 
This procedure was also referred to in the 
preamble to the resolution in question, the 
text of which was communicated to the Presi-
dent of the Assembly on 27th September 
1973. 
While the Council made no further reference 
in their annual report ·to the concept of the 
NATO commitments of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, they nevertheless made a point 
of informing the Assembly of a factor which 
had played an important part in arriving at 
their decision, namely, the need to take 
account of technical developments." 
This wording of the Council's reply leaves un-
answered questions in the Committee's mind. 
20. The amendment made by the Council on 
26th September 1973 raised the tonnage of sub-
marines which ·Germany is authorised to manu-
facture on its territory from 450 to 1,800 tons. 
Under the previous limit, Germany had also been 
authorised to manufacture up to six submarines 
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not exceeding 1,000 tons, and this quota of six 
submarines had subsequently been exported -
four to Greece and two to Turkey - as the Com-
mittee has previously reported 1• 
21 . The Committee finds the situation concerning 
the revised limit of 1,800 tons to be unclear. 
Article II of Protocol No. III states that amend-
ments to the list of prohibited weapons are to be 
made "if in accordance with the needs of the 
armed forces 2 , a recommendation is made by the 
competent Supreme Commander of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation ... " The Committee 
would be interested to know to what extent the 
amendment in this case was made to permit the 
export of submarines by Germany rather than 
to meet the requirements of the German armed 
forces assigned to NATO. There appears to be 
no other explanation for the Council's inability 
to state that the amendment was made "to enable 
the Federal Republic of Germany to fulfil her 
NATO commitments". 
Other written questions - The Montreux Con-
vention 
22. In Written Question 133, which Mr. Zam-
berletti put to the Council on 12th June 1973, 
the question of the Montreux Convention regula-
ting the passage of ships through the Turkish 
Straits was raised. France and Britain are parties 
to that convention. The Council was unable to 
give a substantive reply to that question and, in 
reply to Written Question 140, put to the Council 
by Mr. Tanghe on 15th May 1974, the Council 
stated that the •two WEU member governments 
concerned were "still unable to give a final reply 
and indeed are unlikely to be able to do so until 
they have more substantive information concern-
ing the vessel in question". The Assembly, in 
Recommendation 256 8, reiterated "its earlier 
recommendation for the correct application of 
the Montreux Convention to prevent the pas-
sage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles". 
In paragraph 36 of the explanatory memorandum 
to Document 651, the Committee stated its view 
that "the passage of these carriers [two Soviet 
1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 
638, paragraph 11, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe. 
2. In the French text the words "qui lui BOnt aOecUu" 
[assigned to the NATO supreme commander] appear here. 
3. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1974, 
on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments, Document 651, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley. 
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aircraft-carriers under construction in the Black 
Sea] through the Straits could not be reconciled 
with the Montreux Convention ... " 
In a written reply to a question covering the 
Assembly's recommendation put by Mr. Bonaldi 
in the Italian Senate, the Italian Ministry of 
Defence stated : 
"Scrupulous respect for the Montreux Con-
vention and in particular for the clause 
relating to the ban on aircraft-carriers pas-
sing through the Turkish Straits, is in the 
interests of the Alliance. 
In this context, the Assembly's suggestion 
that appropriate representations be made to 
ensure that the convention is correctly 
applied is acceptable, since it is mainly a 
matter of urging Turkey to ensure that the 
convention is scrupulously applied." 
CHAPTER III 
Armaments Control Agency 
23. The Assembly has always stressed the 
importance of the application of the ar:ns control 
provisions of the Brussels "Freaty. Artlcle IX .of 
that treaty makes it clear, m fact, that the chief 
reason why the Assembly was set up was precisely 
to watch over the way in which the Council 
carried out its responsibilities in this respect. The 
provisions of the treaty concerning the control 
of weapons have been summarised on. num~ro:us 
occasions most recently by the Committee m Its 
report 1~ year 1 • In Recommendation 247, 
adopted on 18th June 1974, the Assembly called 
on the Council to "include in its annual reports a 
prominent, full and clear st~tement of all aspects 
of the arms control provisiOns of the Brussels 
Treaty which are not fully applied .. .:• The .fol-
lowing statements are to be found m various 
parts of Chapter III o~ the annual ~po:r:t now 
under review : Concermng the determmatlon by 
the Council of the appropriate levels of arma-
ments for the forces of the WEU countries, the 
report (page 13) makes the following comment : 
"... the term 'armaments', whenever used 
with reference to levels in this report, should 
be understood to mean : 
1. Report on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974, Document 
638, paragraph 15 tt asq., Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe. 
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armaments declared by the member States 
as being held by their forces on the main-
land of Europe, with the exception of arma-
ments with nuclear capability and of the 
armaments of what one member State calls 
strategic forces, that is to say, the armaments 
over which the Agency has so far been 
enabled to exercise its mandate of controlling 
levels." 
24. Mr. Zamherletti put Written Question 131 to 
the Council on 16th April 1973, asking which 
categories of armaments were covered by the 
expression "the armaments of what one member 
State calls 'strategic forces'". The Council replied 
on 14th June 1973 that "the Armaments Control 
Agency has no knowledge of the categories of 
armaments included in the expression 'strategic 
forces' ... The Agency is, therefore, unable to 
report on them in any way to the Council". It 
is thus clear that the Council itself is unaware 
of the categories of armaments over which it 
declares itself unable to exercise control by 
virtue of the foregoing comment. 
25. The annual report further states (page 14) : 
"As the convention for due process of law 
has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at pri-
vate concerns take the form of agreed control 
measures. 
One consequence of this situation is that, in 
order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency must give some six 
weeks' notice ... " 
Protocol No. IV of the treaty makes provi-
sion for the process of law in respect of private 
interests {which might suffer damage by inspec-
tions) and for members of the Agency to be 
accorded free access to plants and depots and 
the relevant accounts and documents. In applica-
tion of these two provisions, the member States 
drew up the: 
"Convention concerning measures to be taken 
by member States of Western European 
Union in order to enable the Agency for 
the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and making provision for 
due process of law in accordance with Pro-
tocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty as 
modified by the Protocols signed in Paris 
on 23rd October 1954," 
which is the convention here referred to in the 
annual report. 
Signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 by 
the seven member countries, this convention has 
been ratified by only six of them : Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. 
The serious situation arising from the con-
vention not having come into force is made clear 
by more ample information contained in previous 
annual reports but omitted from the present 
report. Thus, the report for 1972 (Document 598) 
states, in Chapter III, Section D, that: 
"In the absence of a due process of law, it 
cannot be claimed that the Agency's methods, 
particularly in the case of chemical weapon.~, 
have reached a fully satisfactory state of 
development." 
and earlier reports that "one of the principal 
reasons for this situation [non-application of 
controls on biological weapons] is the absence 
of any legal guarantees to protect private inter-
ests". 
26. The annual report further comments (page 
15) : 
"(b) In present circumstances, the Agency's 
activities do not extend to atomic weapons 
or, in one member State, to what that State 
calls 'strategic forces'. Nor does the Agency 
apply any controls to biological weapons. 
(c) As the convention for due process of 
law, signed on 14th December 1957, has not 
yet entered into force, control operations 
carried out by the Agency in private estab-
lishments had to be applied in accordance 
with the 'agreed control' procedure, as in 
previous years." 
The report finally comments (page 18) : 
"6. Atomic weapons 
Since the situation regarding these weapons 
remained the same as in previous years, the 
Agency is not in a position to engage in any 
control activities, or even to carry out prepa-
ratory studies with regard to atomic 
weapons." 
27. The Committee remains deeply concerned at 
the serious gaps in the application of the control 
309 
DOCUMENT 673 
provisions provided for by the treaty. It has to 
be recognised that they completely vitiate the 
whole principle of control. In the Committee's 
view, these shortcomings do not warrant the 
complacent assertion in the conclusion to Chap-
ter III of the annual report (page 19) : 
"In 1974, the Agency applied controls effec-
tively in those fields which are open to it." 
The conclusion to the arms control chapter of 
previous annual reports always mentioned the 
reservations included in the body of the chapter. 
The Committee recommends that the general 
conclusion of Chapter III of the annual report 
should list clearly all the areas in which the 
Agency has not been enabled to apply the con-
trols provided for in the treaty. 
28. The Committee finds the Council's compla-
cency over the failure to apply the arms control 




Application of the arms control provi-
sions remains one of the very few activ-
ities left to the Council in the defence 
field. The Council has recently reiterated 
the importance of the defence provisions 
of the Brussels Treaty (paragraphs 10 
and 11 above). These will inevitably 
lose credibility if the Council is unable 
to take action under the treaty. 
If the member countries of WEU are 
unable to apply among themselves those 
arms control measures on which they 
were agreed in 1954, there is little or no 
hope of reaching agreement on serious 
arms control in an East-West context 
such as SALT, MBFR, and the confi-
dence-building measures to be associated 
with CSCE, or in a world-wide context 
such as the non-proliferation treaty, on 
both of which topics the Committee 
reports elsewhere 1 • 
29. The Committee is aware of the problems 
which the Council claims make it impossible to 
apply the treaty fully at the present time, and 
the Assembly, on the report of the Committee, has 
1. Reports on the state of European security (Docu-
ment 671) and on the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
(Document 672). 
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adopted various recommendations proposing 
alternative solutions over the years. These have 
been most recently summarised in the pre-
vious report of the Committee on this subject 1 • 
None of these alternative proposals has been 
found acceptable by the Council. The Committee 
therefore recommends that annual reports should 
state unequivocably the areas in which controls 
are not applied, and that the Council should 
continue to press for the entry into force of the 
convention on due process of law. 
Activities of the Agency 
30. The Committee's criticism of the Council 
is in no way to be construed as criticism of the 
Agency, which has continued to carry out its 
task efficiently in difficult circumstances. 
31. It may be said that controls are applied in 
respect of conventional weapons on the mainland 
of Europe (including aircraft) and various missile 
systems capable of carrying nuclear bombs and 
warheads - although, of course, the warheads 
concerned remain in United States' custody and 
are not subject to control by the Agency. The 
Council confirmed the situation in reply to 
Written Question 142, put by Mr. Tanghe on 
27th May 1974: 
"(a) Is it correct that the Agency for the 
control of Armaments carried out inspec-
tions of certain of these missiles [i.e. mis-
siles with a nuclear capacity], as well as 
tactical aircraft with a possible nuclear 
capability 1 " 
The Council replied : 
"(a) It is correct that the Armaments Con-
trol Agency carried out both documentary 
and field controls on sections of missiles 
and on aircraft covered by the terms of 
Protoool No. III, Annex IV, 2, 3, 4 and 11." 
Statement of the number of inspections 
32. Annual reports of the Council up to and 
including the eleventh, covering the year 1965, 
gave details of the number of inspections carried 
out by the Agency. Those reported for the years 
1961-65 inclusive are summarised in the follow-
ing table: 
1. Document 638, paragraph 22, Rapporteur Mr. 
Tanghe. 
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Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments 
(from the corresponding annual reports 
of the Council) 




tary depots and cen-





na.l units 15 20 13 19 
-- ---- -
Agreed controls of 
levels a.t production 
plants (including 
shipyards) 12 11 13 13 
------
Agreed non-produc-
tion controls a.t fa.c-
tories 7 7 10 9 
-- ------












It will be noted that totalS do not always tally 
with the figures given; it is understood that 
there are errol'S in the figures reported by the 
Council, but they are only minor. 
33. Annual reports of the Council covering the 
yeal'S 1966 onwards have omitted figures con-
cerning the number of inspections carried out. 
The Assembly, in Recommendation 183 adopted 
in June 1969, demanded the reinstatement of 
these figures in the annual reports of the Coun-
cil. It reiterated this demand on a number of 
occasions in 1970 and 19711 • The Council finally 
agreed3 to comply with the Assembly's repeated 
requests, but on a confidential basis only, and 
the detailed figures for inspections in the years 
1970-74 have been duly communicated to mem-
bers of the Assembly by the Secretary-General. 
34. Officially, the figures for the yeal'8 1966-69 
have not been communicated, but in fact your 
Rapporteur understands that the Agency's activ-
ities continued unabated as follows : 
1. See reply to the fifteenth annual report adopted on 
let June 1970, Recommendation 213 adopted on 30th 
November 1971 and Written Question 123 put by Mr. 
Vedovato on 13th April 1971. 
2. See reply to Written Question 123 dated 1st June 
1971, reply to Recommendation 213 dated 20th March 
1972, and subsequent letters from the Secretary-General 
of 17th March 1972, 19th Apri11972, 12th March 1973 and 
22nd Aprill974 on the same subject. 
Control measures at depots 
(including central account-
ing offices) 
Control measures at units 
under national command 
Control measures at pro-
duction plants (quantitative 
control measures) 
Control measures at pro-
duction plants (non-pro-
duction control measures) 





35. When communicating the (confidential) 
figures for 1971. the Council reported that the 
Agency had adopted a new system of present-
ing its summary table of inspections and was 
thenceforth counting inspections of several small 
grouped ammunition depots as a single inspec-
tion. An apparent reduction in numbers of 
inspections resulted that in fact reflected no 
reduction in the activities of the Agency. For 
comparison, the Council reported both sets of 
figures (old and new style) for the years 1970 
and 1971. The following table shows the num-
bers of inspections reported (confidentially) for 
the years 1970-74. 
•••• Confidential material deleted from the published 
report. 
36. The Committee continues to regret that the 
Council refuses to publish the detailed figures 
of inspections since 1965, because the unneces-
sary secrecy can only lead the uninitiated to 
suspect that the activities of the Agency have 
been curtailed. From the confidential inform-
ation available to it the Committee is able to 
state that this is not the ease ; the activities of 
Numbers and types of inspection carried 
out lJy the Agency for the Control of Anname1tts 
(Communicated confidentially by the Council) 
1970 11971 11972,1973,1974 
Control measures at depots Old style New style 
Control measures at units under Old style national command New style 
Control measures at production 
plants (quantitative control Old style **** 
measures) New style 
Total quantitative control mea- Old style 
sures New style 
Control measures at production 
plants (non-production control Old style 
measures) New style 
--------
Total control measures (all cate- Old style 82 **** - - -
gories New style **** 72 66 66 71 
•••• Confidential material deleted from the published report. 
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the Agency have continued at broadly uniform 
levels for the last ten years. The apparent fluctua-
tions in the total numbers of inspections is 
due only to the change in accounting methods. 
The Committee is of course aware that these 
figures are administrative and do not give a full 
picture of the Agency's activities, but in the 
absence of fuller information they provide the 
only quantitative indication available. 
The Committee recommends that future 
annual reports state clearly numbers of inspec-
tions carried out, both by category, as was done 
in the years prior to 1966, and by country, so 
as to give a clear picture of the Agency's activ-
ities. 
"No effective production of nuclear and biological 
weapons" statement 
37. For some years annual reports of the Coun-
cil have stated that "the replies received from 
member countries which have not renounced the 
right to produce chemical weapons show that 
no effective production has yet been undertaken 
on the mainland of Europe". (The countries con-
cerned are all member countries except Ger-
many.) No corresponding statement is made in 
respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, 
despite the fact that the provisions of the treaty 
concerning control of these weapons are iden-
tical to those for chemical weapons. In Recom-
mendation 209 the Assembly therefore called on 
the Council to incorporate in annual reports 
similar "no effective production" statements in 
respect of bacteriological and nuclear weapons, 
but in its replies the Council did not agree to 
these proposals. 
CHAPTER IV 
Standing Armaments Committee 
38. The Standing Armaments Committee was 
established by a decision of the Council dated 
7th May 1955. In this framework governmental 
delegates meet: "to encourage ... agreements or 
arrangements on such subjects as the develop-
ment, standardisation, production and procure-
ment of armaments". 
39. As previous annual reports have noted, the 
Council has been engaged since 15th February 
1973 in a comprehensive review of the role of 
the Standing Armaments Committee, on the 
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understanding that there should be no dupli-
cation of the work of other collaborative fora. 
In this connection, the deputy national arma-
ments directors of the member countries met in 
Paris on 29th and 30th January 1974 and duly 
reported to the Council. In its reply to Recom-
mendation 244, dated 13th May 197 4, the Coun-
cil stated: 
"... The Permanent Council devoted several 
meetings to studying the report of the 
deputy national armaments directors. Hav-
ing reached no joint conclusion, they sub-
mitted a summary of their discussions to 
the meeting of the Ministerial Council of 
11th March 1974. The Ministerial Council 
had an exchange of views about the ques-
tion ; no unanimous agreement was reached 
on any concrete proposal and the Ministers 
were therefore only able to request the Per-
manent Council to consider their study on 
the basis of the various proposals which 
had been made. The question is therefore 
still before the Permanent Council." 
40. The annual report states (page 10) that 
"this situation has not altered and the Council 
have not discussed this question in depth for 
several months. Nevertheless, it is still before the 
Council who will bear in mind the possibility 
of reporting to the Assembly as soon as more 
substantive results have been obtained". 
41. The present activities of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee and its working groups relate 
chiefly to study of operational research in mem-
ber countries ·and to a study of new means of 
hindering enemy action. 
42. On 18th February 1975, the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments met the dele-
gates to the Standing Armaments Committee 
together with the Secretary-General of WEU 
and the Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the 
Standing Armaments Committee Secretariat. 
Known as the "Liaison Sub-Committee on the 
Joint Production of Armaments", this joint meet-
ing between the Defence Committee and the 
Standing Armaments Committee was the ninth 
to be held since such meetings were instituted in 
1959. To the regret of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments, out of four questions 
it submitted concerning armaments production 
the Council had agreed to only a single question 
being discussed at the meeting : "What are the 
present activities of the sub-groups and of the 
working groups of the Standing Armaments 
Committee ?" 
43. Nevertheless, the Committee found the occa-
sion a useful opportunity for a frank exchange 
of views with the delegates to the Standing 
Armaments Committee, all of whom represent 
their countries on the various NATO and Euro-
group working groups deali.ng with the pro-
duction of armaments. The Committee expresses 
its thanks to the delegates to the Standing Arma-
ments Committee, to the Secretary-General and 
to the Assistant Secretary-General who attended 
the meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee on 
18th February. 
44. The Committee is aware that active co-opera-
tion between countries on the joint production 
of armaments is chiefly arranged on an ad hoc 
basis as in projects such as the MRCA, Alpha-
Jet and Jaguar aircraft, or the production in 
Europe of United States' equipment such as 
the Hawk and improved Hawk surface-to-air 
missiles. The principal international fora con-
cerned with the joint production of armaments 
are the NATO conference of national armaments 
directors (CNADs), and its Eurogroup counter-
part, Euronad. The Assembly, on the report of 
the Committee, has recommended in the past : 
" ... that full use be made of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee as a co-ordinating and review 
body responsible for detecting and making pro-
posals for eliminating duplication in other inter-
national bodies concerned with the standardisa-
tion and joint production of armaments" 1 • 
45. The Council, in its reply, and in its present 
review of the future activities of the Standing 
Armaments Committee, has borne in mind the 
need to avoid duplication with the work of other 
comparable fora. In this connecti<m, the Com-
mittee draws attention to the proposal made by 
Mr. Van Elslande, the Belgian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, when he addressed the Assembly 
on 5th December 1974. Mr. Van Elslande pro-
posed that WEU should undertake a study of 
the armaments production capabilities existing 
in the member countries, their possible special-
isations and the possible pooling of their research 
activities and finance. It could also study the 
problem of arms exports to non-NATO countries, 
which often hampered agreement on the joint 
production of armaments. In reply to questions, 
Mr. Van Elslande added: 
11 
"... So long as we have national armaments 
factories, we shall have for purely economic 
and technical reasons to combine production 
I. Recommendation 234, adopted on 19th June 1973. 
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with export. I would be very glad if we 
could give up exporting weapons. This is 
something that I believe would be possible 
if we tackled the problem on a European 
scale. What we need to do, inside this 
Alliance of ours, is to create enough economic 
opportunities to be able to limit weapons 
production to meeting our own defence 
requirements. Bearing in mind the areas 
of territory we have to defend, our economic 
potential and the equipment we need, I 
think it must be possible to set up an inte-
grated European armaments industry which 
would serve only our own defence needs. 
When I say 'our own defence', I mean, of 
course, the two pillars of the Atlantic 
Alliance, standing on either side of the 
Atlantic Ocean. 
... I believe I said that if we achieved an 
integrated weapons production I would not 
rule out any exporting of weapons, but that 
first of all this would certainly become mar-
ginal compared to the present-day total of 
exports from the various countries, and that 
secondly this would no longer be to meet 
economic needs but could become an instru-
ment of diplomacy for us, and an instrument 
of our joint policy ... " 
Conclusions 
46. The Committee's chief conclusions are set 
forth in the draft recommendation : 
Preamble 
First paragraph 
47. The Committee expresses satisfaction at the 
action taken by the Secretary-General to imple-
ment part of Recommendation 183 of the Assem-
bly (quoted here in the preamble). See para-
graph 4 of the explanatory memorandum above. 
Second paragraph 
48. This paoo.graph introduces operative para-
graph 6 (see below). 
Fourth paragraph 
49. The Committee's concern at the possible 
repercussions on East-West negotiations, of the 
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shortcomings in rthe application of the arms 
controls provided for in the treaty, is described 
in paragraphs 28 and 29 above. 
Fifth paragraph 
50. Omissions of numbers of inspections are 
referred to in paragraph 32 et seq. 
Sixth paragraph 
51. The scope of the Agency's activities in dif-
ficult circumstances are described in paragraphs 
30 to 37 above. 
Seventh paragraph 
52. A previous recommendation of the Assembly 
concerning the Standing Armaments Committee, 
and Mr. Van Elslande's recent proposal, are 
referred to in paragraphs 44 and 45 above. 
Operative text 
ParagraPh 1 




54. In paragraph 36, the Committee recommends 
that full information concerning numbers of 
inspections be given. 
Paragraphs 3 and 4 
55. The omissions concerned, and the need for a 
clear statement of the situation and the impor-
tance of rthe convention are explained in para-
graphs 23 to 29 above. 
Paragraph 5 
56. Mr. Van Elslande's recent proposal con-
cerning the Standing Armaments Committee is 
mentioned in paragraph 45 above. 
Paragraph 6 
57. Attention is drawn to the inaction of the 
North Atlantic Council in certain matters in 
paragraph 12 above. 
3~f-~ + 
r...(es r 73~)(r~c) 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the European aeronautical induatry and ci11il a11iation 
The Assembly, 
Aware that the recession in air tra.nsport and aircraft construction has compelled governments to 
consider the economic, social and financial problems facing the industries concerned ; 
Also aware that, since they provide subsidies, governments now follow more closely the activities 
of airlines and aircraft industries in order to obtain better returns for their subsidies through more rational 
management of the firms concerned ; 
Considering that the Council's reply to Recommendation 257 that all aspects of European aviation 
continue to receive its fullest attention evades the question and demonstrates its complete inability to take 
the neceBSary political action ; 
Aware of the study undertaken within the Communities on civil aircraft production, to be ready 
by 1st October 1975 ; 
Aware that the scope of Eurocontrol's activities is shrinking, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments : 
I. To call upon European airlines to agree on the characteristics of their future equipment and Euro-
pean manufacturers to co-operate in the manufacture of such equipment ; 
2. To ensure that the study undertaken by the Communities includes a detailed chapter on means of 
allowing effective decision-making machinery to be established in Europe, including a European aviation 
agency after the fashion of the European Space Agency ; 
3. To seek practical ways to help the European aircraft industries to harmonise their concepts and 
methods of work in the civil and military sectors so that they may develop in satisfactory conditions ; 
4. To acknowledge that the weakening of Eurocontrol would be most detrimental to Europe and ensure 




(submitted by MM. Warren and Valleix, Rapporteurs) 
PART I 
State of the European aeronautical industry 
(submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur) 
1. In December 1974 your Rapporteur had 
the honour to present to the Assembly of Western 
European Union a report on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions entitled "State of European aviation 
activities". In the five months which have passed 
since the presentation of that report, which was 
adopted unanimously by the Assembly, there 
has been no action by any member government to 
implement any of the report's recommendations 1 • 
Thus we have an illustration of Western Europe's 
extraordinary inability to take political action, 
which everyone agrees is essential, because the 
issues involve technology and result in a para-
lysis of political action. 
2. Indeed, two major events have occurred in 
Western European aerospace in 1975 which 
clearly illustrate this paralytic process proceed-
ing. Firstly, there is the indigestion which is 
developing in the four nations seeking to select 
a Starfighter replacement as they try to swallow 
the vast American offsets which have become 
more a political than an economic condition of 
the purchase of foreign aireraft. It is incredible 
to witness Europeans proposing to commit them-
selves to a mass production programme for an 
American fighter aircraft larger than that to 
which the Americans have committed themselves 
to date. Without doubt the General Dynamics 
F-16 aircraft is an extremely fine aircraft and 
it appears that it may win the United States 
navy's acceptance as opposed to the Northrop 
F-17. The European solution of purchasing the 
Marcel Dassault F-1E, with or without a mixed 
force of Jaguars, may yet pass the F-16 in the 
selection choice. However, what is really incred-
ible is that Europe should have allowed itself 
to get into a position where there should be any 
doubt whatsoever about its ability to supply 
350 aircraft from its own resources. Such a 
production run would have been more than the 
level required to justify indigenous design and 
production to meet a European specification. But 
I. See Recommendation 257 and the Council's reply 
at Appendix I. 
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the years passed without the essential political 
initiatives being taken. 
3. The second symptom of our problems con-
cerns our continued inability in Western Europe 
to see our aerospace industry as a European 
entity and not as a series of separate national 
aircraft industries. Whereas every nation in 
Western Europe still has the right to make its 
own decisions affecting its industrial policy, one 
would have expected Western Europe to have 
measured the effect on its economy which was 
likely to arise from political action being taken 
within an individual country which could affect 
the security and industrial power base of all of 
us. Whatever one's political beliefs, there can be 
no doubt that the United Kingdom Government's 
proposals on defence cuts should be considered 
in the light of the effect which they will have 
upon Western Europe 1 • 
4. The United Kingdom always has been a very 
substantial contributor to the defence of Western 
Europe. This capability has stemmed from the 
fact that the nation was able to afford to bear 
more than its fair burden of defence costs. It is 
the belief of the present British Government that 
these charges are more than the nation can 
afford at present. Therefore it has decreed that 
there shall be reductions in current programmes 
and future research and development. Europe's 
misfortune is that it now should take into 
account a reduction in the strength of the British 
defence industries and therefore in its capability 
to supply its defence from its own resources. 
5. No one can quantify the effect of the pro-
posed nationalisation of the airframe manufactur-
ing resources of Hawker Siddeley, British Air-
craft Corporation and Scottish Aviation. 
Although the bill has been delayed several months 
in its presentation to the British parli~men~, it 
is the government's plan to carry out this natiOn-
alisation during 1975. 
6. The magnitude of the effect of these twin 
actions on the security of Western Europe can-
1. See Addendum. 
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not be measured. Your Rapporteur would be 
failing in his duty if he did not issue a warning 
that the consequences could be dangerous and 
that he believes Western Europe must make such 
arrangements as it feels necessary to ensure that 
there is a sufficient design and manufacturing 
capability for military aircraft on the mainland 
of Europe. 
7. Britain's aircraft equipment industry still 
remains the ·strongest in Europe and there is no 
proposal, at present, to nationalise that sector 
of the industry nor is it proposed to interfere 
with the substantial helicopter capability of West-
land Limited. 
8. During the discussion in Committee on the 
second of the two major events that have occurred 
in Western European aerospace in 1975, namely 
the British Government's intention to reduce 
its defence expenditure and to nationalise the 
airframe industry, several members believed the 
Rapporteur's wording pointed to an internal 
British dispute which should not be taken up in 
the framework of a European parliamentary 
committee. 
9. While your Rapporteur made some changes 
in the original text, he did not wish to delete 
an important part which to his mind was not 
ideologically antagonistic. 
10. Other members felt that a common attitude 
should be adopted by governments and parlia-
ments in order to help the aeronautical industry 
to overcome its present difficulties. 
11. However, your RaJpporteur would stress that 
many people in the United Kingdom do not 
believe that the effect of the measures taken by 
the United Kingdom Government will be other 
than beneficial. These are certainly matters of 
domestic debate but your Rapporteur's views 
must be recorded as they have a direct influence 
on the European aeronautical structure. 
12. Europe has a remarkable inventiveness and 
genius in the construction of aircraft. But if 
Europe is ever to develop its own foreign policy 
then it has to learn how to maintain and encou-
rage strategic industries such as those required 
for the defence of Western Europe before it can 
assure itself it has the power to make its own 
policy. 
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13. Developments in civil air transport since last 
December have been chiefly marked by further 
substantial increases in air fares. Europe's pas-
sengers continue to remain in the hands of air-
lines which, with the backing of bilateral agree-
ments between governments and the safety net 
of lATA, are virtually free to set any fare 
levels they want to. Air fares on the London-
Paris sector, for instance, have been increased 
by 25 % since last December and it now costs 
each passenger 12.5 pence per mile to be carried 
over this sector. This story of high charges per-
sists throughout Western Europe with the per-
sistent excuse that conditions in Western Europe 
are not as favourable as those available to air-
lines operating the same types of aircraft in the 
United States. The recommendations of the last 
report indicated several clear actions which 
Western European governments could take 
immediately to establish Western Europe as a 
single unified air transport market. One would 
have expected initiatives to be taken promptly 
by our governments to offset the effects of infla-
tion by the simple legislative actions which are 
required to do so. The passenger who also hap-
pens to be the voter has not yet, luckily, appre-
ciated what is being done to him I 
14. Europe's civil air transport manufacturing 
capability is still suffering and regretfully will 
continue to suffer from the slowing down in 
demand for air transport 1 • There are clear indi-
cations however that recovery in this demand is 
appearing on a wide scale throughout the world 
and it could well be that aircraft such as the 
European Airbus will prove, fortuitously, to be 
ideal vehicles for the changed pattern of demand. 
15. This year Europe looks forward to the intro-
duction of Coneorde into passenger service. 
Objections from the other side of the Atlantic 
now seem to be based more on nationalistic than 
realistic grounds. It is worth reflecting that 
the total cost of getting this magnificent aircraft 
into service will be equivalent to that which the 
Americans spent on producing a wooden mock-up 
of their proposed SST before it was cancelled. 
16. European engineers have proved that they 
can meet the most stringent tasks set for them. 
As politicians we still have to match their deter-
mination and their vision. 




(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur) 
(a) Airlines 
17. In its twentieth annual report 1 the Council 
indicated that it had noted questions raised by 
the Assembly concerning European co-operation 
in the field of civil aircraft : the development 
of a European network, the balanced development 
of air and other forms of transport, the harmon-
isation of airworthiness standards and the stan-
dardisation of equipment. Broadly speaking, the 
Council shared the Assembly's preoccupations : it 
stressed the importance of the contribution made 
by the European Civil Aviation Conference to 
co-operation on European air transport ques-
tions ; it underlined the need for development 
of inter-city transport systems ; it agreed that 
a study of the requirements of airline companies 
should be made by the Association of European 
Airlines and praised the work of AECMA ll, 
18. In his speech to the World Affairs Council 
Of San Francisco on 11th November 1974, the 
President of lATA, Mr. Knut Hagrup, who is 
also President of SAS, stated that the airlines 
today are in trouble. A series of difficulties have 
arisen, one of which he caJlled the airlines' "revo-
lution of rising expectations". In the first two 
decades after the second world war demand was 
so great that more and more services were 
established. Some governments were tempted to 
consider that if one airline on a route was a 
good thing, two, four or five were even more 
desirable. Prices were cut and where reductions 
were not considered sufficient charter carriers 
moved in. The downhill road went so far that a 
large percentage of passengers was literally tra-
velling below oost on both scheduled airlines and 
charters. 
"For example, on the North Atlantic, the 
world's heaviest and most competitive route, 
the average yield per economy class pas-
senger dropped inexorably from 3.6 cents 
per passenger kilometre in 1963 to 2.55 cents 
in 1970. More than twenty scheduled airlines 
on the route between them eked out an 
1. Document 661, pages 21 and 22. 
2. See Recommendation 244 and the Council's reply at 
Appendix III. 
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operating profit of only $145 million all 
told for the three years of 1968 through 
1970. And since then, ollil' cumulative losses 
on the route have been almost four times 
as great, or $550 m.illions - $300 million of 
it in this year alone. 
While the established profitability standard 
for the airlines is 12 %, the industry as a 
whole fell short of 5% in 1968 and 1969. 
It slid down to 2 % in 1970 and went to 
minus 1.1 % in 1971. It had clawed its way 
back up to 2.3 % last year when the fuel 
crisis hit. This year, the world-wide operat-
ing loss is forecast to be 3.2 % - the worst 
in history. 
We were not helped by the fact that in the 
days when the going was good, many airlines 
felt that the best answer to rising operating 
costs and threatened saturation of airports 
was a very sizeable quantum jump in indivi-
dual aircraft capacity. The jumbo airplane 
was a seductive one, to the passenger because 
of its wide-bodied comfort, and to the airline, 
because its seat-mile and ton-mile costs, with 
a proper cabin factor, were very good indeed. 
We knew that it would take some time for 
demand to catch up with this new out-pour-
ing of supply, but with the market for travel 
still yeasting under us the risk seemed 
entirely acceptable. 
What we could not foresee, of course, was 
the recession of 1971 and the creeping infla-
tion which accompanied it. We were not 
alone in this, for governments and economists 
were equally unprepared for this unusual 
combination. Anyway, the quantum jump 
was too great for most of us and we ended 
up flying more empty seats than filled ones 
a good deal of the year. 
During 1972 and 1973, many companies 
exerted vigorous effort to rationalise admin-
istration, reduce overheads and cut costs. As 
I have indicated, the industry managed to 
crawl back into the blaek and our world-
wide situation was improving somewhat 
when the energy crisis hit us - and the 
world turned upside down. 
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Our great expansion had been based in large 
part on an almost unlimited supply of 
energy at a moderate cost. Within a very 
short time, however, jet fuel soared from 
13 -cents a gallon to an average of 42 cents, 
with prices as high as 66 and 88 cents a gal-
lon at some points. And there they have 
stayed, to constitute more than a quarter of 
our total operating cost, as against 12 % a 
year ago. 
The impact of the energy crisis on the rest 
of the economy triggered off a further sharp 
inflation, and we now find that personnel 
costs, pushed upward by escalating consumer 
prices, come to as much as 40 % of our 
operating cost. We have managed to get some 
fare increases to compensate for these esca-
lated costs, but they have been leapfrogging 
ahead of us and, at this moment, we 
estimate that we are between $700 and $800 
million behind, on a cumulative basis, on 
fuel alone. Of course, each time we increase 
fares we are cutting out a bit of the market, 
which is being further diminished by rising 
ground costs and diminishing disposable 
consumer incomes. To top it aLl. off, the 
supply of credit has been faHing off and its 
price increasing, so that many of us are 
having severe liquidity problems. 
... While we must obviously slow down the 
buying of new airplanes to expand capacity 
for the next couple of years, we are still 
replacing less economical types with aircraft 
which will be more efficient, more economical 
and more compatible with today's concerns 
for the environment. 
Moreover, the fuel crisis itself has provided 
a new chahlenge which is full of promise 
for the manufacturer. By changing the eco-
nomic parameters of air transport, it has 
opened up whole new vistas of design speci-
fication and opportunity. 
I feel certain as welil that as the rest of the 
economy adjusts, as it must, to the new 
parameters of cost, the markets which sup-
port us will regain their momentum. The 
forecasts by market experts tell us that 
combined lATA passenger traffic will be up 
about 40 % by 1980. It seems high, but I 
hope they are right." 
19. The Association of European Airlines to 
which nineteen European airlines belong is of 
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the same opinion. For two decades the European 
airline carriers had an average annual traffic 
growth of 14.4% on intra-European services. At 
the same time air fares remained basically stable, 
despite general inflation. In the AEA document 
on the generml development of air transport in 
Europe, the Association accounted for roughly 
20 % of world scheduled passenger kilometres 
between 1963 and 1972. 
20. It became clear everywhere that new forms 
of collaboration were essential if European com-
panies wished to stop running at a loss. 
21. At the beginning of April 1975 the Benelux 
Ministers of Transport agreed that the possibility 
of a common aviation policy should be studied. 
The main aim of this study wiH be to strengthen 
the position of the national airlines : KLM, 
Sabena and Luxair. The three governments wish 
to terminate the companies' losses as soon as 
possible, improve the exploitation of the three 
national airlines, avoid unnecessary harmful 
competition, reach a higher productivity and 
start co-ordination and rationalisation of the 
activities of the three companies. 
22. The Ministers wish the market position of 
the three companies to be strengthened in the 
air transport and financial fields, and to 
co-ordinate procurement. Landing rights, old as 
well as new, wHl ailso come within the framework 
of the study and it is hoped that a better social 
climate will be established between the three com-
panies. 
23. The Commission in Brussels will help the 
three countries as w~ll as the three airlines in 
trying to find solutions to their difficulties and 
financial losses. 
24. The fact that KLM belongs to KSSU and 
Sabena to ATLAS will not make it easy for these 
two companies to find a solution to their prob-
lems as KSSU was specially established for the 
supply and maintenance of the DC-10 and 
ATLAS for the Boeing 7 4 7. 
25. Your Rapporteur is aware that there is a 
great difference between the abovementioned 
companies and companies like British Airways, 
Air France, Lufthansa and Alitalia. The latter 
can manage fairly well with passengers from 
their own countries, whereas the former also 
depend on foreign - i.e. American - custom, 
and sometimes for a large percentage. 
26. Since 1954 it has proved too difficult to 
organise anything like an "Air Union". The 
nationa:l carriers are considered national repre-
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sentatives and governments and parliaments 
would be extremely reluctant to forego this sym-
bol of sovereignty. They all want to defend their 
own flag, with taxpayers' money if necessary. 
This being the case, your Rapporteur still thinks 
that a distinction should be drawn between 
European Community countries and other Euro-
pean or American countries as far as airline 
coHaboration is concerned. The Common Market 
should extend to the airlines, the more so as they 
influence the general economy. Your Rapporteur 
will therefore follow the Benelux experiment 
with great interest. 
(b) Community action 
27. On 4th March 1975 the Ministerial Council 
of the European Communities adopted a resolu-
tion on the industria:! policy with regard to air-
craft construction. This resolution provides for 
the various governments to consult each other 
on new programmes if civil aircraft fleets in 
Europe are to be renewed. In addition, member 
States have indicated that they are in favour 
of a structural alignment for aircraft firms in 
the various Community countries. The Commis-
sion is preparing a report on the situation in the 
European aviation industry and will be forward-
ing it to the Council of Ministers before 1st 
October 1975. This will make it possible to pin-
point precisely the measures which are needed 
to develop an industry which is at present passing 
through a world-wide crisis 1 • 
28. On the other hand Article 84, paragra.ph 2, 
of the Treaty of Rome still limits the Commun-
ity's activities in the air transport field. It is not 
likely that the Council of Ministers will take a 
unanimous decision in order to extend the arti~les 
of the treaty to cover maritime and air transport. 
29. One day the governments of the Community 
will have to decide whether they wish to maintain 
a modern aeronautical industry capable of deve-
loping the most advanced civil and military air-
craft. Full economic and industrial capacity can-
not be used if the most important enterprises are 
becoming subcontractors to the American air-
craft industry in an atmosphere of every man 
for himself. 
(c) The American attitude 
30. Welil known are the difficulties now facing 
American international airlines and especially 
I. See Appendix IV. 
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Pan Am. In order to remain in operation Pan 
Am made a financial agreement with Iran and 
was forced to make a route exchange agreement 
with TWA, the latter having been approved 
by the United States Government. It is also 
proposing a similar agreement with American 
Airlines regarding its Caribbean and Pacific 
lines. ' 
31. On the other hand, several authorities are 
expressing the idea that the United States Civil 
Aeronautics Board should stop protecting an 
inefficient industry which is overcharging the 
travelling public. They consider the present Ame-
rican air regulatory structure to be outdated, 
inefficient, uneconomical and irrational and it 
appears that the new Administration led by 
President Ford might be willing to listen to these 
arguments. They hope that if freedom of entry 
is accepted the public will be offered improved 
service and reduced fares. There is no doubt 
that competition would force many companies 
to relinquish some of their regular lines, but it 
is equally doubtful whether present-day markets 
can be maintained. 
32. Aircraft companies such as McDonnell-
Douglas, now in the process of defining market 
needs between 1980 and 1994, are proposing to 
build planes with capacities ranging from 30 to 
70 passengers. 
33. A market study carried out by NASA also 
concluded that a new aircraft with a passenger 
capacity of between 30 and 120 was required. The 
NASA study was also prompted by the fact that 
in Europe the VFW-Fokker 614, Hawker Sid-
deley HS.146 and Dassault Falcon 30 seemed 
good aircraft for medium-density air transport-
ation. Such a plan might also meet a military 
requirement, in which case a common military/ 
civil design could be worked out. 
34. Instead of an annual paBSenger growth rate 
of nearly 15 %, NASA estimated the growth 
rate to be 6 % for the period 197 4-80, 5 % for 
the period 1980-88 and 4 % for the period 
1988-94. 
35. On the other hand a reduction in the number 
of seats on existing aircraft is also being con-
sidered, for instance the Jumbo-Jet 747. The 
spa.ce gained would be used for freight or for 
extra equipment and fuel and would enable the 




36. During the colloquy held on 17th and 18th 
September 1973, the Director-General of Euro-
control, Mr. R. Bulin, discussed the organisation 
and its goals. He expressed the hope that an air 
traffic control organisation covering the whole 
of the upper and lower European air space would 
be established. If this were the case, savings in 
terms of effort and cost could be made. 
37. Since then, however, the authorities in several 
member countries have been considering reverting 
more to nationaJ. systems. Instead of gradually 
transferring air traffic control to Eurocontrol 
in Brussels, they are tending to deal with it on 
a national basis. The Netherlands has developed 
a new radar system called SARP and wants to 
resll!llle control of its air space, with the exception 
of overflying aircraft ; Germany is considering 
taking over the Eurocontrol centre in Kartlsruhe 
when this becomes operational ; France also 
wishes to keep control over nearly all its air 
space for military reasons, and the British 
Government is opposing the joint purchase of 
European control and navigation equipment. 
38. Your Rapporteur hopes that this tendency 
will not be allowed to g·row as it would seriously 
affect the Europeanisation of aviation. 
39. In 1983 the Eurocontrol convention will have 
to be reconsidered and the member countries 
might well take this opportunity either to streng-
then or to weaken the organisation. It is therefore 
important for this issue to be discussed in time. 
Conclusions 
40. In Recommendation 257 on the state of Euro-
pean aviation activities 1 certain measures were 
suggested for improving the European situation 
in aviation matters such as the aviation industry, 
the relationship with the United States and the 
export of aviation products, but the Council was 
unable to give a documented reply. 
41. The situation is still serious. In 1974 only 
two of the fifty-one aircraft sold in the civil 
European market were of European origin 2 • The 
very existence of the industry would have been 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974, 
see Appendix I. 
2. See Appendix II. 
322 
in jeopardy had military production not been 
considerable. Military production may well have 
to be cut back since Europe has been unable to 
produce the aircraft of which some 350 are needed 
for its own defence and this will certainly influ-
ence foreign military buyers. 
42. How often must it be said that Europe needs 
a European agency for armaments procurement ? 
If one is not set up, deterioration within the 
industry might lead to increased competition 
between European firms and consequently nullify 
all efforts made in the organisation of the civil 
aircraft market. 
43. The present situation is that governments are 
urging aircraft industries to collaborate in the 
civil sector and compete in the military sector 
with the result that production runs are too short 
and Europe is in a weak position vis-a-vis its 
American competitors. 
44. The three main European companies - Air 
France, Lufthansa and British Airways - have 
agreed to consider the types of aircraft they 
would need within five to ten years. 
45. When a common procurement policy is dis-
cussed, it is important to discuss a common avia-
tion policy at the same time. The six major 
industriaJ European aircraft industries which are 
also discussing future procurement policy should 
meet the airlines in order to agree on a common 
programme. 
46. There is no doubt that European industry 
cannot compete with Boeing and McDonnell-
Douglas if no permanent European industrial 
groupings have been established. 
4 7. As indicated in the report, the American 
Government has asked NASA to make studies of 
a small commercial aireraft. This could be a 
serious competitor to existing small European 
aircraft, especially if the military as well as 
airlines and other civilian users order the NASA-
developed aircraft. 
48. It has often been stated that a European 
aircraft industry cannot be established without 
a European Government. Nevertheless, an orga-
nisation could be established if the European 
decision-making machinery began to function. 
The real problem is that neither in the Com-
munities nor in any other European framework 
is decision-making efficient. 
49. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that 
the construction of the Airbus was an important 
step in the right direction and the European 
Civil Aviation Conference is gaining in impor-
tance which shows that there are still possibilities 
if the political will is present. A difficulty of 
course remains that the civil and military aspects 
of the aircraft industry are inextricably linked 
but governments fail to afford the industry full 
encouragement by not agreeing on joint procure-
ment in the absence of a common defence policy. 
50. In the European Space Agency machinery 
has now been set up which, although slow, may 
prove itself able to take decisions. Why should it 
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not be possible to establish a European aviation 
agency or a European agency for armaments 
procurement ? Such agencies could assist the 
European aeronautical industry to achieve unity. 
51. The deterioration of the European political 
situation can be clearly deduced from the process 
which is weakening Eurocontrol. Here is a tech-
nical agency which can control European air 
space more efficiently and at iess cost but its 
position is nevertheless being weakened and 
national agencies wish to take over the work 
which this organisation is doing so well. 
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APPENDIX I 
RECOMMENDATION 257 1 
on the state of European auiation activttia 1 
The Assembly, 
Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and 
hence for the aviation industry ; 
Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced 
technology ; 
Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Invite the member countries to : 
1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ; 
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equip-
ment capability of European aviation companies ; 
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ; 
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories 
so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be 
retained in Europe ; 
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import 
of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such 
agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to 
protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ; 
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations 
and aircraft sales ; 
7. Establish a. strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, 
financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales . 
... 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 8 
to Recommendation 261 
The Council refer to their earlier replies to Recommendation 244 on an aviation policy for Europe, 
and to Written Question 151. 
The views expressed in Recommendation 257 have been brought to the notice of member govern-
ments. The Council can assure the Assembly that all aspects of the important problem about which it 
is concerned continue to receive their fullest attention. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1974 during the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary 
Session (lOth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on 
Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 658). 




New European and American equipment 
purchased by European airlines 1 
(Orders placed between 1st January 1969 and 31st December 1914) 
APPENDIX II 
The following tables show year by year the type of equipment and numbers of new commercial 
aircraft ordered from manufacturers by European airlines or leasing firms acting on behalf of the airlines 
with a breakdown by European country or group of countries. 
To determine the value of the respective shares of the market held by European and United States 
manufacturers, the scale of average unit prices without replacements calculated for each year in the light 
of the various versions ordered has been applied. The figures obtained, which have been cross-checked 
with American aircraft export statistics per country and year, do not give an exact picture of order books, 
but nevertheless allow a reasonably accurate comparison to be made. 
Graph I illustrates the comparative trend of total and American orders expressed in current dollars 
and graph II gives the percentage trend of European and United States shares in the European market. 
For 1974, the European manufacturers' share fell to less than I% if account is taken of the value 
of new equipment ordered by regular and occasional European carriers. 
It should be noted that sales of new aircraft to regional airlines have not been included in these 
calculations, since although they have increased recently (Corvette) they are still very slight in absolute 
value. In general, these carriers have so far used only second-hand equipment. 
Notes on the tables 
1. Since Luxembourg ordered no new equipment, Benelux means here only Belgium and the Netherlands 
2. When an order is reduced or cancelled subsequently, this is taken into account in the column for 
the year corresponding to the signing of the initial contract. 
1. Sour~: Aerospatiale, Suresnes, 7th January 1975. 
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Table I 
Recapitulation of orders by type of aircraft 







Caravella 9 23 22 18 5 12 10 20 7 10 18 4 5 - - - 163 
Nord 262 - - - - 4 - - 2 6 - 1 1 - - - - 14 
A300-B - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 3 1 - 10 
Mercure - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - 10 
Concorde - - - - - - - - - - - - - 9 - - 9 
F-27 - 2 2 2 5 2 5 7 37 4 2 5 2 - - - 75 
F-28 - - - - - - - - 7 3 6 3 8 - - - 27 
Comet 4 3 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12 
Herald - 9 - - 4 4 1 - - - - - - - - - 18 
AW-650 - 3 - - - 5 - - - - - - - - - - 8 
Trident 24 - - - - - 15 - 5 26 - - - - - - 70 
HS-748 5 - - - - - 4 2 - 1 1 1 1 - 2 2 19 
Super VC-10 - 17 2 - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - 21 
Viscount - 6 - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 





Total 41 69 36 21 22 24 44 36 86 67 34 17 24 22 3 2 548 
American aircraft 
B-707 3 13 6 5 1 19 4 9 6 7 6 1 - - 3 - 83 
B-727 - - 12 - - 1 8 22 6 7 8 6 14 24 13 10 131 
B-737 - - - - - - 25 3 7 13 3 - 2 2 14 11 80 
B-747 - - - - - - - 17 13 8 9 6 4 4 5 7 73 
DC-8 9 2 4 6 5 6 18 20 6 3 7 1 1 - - - 88 
DC-9 - - - - - 10 48 48 22 24 12 10 20 3 42 11 250 
DC-10 - - - - - - - - - - 14 14 2 16 8 4 58 
L-1011 - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 7 3 6 18 











GRAND TOTAL 61 84 58 32 28 60 147 155 146 129 93 55 69 78 91 51 1337 
Table II 
European aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country 








France - 11 7 - - 2 3 7 4 2 2 1 5 - - - 44 
FRG - - - - - - 1 2 - 1 1 - - - - - 5 
Italy 4 4 6 2 2 - 1 - - - - - - - - - 19 
Benelux 4 2 2 - - 2 - - - 2 1 - - - - - 13 
Switzerland - - 4 - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 5 
Spain fPortugal - 4 2 5 - 2 1 8 - - 5 - - - - - 27 
Austria - - - 2 1 1 1 - - - - - - - - - 5 
Scandinavia 1 1 1 - 2 5 1 2 2 4 7 3 - - - - 29 
Finland - 1 - 6 - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 9 




Total Caravelle 9 23 22 18 5 12 10 20 7 10 18 4 5 - - - 163 
N-262 
France - - - - 4 - - - 2 - - - - - - - 6 
FRG - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2 
Italy - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 2 
Scandinavia 
- - - -
- - - -







Total N.262 - - - - 4 - - 2 6 - 1 1 - - - - 14 
A300-B 
France - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - 6 
FRG - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - 3 






Total A300-B - - ~ - - - - - - - - - 6 3 1 - 10 
Mercure 
France - - - - - - - - - - - - - 10 - - 10 
Gonoorde 
France - - - - - - - -
Britain - - - - - - - -
------
---- ------
Total Concorde - - - - - - - -
Fokker F-27 
France - - - - - - - -
FRG - 1 - 1 1 - - -
Italy - - - - 3 - 3 3 
Benelux - - 1 - - - - 2 
Switzerland - - - - - 1 - 2 
Spain /Portugal - - - - - - - -
Sca.ndina. via. - 1 1 1 1 - 1 -






Total F-27 - 2 2 2 5 2 5 7 
Foklcer F-28 
~ 
~ FRG - - - - - - - -
Italy - - - - - - - -
Spain 
- -
- - - - - -
Sca.ndina. via. - - - - - - - -
------------
-----
Total F-28 - - - - - - - -
Comet 4 
Britain 1 7 - - - - - -
Greece 2 2 - - - - - -
------------
----
Total Comet 4 3 9 - - - - - -
Herald 
FRG - - - - - 1 1 -
Britain - 7 - - - 2 - -
Italy - 2 - - - 1 - -
Switzerland - - - - 4 - - -
------------
----
Total Herald - 9 - - 4 4 1 -
- - - -
- - - -
--------
- - - -
24 - 2 3 
- - - -
3 2 - -
- 1 - -
1 - - -
8 - - -
- 1 - 2 
1 - - -
------
--
37 4 2 5 
2 1 3 2 
- 2 - 1 
- - 3 -





7 3 6 3 
- - - -
- - - -
--------
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
--------





































































































European aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country (continued) 






Britain 24 - - - - - I5 - 5 26 - - - - - - 70 
HS-748 
France - - - - - - - - - - I I - - I - 3 
FRG - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - I 
Britain 5 - - - - - 4 2 - - - - - - - 2 I3 






Total HS-748 5 - - - - - 4 2 - I I I - I 2 2 I9 
BAG V0-10 
Britain - I7 2 - - - I I - - - - - - - - 2I 
Viscount 
FRG - - - I - - - - - - - - - - - - I 





- 6 - I - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 
BA0-111 
FRG 
- - - -
- I - - - I 2 3 2 - - - 9 
Britain flreland - - IO - 4 - 8 4 24 I6 4 - - - - - 70 




Total BAC-UI - - IO - 4 I 8 4 24 23 6 3 2 - - - 85 
Table III 
American aircraft : Breakdown of orders by European country 





France - 3 4 2 - 2 - 2 2 - - - - - - - I5 
FRG - 8 2 - - IO I 3 - - - I - - - - 25 
Britain flreland 3 - - 3 I 4 I 4 - 2 4 - - - - - 22 
Benelux - 2 - - - I 2 - I 3 - - - - - - 9 
Portugal - - - - - 2 - - I - 2 - - - - - 5 
Greece - - - - - - - - 2 2 - - - - - - 4 
Romania - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - 3 
------------------
--------------
Total B-707 /720 3 I3 6 5 I I9 4 9 6 7 6 I - - 3 - 83 
B-727 
France - - - - - - - 4 5 I 6 4 - - - - 20 
FRG - - I2 - - I 8 6 - - 2 2 I 5 II - 48 
Benelux - - - - - - - 4 I - - - - - - - 5 
Spain /Portugal - - - - - - - 6 - - - - I3 I6 - 4 39 
Scandinavia - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 3 - - 5 
Greece - - - - - - - - - 6 - - - - - - 6 




Total B-727 - - I2 - - I 8 22 6 7 8 6 I4 24 I3 IO I3I 
B-737 
FRG - - - - - - 2I - 3 6 - - - - - - 30 
Britain - - - - - - 2 3 I 7 3 - - 2 3 4 25 
Benelux - - - - - - - - - - - - - - II 7 I8 







Total B-737 - - - - - - 25 3 7 I3 3 - 2 2 I4 II 80 
Table III 
American aircraft: Breakdown of orders by European country (continued) 






France - - - - - - - 4 - - 4 - 3 3 1 1 16 
FRO - - - - - - - 3 - - 2 2 1 - - - 8 
Britain flreland - - - - - - - 6 2 6 - - - 1 2 2 19 
Italy 
- -
- - - - -
4 - - - 1 - - - - 5 
Benelux - - - - - - - - 3 2 3 1 - - - 2 11 
Switzerland - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2 
Spain fPortugal - - - - - - - - 3 - - 2 - - 1 2 8 
Scandinavia - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - 2 





Total B-747 - - - - - - - 17 13 8 9 6 4 4 5 7 73 
D0-8 
France - - - - - - 3 3 - 1 - - - - - - 7 
FRO - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 - - - - - 3 
Italy 2 2 2 3 - 2 4 2 2 - 2 1 - - - - 22 
Benelux 4 - 1 - 3 - 3 3 - 1 - - - - - - 15 
Switzerland - - 1 - - - 1 4 2 - - - - - - - 8 
Spain 3 - - 3 - - 1 4 - - 3 - - - - - 14 





Total DC-8 9 2 4 6 5 6 18 20 6 3 7 1 1 - - - 88 
D0-9 
FRO - - - - - - - 2 - - 1 1 - - - - 4 
Italy - - - - - - 28 - 12 3 6 - - - - 3 52 
Benelux - - - - - - 6 11 5 1 3 - - - - - 26 
Switzerland 
- - - - -
10 2 3 3 6 2 - - - 10 - 36 
Spain - - - - - - 12 12 - - - - 11 - 8 2 45 
Austria 
- - -
- - - - - - -
- -
9 - 2 - 11 
Scandinavia - - - - - - - 20 2 I4 - - - - I6 - 52 
Finland - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 6 6 
Yugoslavia 
- - -
- - - - -




Total DC-9 - - - - - IO 48 48 22 24 I2 IO 20 3 42 11 250 
D0-10 
France - - - - - - - - - - 2 2 - I - I 6 
FRG - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - 5 - - 9 
Britain - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 I - 3 
Italy - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - 4 - 8 
Benelux 
- - - - -
- - - - -
6 2 - I - 3 I2 
Switzerland - - - - - - - - - - 6 - - I I - 8 
Spain 
- - - -
- - - - - - - -
- 3 2 - 5 
Scandinavia - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 3 - - 5 





Total DC-IO - - - - - - - - - - I4 I4 2 I6 8 4 58 
L-1011 
FRG - - - - - - - - - - - - - I - - I 
Britain 
- - -
- - - - -
- - - -







- - - - - - - -
- 2 7 3 6 IS 
Convair 990 












I. Trend of annual orders in Europe (in millions of current dollart~) 
Proportion of American aircraft and total amount of orders 
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II. Trend of the percentage breakdown of sales of European and American aircraft to European airlines 
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APPENDIX III 
RECOMMENDATION 244 1 
on guidelines for an aviation policy for Europe 
drawn from the colloquy on 11th and 18th September 1913 11 
The Assembly, 
Believing, in agreement with the governments of several member countries, that early political deci-
sions should be taken setting out essential guidelines for ensuring the future of the aeronautical industry 
in Europe; 
Considering that Europe's strength and prosperity can be preserved and increased only if it masters 
advanced technology, particularly in the aeronautical field, and at the same time ensures the best conditions 
of employment for highly -qualified manpower at all levels ; 
Considering that, notwithstanding the rapid rate of growth of its economy over the past twenty-five 
years, Europe has not achieved the full technological potential of its population ; 
Considering that in the civil European market the number of passengers is expected to increase 
sharply during the years to come ; 
Considering also the size of the European military market which, in the period 1968-80, can be esti-
mated as representing some $35.4 billion including more than 2,000 aircraft 
Aware of the interdependence of the civil and military markets; 
Aware also of the need for harmonisation and standardisation in the technological field, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Invite the member governments : 
1. To agree that civil programmes will be the subject of prior concertation between the member govern-
ments and that State assistance should be granted only to projects meeting the interests of the aeronautical 
industry in Europe as a whole ; 
2. (a) To speed up decision-making processes by establishing close and continuing colla.boration be-
tween all European governmental air transport agencies and thereby also contributing to the formulation of 
coherent decisions ; and 
(b) To have, as a goal, the creation of a European Aviation Agency; 
3. To agree, as a long-term project, to reshape the existing European air network and improve its effi-
ciency by inviting the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Association of European Airlines to 
afford their assistance ; 
4. (a) To conclude new aviation agreements with a view to encouraging the development of regional 
or provincial inter-city links which in itself is an essential element of European regional policy ; 
(b) To consider financial incentives to accelerate the introduction of such links; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd November 1973 during the Second Part of the Nineteenth Ordinary Seasion 
(13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 618). 
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5. To instruct their Ministers of Aviation and of Transport to review with the airlines and aircraft 
companies on the one hand, and the railways and transport organisations on the other hand, the correct 
balance between civil aviation and land and sea transport, bearing in mind the energy crisis in the short 
term, and the rising cost of energy in the middle and long term and the need to provide transport systems 
which are economical and attractive to mass markets ; 
6. To take the necessary action to define aircraft and other aeronautical equipment requirements in 
the light of the prospects of developing the abovementioned intra-European net•vr-rks and extra-European 
international lines, in liaison, inter alia, with European airlines or any groups they have formed ; 
7. (a) To speed up current work by national bodies responsible for airworthiness - in close co-operation 
with the appropriate committee of the European Association of Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers -
with a view to eliminating differences concerning rules relating to airworthiness certificates ; 
(b) To instruct these bodies to prepare the creation of a European agency specialised in certification 
of airworthiness ; 
8. To ask national and European standardisation committees to speed up work on the standardisation of 
aeronautical equipment in close co-operation with the standardisation Committee of the European Asso-
ciation of Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers ; 
9. To endeavour to draw up a European policy for the procurement of military aircraft with a view to 
reducing costs and, to this end, to ask the Standing Armaments Committee for assistance ; 
10. To define a common policy for the expansion of the aeronautical industry enabling it to compete 
equitably through the adoption of appropriate measures of compensation producing parity in world com-
petition, it being understood that the purpose of such a policy is not to be antagonistic but to safeguard 
the European aeronautical industry ; 
11. To encourage collaboration between the Community and the European Civil Aviation Conference. 
** 
* 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 244 
The Council agree that a major contribution to the future prosperity of Europe lies in the develop-
ment of her advanced technology and exploitation of this capability on a greater scale than that achieved 
in the past. The importance of the aeronautical industry has long been recognised by Ministers and in 
the past year, the countries of Europe, both at industry and government level, have been engaged in 
wide-ranging discussions on the industry's future. Much of this effort has taken place within the 
framework of the European Economic Community. Although the efforts in the Community have been 
concentrated on the civil side of the industry, the importance of the military sector has been 
recognised in the context of an overall aeronautical industry policy. 
1. Paragraph 2 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 231 referred to a communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities on the European airframe industry. This proposal for Community 
policy on industrial and technological development in the aeronautical sector has been examined in detail 
since that reply. The first of the implementing texts of the policy proposals provides for a mutual exchange 
of information between member States to allow aircraft industry policy to be co-ordinated, with particular 
reference to civil aircraft programmes and the structure of the industry, and recognises the principle of 
concertation of policies of the member States. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th May 1974. 
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Groups of experts have discussed the different facets of government assistance for civil projects 
with the aim of reaching agreement on the harmonisation of existing methods of support. The Council 
consider that government support should be channelled towards those projects which would strengthen 
the competitive position of European industry. Such projects should by definition therefore be researched 
thoroughly from the market point of view, and be economically viable affording good prospects of a reason-
able rate of return to the governments on their investments. 
2. (a) The European Civil Aviation Conference provides a forum in which national air transport 
agencies already collaborate on a wide range of air transport questions. The organisation operates with 
a considerable degree of flexibility and in recent years, significant progress has been made in achieving 
a common approach, while taking into account the differing circumstances of the air transport industries 
of member countries. 
(b) The Council appreciate that there are some functions currently exercised by governments and 
their agencies which in the long term (assuming a commonality of policy objectives) might usefully be 
put in the control of a single agency. There would, however, be considerable difficulty in setting up an 
organisation which would carry out any substantial part of existing governmental functions, other than 
within a completely integrated European legal framework. Amongst the functions which do lend 
themselves to closer integration are the regulation of air safety and air traffic control. The Eurocontrol 
Organisation already exercises responsibilities in these areas and the Council, while not ruling out the 
eventual integration of other functions in a separate organisation, recognise the importance of building 
on the foundations provided by Eurocontrol in its own sphere of activity. 
3. The present European air network has grown over the years within a system of bilateral arrangements 
between governments. Within this system, airlines have been free to arrange their services in accordance 
with their judgment of potential traffic opportunities. It is however in no way a rigid framework, and 
large numbers of services are operated by mutual agreement on routes which are not covered by any formal 
agreement. The replacement of point-to-point operations by multisector services, while possibly attractive 
on fuel and resource grounds, would inevitably involve longer journey times and the greater risk of 
delays and inconvenience to passengers on longer routes. 
4. (a) A feature of recent years has been the growth of international operations serving provincial 
points, a trend which has reflected the increasing number of commercial contacts throughout the 
Community. The Council welcome this development in furthering European economic co-operation 
particularly where such services are firmly based on the needs of the market. 
(b) While a number of States at present give subsidies to domestic air services to outlying regions 
which are particularly dependent on air transport, it is not usual for financial incentives to be given by 
governments in respect of international services between provincial points. Such action might well be 
discriminatory and thus contrary to the country's international obligations. While the significance of the 
economic infrastructure, including transport, in the context of regional development is recognised, any 
specific link between the provision of air services and regional development has yet to be established. 
The possible contribution of such a policy towards European regional development would therefore 
require further examination. 
5. In 1971 a meeting of nine European Ministers of Transport, including those from most WEU 
countries, endorsed a proposal that an OECD study of the future development of inter-city transport 
systems within Europe should be carried out in liaison with the EEC and the European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport (ECMT). This project, known as COST (Go-operation europeenne dans le domaine 
de la recherche scientifique et technique) project 33, has been in progress since 1971 under terms of reference 
which are very similar to those suggested in the recommendation. The governments concerned, together 
with many transport firms and organisations, are providing a great deal of information for use in the 
project, which should be completed in 1976. The Council are convinced of the value of COST 33 and believe 
it necessary to await its findings before instituting further studies. In this way the experience gained and 
the conclusions reached will be of value in future work. 
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6. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) is to undertake a study this year of airline require-
ments. The Council consider that this organisation with its wide European membership is the most 
appropriate body to undertake such a study. When requirements are known it is for the aircraft industry 
in consultation with the users to formulate precise project proposals. The Council recognise the importance 
of developing aeronautical equipment on an international basis and note the effective work carried out 
by EUROCAE (European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment) in its area of responsibility, in 
collaboration with its United States counterpart. 
7. (a) Member countries recognise the great importance of eliminating differences in national rules 
relating to airworthiness. The Council note the considerable work programme under the auspices of the 
Joint Airworthiness Requirements Committee of the manufacturing countries and that progress is 
thought to be satisfactory. 
(b) The Council approve the principle of a European Agency specialising in certification and 
airworthiness, and believe that as soon as the national bodies can report that they have reached a degree 
of commonality which would enable a central agency to be set up with the prospect of operating 
successfully, the necessary action should be taken by governments. The immediate creation of an agency, 
before agreement that this stage has been reached, might slow up current negotiations, and the Council 
therefore accept thi:i as a medium-term goal. 
8. The Council recognise the great benefit to the aircraft manufacturing industry resulting from the 
work undertaken by the Standardisation Committee of AECMA (Association Europeenne des Oonstruc-
teurs de Materiel AerospatiaJ.) and therefore welcome the agreement reached between AECMA and the 
Oomite Europeen de N orrruilisation (CEN) which will rationalise the formulation of European aerospace 
standards. The Council agree with the Assembly that this work should be expanded where possible. 
9. The Council accept that, because of the escalating costs of research, development and production 
and the continuing and increasing pressure on national defence budgets, it will be both desirable and 
necessary for there to be an even greater degree of collaboration in the military aircraft field than 
hitherto ; and the Council therefore see the eventual formulation of a European military aircraft procurement 
policy as a desirable goal. Substantial work is already being done to further European co-operation in 
defence equipment procurement. 
The Ministers of the member countries of Eurogroup announced, after their meeting on 6th December 
1973, that they had directed that special effort be made by their national armaments directors to identify 
project areas offering the greatest prospects for collaboration so that Ministers could give appropriate 
and early instructions ; the project areas to be examined include military aircraft. 
The question of an approach to the Standing Armaments Committee in this field is related to the 
current study of proposals for reactivating this body. In this connection, the Council organised a meeting 
of deputy national armaments directors, held on 29th and 30th January 1974, to review, as a first step, 
the current collaborative arrangements between European allies and to submit to the Council their 
conclusions and recommendations on fields of activity and projects of European interest which could be 
given to the Standing Armaments Committee on the understanding that there should be no duplication 
of the work of other collaborative fora. The terms of reference stated that, on the basis of this report, the 
Council would give the national armaments directors the necessary directives for continuing this work. 
The Permanent Council devoted several meetings to studying the report of the deputy national armaments 
directors. Having reached no joint conclusion, they submitted a summary of their discussions to the 
meeting of the Ministerial Council on lith March 1974. The Ministerial Council had an exchange of views 
about the question ; no unanimous agreement was reached on any concrete proposal and the Ministers 
were therefore only able to request the Permanent Council to continue their study on the basis of the 
various proposals which had been made. The question is therefore still before the Permanent Council. 
The Council consider that these collaborative fora, together with the numerous bilateral and trilateral 
arrangements which exist, provide ample means of identifying further collaborative projects and see the 
existence of these bodies as a step on the road towards a European system of defence equipment 
procurement consistent with the aim of European construction. 
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10. The Council accept the aim of a. European aeronautical industry which is economically viable and 
competitive on world markets and believe that any policy of support for the industry should be considered 
against these objectives. The Council consider that the size of the industry must be matched to the 
markets it is able to secure. 
11. The Council recognise both the importance of the contribution which the European Civil Aviation 
Conference (ECAC) makes to co-operation on European air transport questions and the fact that the EEC 
will have an increasingly important r6le in the wider transport field. At present, however, Community 
action in the field of air transport is limited by Article 84 (2) of the Treaty of Rome. Under this article 
the extension of the treaty's transport provisions to sea and air transport needs a unanimous decision of 
the EEC Council of Ministers. Scope for collaboration between ECAC and the Community will necessarily 
be limited until such a decision is taken. Meanwhile the Council hope that co-operation between European 
countries on air transport questions, both in and outside the EEC, will continue under the auspices of 
such organisations as ECAC and its airline counterpart, the Association of European Airlines (AEA). 
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APPENDIX IV 
The European aircraft industry 1 
Despite the fact that the number of aircraft in service and on order throughout the world continues 
to increase, the European aircraft industry's share of the market in civil aircraft is declining steadily. In 
the face of direct competition from the American aircraft industry, its share of the world market has dropped 
to less than 5% for long-haul and less than 10% for short- and medium-haul aircraft. 
An exact picture of the situation of fleets is afforded by the number of aircraft in service and on 
order at a given date. The change in position between June 1973 and May 1974 is shown below. 
Number of aircraft Value (Mio EUR) 
1973 % 1974 % 1973 % 1974 % 
Long-haul (US) 1624 35.5 17ll 35.2 13 447.7 49.5 17 543.5 51.9 
Long-haul (European) 63 1.4 66 1.3 465.6 1.6 513.7 1.5 
Short- and medium-haul (US) 2 315 50.6 2482 5l.l II 930.3 43.9 14 258.8 42.2 
Short- and medium-haul 
(European) 572 12.5 602 12.4 1343.6 4.9 1466.5 4.4 
4574 100.0 4861 100.0 27187.2 100.0 33 782.5 100.0 
1 EUR = US $ 1.2 
The value distribution of fleets varied a great deal between 1970 and 1974: there was a 15.9% 
decline in the relative value of the United States fleet, a 4.7% increase in the relative value of the European 
fleet and an 11.2% increase in the relative value of the "rest of the world" fleet. 
The world market was shared as follows in 1970 and 1974: 
% 
Market size Market share of aircraft from 
EEC United States 
1970 1974 Change 1970 1974 Change 1970 1974 Change 
EEC 14.7 17.9 + 3.2 33.0 20.2 -12.8 67.0 79.8 + 12.6 
Other 
European 
countries 6.3 7.8 + 1.5 23.1 6.7 -16.4 76.9 93.3 + 16.4 
Europe (21.0) (25.7) (+ 4.7) 30.1 16.1 -14.0 69.9 83.9 + 14.0 
United 
States 63.9 48.0 -15.9 2.1 - - 2.1 97.9 100.0 + 2.1 
Rest of the 
world 15.1 26.3 + 11.2 12.2 6.3 - 5.9 87.8 93.7 + 5.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 9.5 5.9 - 3.6 90.5 94.1 + 3.6 
1. Source: Industry and Society, No. 14/75, 8th April 1975. 
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The opinion expressed at the end of 1973 still holds good in the spring of 1975. It was felt then that, 
since the situation had continued to deteriorate, the logical consequence of the endeavours of the European 
aircraft industry and of the governments of member States to offer a range of new civil aircraft must be 
to respond to the competition by exploiting the large relative importance on the world scale of the value 
of the European market. It is not enough to say that the size of the European market warrants the existence 
of a European aircraft industry ; it is necessary for the industry to take advantage of the size of the market. 
This is true not only in the short term but also in the long term : with the stabilisation of European 
percentage demand, the increase in percentage demand by the rest of the world and the fall in United States 
percentage demand, the negative trade balance on new civil aircraft from the Community will tend to 
increase in the next decade. 
For long-haul aircraft, the disproportion between the size of the European market (28.8% of the 
world's long-haul fleet) and the European aircraft industry's share of the world market (2.8% for long-
haul aircraft) is astounding. 
The following table shows the situation for long-haul aircraft : 
% 
Market size Market share of aircraft from 
EEC United States 
1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 
EEC 22.0 21.3 10.1 8.8 89.9 91.2 
Other European countries 8.0 7.5 - - 100.0 100.0 
Europe (30.0) (28.8) 7.4 6.6 92.6 93.4 
United States 44.4 39.0 - - - -
Rest of the world 25.6 32.2 4.3 2.9 95.7 97.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 3.3 2.8 96.7 97.2 
The situation is equally alarming for short- and medium-haul aircraft : 
% 
Market size Market share of aircraft from 
EEC United States 
1973 1974 1973 1974 1973 1974 
EEC 14.3 14.0 47.4 40.0 52.6 60.0 
Other European countries 8.1 8.1 14.0 13.9 86.0 86.1 
Europe (22.4) (22.1) 35.3 30.4 64.7 69.6 
United States 62.1 58.4 0.1 0.1 99.9 99.9 
Rest of the world 15.5 19.5 13.4 12.7 86.6 87.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 10.1 9.3 89.9 90.7 
342 
APPENDIX IV DOCUMENT 674 
The military aircraft market has hit the headlines recently. The two tables below show the position 
of the European fleet and the fleets of the main regions of the world on 31st December 1972: 
European.designed aircraft American-designed aircraft 
Total 
Value % Value % 
(Mio EUR) 
(Mio EUR) (Mio EUR) 
Belgium 154.9 33.6 305.8 66.4 460.7 
Denmark 49.2 32.9 100.5 67.1 149.7 
France 1 661.3 93.1 122.2 6.9 1 783.5 
Germany 1347.6 29.3 2 077.4 60.7 3 425.0 
Ireland 1.4 100.0 - - 1.4 
Italy 690.0 63.0 405.2 37.0 1 095.2 
Netherlands 87.2 23.6 282.3 76.4 369.5 
United Kingdom 1 680.5 69.4 740.1 30.6 2 420.6 
EEC 5 672.1 58.5 4033.5 41.5 9 705.6 
European-designed aircraft 
Number of aircraft Value % of total European (Mio EUR) aircraft 
United States 26 108.3 3.7 
Canada 5 4.6 0.2 
Latin America 480 170.4 5.9 
Europe other than EEC 2 868 1445.6 49.8 
Middle East and North Mrica 979 482.8 16.6 
Mrica south of Sahara 322 75.9 2.6 
South Mrica, Rhodesia 484 351.6 12.1 
Asia 822 161.4 5.6 
Australia 207 83.3 2.9 
Oceania 48 18.7 0.6 
Total 6211 2 902.6 100.0 
The Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the European Commission, has decided that there is 
to be concerted action and consultation between the member States of the Community on industrial policy 
in the aircraft industry (see I and S No. 11 f75). The launching of construction programmes by undertakings 
obviously depends on public funds. Member States must therefore co-ordinate their national policies to 
avoid unnecessary duplication, improve the choice of programmes and find the best means of ensuring 
their realisation. 
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State of the European aeronautical industry 
(svbmitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur) 
29th May 1975 
At the seventh sitting of the Assembly on Thursday, 29th May 1975, Mr. Brown and Mr. Carter 
proposed amending the explanatory memorandum from the end of paragraph 3 to paragraph 7 inclusive 
as shown below. The Rapporteur agreed to add the proposed text as an addendum to his report. 
3 .... Whatever one's political beliefs, there can be no doubt that the United Kingdom's defence 
cuts should be considered in the light of the effect which they will have upon Western Europe. 
4. The United Kingdom always has been a very substantial contributor to the defence of Western 
Europe. This capability has stemmed from the fact that the nation was called upon to bear more 
than its fair burden of defence costs. It is the belief of the present British Government that these 
charges are more than the nation can afford at present. Therefore it has decreed that there shall 
be reductions in current programmes and future research and development. [Text deleted] 
5. [Text deleted] 
6. [Text deleted] Your Rapporteur would be failing in his duty if he did not issue a warning that 
the consequences could be dangerous and that he believes Western Europe must make such arrange-
ments as it feels necessary to ensure that there is a sufficient design and manufacturing capability 
for military aircraft on the mainland of Europe. 
7. [Text deleted] 
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